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ABSTRACT

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Environmental Journalists: How They Perceived A New Journalistic Role" (Jaeyung Park and Robert A. Logan); and "Manufacturing Consent of 'Crisis': A Content Analysis of the 'New York Times' Reporting on the Issue of North Korean Nuclear Weapon" (Oh-Hyeon Lee). (RS)

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THE EUROPEAN PRESS AND THE EURO: MEDIA AGENDA-SETTING IN A CROSS-NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

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THE EUROPEAN PRESS AND THE EURO: MEDIA AGENDA-SETTING IN A CROSS-NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

ABSTRACT

Coverage of the Euro currency introduction was analyzed in the leading news publications in the UK and Germany. Specifically, we probed whether (1) coverage of the same cross-national issue differed in level of support and (2) the two national media applied different news frames.

The study showed that the *London Times* opposed the Euro even with pro-Euro sources, whereas the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* maintained neutrality. The *Times* used an episodic, while the *F.A.Z.* employed a thematic style. The difference in styles allowed for different covering of subissues.

THE EUROPEAN PRESS AND THE EURO:
MEDIA AGENDA-SETTING IN A CROSS-NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

After nearly three decades since the seminal agenda-setting work by McCombs and Shaw (1972), an impressive number of research projects was conducted to study media agendas, public agendas and the relationship between them (from Weimann and Brosius, 1994). The vast majority of these studies, however, dealt with ethnocentric research during and outside elections within specific countries, predominantly oriented and conducted toward phenomena in the U.S. Despite the fact that "similar methodological approaches, pointing to the same conclusions, further strengthen the validity of the agenda-setting concept" (see Semetko and Mandelli, 1997), cross-national comparative research would move the agenda-setting theory into the transnational arena.

As Semetko and Mandelli (1997) argued, cross-national agenda-setting "provides an opportunity to examine how those involved in the political communication process – publics, political parties, and media – behave when operating under different institutional constraints." In the same article, the authors ask for two angles of future cross-national research efforts on agenda setting and the related issues of priming and framing – one looking at the formation of media agendas and story frames (including contributing parties), the other looking at the influences of those agendas and frames on public opinion. Semetko and Mandelli contended that it is crucial to integrate a political culture approach to the cognitive approach to agenda-setting in a cross-national arena. This would not only help explain, how the different media operate, but also how they are influenced and are influential themselves. We would stand to gain from this research, as it dives further into the "international expedition" sub-theme of the theory. It would also help explain why researchers seemingly found that the original hypothesis isn't working as well in other countries as it is in the U.S., and if that indeed is the case. Furthermore, since this research will also need to make frequent excursions into the related research field of influences on media content and political agenda formation, it will ultimately help to further advance agenda-setting research altogether by merging it with these other areas.

The present study seeks to bring quantitative data to the discussion by comparing the agendas of the leaderships of two member countries of the European Union, the UK and Germany, regarding the supra-national issue of the EU-wide currency change, to the agenda of reports in the two leading newspapers in the respective countries, thus examining the transfer of salience and frames at the public level.

Background

On January 1, 1999, the European Union embarked on becoming a true monetary union via a transitional process, which will be concluded by January 2002 with the introduction of Euro banknotes and coins and withdrawal of national money. During this preparation time and setup of the European Central Bank (Spring through Winter 1998) of the larger member countries, only the UK opted out of joining in 1999. Despite its known longstanding reservation toward continental Europe, the UK had become increasingly tied in with the EU and benefited from its existence. Hence, this decision can have potential negative consequences for the economy and political position of the UK within the EU. Likewise, Germany's decision to let go of the strongest currency on the continent (the Deutsche Mark) can impact the country negatively in its role as a keystone financial force and can hurt the country's national economic pride as the "anchor of Europe."

It is, therefore, in the interest of either country's leadership to "sell" its decision as the right one for its national public's welfare and prosperity. Drawing samples from pre-change 1998 and immediate post-change 1999 allows the testing of Nelson et al's notion of "framing serving as bridges between elite discourse about a problem or issue and popular comprehension of that issue"(1997).

Applying the concept of framing (Iyengar, 1991) we suspect that the use of "episodic" vs. "thematic" media frame, used respectively in the two countries, will lead readers unto making internal vs. external attributions for the social issue and thus give us a clue as to why the countries' news media and public seem to be on opposite poles of this agenda topic.

Literature Review

There has been a dearth of research in the cross-cultural field of agenda-setting, which might have led some researchers to believe – based on some studies in Europe – that there is less clear support for the agenda-setting hypothesis outside the U.S. (Semetko and Mandelli, 1997). However, the same authors also note, that "the absence of evidence to support the agenda-setting hypothesis does not mean that other important media effects on the public were entirely absent" (p.206).

As a matter of fact, in the field of comparative political analysis there are numerous studies (e.g. Wood and Peake, 1998; Pollack, 1997; Saideman, 1994; Livingston, 1992) that look at international agenda setting as a means for political decision makers to shape a public agenda on foreign or international policy. Livingston (1992), for instance, conducted an analysis on the attempt of the Reagan administration to remove North American-South American relations from the international agenda, and found that agenda success was "dependent on prevailing international practices and the access points to the international agenda they create" (p.313). Saideman (1994) asserts in his study, "agenda-setting is an interactive process, in which politicians are influenced by both domestic interests and the activities of leaders of other states and international organizations" (p.288). He also found certain conditions within a nation (apathy, ambivalence, ambiguous solutions), under which agenda-setting matters. Admittedly, the focus of agenda research in the political science field is primarily targeted toward the political agendas, i.e. the influences of the agendas of political actors and their relationship to the public. The media are not the focus here and are most often even neglected as a unit of analysis.

If we recall though the influences that interest groups can have on the media (McCombs et al, 1991; Lang and Lang, 1991; Gandy, 1982; Tuchman, 1978; Huckins, 1999), we cannot deny that those two agendas could be somewhat related. In our case, we might need to consider that the news story will need to filter through more gatekeepers than a domestic one would. News might travel from the on-site reporter through editors at the local wire house, the wire services headquarters or home country office to the local newspaper bureau, where various editors scan it again. With the assumption that many news organizations will use international wire services for leads, one could conclude that in the end the news will be the same for all national media, a so-called stacked category. In a related study Whitney and Becker (1982) laid this notion to rest though, finding support for the fact that wire news are not uncritically accepted in newspaper and TV newsrooms. They didn't deny, however, an initial influence of the wire news bureaus. In a sense then, we are dealing with more than one single "Mr. Gates" in a gate-keeping role. This will be reflected by the ultimate media agenda-setting process but will also make an influence by an interested political group or individual even more difficult. This notion can be traced back in a way to Livingston's access point idea. But how do we perceive the stories to be told and told differently by the two countries' media organizations, if indeed that is the case?

Most likely the two most helpful answers come from two interesting findings in agenda-setting research: issue categorization (obtrusive-unobtrusive, abstract-concrete) and interpersonal agenda as a contingent conditions to the process and effects. Saideman (1984) pointed out the existence of conditions for the workings of international agenda-setting processes. Taking it a step further, Miller and Wanta (1996) regarded story frames as an "important variable to the agenda-setting process of different demographics." Wanta and Hu

(1993) also mentioned story frames as contingent conditions in the agenda-setting effect of international news. And Weimann and Brosius (1994) argued that influential individuals (could it be national news editors?) would frame emerging news to their own personal network, splitting the agenda-setting process effectively into a two-step flow. If story frames are an important condition to cross-national agenda-setting effects, we need to define a frame and ask, how the media frame issues.

Goffman's thematic question on frame analysis (see Manning, 1980) was, "under what circumstances do we think things are real?" He thus attributed "two kinds of understanding to social life, a literal one (what is going on?), and a metaphoric one (what is the meaning of what is going on?)" (p. 272). The concept of a frame is used, among other reasons, to "show that as actions change our definitions (or frames), we can alter our original meaning and confer new ones, or add them to the first set" (p. 273). Following this logic, Gitlin (1980) argued, "media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse" (p.7). This notion does, then, define a news frame in terms of ideological or value perspectives. By excluding, e.g., all the benefits that a European currency might bring and emphasizing its detrimental effects on the British economy, the British media would effectively have framed the news story very differently from the German media, which might have highlighted the positives of the change and suppressed the negatives.

According to Iyengar (1993), the media frame issues in either "episodic" or "thematic" terms. "The episodic frame depicts public issues in terms of concrete instances or specific events – a homeless person (…) or an attempted murder -, which make "good pictures." The thematic news frame, in contrast, places public issues in some general or abstract context, which typically takes the form of a "takeout" or "backgrounder" report, frequently featuring "talking heads"" (Iyengar, 1993, p. 219f). While thematic news framing is more objective, in-depth and analytic, it is also seen as dull and slow and, due to its "subsurface" reporting style, vulnerable to charges of bias and editorializing. Episodic framing, on the other hand, is fast-paced, attention grabbing and achieves "objectivity" via focusing on the "hard" news. It will also, however, fail to include significant issues, if they are deemed not newsworthy due to a lack of "good pictures". It can be speculated that this latter point could be a reason for why Brosius and Kepplinger (1995) found only limited support for their assumptions regarding killer issues, which they saw working in a replacement model, eclipsing other agenda issues on German TV.

To avoid any ambiguities in our findings, it is important to look at agenda issues that have news value in either country. These are usually those that either originated from supranational sources, governing to an extent over both countries and can hence impact both country's policies or economies, or, as an alternative, a national source (national government or the like), which makes decisions of the same multinational impact. Examples to this point would be employment issues within NAFTA (Mexico and US), oil price settings after warfare and embargos within OPEC (Venezuela and Iran) or the unified currency debate in the EU (Great Britain and Germany). The importance of this point becomes obvious when we consider the low public interest level of stories about Country A, reported to the public of Country B, with no or minimal actual impact on Country B. In a study of that particular nature, Wanta and Hu (1993) found that other than high-conflict or direct involvement frames, most international news stories have little relevance to the average (in this case: American) citizen. The findings show that agenda items, which are "just" international in kind, will probably have less chance to be noticed than those international agendas, which indeed impact the home country.

As a result, the national news media may pay far more attention to those issues. More importantly, to the extent of the independence and antagonistic positioning of the national media landscape in a given country, the international story will be more "localized," i.e. framed by the national media in a way that best suits the country's interest, in which said media operate. There is also strong possibility that some news frames form a better negative or positive argument. In other words, the antagonistic media might use certain frames because they provide good arguments against the international issue. The execution itself, however, will also depend on the style of storytelling that a national media subscribes to. It only seems logical to assume that every culture has a journalistic legacy, which dictates in some way what style of storytelling a country's press applies. This latter point alludes to the integration of political culture approaches to understand political and social change. As Semetko and Mandelli (1997) argue, "comparative political communication research would benefit from integrating (the above approach) with a more cognitive approach to understanding public opinion." They then give an illustration of this statement by saying that "political culture helps to explain why a U.S. news story about poverty often is framed in such a way as to place the responsibility on the individual rather than on the system or state (Iyengar, 1991), whereas a story about poverty is likely to be framed differently in most European social welfare states" (p.206).

Hypotheses

The first research question addressed here, then, is how are international stories regarding a change from national currencies to the European Currency (Euro) framed in two EU member-countries that are politically opposite on the issue itself? We speculate that different ideologies of the news media and their sources toward the international issue will lead to different influences on the story, i.e. media that oppose an international issue will engage in a more spirited debate on the issue and use more sources, than those media that favor the issue. Furthermore, media that oppose the international issue will communicate and support an agenda detrimental to their sources' intentions, i.e. they will maintain a negative position even if a quoted source seems to promote a positive view on the issue. Those that support the issue, will communicate a like-minded agenda, i.e. they stay predominantly neutral and report matter-of-factly. Thus, based on the above scenario, we propose to test the following hypotheses:

H1: The *London Times* will be more likely to quote anti-Euro sources than the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

Since the *Times* is located in a country that is opposed to this international issue, they will be more likely to follow the national sentiment on the issue.

> **H2:** The *London Times* will be more likely to maintain an anti-Euro position, even if sources that they use for quotations support the issue, whereas the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* will follow its sources' positions.

Since the *Times* is located in a country in which its press has a more independent and critical position toward its own government and since every issue regarding the European Union is seen much more negatively by this independent press, without regard where the government stands, they will remain critical even when fulfilling their journalistic role of quoting sources from various positions.

The second research question addressed here is: How did the individual news organizations go about communicating their position, i.e. what style did they use to support their arguments. If it could be found, e.g., that Germany's media would predominantly apply a thematic frame in reporting on cross-national issues – mostly analytical, factual news, at times tainted by Euro-centric interest group influences – and that the UK would subscribe largely to an episodic frame – mostly featured stories and personal comments, depicting heart-wrenching national (i.e. British) tragedies, but omitting vital information otherwise - we could gain an understanding, as to why, if so, the countries' news media and public seem to be on opposite poles of this agenda.

Furthermore, the news media, applying an episodic style, will cover more aspects of the issue (subissues) to make a case for their position than those applying a thematic style. Based on this scenario, we propose to test the following hypotheses:

> **H3:** The *London Times* will be more likely to use episodic story frames to arrive at its negative position, whereas the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* will be more likely to use thematic story frames to arrive at its neutral position.

To make arguments against the Euro, the *Times* has to appeal to a deeper mistrust of the British population toward all European issues. This is exaggerated by the fact that the Euro decision was a democratic majority vote of the other countries, leaving Britain already in an uneasy position. The best means to achieve this daunting task seems to deliver real-life stories and opinions against the Euro rather than listing factual information or data, as the former appeal better to emotions.

> **H4:** The *London Times* will be more likely than the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* to cover a wider range of subissues, connected with the Euro issue, to support its position.

It seems plausible that a tendency toward episodic styles for the above-mentioned reasons will compel the Times to look for categories (subissues), where this style is most applicable. Unlike the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, whose thematic style will be well-suited for the usual key subissues of a currency change, i.e. financial and economic (both full of data and "dry" information), the Times will need to look at other aspects of Euro influences, such as social, personal, political, ethical, cultural and so on. This consequently will broaden their range of covered subissues.

Methodology

The study examines media coverage of the "birth of the Euro" currency from December 1, 1998 through January 30, 1999, the two months surrounding the historic date of January 1, 1999. This timeframe was chosen because it was the period in which European news media carried most coverage of the issue, simply because it became one of the most emphasized issues on the continent.

The case of the birth date of the Euro was chosen, as this date effectively marked the beginning of the finalization of a ten-year, three-step process within the Union to move from economic coordination to a single currency, supervised by the European Central Bank. As this obviously will impact the EU's member countries in a profound way in all facets of life, it is expected that the national media, as well as the media's sources and the public, will voice strong opinions regarding the issue.

The method chosen is a content analysis of the *Times* of London in the U.K. and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in Germany, with the individual paragraph as the unit of analysis. Both of these papers are not only among the largest in circulation and readership in their respective countries, but they are also considered as one of the most respected and professional, as well as newspapers "of record." The paragraph is chosen as the unit of analysis as it will support the finding of hypothesized discrepancies between press and source as well as varying story frames within the story.

Issues

The study focuses on four areas:

- Story Type, i.e. what kind of reporting style (hard news (factual information), feature (snapshots, slice-of-life piece), commentary (reporter's position)) was used to report on the issue
- Overall tone of the news story, scored as pro-Euro (conversion to Euro and its consequences is supported in tone and voice), neutral (conversion debate is covered without emotional attachment or opinion about it) and anti-Euro (conversion to Euro is opposed, argument against it are brought forth), from the position of the media themselves
- Sources quoted in the story, divided into official (i.e. governmental) and non-official (i.e. experts, citizens), and their position toward the issue.
- Subissues within the overall story, i.e. which aspect of the country's sphere (economic, society, culture, taxation, banking) was mostly reported on, and how was

the introduction of the single currency interpreted to have an impact on those subissues.

Using Holsti's formula (Holsti, 1969) the intercoder reliability across the categories ranged from 0.72 to 0.98 with an average of 0.85.

Results

The content analysis led to 61 stories with 579 paragraphs for the *Times* of London and 68 stories with 351 paragraphs for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

Hypothesis 1 argued that a negative stance on the Euro-issue by the *London Times* will be related to the use of likewise issue-opposing sources for direct quotes in the story. Out of the 579 paragraphs in the *London Times* 34.8% had an anti-Euro slant, 55.1% were neutral and only 10.0% were positive. The German *F.A.Z.* published 5.1% anti-Euro paragraphs, 84.0% had a neutral tone and 10.8% were positive. As Table 1 shows, the *Times* quoted about four times as many negative (or anti-Euro) sources as the *F.A.Z.* did. As a matter of fact, two-thirds of the quoted sources in the German paper commented as objective on the Euro debate as the paper did itself, whereas quoted sources in the British paper engaged in a lively debate on the pros and cons of the issue. The data therefore largely support Hypothesis 1.

It was argued further that the *London Times* would maintain their opposition even if the source were in favor of the Euro. Table 2 shows that while the data for the *F.A.Z.* basically follow the paper's distribution, where source position and media position are the same, the *Times* remains reserved or opposed to the Euro, even when they quote a source who endorsed the change (80.9% of its quoted pro-sources).

To illustrate this surprising point further, the *Times* is quoted, writing in a story from 12/5/98, "To many Britons, Europe seems like a high-speed train, hurtling its reluctant passengers into a new millennium of continental government where Britain becomes a dependent province. (...) There are plenty of reasons why the vision is plausible. Successive governments, from Ted Heath's to Tony Blair's have tried to soothe British fears by playing down the political ambitions of the Union, only to be swept along with the rush to integrate", while they quote an official in the same article, saying "The British don't realize what a strong hand they have. They just have to keep their nerve." The paper also quotes its own Prime Minister in an article from 12/15/98, saying, "(...) a majority of Europeans are not part of a vile conspiracy to nobble Britain," to which the paper responds in the same paragraph, "The Prime Minister is only half right."

Finally, in an article from 12/18/98, the *Times* admits "most Eurosceptic national newspapers have redoubled (throughout the last month) their campaign against the Euro", yet they also quote again their Prime Minister, saying that "a lot of the scare stories were simply untrue." In that same article, one of the *Times'* correspondents, Peter Riddell, pointed out that "Blair's article demonstrated that the alliance of convenience between new Labor and the sceptic press, always bogus, was now, at last, over. Blair and his Government had emerged in their true pro-European colors."

The *Times* also allows many more negative sources to be heard, in the case they stay neutral; 21% of the times, the paper remains objective, an anti-Euro source is quoted. And even in the rare case when the newspaper supports the Euro-debate, 7% of their quoted sources oppose the Euro. The German paper has not a single negative voice in that case. Hypothesis 2, then, seems to be largely supported as well.

Hypothesis 3 said that the *London Times* will apply an episodic style, which will allow for negative real-life examples and personal comments by influenced individuals of the Euro, while the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* will use a thematic style, whose factual tone will give data without much opinion. Table 3 illustrates that the *Times* uses feature stories and commentaries about as much as hard news (45.8% vs. 54.2%), while the *F.A.Z.* uses the hard news angle 75% of the time. This data support the initial assumption that the British newspaper examined here applies an episodic news style more often than does the German newspaper, which largely is committed to a thematic style. The heavier use of the episodic style is also the vehicle through which the anti-Euro position is communicated. While only 19% of the hard news paragraphs have an anti-Euro bend, 33% of the features and 62% of the commentary are in that tone. Interestingly enough, the German *F.A.Z.* uses the commentary to support the Euro (31% of all commentary style) but overall remains neutral in even the features. Hypothesis 3 is then largely supported by the data.

It was finally asserted in Hypothesis 4 that the different news styles result in different width in the coverage of connected subissues, which in turn serve to illustrate the impact points of the Euro issue. In other words, an episodic style allows for analyses of more subissues, such as cultural, social and political, areas where the more personal approach makes sense, but also can be used to rationalize why a position is maintained. The thematic style, which is by its nature matter-of-factly and removed, will only make sense for subissues where pure data delivery is most applicable.

Table 4 shows that the *Times* uses the feature story style in particular when dealing with cultural, personal and even economic issues and the commentary style, when dealing with cultural/political and economic issues. The *F.A.Z.* reverts to these styles only rarely. Overall the table shows that the British paper looks at many more subissues, impacted by the Euro than does the German paper, which devotes more than 50% of its coverage to the monetary aspect of the Euro-debate. These data support largely the hypothesis.

Discussion

This study compares the media coverage of the leading newspapers in two of the key member countries in the European Union on the cross-national debate of the Euro currency. The purpose of the study was to illustrate that the media occupy a more independent position regarding nationally debated issues vis-à-vis their news sources than routinely assumed and in so influence the news agenda of the public as much as political news makers, based on their own position towards the agenda issue. Support was furthermore found for the assumption that different countries and cultures not only use different news style frames, but also use these different frames as they play different communication roles in their respective countries. Framing of a story – or new writing in general – is certainly influenced by a country's political landscape and the position if the press in it. The recent case of the shutdown of liberal media organizations in Iran may attest to this notion. However, the two chosen countries here are in many ways similar in their political, economic and social makeup. What can and will set them apart is the cultural heritage and values of those covering the news. These diverse values seem to affect the different position and chosen frames for an issue which seemingly should be covered identically, as it has the ultimate same source (the European Parliament).

The study found support for Iyengar's assumption of the existence of two different news styles and serves to explain different media agenda phenomena in different countries. One of the most interesting finding is not so much the fact that Britain stood politically on opposite sides with Germany regarding the Euro conversion debate, but that it seemed that the British media were far more opposed to the impending change than the British government was. E.g., in an article from 12/2/98 the *Times* notes, "Britain wants different things from Europe than do France and Germany" and goes on to say that "Mr. Blair is a man who likes to please others. He wants to be liked by his European partners." In another article, dated 12/6/98, the *Times* notes, "The government underestimated Germany's finance minister and is being bounced towards a federal Europe. (...) When the crime was made more heinous by linking tax changes to the next round of European integration (which was part of the Euro debate, author's comment), Blair's inner circle knew they faced trouble, especially with Britain's eurosceptic media. (...) From the moment the drama broke, Alastair Campbell, Blair's official spokesman, accused the press of hysteria. But the spin doctors faced a hopeless task."

If we believe the usual flow of agenda-setting effects leading from source to media to public (see Wanta, 1997, for example), then we are dealing here with a break in the normal agenda setting-process, in which the media activity is an intervening variable to the channel for policy makers to provide information to the public.

Of specific concern here was not only if the media would counteract their sources, but also how they would go about doing so. The data show that the British press indeed promoted its own agenda to the public. Given the fact that the average British citizen expects to receive information about European issues primarily from the media (Eurobarometer, 1/1999), this marks indeed a powerful position and parallels that of the government (79% responded to the Eurobarometer survey that they would expect information on European issues to come from both the media and the government). In Germany the media are still an important information source (76%), but as far as the Euro is concerned, most of the Germans expect to be informed by their financial institutions (81%). This points to the following explanations:

Germany is less concerned with the Euro issue's implications beyond the obvious change of currency and banking. The German media therefore seem to concentrate on this issue and update the public on activities in the banking and stock trading arenas. The reporting style applied seems to fit with what the German public expects from its press, as the relative few non-neutral sources attest. It also points to the more political aspect of integration of the country into the Union in general and acceptance of this integration by the policy makers and the public. As a result, there is no need to discuss every detail of the Euro debate, in particular its negative implications. The German newspaper, hence, does not only maintain a relatively objective reporting style throughout the examined time period, but also concentrates on subissues that deal with financial (currency, European Central Bank, etc.) and broader economic (national business climate, stock markets, etc.) issues. Those subissues are not only by their very nature more prone to be used with a factual style or frame, but also offer the *F.A.Z.* the chance to cater to the public's expectations from its newspapers. This thematic frame is even largely maintained when a story angle asked for a feature-like style, e.g. in a story about the indifference of the population in the "Saarland" region (a small German state, bordering France and the home state of then German finance minister, Oskar Lafontaine) to the Euro debate. Despite the potential to include its own position, the *F.A.Z.* stays as neutral as possible and basically presents this feature-type story more as a background information piece, providing more hard news than opinion.

Britain, on the other hand, seems to be a country where its public expects a lively debate of issues, in particular issues that concern Britain's leading position in Europe and the world. Quite contrary to Germany, then, the episodic style is used more often, as it gives the more opinionated *Times* a means to play out all the drama and personal aspects of the Euro story. Although economic and financial subissues are still leading topics, those are reported in a way that opens avenues for personal positions. The frequent use of features and commentaries for those subissues demonstrates this.

At the same time, the more frequent use of cultural (or political) issues, i.e. issues framing the Euro debate in a larger debate about Britain's role in and position toward the European Union in general, both from a contemporary and historic perspective, imply that the more negative position of the *Times* toward the Euro has deeper roots than this particular supranational story. It also shows that the use of multiple subissues, allowing the newspaper to apply an episodic style, help the British paper to fulfill its role as watchful commentator and protector of British interests in the European arena.

Consequently, we are led to conclude that behind the debate of the Euro are far deeper concerns in the UK about an integrated Europe, in which the country only plays a minor or equal role to every other member. In particular the British media (or, at least, the publishers of the major news vehicles) seem to be conservative and isolationist and are willing to engage any domestic government that favors European issues in a debate. An article on the Euro debate in the *Times* from 12/18/98 is even headlined "Gloves come off for biggest press scrap of the century" and discusses Prime Minister Tony Blair's fight with the Eurosceptic news editors. Furthermore, the British media – as illustrated above – are looking at many more subissues of the Euro debate and conclude the impact of a currency change on many of those as detrimental to the country's welfare.

We do admit that our research looked at only two of the fifteen member countries of the European Union. It is possible to assume that in pro-Euro countries a more lively debate over the Euro is in place than in Germany, or a less detrimental media position in other Euro-hold-out countries, such as Denmark and Greece. This is obviously a limitation of the study. It is also possible to assume that the chosen newspapers are in ownership situations that led to the results here. Given the fact though that these two newspapers have a certain reputation to uphold and that the issue, while politically a hotbed, does not impact the two papers' organizations as such that much, we are confident that the data are generalizable to the countries' media. Also, despite the fact that the two countries settled on different sides of the Euro debate, they are not only both members of the EU, but also part of the family of countries which respect the freedom of the press. This will largely guarantee an equal freedom of the newspapers to report independently on the Euro debate.

Conclusions

General conclusions for mass communication research should be that the source-to-media influence flow is not as clear as may be assumed. It seems that, depending on the issue and the media's position toward it, media sources and the media themselves can promote different positions of the same issue, making the idea of agenda setting oftentimes a "two-way street" altogether. Second, the findings support the conclusion of Saideman (1994) that politicians are not only influenced by other states and international organizations but as well by domestic interests, which in conclusion makes agenda-setting a highly iterative process.

The findings also support the 'gatekeeper model' of the media, as well as the study by Whitney and Becker (1982), which asserted that international news is not uncritically accepted by national media. It seems in particular intriguing that the aforementioned multiple gatekeepers due to the use of wire houses seems to apply little in a country such as the UK. It seems rather clear that the national newspaper editors are just cherry-picking factual news developments to then embed them in a nationally biased commentary piece. Germany on the other hand seems more prone to download the wire services news piece without changes. Overall, it would make for an interesting follow-up research to shed further light onto the use of wire service articles in the different countries.

The gatekeeper role is furthermore augmented here to the point that media can go beyond filtering information but add to it and generate their own. Furthermore, we can't assume that because an issue is international in scope, every country's media will have set the same agenda toward this issue. International agenda-setting will need to specifically put into consideration the culture and environment the research is done in. We speculate that it will be helpful to mirror to some extent the efforts of cross-cultural advertising and mass persuasion. Cultural models, such as the ones by Hofstede (1992) and de Mooji (1998) could be helpful, understanding a culture and, in the wake, understanding the operation of media within this culture. Granted that this is not at the heart of agenda-setting research, it could nevertheless be helpful to explain why international agenda-setting effects seem inconclusive to date.

Overall, the findings point to the fruitfulness of including story frames (news style) and media position in the agenda-setting process, in particular for international or cross-cultural aspects of it. We suspect that specifically second level research would benefit from looking at the news frames, given that they have an influence on what subissues are covered and how they are covered. There seems to be, in general, an interesting relationship between media position, sources' position, news frame styles, subissues and issue effect.

In addition, these findings suggest the need to examine the media-to-public effects, or the original agenda-setting hypothesis, based on these assumptions. This study found that there were differences between nations and between news frames in how the media position a message and comment on it. While preliminary findings do not deny the continued workings of the agenda-setting hypothesis, i.e. the media do set the agenda for the public in both of the studied countries, the notion that the media and their sources disagree on an agenda as well as the notion that some stories can give individuals different emotional and rational cues about an issue deserve further attention.

Table 1: Comparison of source position in two newspapers

	Times of London	*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*
Pro-Euro	63 38.2%	27 24.1%
Neutral	44 26.7%	75 67.0%
Anti-Euro	58 35.2%	10 8.9%
Total	165	112

Chi-Square = *47.973, p< .001*
Note: Top line cells are raw score and second line is column percentage

Table 2: Comparison of position of quoted sources and media position

			Media Position		
			Pro-Euro	Neutral	Anti-Euro
The Times of London	Position of Source	Pro-Euro	12 85.7%	41 40.2%	10 20.4%
		Neutral	1 7.1%	40 39.2%	3 6.1%
		Anti-Euro	1 7.1%	21 20.6%	36 73.5%
		Total	14	102	49
Frankf. Allgem. Zeitung	Position of Source	Pro-Euro	10 90.9%	17 18.1%	
		Neutral	1 9.1%	74 78.7%	
		Anti-Euro		3 3.2%	7 100.0%
		Total	11	94	7

Chi-Square (*Times*) = *57.973, p< .001,*
Chi-Square (*F.A.Z.*) = *105.066, p< .001*
Note: Top line cells are raw score and second line is column percentage.

Table 3: Comparison of news style and media position in the two newspapers

			Media Position		
			Pro-Euro	Neutral	Anti-Euro
The Times of London	News Style	Hard	36	217	61
		News	**11.5%**	**69.1%**	**19.4%**
		Feature	4	48	26
		Story	**5.1%**	**61.5%**	**33.3%**
		Comment	18	54	115
			9.6%	**28.9%**	**61.5%**
		Total	58	319	202
Frankf. Allgem. Zeitung	News Style	Hard	18	242	6
		News	**6.8%**	**91.0%**	**2.3%**
		Feature	1	12	10
		Story	**4.3%**	**52.2%**	**43.5%**
		Comment	19	41	2
			30.6%	**66.1%**	**3.2%**
		Total	38	295	18

Chi-Square (*Times*) = *97.178, p< .001*
Chi-Square (*F.A.Z.*) = *104.783, p< .001*

Chi-Square (*Times* vs. *F.A.Z.* News) = *48.87, p< .001*
Chi-Square (*Times* vs. *F.A.Z.* Features) = *0.80, p< .67*
Chi-Square (*Times* vs. *F.A.Z.* Comment) = *64.43, p< .001*

Note: Top line cells are raw score and second line is row percentage.

Table 4: Comparison of subissues and news style by newspaper

		News Style			
Source	**Subissues**	Hard News	Feature Story	Comment	Total
The Times of London	Economic	83	12	45	140
		27.9 %	**20.0 %**	**26.8 %**	**26.6 %**
	Social	20	6	9	35
		6.7 %	**10.0 %**	**5.4 %**	**6.7 %**
	Tax	13	2	11	26
		4.4 %	**3.3 %**	**6.5 %**	**4.9 %**
	Financial	128	10	37	175
		43.0 %	**16.7 %**	**22.0 %**	**33.3 %**
	Cultural	50	20	61	131
		16.8 %	**33.3 %**	**36.3 %**	**24.9 %**
	Personal	4	10	5	19
		1.3 %	**16.7 %**	**3.0 %**	**3.6 %**
	Total	298	60	168	526
Frankf. Allgem. Zeitung	Economic	36		10	46
		13.7 %		**16.1 %**	**13.3 %**
	Social	6			6
		2.3 %			**1.7 %**
	Tax	3			3
		1.1 %			**0.9 %**
	Financial	175	3	3	181
		66.5 %	**13.6 %**	**4.8 %**	**52.2 %**
	Cultural	22	3	49	74
		8.4 %	**13.6 %**	**79.0 %**	**21.3 %**
	Personal	21	16		37
		8.0 %	**72.7 %**		**10.7 %**
	Total	263	22	62	347

Chi-Square (*Times*) = *74.878, p< .001,* **Chi-Square (*F.A.Z.*)** = *255.512, p< .001,*
Chi-Square (*Times* vs. *F.A.Z.* totals) = *15.76, p< .01*
Note: Top line cells are raw score and second line is column percentage.

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Running head: FACTORS AFFECTING

Factors Affecting the Internet Adoption by Thai Journalists: A Diffusion of Innovation Study

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Abstract

This research was designed to examine what factors affect the adoption of the Internet by newspaper journalists in Thailand. The diffusion of innovation (Rogers, 1995) was used as a primary theoretical framework for the study with English language introduced as an additional variable. The results indicated that the perceived attributes of innovation--relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability--were useful predictors of adopting the innovation. The additional attribute--English-language compatibility of the Internet--did not turn out to be a significant predictor of adoption because likely-adopters and nonadopters did not appear to be aware of the problem. The adopters, on the other hand, realized the language incompatibility of the medium but still used it because their perceived relative advantage and other attributes were greater and overrode the language barrier they encountered.

Factors affecting the Internet adoption by Thai journalists: A diffusion of innovation study

Research in North America has shown that the majority of journalists have adopted the Internet and are increasingly use it in their work (Ross & Middleberg, 1999; Garrison, 1999a, 1998). However, the Internet is a relatively new technology in Thailand and its adoption process is still in an early stage.

The scenario is different in Thailand. The Internet is relatively a new medium and not widely available to the people. The number of Internet users in Thailand by the end of 1995 was estimated to be 100,000, with the majority using Internet access via their corporate or institutional networks. Fifty percent of the users are involved in research and academic work ("Ethics Increasingly," 1996). According to Trin Tantsetthi, the director of National Electronics and Computer Technology Center of Thailand, the estimated number of Internet users in Thailand in 1999 is about 390,000 (250,000 in the academic circle, 80,000 in government, state enterprises and commercial firms, and 60,000 in household market).

Though the number of Internet users in the country is increasing, it is still very small as compared to population as a whole (59,450,818 people) ("1997 CIA," 1999). Less than 1% of the population in Thailand uses the Internet whereas 40% of the U.S. population age 16 or older has adopted the Internet ("IntelliQuest Study," 1999).

Statement of problem

Rogers (1995) argues that "the receivers' perceptions of the attributes of an innovation . . . affect its rate of adoption "(p. 209). The five attributes of innovations are relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability. Moreover, socioeconomic status of individuals (Roger, 1995) and psychographic forces such as attitudes and goals (Spencé, 1994) toward their career also related to the rate of adoption.

Because English is the predominant language on the Internet, past studies have showed this could be a possible barrier to its adoption in non-English speaking community (Arguello, 1996).

First put in first sentence of abstract

Specifically, this study will examine how leading attributes of innovations--relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, observability, and language compatibility--predict adoption rate of the Internet in Thailand after controlling for demographic, psychographic, Internet socialization and computer experience.

What made Thailand an ideal place to study the diffusion of the Internet was that the medium was considered a "new" technology to the Thai people. The availability was still limited to the metropolitan area where telephone lines were accessible.

In the journalism field, only some major publications could afford the technology and made it available to all of their staff. Internet literacy, therefore, had not been considered an important requirement for being a journalist in Thailand, where a majority of newsmen gathered news in the traditional way--talk to people on the telephone or in person, or conduct a document search. But the technology of the Internet that was reinventing the journalism practice throughout the world will surely transform the traditional practice of the press in Thailand in near future.

However, the adoption of the Internet by the Thai people in general, and by the Thai journalists in particular, was not without problems, even it was available. The Web is far from culturally neutral, especially in terms of language. Global Internet statistics complied by Euro Marketing (1999) estimated that there are 103.6 million people who access to the Internet in English language while there were only 130,000 people who accessed in Thai language.

Because the English language dominates the Internet and most of the Web sites are also in English, most Thai people would find those sites on the Internet useless for them. As Tony Waltham (1999), the editor of Database section in the Bangkok Post, put it: "Presumably, as content on the Web in the Thai language increases, so more Thais will find reasons to spend more time on the Internet."

Literature Review

Diffusion of Innovation

Rogers (1995) provides the working definition for diffusion: "The process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system" (p. 10). An innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual. While innovations are typically new, they may be long-established ideas, products or practices which are found to have a fresh application. They could be old for someone but are regarded as new by some people.

Rogers classifies adopter behavior into five categories: Innovators, Early adopters, Early majority, Late majority, and Laggards. The criterion Rogers uses for adopter categorization is innovativeness--"the degree to which an individual is relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than other members of his social system" (p. 180). In the case of the Internet, the rate of adoption is phenomenal. According to Rogers (1999), it is the fastest rate of innovation adoption in the history of mass media.

Attributes of Innovation. Specifically, Rogers (1995) suggests that relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability are important attributes of innovations that can help explain adoption rates. Rogers applies the following definitions:

1. Relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as better than the idea it supersedes.
2. Compatibility is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being consistent with existing values, past experiences, and the needs of potential adopters.
3. Complexity is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as difficult to understand and use.
4. Trialability is the degree to which an innovation may be experimented with on a limited basis.
5. Observability is the degree to which the results of an innovation are visible to others (1995, 15-16).

Rogers suggests that those innovations which have greater relative advantage, compatibility, trialability, and observability will be adopted more rapidly than other innovations, and notes that innovations which are less complex will be adopted more rapidly than those which are perceived as more complex.

6. Language compatibility is a new variable for innovation adoption. According to Rogers (1999), English language barrier had never been empirically examined or integrated into any study of the Internet. Comprehension in English is expected to facilitate the Internet adoption rate.

Demographics. According to Rogers (1995), socioeconomic status of individuals is related to the rate of adoption. He asserted that the earlier adopters generally are more educated, of higher social status, wealthier, and more specialized in the area related to the innovation (p. 269).

Psychographic. Spence (1994) claims that internal forces and hereditary tendencies within individuals predispose them to react or behave in a particular way. He mentions that the satisfactory progress towards an approved goal is a trait which may be characterized as human "progressiveness." He calls these forces predispositional or personality factors. Among factors in this category are attitudes, beliefs, values and goals. However, Spence does not suggest further as to how these factors can be measured.

In the present study, two variables--attitudes and goals--are relevant and measurable in terms of job satisfaction and goal toward the career. Job satisfaction has often been used synonymously with job attitudes and is generally considered to be an individual's perceptual reaction to important facets of work (Pincus, 1986; Barrett, 1984; Vroom, 1967). Locke (1976) defines job satisfaction as: "a pleasurable or positive emotional state from the appraisal of one's job or experience."

Experience and ability to learn new technology. In a marketing study, Goldsmith and Hofacker (1991) found that consumer knowledge and experience with products and services in the same general area as the innovation could hasten the adoption decision. More recent literature (Henrichs, 1995; Kaminer, 1997) also suggests that people's ability to learn new technology related to the innovation or new technological service can be used as an indicator of an increased rate of adoption.

Internet socialization. Spence (1994) suggests that there are factors that are not within the control of the individual, but have the capacity to either stimulate or impede personal adoption. Among these factors he includes are strategy and tactics of change-agents, national or local policy (p. 49). Rogers (1971) mentions about the system norm that influences the adoption rate. The norms tell an individual what behavior is expected. Moreover, he says that "the pressure of peers is necessary to motivate adoption" (p. 185).

Talk about variable you will use

Adoption and Use of the Internet and Related Technologies

A fairly significant body of research has examined the adoption of Internet and related innovations in the United States. Many studies follow Rogers' adoption decision models in determining factors affecting the process. Perceptions of an innovation is also a common theme underlying various models that explain the adoption of related innovations such as network services and computers. Demographic variables are also taken into account in explaining the adoption behavior.

In a study of consumer adoption of the Internet (Henrichs, 1995), perceived attributes of the innovation, i.e., relative advantage, compatibility, trialability, and observability, highly correlated with the early adoption of the technology by a group of consumers in the United States. This suggests that these constructs can be used to determine differences between early adopters and late adopters of this technology.

Some studies of the use of the Internet or its components pointed out some relative advantages of this innovation pertinent to this immediate study. First, it is easy to find information (Kaye & Johnson, 1998; Garrison, 1998a, 1998b; Davenport, Fico, & Weinstock, 1996). Second, it provides information on demand (McGuire, Stilborne,

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McAdams & Hyatt, 1997; Parsons & Johnson, 1996; Koch, 1996; Branscomb, 1998; Reddick & King, 1997; Koch, 1996; Ross & Middleberg, 1999).

Third, it has a high potential for information finding (Garrison, 1998a, 1998b; Miller, 1998; Parsons & Johnson, 1996). The growth of the World Wide Web makes the Internet a reservoir of information. There were several hundred search engines and indices for locating information on the Web in mid-1998 (Glossbrenner & Glossbrenner, 1998).

Fourth, it has a potential for interactivity. Because the Internet allows for feedback, this advantage also enhances socialization and information exchange via various components of the Internet (Kaye, 1998; James, Wotring, & Forrest, 1995; Blackman, 1990; Garramone, Harris, & Anderson, 1986).

Fifth, it allows people to speak anonymously which can lead to the expression of honest opinions (Garramone, Harris, & Anderson, 1986; Phillips, 1983). However, as mentioned earlier, the anonymity feature of the Internet generates a serious problem to the journalists--credibility (Johnson & Kaye, 1998; Singer, 1996).

Sixth, it allows users to keep up with issues (surveillance), or to learn what other people are talking or thinking about (Garramone, Harris, & Anderson, 1986; Rafaeli, 1986; Kaye & Johnson, 1998)

Seventh, it is available at any time of day (James, Wotring, & Forrest, 1995). Finally, the Internet is capable of communicating globally and breaking down geographic isolation (James, Wotring, & Forrest, 1995; Schaefermeyer & Sewell, 1988; Tombaugh, 1984; Carter, 1997; Burg, 1997). Scientists from around the world can interact through bulletin boards. International business transaction can be done through e-mail. And of course, the World Wide Web is globally accessible.

However, disadvantages such as that it is time-consuming were also reported in some studies ("GVU's Ninth WWW User Survey," 1998; Covi & Kling, 1996).

Regarding complexity, some studies found people ran into difficulties finding their way around on the Internet (Garrison, 1998a). According to the survey of American Internet users, millions of people tried the Net but did not stick with it because of the complexity ("Online Growing Pains," 1997).

Another study found that users were frustrated with technical problems of the Internet, which was crucial to the degree of their Internet use (Wang & Cohen, 1998). The complexity of Internet commands was reported to be a major factor in explaining a low level of Internet usage among scientists in New Zealand (O'Regan, 1996). The researcher notes that the Internet protocols have become so much more user-friendly during the past few years, that the situation might change.

In case of the Internet, compatibility is computer literacy. Low levels of computer literacy certainly make the Internet incompatible. In fact, computer literacy was found to be an important barrier associated with Internet adoption by U.S. scholars (Kaminer, 1997; Carter, 1997; McClure, Bishop, Doty, & Rosenbaum, 1991). ~~Since~~ Because computer literacy has gone up, this should be less of a problem for the Internet adoption ("Household PC," 1998).

Few studies have considered language barrier as a factor affecting the Internet adoption. However, Arguello (1996) studied the impact of the Internet in Costa Rican journalism and society. He found that the lack of training was the main reason why journalists were not using the Internet, but perhaps the most important barrier was language because most of the Internet language was in English. The language compatibility is expected to be one of the major factor affecting the adoption of the Internet technology in Thailand as well.

Though there is no study that provide a direct link between Internet adoption and job satisfaction, one study (Voakes, 1997) found that younger journalists at the age of 30 and under were keenly interested in or regularly using the Internet and they seem to be more happier and optimistic about their jobs than the older journalists (over 30). Job satisfaction was associated with Internet use.

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Studies of the Online Service and Internet in Thailand

As mentioned earlier, the Internet is a relatively new medium in Thailand. So far, few studies have been investigated the adoption and usage of this innovation. However, there are three studies concerning the Internet and its components which are based on the diffusion of innovation theoretical framework.

One of these studies (Vachiropaskorn, 1997) investigated the Bulletin Board System (BBS) adoption among a small group of people in Bangkok (*n*=15). The other two (Kongsupabkul, 1997; Sopratum, 1997) directly investigated Internet adoption with larger sample sizes (*n*=400 and *n*=224).

All three studies relied on survey research using an online questionnaire with an additional in-depth interview employed in one study (Sopratum, 1997). The significant findings pertaining this present study could be summarized as followed:

1. The innovators and early adopters of the technologies were people with higher education or who were experts. Vachiropaskorn's study of BBS adoption indicated that the adopters were those who were particularly interested in computers and who were computer literate. Similarly, Sopratum (1997) also found in her study of Internet adoption that almost 80% of the adopters were attending college or held a bachelor's degree. Education correlated with the adoption rate.

Contrary to Rogers' proposition (1995) that early adopters were people with high income levels, all three studies found that the adopters had lower income levels. However, there is an explanation to this finding.

Respondents in these studies were netizens who received the questionnaires online. Back in 1996 when the studies took place, the majority of Internet users in Thailand were college students who obtained accounts through their universities in Bangkok. Therefore, low income level seemed to be typical among college students who were unemployed.

However, a further analysis in Sopratum's study (1997) pointed out that high income level correlated with intention to adopt the Internet in future.

2. Regarding attributes of innovation, Sopratum (1997) found that two out of five perceived attributes, i.e., relative advantage and compatibility, correlated highly with the adoption rate. The majors advantages were the ability to communicate globally, time-saving in research, and high information potential. Vachiropaskorn also reported that perceived relative advantage of BBS was a major factor influencing the technology usage.

3. All three studies found a limited usage of the technologies. Respondents almost exclusively used the Internet only to e-mail and to download programs online. Surprisingly, research was not found to be a major use among the respondents, although the majority of them were students.

4. Complexity of the technology was not a major problem for adoption because most of the respondents were college students who were trained to use the technology. However, additional information obtained from in-depth interviews (Sopratum, 1997) demonstrated that access to the Internet was a problem, due to limited phone lines and the poor telephone system in the country.

These studies could be considered pilot studies for the Internet adoption in Thailand. The findings shed some light about Internet adoption in a foreign setting. However, time has changed and the Internet technology has grown significantly in the country in the past few years. More research is definitely needed to be done. This present study will move away from the academic setting found in the previous studies to a professional one.

Key research questions

Based on conceptual foundation provided by Rogers (1995) and from past research, the study asks the following key research questions:

1. What are the demographic and psychographic ~~characteristics~~ differences between the Internet adopters and nonadopters?

2. What are the attributes of the Internet that best predict the adoption rate by Thai journalists?

3. Is English language a barrier to the adoption of the Internet by the Thai journalists?

Methods

This study attempted to reach all of the journalists in the five newspapers. Questionnaires were distributed in September 1999 to 811 journalists from five major daily newspapers in Thailand. Three of them are Thai-language newspapers--Thai Rath, Daily News, and Matichon. They are the top three newspapers in terms of circulation. The others --Bangkok Post, The Nation--are the only two daily English-language newspapers in the country. There were 278 questionnaires returned but only 267 of them were usable due to incompletion of the questionnnaires. The response rate was 33%.

The dependent variable in this study is the Internet adoption rate. Lin (1998) presented a three-type adopter classification in which "likely adopters" was put in between the dichotomous conception of adopter versus nonadopter. In this study, "adopters" represents those who already use the Internet, "likely adopters" are those who intend to adopt within one years, and "nonadopters" are those without such an intent.

Five-point Likert scales ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" were used for all statements measuring the independent variables, i.e. six attributes of innovation (relative advantages, compatibility, language compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability), job satisfaction, Internet socialization, and computer experience.

Relative advantage. In this study, the Internet advantage could be contrasted with traditional research and news gathering. This construct was operationalized by asking respondents about their expectations for finding useful information on the Internet (Henrichs, 1995), together with an original question asking whether they believe that the Internet would be more useful than library search.

Compatibility. This construct was operationalized by asking respondents about their frequency of personal computer use at home or at work, and their perceived level of agreement that the Internet was easy to use (Henrichs, 1995).

Language compatibility. The English language barrier found in Arguello's study (1996) was a new variable that had never been empirically examined or integrated into Rogers' theoretical framework. Because English is a common language for Internet, but not commonly used in Thailand, this variable was important to this study. Because there was no question from previous study concerning this variable, an original statement was added in order to measure the language barrier: "Not understanding English is a problem for using the Internet." Also, the respondents were asked to assess their English proficiency: "I am proficient in English."

Complexity. In order to measure this construct, the respondents were asked how easy it was to learn and to use the Internet, and whether they required help in getting started (Henrichs, 1995).

Trialability. In the case of the Internet, this construct was operationalized by asking respondents whether they could try the Internet at the office or elsewhere, and whether they had tried using it personally at least once (Henrichs, 1995).

Observability. This construct was operationalized by asking respondents whether they could observe the Internet in use at the office or elsewhere, and whether the Internet was available for them anytime they wanted (Henrichs, 1995).

Experience and ability to learn new technology related to the innovation. In the case of Internet, computer experience is a prerequisite to the Internet use. Therefore, this variable was operationalized by asking the respondents to rate themselves in terms of computer literacy, then asking how much they enjoyed learning new computer technologies, their frequency of use of personal computers at work or elsewhere, and whether they had formal training in computer programming. These statements were also adapted from Henrichs' study (1995).

Internet socialization. The variables that were examined in this study concerned the organization policy toward the Internet and peer pressure. Three original statements were included to examine the intervening factors within an organization. The respondents were asked whether their organizations offered any Internet training, and whether their organizations encouraged them to use Internet. Another question asked whether their colleagues used the Internet extensively. This last question was conceptualized according to Rogers' "peer pressure" (1971) and was adapted from Henrichs' study.

Psychographic. The factors examined in this category were attitudes and goals (Spence, 1994). A statement, asking the respondents whether they planned to remain in the newspaper field for the rest of their career (Barrett, 1984), was included to measure goals.

Attitudes were measured in terms of job satisfaction; therefore, a set of four statements from previous studies (Ekachai & Komolsevin, 1995; Broom & Dozier, 1986; Barrett, 1984) were used in the questionnaire. The statements ask: how much the respondents liked their job, whether their duties and responsibilities were well matched to their abilities, how important they perceived their job was as compared to the others within the same organization, and how satisfied they were with the job as compared to their colleagues. The Thai version of these statements was available from a previous study (Ekachai & Komolsevin, 1995).

Demographics. Among the variables that contribute to individual identity, the ones that relevant to this study were age, gender, marital status, education level, income. Therefore, the questions concerning these variables were posed to the respondents.

An open space at the end of the questionnaire was provided for the respondents to add comments regarding their use or nonuse of the Internet.

Findings

Demographic Characteristics

Most of the respondents were single (70%) with a bachelor's degree (83%). The majority of them (55%) earned a monthly income between 10,001-20,000 bath (38 bath =

US$ 1 at the time of data collecting) which was slightly lower than average monthly income based on GDP-per capita ("1997 CIA," 1999). There were more female (56%) than male (44%) respondents. In terms of languages, there were 171 individuals from Thai-language newspapers and 96 from English-language newspapers.

Chi-square analysis suggested that there was no significant differences in terms of gender, age, and marital status among the three groups. However, educational and income levels were significantly different (see table 1).

For education, the author made high school and some college level missing values as there were too few cases to analyze. The result indicated that the majority of the respondents held a bachelor's degree, with 46% (102 people) being adopters and 42% (93 people) likely adopters. People with advanced degrees tended to be adopters of the Internet. In fact, out of 37 people with higher degrees, 28 of them (75.7%) were Internet adopters.

In terms of income, most of people with income higher than 20,000 baht were adopters of the Internet. More importantly, there was more than twice as many adopters with income higher than 30,000 than adopters with income under 10,000.

In general, the typical adopter tended to be a single female, around 26-35 years of age, with a monthly income of 10,001-20,000 baht, which is slightly lower than the national average. Almost half of them (45%) generated income over 20,001 baht a month. Most of the adopters had graduated with a bachelor's degree and had been worked in journalism field for more than 5 years.

Most likely adopters had monthly income around 10,001 to 20,000 baht. The majority of them (84%) worked for Thai-language newspaper and graduated with a Bachelor's degree. They were mostly single and had worked in the journalism field for more than 5 years.

The majority of nonadopters had a similar profiles to that of the likely adopters except for their work experience. The number of years they had been in newspaper business ranged from 1 to 5 years.

Table 2 reports the mean scores of the perceived attributes of adopters, likely-adopters, and nonadopters. Anova was computed to compare the means of the three groups. In general, the perceived attribute means of the adopters were higher than those of the likely-adopters and the nonadopters. A post hoc test (Scheffe) also indicated significant differences in means of all attributes between adopters and the other two groups, except for relative advantage. For relative advantage, adopters were higher but not statistically different from likely-adopters.

The highest means for all three groups were for relative advantage (8.05 for adopters, 7.64 for likely-adopters, 4.87 for nonadopters). Obviously, the adopters and likely-adopters found the Internet a useful and advantageous technology. However, though nonadopters perceived the relative advantage higher than any other attributes, the mean was still low as compared to the advantage means of the other two groups. This meant that the nonadopters did not find the innovation very advantageous. A post hoc test (Scheffe) indicated that nonadopters were statistically different from both adopters and nonadopters in terms of relative advantage.

The lowest means for likely-adopters and for nonadopters were trialability. These two groups had difficulty experimenting with the Internet. According to the operational definition, they either could not try it at the office and elsewhere, or they had not tried using it at all. For them, trialability was the most important obstacle for Internet adoption.

Language compatibility was the lowest mean only for the adopters (4.98). They found themselves deficient in English and found language incompatibility a problem for using the Internet. The mean of this attribute was next to the lowest for likely-adopters (4.22).They were also aware of the language incompatibility of the Internet and found it a major problem for Internet adoption.

Nonadopters did not find language incompatibility a major drawback as compared to the rest of the attributes of the Internet because the mean was not the lowest. However, in real terms the mean of this attribute was still very low (3.84). For nonadopters, language incompatibility was seen as a problem, but in comparison it was not as serious as some other factors.

A post hoc test (Scheffe) indicated significant differences in language compatibility mean of adopters and those of the other two groups; however, the mean for likely adopters was not different statistically from nonadopters' one.

Note that the lowest attribute mean of adopters, which is observability (6.55), was still higher than the highest attribute mean of nonadopters which is relative advantage (4.87).

A linear regression analysis using perceived attributes of the Internet as the predictors of the adoption rate indicated that compatibility and trialability were the only two predictors that were statistically significant (see Table 3).

The beta weight indicated that trialability was the stronger predictor. The ability of the respondents to try the Internet at the office and elsewhere, or the opportunity to try using it personally seemed to be the prime reason for adoption. Compatibility, which in this study referred to the respondents' use of the personal computer and their perceived level of agreement that the Internet was easy to use, turned out to be the second strongest predictor.

The smallest beta weight was found for language compatibility. Apparently, the English language barrier and the respondents' proficiency in English had little to do with adoption rate of the Internet in this study.

However, this regression considered only the attributes of innovation as the predictors of the adoption rate. To take all independent variables into account, a hierarchical analysis was performed. Three levels of adoption rate (1-nonadopter, 2-likely-adopter, 3-adopter) were treated as ordinal variables (see Table 4).

The result in final regression suggested that the same independent variables as in the previous regression analysis (see Table 3)--compatibility and trialability--were significant predictors of the adoption rate.

Other attributes, including language compatibility, were positively related to adoption rate, but none was a significant predictor. Overall, attributes of the Internet contributed about 13% of the variance in adoption rate over and above other independent variables.

There was only one other significant factor in the final regression, and it was negatively related to the adoption rate. This factor was part of job satisfaction measurement. This negative relation indicated that the more the respondents felt that their duties and responsibilities matched their abilities, the less likely they were to adopted the Internet.

Initially, the first regression indicated two of the demographic variables--education and income--significantly predicted the adoption rate. Those who were more educated and those with higher income were more likely to adopt the Internet. Though income continued to be a significant predictor in regression two and three, both variables were no longer significant in the final regression.

Most of the psychographic variables were negatively related to the adoption rate in the beginning but became more positive toward the final regression. Ironically, the statement directly assessed the respondents' satisfaction with their jobs turned out to be negatively related to adoption rate but was not statistically significant in the final regression.

Two intervening factors--encouragement by the office and coworker use of the Internet--were strong predictors at first. However, they all became insignificant once perceived attributes of the innovation were controlled. Nevertheless, the entire block of intervening factors significantly increased the adoption rate and explained more than 23% of the variance.

In addition, computer literacy and enjoyment in learning or using computer also predicted adoption rate before the attributes of innovation variables were controlled. The positive relation suggested that the higher computer literacy a person had and the more they enjoyed learning or using computer, the more likely they adopted the Internet. However, formal training in computer proved to be negatively related to adoption rate. The more a person received a formal training in the computer, the less likely they used the Internet. In general, this computer experience block explained about 12% of the variance.

As a further test of the influence of perceived attributes on adoption rate, the adoption rate was collapsed into a dichotomous dependent variable consisting of adopters = 1, and nonadopters = 0 (likely-adopters and nonadopters combined) in order to run a logistic regression analysis (see Table 5). The result yielded more significant predictors of Internet adoption as compared to the previous regression analysis (Table 4).

In the final regression, four out of six attributes of innovation predicted Internet adoption. The perceived attributes of the Internet proved to be strong predictors. Perceiving the Internet as more compatible, more trialable, and less complex led to higher probability of Internet adoption. Surprisingly, relative advantage was negatively related to adoption. People who perceived the Internet as highly advantageous were less likely to adopt the technology.

Two perceived attributes that failed to predict Internet adoption were language compatibility and observability. It was not surprising for language compatibility to be insignificant since it was also found to be the weakest predictor of Internet adoption rate in the initial linear regression (Table 3). For observability--whether the journalists could observe the Internet in use and whether the Internet was available for them--this regression indicated that the variable had little to do with the probability of the adoption.

Like the previous regression, computer literacy and enjoyment in learning and using computer were strong predictors of adoption at first, but computer literacy fell short of significance after the perceived attributes of innovation were entered to the regression.

Internet training was a significant predictor, but was negatively related to adoption. Training did not increase the probability of Internet adoption. In fact, it seemed to hinder it. Only one psychographic measure--one's duty matched his or her ability well-- predicted Internet adoption and the direction was negative. However, the block of psychographic variables was the only one that did not significantly predict Internet adoption.

Demographic variables had some impact on adoption. Being single was linked to adoption. The negative direction of age indicated that being younger was related to Internet adoption. Surprisingly, educational level and income were not significant indicators of Internet adoption in the final regression though they both appeared to be significant and positive in the early equations.

Discussion and Conclusions

Based on linear hierarchical regression, perceived attributes of innovation were strong predictors of adoption rate. Moreover, two attributes--trialability and compatibility--were the strongest predictors of adoption rate and were some of the few significant ones.

The hierarchical regression did not yield more significant predictors because it was quite a conservative test as compared to a less robust logistic regression. The latter tested the probability of adoption not the adoption rate. The result of logistic regression yielded more significant variables that predicted Internet adoption.

Three of perceived attributes of the Internet--trialability, complexity, and compatibility--positively predicted the probability of Internet adoption. Relative advantage was statistically significant but negatively associated with the probability. Several variables other than the perceived attributes also significantly associated with adoption.

However, both regressions proved that attributes of the Internet emerged as the most significant predictors of Internet adoption.

It was a surprise that language compatibility did not significantly predict Internet adoption. Indeed, language compatibility recorded the smallest beta weight among the attributes. This meant that language compatibility was the attribute least associated with Internet adoption in this study. This finding regarding language compatibility needed more explanation.

Perhaps, a better explanation could be found once mean scores of this particular perceived attribute of the adopters was compared with that of the nonadopters. For nonadopters, the mean of language compatibility was relatively moderate among all attributes, although it was still low in reality (M = 3.84). For the adopters, in relative terms, the mean of language compatibility was the lowest among all attributes.

It then might be implied that nonadopters did not perceive English language as a major problem while adopters, on the other hand, found English a major deterrent for their Internet adoption compared to the rest of the attributes. This seems logical because a person who did not try to use the technology would be less likely to realize the language difficulty or problems involving that technology. Once they used it, they would then encounter the problem and realize the difficulty. However, regardless of how low the mean of language compatibility was, the adopters used the Internet because they scored high in other attributes of the technology.

Though observability was positively correlated with adoption rate, ~~but~~ it did not turn out to be a significant predictor of Internet adoption in any regression. This finding suggested that whether the journalists could observe the Internet in use or not had little to do with their adoption.

Moreover, this study suggested that the preeminent problem to the adoption of the Internet among the journalists in Thailand at this point was not the English language compatibility but the trialability of the technology. The narrative comments confirmed the shortage of computers and Internet accessibility in the offices as well as at home. The nature of their job which kept them away from the offices most of the time could also be regarded as part of the problem concerning the inaccessibility of the technology because the Internet was not abundant in Thailand.

Another major problem that did not fall within any attributes of innovation according to this study's operational definition was the problem of connecting to the Internet. Many respondents were put off by the difficulty in logging on the net and staying online. A similar finding regarding accessing to the Internet was documented in a previous study in Thailand (Sopratum, 1997).

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Past studies in the United States indicated that age and gender difference on the Internet were declining (Johnson & Kaye, 1998; "Online Newcomers," 1998). Age was still a significant predictor for the adoption in Thailand according to this study--the younger they were, the more likely they would be the Internet adopters. This finding was similar to earlier studies of the Internet in the U.S. (Atkin, Jeffres, & Neuendorf, 1997; Reagan, Pinkleton, Busselle, & Jackson, 1998). Age, then, might be a significant predictor because Thailand is not as far along in the adoption process as the United States.

In term of education, the result indicated that people who are highly educated tended to be adopters of the Internet. This finding is common for any innovation adoption. As Rogers (1995) asserted, the earlier adopters generally are more educated or "have more years of formal education than later adopters" (p. 269) because the ability to understand and apply complex technical knowledge is needed for adoption.

The finding that the educated persons are more likely to adopt the Internet has also been documented in earlier Internet studies in the U.S. (Hoffman, Kalsbeek, & Novak, 1996; Kaye & Johnson, 1998), as well as in Thailand (Sopratum, 1997).

In this study, a new variable was introduced as a potential predictor of innovation adoption. Specifically, it was assumed in this study that job satisfaction would lead to willingness to adopt a new technology that will help journalists do their job better. As the results show, job satisfaction did not turn out to be a significant variable associated with the Internet adoption in this research.

Perhaps, trialability provides an explanation as to why job satisfaction was not significant. Many journalists could not get access to the Internet, so even if they wanted to learn it to improve themselves they could not. This might also lower their job satisfaction.

Perhaps the most astonishing finding was that while four out five major newspapers included in this study had developed their on-line editions (only Matichon had no on-line edition), it seemed like they put little effort in encouraging ($\underline{M} = 2.8$ on a scale of 1-5) their staffs to use the Internet as a research or communication tool and provided minimal training to them (M = 1.73).

As there are more and more Thai websites on the Internet and as more information is made available on the Web, newspaper executives will find this technology useful to their staffs. However, one problem that comes with the effort to promote the use of the Internet is budget restraints. The economic crisis that hit Thailand as well as the rest of Asian countries in the recent years has a long-term effect on all businesses. The budget concern may prevent Thai newspaper publishers from investing in any new technology in near future including making the Internet more available to their employees.

Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to examine what factors affect the adoption of the Internet by the Thai newspaper journalists. The diffusion of innovation was used as a primary theoretical framework for the study with English language compatibility introduced as an additional variable.

It was clear in this study that the perceived attributes of innovation--relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability--proved to be useful predictors of adopting the innovation. The result enhanced the diffusion of innovation theory advanced by Rogers (1995) in this aspect.

Though Rogers argued that the five attributes were important in explaining adoption rates, he did not spell out as which attribute was more important in predicting the adoption rates (1995). Past studies also found different attributes significantly associated with Internet adoption in different settings (Wang & Cohen, 1998; Garrison, 1998a; Kaminer, 1997; Carter, 1997; O'Regan, 1996; Arguello, 1996; Henrichs, 1995). As for this study, trialability emerged as a prime predictor of Internet adoption by Thai journalists.

The additional attribute--English-language compatibility of the Internet--did not turn out to be a significant predictor of adoption as postulated because likely-adopters and nonadopters did not appear to be aware of the problem. The adopters, on the other hand, realized the language incompatibility of the medium but still used it because their perceived relative advantage and other attributes were greater and overrode the language barrier they encountered.

Currently, English and Internet seems to be inseparable, especially the World Wide Web, as almost two thirds of the world's Web traffic comes from the United States (Flynn, 2000). There seems to be only few options for adopters in dealing with language barrier--to get over it, to drop the technology, or to help develop more Thai websites--for there were not many Thai websites available for them to use. However, if the journalists wanted to obtain international information which is mostly available in English or to go beyond their national setting, it is most likely that the language problem is unavoidable.

As one respondent pointed out clearly in the narrative answer that English language was a problem in using the Internet but he looked at the bright side: just by using it, the Internet would improve his English.

One aspect of innovation adoption that was not explored in this study was discontinuities of Internet adoption. From this study, the results indicated that adopters were aware of the language barrier but the perceived advantage of the Internet were greater. That was why they used it. But how many people could not overcome the language barrier and how many people abandon the Internet after facing language incompatibility is yet to be investigated.

Several respondents mentioned that the cost of the Internet service was one of the major concern for the adoption because many journalists wanted to have the Internet at home. The variable also need to be taken into account in future studies.

The open-ended answers also added more information to the findings as few people asserted that they used the Internet for "relaxation" and to "escape from work." It might be interesting to learn about their uses and gratifications after they adopted the Internet in future research.

Table 1

Breakdown Frequency and Percentages of Demographic Profiles

	Adopters	Likely adopters	Nonadopters
Age			
less than 25	18 64.3 14.1	6 21.4 5.9	4 14.3 14.3
26-35	91 47.9 71.1	78 41.1 77.2	21 11.1 75.0
36 and over	19 48.7 14.8	17 43.6 16.8	3 7.7 10.7
χ2 (4, N = 257) = 4.6, p = n.s.			
Gender			
Male	55 46.6 41.4	47 39.8 45.6	16 13.6 51.6
Female	78 52.3 58.6	56 37.6 54.4	15 10.1 48.4
χ2 (2, N = 267) = 1.21, p = n.s.			
Education			
Bachelor's	102 46.2 78.5	93 42.1 92.1	26 11.8 96.3
Advanced degree	28 75.7 21.5	8 21.6 7.9	1 2.7 3.7
χ2 (2, N = 258) = 11.36, p < .05			
Status			
Single	91 48.1 70.0	79 41.8 79.0	19 10.1 67.9
Married	39 56.5 30.0	21 30.4 21.0	9 13.0 32.1
χ2 (2, N = 258) = 2.80, p = n.s.			

Table 1 (continued)

	Adopters	Likely adopters	Nonadopters
Income			
under 10,000	11	11	6
	39.3	39.3	21.4
	8.4	10.7	19.4
10,001-20,000	61	69	17
	41.5	46.9	11.6
	46.6	67.0	54.8
20,001-30,000	35	20	6
	57.4	32.8	9.8
	26.7	19.4	19.4
30,001 up	24	3	2
	82.8	10.3	6.9
	18.3	2.9	6.5
$\chi2$ (6, N = 265) = 21.89, p < .05			
Work Experience			
less than 1 year	7	-	-
	100.0		
	5.3		
1-3 years	26	13	10
	53.1	26.5	20.4
	19.8	13.0	33.3
more than 3-5 years	28	29	10
	41.8	43.3	14.9
	21.4	29.0	33.3
more than 5 years	70	58	10
	50.7	42.0	7.2
	53.4	58.0	33.3
$\chi2$ (6, N = 261) = 16.92, p < .05			

Table 2

Summary of Perceived Attribute Means

Perceived Attributes	Adopter (n=133)	Likely-adopter (n=103)	Nonadopter (n=31)	F Ratio
Relative advantage	8.05	7.64	4.87	34.03*
Compatibility	7.27	4.36	3.19	77.55*
Language compatibility	4.98	4.22	3.84	12.45*
Complexity	7.47	5.39	3.87	52.82*
Trialability	7.56	4.18	2.58	117.90*
Observability	6.55	4.52	2.90	51.07*

*p < .05.

Table 3

Summary of Regression Analysis for Perceived Attributes of the Internet Predicting Internet Adoption Rate

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
ADV	.013949	.017062	.042019	.818	.4144
COMPAT	.061134	.015941	.231196	3.835	.0002**
LANG	.007330	.022079	.015775	.332	.7402
COMPX	.029727	.017696	.101479	1.680	.0942
TRIAL	.100952	.017173	.405717	5.879	.0000**
OB	.016097	.017400	.056253	.925	.3558
(Constant)	1.040407	.138391		7.518	.0000

*p < .05, **p < .01.

Table 4

Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting the Internet Adoption Rate

Predictor variables	Regression 1	Regression 2	Regression 3	Regression 4	Regression 5
Demographics					
Age	.004	.002	-.018	-.016	-.047
Gender	.067	.068	.021	.051	.053
Marital status	-.050	-.044	.006	.011	.035
Educational level	.168**	.170**	.177**	.090	.039
Income	.184**	.169*	.018	.062	.020
Psychographic					
Plan to remain in the newspaper		-.008	-.026	.027	.025
Like the job		.115	.042	-.014	.046
Duties well matched abilities		-.027	-.045	-.055	-.148*
My job is important		-.031	.063	.015	.008
I am satisfied with my job		-.091	-.124	-.097	-.052
Internet Socialization					
Internet training			-.062	-.031	-.044
Encouragement			.235**	.153*	.078
Coworkers use the Internet			.255**	.184*	.054
Friends use the Internet			.110	.059	-.009
Computer Experience					
Computer literacy				.145*	.022
Enjoy learning or using computer				.269**	.121
Formal training in computer				-.118*	-.065
Perceived Attributes					
Relative advantages					.019
Compatibility					.167**
Language Compatibility					.034
Complexity					.104
Trialability					.323**
Observability					.030
R Square	.081	.095	.329	.452	.582
Adjusted R square	.063	.059	.291	.414	.541
R Square change	.081	.015	.233	.124	.129
Sig of change	.001	.541	.000	.000	.000

$^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$

Table 5

Logistic regression analysis for the Internet adoption

Predictor variables	Regression 1	Regression 2	Regression 3	Regression 4	Regression 5
Demographics					
Age	-.029	-.029	-.039	-.051*	-.090**
Gender	.237	.236	.001	.069	.486
Marital status	.180	.202	.506	.683	1.528**
Educational level	.829*	.823*	1.067**	.662	.222
Income	.454**	.436**	.143	.370	.418
Psychographic					
Plan to remain in the newspaper		.032	.016	.128	.266
Like the job		.032	-.186	-.420	-.325
Duties well matched abilities		-.003	-.072	-.256	-.942**
My job is important		-.106	.102	.120	.159
I am satisfied with my job		-.178	-.301	-.335	-.085
Internet Socialization					
Internet training			-.405	-.344	-1.238*
Encouragement			.451**	.379*	.186
Coworkers use the Internet			.500*	.458*	.143
Friends use the Internet			.182	.059	-.096
Computer experience					
Computer literacy				.669**	.284
Enjoy learning or using computer				.616**	.739*
Formal training in computer				-.720*	.012
Perceived Attributes					
Relative advantages					-.496**
Compatibility					.421**
Language Compatibility					.071
Complexity					.425**
Trialability					.616**
Observability					.096
Model Chi-Square	22.85	3.82	65.12	47.50	84.34
Significance	.00	.57	.00	.00	.00

*p < .05, **p < .01

LINKAGES OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL NEWS

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Abstract

The recent alarm about the decline of interest in foreign/international news by U.S. editors, readers and viewers has not been matched by equal concern over how to make non-local news more relevant. Ironically, globalization in trade, transportation and communication increase as localism flourishes in the practice of journalism.

This study of how five daily newspapers made local tie-ins to international news on page one covers the month of January 1999 for the Boston Globe, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Chicago Tribune, Dallas Morning News and San Francisco Chronicle-Examiner. It surveys research on criteria for international news, professionals' worries about scanty resources and skewed priorities, and the sparse training and textbook guides for both staff and free-lancers connecting "main street" to the larger world whose political boundaries are being dissolved by the electronic and natural environment.

It searches for various journalistic techniques such as the inserted parenthetical sentence, source, or paragraph with a local reference or tie; the localized side-bar and longer additional story on similar local conditions, projects, persons and events; and the impact, import, connections and parallels to "our town" where "it also happens."

Print media's ties to local geographic proximity is challenged by the mediated cyberspace of virtual global electronic communities where television and the Internet make "here" and "there" inseparable and "no where" and "any where" melt into real-time journalism where all news becomes both local and international.

LINKAGES OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL NEWS

There have been frequent cycles of alarm and lament about the nature and amount of foreign/international news in the U.S. press. These alternate between too much or too little such news, to questions about treatment, motives, relevance and impact of such content.

Critics have pointed to foreign news in the U.S. as exploitative, negative, not constructive or informative, especially on the Third World (Riffe & Shaw); ethnocentric (Kline); technically good but "confusing, imbalanced. . dispersed"(Horvat); excessively reliant on official governmental, diplomatic and military sources. The record of U.S. foreign journalism is not exemplary: lack of knowledge about Cuba and the Philippines at the turn of the century and of the Kaiser before World War I; geographic illiteracy on Pearl Harbor before World War II; Presidential candidate George Romney "brain-washed" about VietNam; Gerald Ford confused as to Poland's side of the Iron Curtain; and President Clinton and NATO using maps to show Americans the location of Kosovo.

Yet some say there is too much or enough international news but not enough analysis (Husni & Lee); or that it has mostly a geographic focus (Tsang). Long before the 1979 Afghanistan War,the term "afghanistanism" was used to criticize editors who focused on distant news in order to ignore controversial local news on "main street" or in their own backyard. One argument was that "They give us reports of life in Soviet cities, Israeli kibbutzin, Middle Eastern towns and Chinese villages. It is the far more accessible villages of their own land which they seem to have trouble understanding"(McKenna,p.31).

It has also been charged that "few Americans are able to follow distant events which shape their lives. Most are shown generalities, simplicities and vast empty spaces, a parody of the real world beyond their borders"(Rosenblum, p.3) and "a low-volume cacophony as complex as the world they reflect"(p.222). There has been criticism of soft, "long, often soppy, local features" and "Too many editors overfill their news holes with over-written or pointless local copy. Then they spray world news into the cracks, like liquid insulation. People make no sense of it. In focus groups, they say they skip over it. And the world slips further out of sight"(Rosenblum,p.282). Space is "devoted to secondary local news" and foreign correspondents' "output arrives in torrents, like so much electronic junk mail, and gets thrown away unread. Careful editing would leave room for news that matters, local or foreign"(Rosenblum, p.281).

This common and dominant indictment and alarm centers around the decrease in international news and a shrinking foreign news-hole in the last generation (Riffe et al); the "undernourishment and starvation" of such news (Kaplan); a greater reader "interest in foreign news than editors and reporters generally think they have"(Mauro); and a majority of isolated, self-centered Americans protected by friendly neighbors and two oceans and ill-informed on world affairs (Hachten).

Newsrooms Challenged by Global Realities

Indeed, the "current media priorities keep the United States in a cocoon, insulated from a broad understanding of people in other countries"(Olmstead). "The news has not really been stolen. It has been mugged, muffled and muzzled, kicked into corners, left to atrophy, pumped out of shape or ignored altogether"(Rosenblum,p.280). However, communications technology and global realities may change that. "It is a truism that the revolution in telecommunications has made the world smaller. News of events in other countries can be received as quickly as news of a hold-up at a local grocery store"(Buckman). "In an age of suitcase satellite telephones and global CNN, it is hard to imagine any spot on earth not touched by international communication"(Stevenson, p.544). Foreign news is said to be a misnomer since "in this interdependent world, we are potentially affected by any event almost anywhere"(Hachten, p. 815).

Editors have also sounded the alarm: Readers in LaCrosse, Wisconsin are reminded that "daily events in the world, coupled with American policy decisions, do matter in your life, in ways more direct that you might realize . . .our message is that as a nation, and as a community, we can run but we can't hide from the impact of world events on our daily lives"(Mial). In Atlanta, Keith Graham, international editor of the Journal-Constitution, says "The world has come to us and it will come in a bigger way in the future. Our readers need to know about the key events that could affect their lives--wars, ecological disasters, trade disputes, and sometimes, they just need to know enough about other cultures to be able to talk to their neighbors"(Arnett).

"Local stories increasingly take on global implications. Rural communities become home to international manufacturers. Large immigrant populations retain interest in their home regions. Narrowcasting, far-flung computer news groups, and other forms of specialty media make it possible for a consumer to have as much or more in common with people in another state or country than with the consumer's own neighbors. Such a consumer may consider distinctions between local and international news to be unwarranted and even irksome. With e-mail, direct-dial phones, and perhaps someday, communication by way of virtual reality, local reporters can follow up on stories wherever they lead"(Shaw, Mcombs & Keir). With the new satellite hookups, local news is hardly still local (Kiolbassa); and maybe "all news is local" because "The persuasive immediacy of information from faraway places has blurred the once-clear cut distinction between far and near" (Thompson).

"Global issues, indeed, are increasingly understood to be grounded in daily life, with the debate focused on how to translate that connection into a new politics and, beyond that, into a new and more democratic discourse capable of challenging the prevailing wisdom and institutions of our contemporary industrial and urban order. The environmentalism of the future, depending on the outcome of such debates, offers the potential of generating new kinds of coalitions around the conditions of daily life"(Gottlieb, p.54). In the larger, non-territorial community where geography becomes less important, "The causes of crime, poverty, pollution, and other community problems lie not so much with the characteristics of the local subsystem as with the society's macrosystem"(Lyon,p.60). Small, local towns can become virtual global communities in transborder pollution disputes (Burd 1999). "The environment is a global problem and a local problem and the problems are intertwined.. . .There may be toxins from a nearby plant in one's backyard today, but there may be acid rain from Germany there tomorrow"(Prato). "In the global village. . . .we are finding a whole host of new communities, non-geographic communities of shared interest"(Whitehead,p.33) "'Here' has so far been a place where everyone's thinking and interests were about the same. The center of the universe has been where they (people) put their feet. . . before there were non-geographical communities of interest"(Gibson).

New Needs, But Old Journalism and Geography Prevail

Although communication and transportation have changed the real world, it has been said that even the field of international communication "has neither substance nor method, only geography"(Stevenson, p. 543). And the geographical proximity of news and events to the country reporting them remains a major criteria in the selection of foreign news (Galtung & Ruge; Chang & Lee); and local newspapers stress local events over those outside the local market (Buckalew). Physical and geographical proximity is also used to predict the localization of news (Morton & Warren); and U.S. newspapers closer to foreign countries geographically tend to publish more news about those countries (Colby).

There is no shortage of such alarms and advice about the need to improve and change local coverage of international news. Exactly what to do logically, how to proceed stategically, and what has already been done have been less discussed. First, here are some the loud lamentations indicating a will to act.

"American newspaper readers instinctively realize that with today's interconnectedness, what happens halfway around the world directly affects them", but they are overwhelmed by local news based on proximity and many newspapers have greatly reduced international news since the Cold War except for news of bombs, crises, disasters, immigration and trade (Arnett). Americans now worry about things closer to home, find foreign news confusing and insignificant, and the general public "is being short-changed by media that have yet to exhibit the combination of effort and talent to make news of the wider world interesting and relevant"(Hoge).

For more than 30 years, journalists themselves have admonished the profession. In 1968, the New Yorker foreign editor Seymour Topping told his correspondents to "'pierce those ethnocentric barriers'" and "'be less preoccupied with the daily rhetoric of the capitals. We should report more about how the people live" abroad and help Americans "see what they need (to know) is also what they want'" (Rosenblum, p.289). At about the same time, foreign correspondents were advised to untangle complicated national and international news, make sense of it to the ordinary reader, and realize that mere more news was not enough because "the public in the mass is being battered by daily landslides of information that tend to bury thought and deaden comprehension" (Hohenberg, p.116).

By the mid-1970s, "the media fail to show that international news is relevant to the lives of readers and viewers" with little more than the bare essentials and "not enough to provide any clear view of what is going on in the rest of the world"(Markel & March). Five years later, newspapers, were criticized for negative, spot news, lack of news analysis, and urged to emphasize "the home country angle", impact and affinity (Sparkes & Winter).

Six years later, Peter Jennings, of ABC's "We Bring the World to You", said "For while there is no substitute for foreign correspondents, there is also no substitute for the powerful impression the local angle makes in revealing the impact of foreign relations". He said "the most effective way to connect with your audience is to make your reporting relevant to an individual's life" and "the story isn't always several thousand miles away. It is at home . . .that local window on the world" (Jennings). It was urged then that "journalists need only look on Main Street America for Third World news--news that will make foreign affairs relevant to the lives of their readers, listeners, and viewers" and journalists "Thinking that no local ties exist to the developing world, they do not look for them."(Hamilton, p.5).

To do this, journalists have been urged to write for other people, not just for other journalists. "Reporting is about people, and it is for people. We must take readers or viewers along, step by step, through complex situations. We have to help them across cultural bridges. Events and emotion in one society must be shown in terms that relate to people in another". That was the advice of Kevin Bradley, former Newsweek reporter and later Playboy executive editor (Rosenblum,p.284). "People" news flourished, perhaps excessively, but by 1996, the lack of linkage between local and international was thought to be due to personalized journalism. "It's an election year. And an Olympics year. The presumed Unabomber is behind bars. Grindstone won the Derby. Madonna is pregnant. The average newspaper reader is more familiar with any of these stories than with the Russian elections or the international war-crimes trials now taking place in the Hague"(Sacharow). What can be done to respond to these laments ?

How to Teach Localized International News

Fifteen years ago, the "dearth and poor quality of international news in U.S.media" was matched by "weak and peripheral" journalism training programs (Corrigan). Within a decade, there were signs of concern about "world reporting" (Bruce), and experiments to help journalism students localize the world to Main Street through connective news on campus foreign students and programs (Brownlee). There were also proposals to internationalize journalism education from a parochial to global perspective (Ogan & Brownlee).

Guidance for localizing international news has long been sparse and scanty in journalism writing texts, (especially newer texts) whether basic, advanced or specialized. References are extremely brief, with few examples, and they deal as much with national as with internationsl news. Geographical proximity and impact on local readers in the local media market is emphasized (Brooks, et al; Garrison). This includes local tie-ins to business, education, science and the natural environment (Lovell); fame and travel of locals in out-of-town newspapers (Bird); and local activities and eye-witnesses to events beyond (Behrens).

Students are urged to write about overlooked local stories "before you travel to the far corners of the globe seeking news" (Hensley); and to "people-ize" the "aftermath" stories on disasters and crises, which may "not be so obvious for events that occurred hundreds or thousands of miles away" (Garrison, p.214). One of the older, long-standing texts says “the original story is not complete” without mention of the repercussions, reverberations and impact on the local community, and whether it “could happen here”. “Famine in India, an earthquake in Japan, revolution in Venezuela or the peaceful overthrow of a government anywhere can affect local business conditions”(MacDougall, p. 451).

Some parochial and nationalistic notions pervade. One text tells students that “readers are likely to care more deeply about developments close to home than those far away” and that, for example, France may matter, but ironically “less attention is paid to events in tiny Albania, whose world influence is negligible”(Porter & Ferris, p.6). But the same teachers admit that “In a shrinking world, however, local stories can have ‘ripple’ effects that spread for thousands of miles, and the rule of proximity consequently is becoming less persuasive”(Porter & Ferris). One journalism professor advises editors to “Judge every news story by how it affects your readers instead of how it affects you” by making it personal and close to the reader, even if it’s only a sentence, clause or paragraph about the local situation. He advised that all stories that originated elsewhere be examined for possible adaptation to the local community by asking if “it” could or is happening here (Gibson).

Other links between local and global news have been pointed out by journalism and media scholars. U.S. media quickly, but inaccurately, reported that the Oklahoma City bombing was possibly done by a Mid-East terrorist (Eldar). A study of 107 U.S. newspapers covering 150 international events in seven days, found that coverage was more likely if the U.S. was involved and if they were disasters, crime, accidents, war or violence (Hurrat). A survey of 540 dailies found editors were more likely to select foreign news if the U.S. was involved with military and national interests (Chang & Lee). Another found that world political and economic events are considered more newsworthy in the U.S. press if they deviate from U.S. national values (Shoemaker, Danielian & Brendlinger).

"In fact, journalists often follow American foreign policy in selecting foreign news" and "This ethnocentrism. . .judges other countries by the extent to which they live up to or imitate American practices and values . .(Gans,p.42). This was especially true for communist countries during the Cold War, but during the first post-Cold War congressional elections in 1990 in the midst of extensive news on foreign affairs, both politicians and the press failed to link foreign policy issues to those election campaigns (Wells & King).

New Approaches by Press Practitioners

Some newspapers are thinking globally to help readers and their communities act and react locally, despite the general decline in international news after the end of the Cold War. The Christian Science Monitor continues to win prizes for international news with its 11 international bureaus and its "projective journalism" which looks for a "solutions-oriented" approach that engages readers. The San Francisco Chronicle uses 30-35 overseas bureau stringers and the Miami Herald is concentrating on special and meaningful Latin American issues "targeted by readers". Its executive editor, Doug Clifton, in a staff memo, reminded writers that "'When you write the four hundredth story on anything, unless you present meaning, you fail'"(Sacharow).

The Boston Globe is spending $3 million of its $50 million budget in labor and expenses for international news. In his concern for more localization of international news, former Globe editor Tom Winship is eager for 'more approaches to global news within easy reach of community newspapers of all sizes" and "more creative foreign news in smaller papers". This would include news on lifestyle, the environment, drug traffic, crime, jobs and human interest "far more than in diplomatic double talk"(Winship).

While many newspapers are reducing their foreign correspondents, the Wall Street Journal, which won a Pulitzer Prize for its explanation of the Russian financial crisis, is expanding its foreign business and financial news. The Dallas Morning News aims to "interest readers in distant events and show why they matter"(Rosenblum). The Fort Worth Star-Telegram brings "Local news from the global village" to its International Digest with "global perspective" in "a small world"; and the director of the Chicago Tribune's international reporting, George DeLoma, sees his one foot in two cultures helping him to be "better positioned to know the importance of international news"(Fitzgerald). Some see the local media as able to help "guarantee the cultural visibility of displaced audiences by sustaining the character of communal life that is being altered by globalization." News of immigrants'countries can link the displaced diasporic and "disconnected people from geographic regions, traditional spheres of home, place and identity"(Sampedro, p. 140). One prediction is that "more globalization of the United States could expand interest of new and native citizens about international and intercultural news"(Johnson,p.324).

This comes as post-Cold War international news is dwindling everywhere, while efforts are being made to explain and localize foreign stories as no longer "foreign", to use local sources and to listen more to readers (Edwards). This is an optimism revived from some 15 years ago, when it was found that readers "are more interested in international and national news than in news of their own community" and "no matter where they appear in the paper, their readership is markedly ahead of local stories"(Bogart).

The current movement to localize international news is being spearheaded by the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) through its handbook: Bringing the World Home: Showing Readers Their Global Connections. The effort includes workshops and conferences, advisories for editors, inventories of local international contacts and connections, teaching more foreign language in schools, greater use of writers from abroad, and editor and student training and exchange programs (Simpson) It also includes showcase spots for stories connecting local with global, and a prize for the "best writing about the impact of international forces on the writer's local community" (Seaton; Arnett).

The ASNE project, led by its current president, Edward Seaton, publisher of the Manhattan, Kansas, Mercury, (Freeland), seeks to rekindle foreign reporting, and train publishers, editors and writers in detecting and doing local "points of entry" for international stories. It seeks to reduce isolation of wire editors, provide ideas and suggestions on how to do local tie-ins in an interdependent, borderless world, and banish the parochial term "foreign news"!

The ASNE initiative echoes the prophetic suggestions of journalist-educator John Hohenberg 30 years ago who urged a "new foreign correspondence" which linked local to international by asking these questions: "How do other people solve their problems ? Are they like ours ? How can we learn from them ? What do they have that can help us ? What do they do that is better than what we do ? Can we use it to help ourselves ?" (Hohenberg, p. 116).

Seaton, former president of the Inter-American Press Association and former Fulbright scholar in Ecuador, said "'All this talk abot 'local, local, local', I figured why not make a local story of international news'". The average reader has to be guided into understanding how international news affects them., whether realizing their own clothes may not be made in the U.S. or that "'the global marketplace affects their jobs, their pay, their neighborhoods and even what they buy at Wal-Mart'"(Freeland). Seaton is quoted on linkages as saying "'By writing about how our communities have become internationalized, and about the international connections to their lives, then the reader will make the connection to the international community, If these stories are written, then people will become more interested in the policy stories that drive them'"(Arnett).

Exemplary Examples for Explaining Tie-Ins

Many routine international news items offer chances for local tie-ins: trade (exports and imports), banking, jobs, environment (pollution, pesticides), disease, drugs, immigration, travel, fashion, sports, media and culture (Hamilton). "Even "obscure topics can be made relevant to Americans". Local can become international like the tourist parents' donating their son's organs to Italians after he was murdered in Italy; and Baby Jessica's fall into a West Texas well, which helped CNN in "developing its techniques and sharpening its skills" prior to coverage of the Gulf War (T. Johnson). "Simple devices can make this connection" (Rosenblum). Some other random examples illustrate this:

) "The air that people breathe in Seattle today may contain chemicals that spewed from a factory in China last week".(Lead of AP story by Randolph E. Schmid, March 6, 1999).

) Yugoslavia is compared to Canada and Kosovo to Quebec to explain the NATO war with Serbia (Newhouse News Service columnist Otis Pike, March 1, 1999).

) Presidential prospect and Texas Governor George Bush, noting the small size of Israel on his foreign policy visit, compared it to the smallest county in Texas.(February 28, 1999).

) "World Unrest Hits Home for Local Industry"(Aurora, Ill.,Beacon News); "Area Churches Generous in Third World Donations"(Hattiesburg, Miss., American); "Local Entrepreneurs Tap Into Global Territory; Mission of Marketing"(Everett, Wash., Herald); "Texas Town Feels Tug of Foreign Affairs"(Dallas Morning News) (Hamilton).

)A New York Times story showed how charitable donations of second-hand clothes by Americans were destroying the African textile industry (Fitzgerald).

)The Houston Chronicle reported on poor, sick Romanian children visited by a Houston medical group.(Hoge)

)"Kmart is an Easy Sell on Guam, Draws Tourists" to area that "straddles two identities--its political and territorial allegiance to the United States and its cultural and geographical affiliation with Asia", (Los Angeles Times, January 2, 1999).

)"Brazil's Woes to Hit Some U.S.Regions", including neighboring Texas, Detroit's auto industry, and Florida's tourists and exports.(Darren McDermott, Wall Street Journal,January 25, 1999).

) "'98 Burns up Temperature Record in Dallas-Fort Worth, Worldwide", (Alexandra Witze, Dallas Morning News, January 13, 1999).

) News and features in the Austin American-Statesman: "How Austin gets its gasoline....How crude oil from around the world fills up your car's gas tank" (6-28-98); university professor killed in Cambodian ambush; two local residents detained in Saudi Arabia, others in Mexico; three youths spend summer in Calcutta helping the destitute; local visiting teenager survives Osaka, Japan earthquake and Japanese exchange student writes father still there; local veterans remember foreign wars, and retired Army colonel who led Iran hostage rescue dies; local university grad and donor's investments have ecological impact on Indonesia and local watershed; local athletes are in Olympics, and swimmers cross waters to other countries.

)"In Guatemala, death squads in the Mayan back country influence the price of coffee" and Jim Sterba of the Wall Street Journal drew readers into rural India with one of his signature intros: He named the U.S. cities for which Indian laborers made manhole covers. When Polish workers rose in Solidarity against Communists, I felt their mood on the road with truckers. Their travelling music was Willie Nelson"(Rosenblum,p.284).

) Harper's reproduced the pay slip of an Indonesian woman working at a Nike shoe factory to compare her work hours and pay to the retail price of shoes and how "it would take her 44,492 years to earn what Michael Jordan made for endorsing her product"(Rosenblum, p.285).

) The Portland Oregonian won the 1998 Pulitzer Prize for how Oregon potatoes become fast food french fries in Asia; a Huntsville, Alabama, Times reporter was sent to Dominican Republic to write about the city's baseball players; Riverside Press-Enterprise follows local pharmaceuticals to Nicaragua; Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette explored effect of Asian financial crises on Indiana farm prices; retired Serbs in Sarasota interviewed by the Herald-Tribune on NATO bombing in Yugoslavia.

These stories abound as the U.S. is "riding shot gun for the free world" and "economically, the world is up for grabs". "Every story has some impact, however indirect.. . .A dogfight in Brooklyn is not more important than a revolution in China. . ." but Zambia copper prices matter to copper miners in San Manuel, Arizona. "A coup that paralyzes Haiti could be a problem if it happens in early Spring; Haiti is where all the baseballs are made . (and). . .A quarrel over well fields under remote marshes could mean that soon your brother will come home in a body bag" (Rosenblum, p.289).

Competition Among Page One Priorities

"Anything that gets in the paper, from down the block or from Venus, must justify its space"(Rosenblum, 281). Writers and even advertisers (Freeman) compete to get on page one, and "the front page is the reader's window to the tone and the 'spirit' of a newspaper" with its immediacy, prominence, impact and proximity (Bridges & Bridges, p 834).

There has been "little examination" of page one news criteria, but one study of 101 U.S. dailies in 37 states found that most page one news was based on timeliness, prominence and proximity and "The low use of impact stories indicates a neglect of the kinds of stories that take time and initiative to uncover and to explain to readers"(Bridges, p.336).

The same study found that "those dailies that have strong local coverage will select nonlocal stories because of the impact or effect these stories will have on the local community". It also discovered that "many stories which impact the audience have financial information and involve figures and numbers"(Bridges, pp 335,337). Still another study revealed that geographical distribution and circulation size affect how news is presented. The "publication with readers in a wider area will include less front page as well as total reportage of a local event than will the newspaper with narrower circulation"(Shapiro & Schofield, pp 60-61).

The relevance of local tie-ins relates often to possible impact, but smaller circulation papers need not necessarily be restricted by resources, time and budgets in making connections between local and international news, since television and now the Internet cast a wider news net, leaving smaller media a chance to remain local, but to make local more global.

While magazines (i.e.Newsweek) found that its covers with foreign news caused a 25% drop in newstand sales (Hoge); other critics point out that a newspaper "subscriber can go for days at a time without seeing one (international news story) crack the front page"(Arnett). So, how common is international news on page one and are there local linkages ?

The Search for Linkages: Five Daily Front Pages

This examination of front pages in five U.S. dailies tried to find examples of local tie-ins to international news. It covers 155 front pages (plus jumps and boxes) for 31 days of January 1999, including five Sundays and weekdays, with total daily circulations of 2,392,439 and Sundays at 3,870,929, for a combined exposure to 6,263,368 readers.

Newspaper:	Weekdays:	Sunday:
(Audit Bureau of Circulation-ABC September 30, 1997)		
Editor & Publisher Yearbook, 1998		
Chicago Tribune	(#7) 653,554	(#4) 1,023,736
San Francisco Chronicle/ Examiner	(#11) 484,218	(#14) 625,106
Dallas Morning News	(#12) 481,032	(#8) 789,004
Boston Globe	(#13) 476,966	(#9) 758,843
Atlanta Journal-Constitution	(#30) 296,669	(#11) 674,240

# Rank in Top 100 Daily/Sunday Circulation

This sample includes papers from comprehensive geographical regions of the country and with major commitments to coverage of international news and efforts to do local tie-ins. They might be considered somewhat more regional, and inland in some respects, compared to the more national dailies like the New York Times, Washington Post and Los Angeles Times. The sample is somewhat removed from foreign geographical borders, aside from Canada, Mexico, and Asia-Pacific. Miami and El Paso were considered too close to borders and Denver and Seattle papers were not readily available. Samples used were those available in hard copy (with visuals) and as perceived by readers not on line. The period used was after the holiday season when lots of ads might have made an atypically large news hole for extra feature space into which tie-ins might have been placed.

Each front page was examined for news and features on:

) International News
) Datelines of Foreign Countries
) Sources (writers-staff, correspondents)
) Location and Space on Page
) Photos (visuals, graphs, symbols)
) Jumps to Inside (stories and boxes)
) Tie-Ins to Local City/Region
(Page One and Inside)

(Side-Bars, Sentences, Paragraphs)

FINDINGS:

Top Twelve Tie-Ins on Page One (ILLUSTRATIONS 1-12)

A dozen tie-in stories on page one in the five dailies stood out as good examples of what can be done to connect the local to the international community. In the order of number published, but not necessarily in order of quality, depth, or significance, they were in the Boston Globe (4); Dallas Morning News (3); Chicago Tribune (2); Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2); and San Francisco Chronicle (1).Ironically, the Chronicle and Tribune examples were probably the single best of the twelve, the most thorough with page one dominance, and the longest, and with the best visuals. The Boston Globe provided the best over-all tie-ins in quantity and quality. A list of topics and synopsis follows:

San Francisco Chronicle

1) Jan. 2: OIL LEGACY LEAVES LEGACY OF EFFICIENCY--A 25-year perspective since 1973 gas lines during Arab oil embargo, showing the changes in oil and gas prices, fuel and energy usage, utility rates by Pacific Gas & Electric, Bay area conservation, photos and graphics; 52 column inches, page one, with 28 inches on page jump on A11.

Chicago Tribune

2) Jan.3: A TORMENTED MOM'S VOYAGE--A profile of an immigrant Chicago Guatemalan mother's search for her daughters lost to civil war kidnappers 17 years ago.Tells of her human and youth rights activism in 44 column inches of words and photos covering more than half of Sunday page one, with jump to 120 column inches inside on page 14. Written by Tribune correspondent in Guatemala City.

3) Jan. 20: ANOTHER WALL FALLS AS RUSSIA
OPENS ONCE-HOSTILE SKIES----Chicago's United Air Lines flight from O'Hare Field to Asia crosses air space where Korean Air Lines 007 exploded during Cold War; Route over North Pole cuts fuel costs and flight time. Connects city and U.S.with post-Cold War world with impressive graphics and photo covering nine inches on page one and 75 inches on Sec. 1:14,("From Page One")

Boston Globe

4) Jan. 10: CANADA REACHES SOUTH FOR STUDENTS--Boston area students attracted to Canadian colleges because of lower tuition, safer campuses and higher standards, as U.S. replaces Hong Kong and France with largest number of foreign

ILLUSTRATION 1

Oil Embargo Leaves Legacy of Efficiency

San Francisco CHRONICLE Jan.2, 1999

By Rebecca Smith
CHRONICLE STAFF WRITER

Bill Keese was a young lawyer at Signal Oil in late 1973, when the Arab oil embargo choked off petroleum shipments to the United States, prompting gas lines that seared the memories of a generation of oil executives and energy policymakers.

In a conference of oilmen, Keese, now chairman of the California Energy Commission, recalled how Chevron executives warned that prices could spiral from about $3 a barrel, pre-embargo, to $50, $75 or even $100. "But before you got to $100, war was supposed to break out all over," he said. "They had all these scenarios of terrible things that were going to happen."

Fast-forward 25 years. The world is awash in cheap oil. Petroleum giants are merging to control costs. The price of crude oil, which peaked at about $35 a barrel in 1982, has been in a free fall since 1986 when Saudi Arabia abandoned efforts to support prices by limiting production.

In the past year, the price of crude has dropped from $23 a barrel to about $11 and barely registered a blip when the United States and Britain launched air strikes on oil-producing Iraq.

The world, viewed through 1973 granny glasses, is all topsy turvy. Nothing turned out the way the experts forewarned.

What's clear in retrospect is that the psychological temblor caused by the five-month embargo, combined with smaller aftershocks like the Iran revolution, set in motion a chain of events that transformed the oil industry and the way America uses energy.

Today's low prices – in inflation-adjusted terms, the lowest since 1960 – are the legacy of a relentless national march toward cars that go twice as far on a gallon of gas and refineries that "crack" crude originating in oil fields that were untouched 25 years ago.

UPI 1974

To help conserve gas, Frederick Wheeler of Miami, Fla., hitchhiked during the oil embargo. He said he met a lot of interesting people along the way.

To comprehend the enormity of what has happened, it helps to understand how dramatically behavior was shaped by the embargo, imposed by Saudi Arabia in October 1973 in retaliation for U.S. support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War.

Although the embargo lasted only five months, the threat of again being held hostage by Saudi Arabia and its allies at OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, compelled U.S. policymakers to instigate programs to conserve oil and redirect demand from petroleum to other fuels.

American oil companies, meanwhile, went on a frenzy of oil exploration that gained added vigor after the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up exploration opportunities behind the Iron Curtain.

The confluence of these and other forces have produced dramatic results:

- Per-capita oil use has fallen. Prior to the embargo, each Ameri-

▸ ENERGY: *Page A11 Col. 5*

ENERGY CHANGES SINCE THE OIL CRISIS

U.S. crude oil prices

Dollars per barrel, not adjusted for inflation



Source: Energy Information Administration

U.S. fuel efficiency

Miles per gallon for new vehicles



Source: Environmental Protection Agency

Price of gas

U.S. retail price of gasoline in dollars per gallon (adjusted for inflation)



Source: Energy Information Administration

Refrigerator energy

Efficiency of an average new refrigerator expressed as kilowatt hours needed to cool a cubic foot for a day



Source: Energy Information Administration



Gas lines like this at the Standard station at California and Presidio streets in San Francisco are a distant memory today in a world awash with cheap oil.

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

Tribune photo by Chris Walker

Adriana Portillo-Bartow hugs her husband, Jeff, after seeing relatives' names on commemorative pillars in Guatemala City.

ILLUSTRATION 2

A tormented mom's voyage

By Paul de la Garza

TRIBUNE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT

A Chicagoan returns to her native Guatemala in hope of finding her girls, who vanished in that nation's civil war.

GUATEMALA CITY—Wherever she goes, Adriana Portillo-Bartow studies the faces of the young women around her. She looks for traces of the two daughters she lost to kidnappers 17 years ago—and she wonders. What would her girls look like today?

Would they be married? Would they have children of their own?

"One of my biggest fears," Portillo-Bartow said, "is that I would be in the presence of my daughters, and I wouldn't recognize them."

The last time she saw them was Sept. 10, 1981, a Thursday.

The girls were on their way to visit their grandfather, and in all the excitement to get them on the road—he was outside their house honking his car horn—there was no time for good-byes. "We didn't even hug," she said.

Portillo-Bartow's nightmare began the next day.

On Sept. 11, 1981, Rosaura Margarita Carrillo Portillo, 10; Glenda Corina Carrillo Portillo, 9; Adrian Portillo Alcantara, 70; his wife, Rosa Elena Munoz; their daughter, Alma Argentina Portillo, 1; and a family friend, Edilsa Guadalupe Alvarez Morales, 18, were kidnapped. Portillo-Bartow suspects Guatemalan soldiers and police were responsible because of the family's ties to leftist guerrillas.

The kidnappings occurred at the peak of the decades-long civil war in Guatemala, when the army conducted a scorched-earth campaign, destroying hundreds of villages believed to be sympathetic to the guerrillas.

It was a time in Guatemala City when tortured bodies would surface

SEE DAUGHTERS, PAGE 14



'I go to bed, thinking of them. I get up, thinking of them. I dream of them. They are with me every moment of my life.'

Adriana Portillo-Bartow, whose daughters Rosaura, 10, (top) and Glenda, 9, were kidnapped in Guatemala 17 years ago.

Chicago
TRIBUNE
Jan.3,1999

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ILLUSTRATION 3

Chicago Tribune, Wednesday, January 20, 1999

Another wall falls as Russia opens once-hostile skies

**By John Schmeltzer
and Michael McGuire**
Tribune Staff Writers

Sixteen years ago, a leery Soviet military spotted Korean Air Lines Flight 007 invading its airspace on its way from Anchorage to Seoul.

With the Cold War at its zenith and paranoia running high, Soviet MiG fighter pilots scrambled against the invasion of their airspace, downing the KAL Boeing 747 jumbo jet with four heat-seeking missiles.

The Soviets insisted that the KAL jet had been on an unspecified spy mission. Korea and the U.S. maintained that the aircraft had accidentally strayed off course.

On Wednesday, five hours after United Airlines Flight 895 and its 190 passengers depart from O'Hare International Airport, it will enter Russian airspace. It will pass only a few hundred miles west of Magadan, the site where 269 passengers and crew, including 61 Americans, aboard the KAL flight were killed.

This time, Russian air traffic controllers will assist the United jet across the nation's airspace. There are no celebrations planned by United or the Russians for this event. Virtually no one on Russian soil will even notice. And yet, United Flight 895 represents the aviation equivalent of a chunk of the Berlin Wall coming down.

For United and other international air carriers, Wednesday's "demonstration flight" over Russian airspace offers the promise of a great business opportunity: a

See Flights, Back Page

United rising over Russia, China

The flight path of Wednesday's United Airlines Chicago to Hong Kong flight will take the aircraft for the first time over the North Pole, over Siberia, Mongolia and China before heading to its destination. By avoiding jet stream headwinds, the new route promises shorter flights from the U.S. to the Far East and savings of millions of dollars in annual fuel costs.



NEW ROUTE 8,553.01 miles
Approximate flight time: 15 hours, 25 minutes
Fuel load: 57,175 gallons
Fuel use estimate: 49,530 to 50,265 gallons
Fuel savings estimate: 735 to 1,470 gallons
Jet stream: Negligible

CURRENT ROUTE 8,250.4 miles
Approximate flight time: 15 hours, 55 minutes
Fuel load: 57,175 gallons
Fuel use: 51,000 gallons
Jet stream: Encounter lesser headwinds on Chicago to Alaska leg; strongest headwinds encountered on Russia China border to Beijing leg.

Source: United Airlines

Chicago Tribune

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students in Canada. Charts with comparative U.S-Canadian tuition; 12 inches on page one and 65 on inside jump.

5) Jan. 15: OFFICIALS OF HARVARD PROGRAM
FOR AIDING RUSSIA ARE PROBED--Local university sponsored program in international development under federal civil and criminal investigation;may have profited from inside market knowledge while helping Russian economy. 7 inches on page one and 27 inside on page A16.

6) Jan, 26: HELPING GREECE CATCH ON--Boston Red Sox players and coaches use abandoned U.S. military bases outside Athens to train Greeks for their own baseball team in the 2004 hosted Olympics in "not quite a field of dreams, but a field of weeds with potential". 8 inches, page one, with 35 column inch jump on page A11.

7) Jan. 31: DEBATE SWIRLS AROUND
EX-SERB PRISON GUARD--Bosnian refugees in suburban Boston challenge refugee status of Serbian refugee, a former prison guard whom they fear may have been involved in ethnic cleansing. 7 column inches on page one, with 90 inches of jumps to pages 22,23,including large photo of him.

Dallas Morning News

8) Jan. 10: THE BIG PICTURE--Dallas-based group to help Mexico develop more theater complexes; Globalization of cinema a boost to Mexico film industry. By freelance writer in Mexico City; Small photo. 15 inches, page one; 46 inches on page A18 jump.

9) Jan. 12: INS RELEASES TOGO WOMAN--Dallas immigrant mother of five whose husband was killed in Togo, fights deportation and fears for her life after 10 months in Dallas detention center; 5 and a half inches on page one and 13 and a half inches (with small mug photo) inside on page 7A.

10) Jan. 14: GLOBAL WARNING--Brazil's financial crisis and globalization in close-knit world economy affect suburban Dallas metal detector sales and micro-technology and Texas money market firm and equipment repair facility; Six inches on page one, 44 inches inside, page 17A.

Atlanta Journal and Constitution

11) Jan. 14: SCANDAL IN HAND,
IOC TELLS SPONSORS--In Atlanta, visiting Olympics marketing director shores up local Coca Cola and UPS sponsors in midst of investigations of Salt Lake City Olympics site scandal. Local management group active in project to polish Olympics image. Nine inches, page one; 21 inches inside, page A14.

12) Jan. 25: ATLANTA GAMES UNDER SCRUTINY--IOC scandal expanded to "surprising" investigation to include possible Atlanta favors to attract 1996 Olympics. Story reports "no evidence of improper behavior by members in previous bids" and "no proof" Atlanta officials broke rules to win games.

References ("sandwiched" in page one story and in a separate inside IOC-Salt Lake scandal story) said former Mayor and Atlanta bid committee member Andrew Young acknowledged he had delivered sports equipment, food and apparel as "humanitarian aid" to the Congo and its IOC representative, who switched his vote to the Atlanta site. A small, 2-column, 1990 file photo includes Young and his wife visiting the Congo representative, later recently suspended over the Salt Lake case. Page one tie-in story is 10 inches, with 30 inches on A7 jump.

In this study, numerous local tie-ins were not on page one but were inside and tied to page one by a related jump story or a page one box referring the reader to the inside. A few examples are noteworthy. (ILLUSTRATIONS 13-17)

Perhaps the best example was a Jan. 31 Chicago Tribune Magazine issue devoted almost entirely to THE HOLOCAUST TWICE REMOVED. A page one box on "Facing History" led the reader into pages which connected past Nazi atrocities revealed at the Nuremberg trials in 1945-46 with 3rd generation 10th grade and other Chicago German-Americans in an 18th annual mock trial of Nuremberg. It included photos (past and present); book lists; and profiles of local descendants of Holocaust survivors.

The Tribune also referred readers (Jan. 25) to an inside 71-inch tie-in story on Chicago Catholics going to St. Louis FOR THE FAITHFUL TRIP TO SEE POPE IS JUST THE TICKET. Another (Jan.27) page one box referral to the inside food pages used about 65 inches on CITY FOR THE SENSES, in which a staff writer returned to Istanbul,Turkey after 25 years to recall food and family memories and share recipes and guides to Turkish cooking.

Four inside page tie-ins are other worthy examples appearing in the Boston Globe: Jan,1--LOCALLY A RUSH TO BE READY FOR EURO. Page A7, 20 and a-half inch story on how city and regional computer programers and finance specialists convert funds and accounts into the new European currency; Jan. 2--WHERE THE CAFE MEETS THE MARKET, Page C6.7, 88 inches on a new Back Bay Canadian-European cafeteria style dining expanding locally and beyond in the U.S; and (Jan. 14) 24 inches of inside tie-in on how GILLETTE, BANK-BOSTON PREDICT NO IMMEDIATE NEGATIVE EFFECTS from Brazil's currency devaluation.

Canada reaches south for students

Jan 10, 1999

By Colin Nickerson
GLOBE STAFF

MONTREAL – For Alec Tallman of Lunenburg, it was a tossup with Vassar College, and Vassar lost. For Ian Madeiros of Pittsfield, Maine, the big lure was the caterwaul of bagpipes and ratta-tat-tat of the Scottish side drum. For Meghan Brown of Pembroke, it was the chance for a high-quality education at a palatable price.

"Cost wasn't the big factor. The academic program was, by far," said Brown, 23, who graduated from Nova Scotia's Dalhousie University last year with a bachelor's in marine biology, and is working on a master's degree. "But the cost of studying in Canada is certainly an important side bonus."

As tuition rates continue to climb in the United States, increasing numbers of American students are head-

ILLUSTRATIONS 4-7

WHY STUDY IN CANADA
ABOUT CANADA
SCHOOL INFO
CANADIAN EDUCATION SYSTEM
STUDENT APPROVAL
LIVING IN CANADA

Study in / Étudier au CANADA!

Welcome,

Officials of Harvard program for aiding Russia are probed

Jan. 15, 1999

By Stephen Kurkjian
GLOBE STAFF

Federal prosecutors are conducting a criminal and civil investigation into whether officials of a Harvard University-sponsored effort to help Russia reconstruct its economy profited from inside market knowledge, according to Harvard and US government sources.

Even as Harvard convenes top US and Russian business and political leaders this morning for a two-day symposium on Russia's economy and investments, the university is in the awkward position of answering questions from federal investigators about the Harvard Institute for International Development.

The office of US Attorney Donald K. Stern is conducting the investigation of the institute officials, who were operating under a US government grant while they were helping Russia adapt to capitalism. Both Harvard and US government sources in Washington confirmed the existence of the investigation.

Indeed, institute officials who played a key role in Russia's economic reconstruction, including a distinguished Harvard economist,

PROBE, Page A10

Boston
GLOBE

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Helping Greece catch on

Jan. 26, 1999

US teams pitch in to teach baseball to 2004 Olympics host

By David L. Marcus
GLOBE STAFF

ATHENS – As host of the 2004 Olympics, Greece automatically gets to enter its baseball team in the competition, without having to qualify. Which is fine, but Greece doesn't have a baseball team.

Or a baseball stadium. Or a coach. Or bats. Or baseball fans, for that matter.

The Boston Red Sox and the Baltimore Orioles are about to change that.

As a gesture of good will, the teams plan to send several coaches and players to train Greek players when the 1999 season ends in the United States. In addition, the Major League Baseball Commissioner's office has offered to help refurbish several rutted, rock-strewn baseball fields on an abandoned US military base outside Athens.

The goal is to instill a love of baseball in the cradle of Western thought. More immediately, everyone wants to form a team that won't embarrass Greece as it holds the Games for the first time since it hosted the debut of the modern Olympics in 1896.

The idea came from US Ambassador R. Nicho-

■ IOC president Samaranch tries to weather the storm. C1.

GREECE, Page A11

Jan. 31, 1999

Debate swirls around ex-Serb prison guard

By Charles A. Radin and Steve Fainaru
GLOBE STAFF

A former guard at a notorious Bosnia Serb prison camp has settled with his famil in Everett, stirring intense debate among Bosnian refugees over whether he was an ac complice to "ethnic cleansing" or in fact use his position to help victims of the slaughte in the former Yugoslavia.

No evidence has surfaced that Jezdimi Topic, 56, participated in atrocities that oc curred at Trnopolje, one of three camp around the city of Prijedor in northwester Bosnia where thousands of Muslims an Croats were raped, tortured, and execute during systematic efforts by the Serbs t drive them from the region in the earl 1990s.

Topic's defenders acknowledge that h worked at the camp, armed and in uniform But they said he actually tried to help vic tims of the Serbs and finally fled with hi family because of the mass killing.

Concerned that Topic had not disclose his background as a guard, the Immigratio and Naturalization Service said last wee after a Globe inquiry that it would investi gate his case.

Neither Topic nor his family would be in terviewed.

Dragana Zubcevic, a family friend wh escaped the Serb siege of Sarajevo in 1992 said Topic and his family have been gettin death threats from other Bosnian refugee who, she said, have no evidence but are look

TOPIC, Page A2

ILLUSTRATIONS 8-10

Dallas
MORNING NEWS

Jan. 14, 1999

Global warning

Brazil's financial trouble sends ripples throughout close-knit world markets

By Edward Dufner
Staff Writer of The Dallas Morning News

The waves of gloom washing over financial markets Wednesday subsided to mere ripples by the time they reached Garland.

After months of propping up its currency, Brazil decided on a devaluation, triggering a day of wild stock-market gyrations and prompting President Clinton to offer words of reassurance.

■ World market losses. 17A
■ Brazil devalues currency. 1D

Through it all, optimism prevailed at Garrett Metal Detectors. Sales director Jim Dobrei said the privately held firm still expects to complete a pending deal with a Brazilian security firm to buy Garrett's made-in-Garland units.

"At our level, this economic thing is going to affect us, obviously," Mr. Dobrei said. "But if that country still needs a good metal

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Jan. 12, 1999

INS releases Togo woman

West African is fighting deportation, fears for life

By Dan Malone
Staff Writer of The Dallas Morning News

Ablavi Haden, jailed for 10 months by the immigration service though accused of no crime, was released Monday in what one official said was a cost-cutting effort by the federal agency.

Mrs. Haden, a 47-year-old widow and accountant fighting deportation to Togo because she says she fears for her life, had been behind bars since March 12. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service had said it believed she might go into hiding if released.

Mrs. Haden had applied for asylum in the United States under an international pact known as the Convention Against Torture; she will be free pending disposition of that application.

In a story published last week by *The Dallas Morning News*, Mrs. Haden said she believed she might face death if forced to return to her homeland in West Africa.

Mrs. Haden, who entered the United

Please see INS on Page 7A.

Jan. 10, 1999

The big picture

Dallas' Cinemark among group helping to revive moviegoing in Mexico

By Brendan M. Case
Special Contributor to The Dallas Morning News

MEXICO CITY — A titanic movie theater and shopping complex on the northern edge of Mexico City might look to some like a cultural Death Star: imposing, modern and full of gringo influences from movies to music to mores.

Dozens of upscale retailers have crammed into an airy mall known as Mundo E, short for Entertainment World, that opened in early December. The Rainforest Cafe and Tower Records neighbor clothing outlets hawking the latest international styles. With a giant supermarket next door, it's one-stop shopping for the middle class legions of northwest Mexico City.



Special to The Dallas Morning News: Gerardo Jacome/El Universal

Grupo Cinemex's 19 state-of-the-art movie theaters are set off a French-style courtyard, complete with a fountain and obelisk. It is Latin America's largest cinema.

But Mundo E's centerpiece is Grupo Cinemex's 19 state-of-the-art movie theaters, set off a French-style courtyard complete with a fountain and an obelisk right out of either Paris or Disney World. This is Latin America's largest cinema, with oversized screens and stadium seating.

And the complex that houses it could serve as a sneak preview of

Please see DALLAS on Page 18A.

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ILLUSTRATIONS 11-12

Atlanta JOURNAL and CONSTITUTION

January 14, 1999

Scandal in hand, IOC tells sponsors

By Melissa Turner
STAFF WRITER

Now that the International Olympic Committee has completed its bribery probe, it will "clean house" and revamp its host city selection process, an IOC executive said Wednesday in Atlanta.

IOC marketing director Michael Payne, in town to shore up support from big-money sponsors, said the committee has gathered enough evidence to seek the expulsion of members who engaged in unethical behavior.

"The IOC is committed to root out any form of unethical and inappropriate behavior, and we will do this decisively and quickly," Payne said in an interview after huddling with executives at Coca-Cola and United Parcel Service and speaking by phone with officers at Home Depot, a U.S. Olympic Committee sponsor. He was heading today to Salt Lake City, the focal point of four major investigations into allegations of bribery of IOC officials to snare the 2002 Winter Olympics.

"We're confident that they are going to do what they said they would do — take swift and decisive action," Coca-Cola spokesman Ben Deutsch said.

The IOC will publish on Jan. 24 a report identifying the members implicated in its investigation after a meeting of the organization's executive board in Lausanne, Switzerland. The

➤ *Please see* **OLYMPICS, A14**

■

Utah *allegations of misuse* **C3**

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Atlanta Games under scrutiny

IOC officials are seeking leads on any gifts that might have influenced the bid.

By Bert Roughton Jr.
STAFF CORRESPONDENT

January 25, 1999

Lausanne, Switzerland — In an expansion of its investigation into a bidding scandal, the International Olympic Committee said Sunday it will seek evidence of wrongdoing in the bid for the 1996 Summer Games, held in Atlanta.

The IOC is sending a letter to the U.S. Olympic Committee asking for any proof that IOC members received inappropriate gifts, favors, compensation or other assistance from the Atlanta Organizing Committee, said Dick Pound, chairman of the committee's special commission investigating allegations related to Salt Lake City's bid for the 2002 Winter Games.

"We are asking for evidence of improper behavior," said Pound, who added the IOC would vigorously pursue any substantiated allegations.

The announcement came on a momentous day in Olympics history. A third IOC member involved in the Salt Lake scandal resigned, six more were recommended for expulsion and reforms were installed for the selection of the 2006 Winter Games.

The Atlanta development was somewhat surprising in light of comments made by IOC executive board member Kevan Gosper from Australia on Saturday. "I don't think we need to go back into previous [Games] now," Gosper said. "There's no real point to it."

➤ *Please see* **SCANDAL, A7**

More *on Olympic probe* **D1-3**

Other international news examples connected with page one had tie-ins to states and the U.S. but were not explicitly connected to local city communities. One of the best examples was the Chronicle's, page one story (Jan. 21) on HIGH HOPES FOR DAVIS TRIP AS TIES IMPROVE BETWEEN CALIFORNIA AND MEXICO, which focused on state government, the state capitol being close geographically, but the story not strictly local. Also, a series of Chronicle articles (Jan. 14,20,22) on sweatshop exploitation of Asian garment workers in Saipan was judged to be neither international nor local, although Saipan is in the U.S. Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, a U.S. Commonwealth; and the Bay Area has many Asian immigrants. Also, a (Jan. 24) re-printed Colorado Springs, CO, Gazette article under US LOOKS TO JAPAN ON SCHOOLS was generally relevant but was more U.S.than local.

Likewise, Boston Globe inside page one tie-ins of STARBUCKS REACHES CHINA (Jan.12); BRITAIN GOES STONE COLD in London on Mick Jagger's American wife (Jan. 24); and "FOR SHIPS, END OF THE DOTTED (AND DASHED) LINE for the Morse code in Nova Scotia was judged more national than Bostonian. (Jan.31). Similarly, trips by people in the five newspaper areas to see the Pope in Saint Louis were marginal local-to-international ties, as was the First Lady on page one in the Chicago Tribune (Jan.20) pictured with Cubs home-run hitter and Dominican Republic native Sammy Sosa applauding the President's State of the Union Speech.

In this study, there were also some inserts of local sources, brief paragraphs, and parenthetical references in page one international stories to constitute tie-ins that create less than a separate story. The Boston Globe "sandwiched" in comments by local college professors as sources: (Jan.11)-former Boston University economics professor and "Harvard-trained" economist on Mexico poverty; (Jan.12)-Brandeis law professor on Iraq; (Jan.22)-Boston College chancellor as co-author of article on Vatican's criticism of U.S. Catholic colleges; and (Jan.30)-local economist on U.S. and the global economy.

During the reported corruption of European Union finances, the Globe quoted a former Harvard lecturer, and in a local tie-in said "This unfolding saga is as intriguing as Edwin O'Connor's 'The Last Hurrah', the novel based on (James) Curley's corrupt machine in Boston".

In a profile of a mayor in Turkey, the Chicago Tribune, (Jan.18) mentioned his political party as similar to "how the old Democratic Party in Chicago used to work" as it "cultivated their bases among new immigrants . .". In other brief references in international stories, the Tribune noted that the new India Nobel Prize winner in economics broke the Prize domination by University of Chicago professors (Jan.11); used a paragraph quoting a Federal Reserve Bank

ILLUSTRATION 13

1945-46: Col. Rufus Bratton testifies as a witness (left); a general view of the courtroom at Nuremberg, where 21 men were tried for war crimes.

THE EASE OF EVIL

By Julia Keller

Slipping into the skin of a Nazi—for that is the task, that is a large part of the assignment when you strip it of pedagogical niceties—has a certain silken ease, an oily, eel-like smoothness.

1998: Judges in the mock trial confer, led by Elizabeth Heroy (seated at left); Taylor Cope as Goering is questioned by prosecutor Alex Greenbaum.

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Tribune photos by Candice C. Cusic

Bishop Gerald Kicanas raises his hand to bless the 92 St. Anastasia pupils and parent chaperones who will leave Monday for St. Louis to hear Pope John Paul II's mass at the Trans World Dome.

For the faithful, trip to see pope is just the ticket

Chicago TRIBUNE Jan. 25, 1999

By Bechetta Jackson
TRIBUNE STAFF WRITER

Most Chicago-area residents hoping to catch a glimpse of Pope John Paul II during his much-anticipated pastoral visit to St. Louis this week found themselves out of luck if they thought local officials could supply tickets.

"Everyone thinks we have passes, but we don't," said Nancy McNaughton, a spokeswoman for the Catholic Archdiocese of Chicago. "We have had to disappoint quite a few people."

While the great majority of Chicago-area residents have resigned themselves to watching the papal mass on television, at least several hundred are expected to be among the masses welcoming the Holy Father on Tuesday and Wednesday. Some are going with tickets and others are going without.

"I can't wait, because I'm getting a chance to do something that not many people in life get to do," said the 8th grader at St. Christopher School in Midlothian. "All my friends think it's really cool."

Her principal is impressed as well.

"It's wonderful," Donna Kirk said. "Because of the pope's age and his health, this could very well be his last trip to the United States."

Madlener's mother, Linda Madlener, has been searching for tickets since September, when she saw a small item in a newspaper publicizing the pontiff's visit to the Midwest.

"I made every possible effort to get passes," said Linda Madlener, the Girl Scout leader of St. Christopher Cadette Troop 007 of the Willow Wood Association, in which her daughter is a member

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ILLUSTRATION 15

High Hopes for Davis Trip As Ties Improve Between California and Mexico

Governor's mission will be to improve business links, acknowledge changing opinions on immigration

"The relationship with Mexico is not pie in the sky — it is real and substantial."

CRUZ BUSTAMANTE
lieutenant governor

"We will (also) go to Central America and South America (on) missions."

RICHARD POLANCO
D-Los Angeles

By Carla Marinucci
CHRONICLE POLITICAL WRITER

When Governor Gray Davis announced during his campaign that he would travel to Mexico as one of his first official acts, many viewed the promise as largely symbolic.

But just days into his administration, Davis' courtship of California's only international neighbor is emerging as anything but symbolic.

Mexico is now the leading importer of made-in-California goods, passing Japan for the first time in the third quarter of last year. And experts believe those numbers are not likely to change anytime soon.

"The two countries are going in opposite directions," said Ted Gibson, economist with the state Department of Finance. "Japan is buying less and less, Mexico more and more."

The trade figures come as a new poll shows California's attitude toward Mexico has changed markedly since the recession, when anti-immigrant sentiment helped pass Proposition 187. The majority of Californians now believe Mexican immigrants are a real boost to the state, according to a new Public Policy Institute poll released last week.

Davis plans to seize the moment, making his first official trade mission to Mexico City and Monterrey on February 1. He will meet with President Ernesto Zedillo, accompanied by a bipartisan delegation of political leaders, as well as others in the corporate and academic worlds.

Already, the Davis administration is involved in negotiations to beef up exchanges across the border – and suggests there could be a big payoff.

"There are specific issues and specific companies that we are talking with in Mexico – and the Mexican government is talking to California companies about some very real business arrangements that can result in more jobs on both sides, more investment opportunities for the state, and better overall relations," said Davis deputy press secretary Chris Campana.

The moves by Davis, while emphasizing the ever-more-global view for California business, also capitalize on a wave of demographic and political changes in California.

With one out of four Californians boasting of ancestral ties to Mexico – and half of all U.S. Mexican Americans residing here – "there is increasing recognition that the Latino population is an important and potent political force," said pollster Mark Baldassare.

Latino voters, who now make up 15 percent of the electorate, also have helped

▸ **MEXICO:** *Page A10 Col. 1*

"That's a goal — improving those (exchanges) and expanding them. They are very important to international understanding."

ANTONIO VILLARAIGOSA
Assembly speaker

San Francisco
CHRONICLE
Jan. 21, 1999

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ILLUSTRATION 16

Boston GLOBE

Jan. 1,1999

Locally, a rush to be ready for euro

By Peter G. Gosselin
GLOBE STAFF

While Bostonians recover from their New Year's celebrations this weekend, computer programmers and finance specialists from across the region will be engaged in a distinctly un-celebratory enterprise: racing to convert billions of dollars' worth of mutual fund holdings, trust assets, and bank accounts from their original mark, franc, or lire denominations into that of Europe's new currency, the euro.

Their deadline is Sunday evening. "That's when the trading day begins in the Far East," said Richard A. Heckinger, senior vice president with Boston's State Street Corp.

Chicago TRIBUNE
Jan. 25, 1999

INSIDE

Sewing up plans to see the pope
Several hundred Chicago-area Catholics will journey to St. Louis to join in the excitement, including Ana Zilinska (left), who has been sewing 100 babushkas in the colors of the Polish flag. **Page 7.**

MAGAZINE Jan. 31,1999

Facing history
A new generation of Chicagoans and Germans confronts the evil of the Holocaust.

Gillette, BankBoston predict no immediate negative effects

Boston GLOBE Jan. 14, 1999

By Chris Reidy
GLOBE STAFF

Brazil's currency devaluation led two local companies [redacted] to issue statements yesterday about the impact the fall of the real would have on them.

As the US stock market dipped and Washington scrambled to deal with the fallout, Gillette Co. and BankBoston Corp. said separately they were closely monitoring the situation in Brazil.

Neither said the crisis would likely have an immediate negative effect on them, and BankBoston said "market turbulence" might be something it could take advantage of.

BankBoston has assets of $73.8 billion, with about $6 billion of that coming from Brazil. In a country with a volatile economy, BankBoston has made money before when Brazil was in a downturn.

"We are obviously monitoring events in Brazil very closely," BankBoston said in a statement. "We have a very focused and well-positioned business that has performed well over the 50 years we've operated in Brazil, and it is prepared to take advantage of market turbulence. We remain confident in our near-term performance in Brazil, and our outlook for the remainder of the year continues to be positive."

On the New York Stock Exchange, shares of BankBoston rose 9/16 to close at 38¾.

Gillette, the Boston maker of razors, toiletries, and batteries, does not break out sales by individual countries.

But Gillette did say Latin America accounted for about 12 percent of 1997 sales of $10.06 billion and that Brazil is a major Latin American customer.

The immediate impact of Brazil's devaluation on Gillette is "minimal," said Eric A. Kraus, director of corporate public relations.

"Because we locally manufacture most of what we sell in Brazil, we will be able to offset some of the negative effect of the devaluation through lower manufacturing costs," he said.

In addition, Gillette raised prices for the products it sells in Brazil at the beginning of the year.

"The percentage increase is approximately equal to the just announced movement of the Brazilian real trading band to the US dollar," Kraus said.

Problems in foreign markets were one reason why Gillette turned in a rare subpar performance when it reported third-quarter earnings last year.

On the Big Board, shares of Gillette dropped 2¾ to close at 52¼.

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City for the senses

A return to Istanbul fuels memories of a classic cuisine of kebabs, dumplings and sparkling fresh produce

By Kristin Eddy
TRIBUNE STAFF WRITER

ISTANBUL—It took a whole day of eating to feel like I was really back in Turkey. To feel it more surely, even, than when crossing the Bosporus Bridge the night before, with a light, low fog resting over the boats, or by being awakened at 5:30 in the morning by a loudspeaker calling the faithful to prayer at a neighborhood mosque.

I was looking for more familiar signs, like the note left the first morning by my Turkish friend Pelin Rau: "Please help yourself if you'd like to have some breakfast. We have everything you need: cheese, butter, tomatoes, cucumbers, olives, eggs, honey, bread ..." All the essentials, in other words, for a complete Turkish breakfast.

Tribune photo by Kristin Eddy

With years of practice behind her, Semiha Surel deftly prepares *manti.*



Tribune photo by Ja

Pistachios and currants add a Turkish influence to chicken b

Guides to Turkish cooking



GLOBE STAFF PHOTO / JANET KNOTT

A diner looks over offerings from the marketplace at Marche Movenpick.

Boston GLOBE
Jan.2, 1999

A bridge between the market and the cafe

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

president on the Brazil economic crisis (Jan.14); reported a local economist's comments on the Asian slump (Jan.19); and listed a relief agency in the Chicago area for aid to Columbian earthquake victims (Jan.28).

The Dallas Morning News (Jan 11) briefly quoted an Austin expert on Columbia rebels; and (Jan. 26) a local Dallas Catholic diocese spokesman and editor on the Pope's U.S. visit. The Atlanta Journal (Jan.11) referred to use of graphic material on Nazi treatment of homosexuals in a Holocaust study in Georgia schools. The Atlanta newspaper's global-local tie-ins do "not necessarily show up on the front page". It also runs segments on "International Atlanta","International Business" and "Atlanta and the World"; and has connected the city to news of Sierra Leone, to Nigeria, and to the Kurds and to Jordan and local visits from its late King Hussein (Graham).

CONCLUSION/SUMMARY:

) This study indicates serious and impressive attempts at local-global linkages are being made on page one, especially in the Boston Globe, which had international news on page one every one of the 31 days in the period. The four other dailies together published their page-one 45 times without any international news on it: Atlanta Journal-Constitution (13); Chicago Tribune (11); San Francisco Chronicle-Examiner (8); Dallas Morning News (3). The San Francisco paper had no international news on page one for five days (Jan. 5-9) in a month heavy with national news on the presidential impeachment, football bowl games and winter weather.

) Despite a possible shift from if and how much foreign news to how to make the local global, the challenge remains on finding ways that lead from thought to action on mutual international problems and evidence it happens.

) The content of foreign news remains heavy on disasters and crises (political, financial and natural) which do not preclude meaningful local tie-ins, which in this sample were heaviest on money, economics and popular culture. Tie-ins of international to national were not included here, and therein is a danger of assuming national is *not* international or local. There is also herein no suggestion as to what *might* have been localized.

) The study is a reminder of how hard it is to define where international and local separate, i.e. the Olympics scandal (geographically and source-wise in Salt Lake City and/or Switzerland ?); the Holocaust debate (in Germany, Israel, Georgia or Chicago ?); and the Pope's Mexico-U.S. visit (from Mexico City, St.Louis or the Vatican ?). And where *are* the Balkans, a difficulty for television trying to"anchor" a geographical center (Shister).

Salt Lake City and Denver (not in the sample) were logical places to localize the Olympics site and the Denver-Israel hostage stories. By early February, after this sample, the Dallas *Morning News* accelerated its stories on both the Utah site and scandal and a possible Dallas bid for the 2012 Summer Olmpics.

) Beyond this study, there is a need to examine more thoroughly the location and space for tie-ins, where they were produced (datelines) and how and by whom (staff, bureaus, correspondents, free-lancers). There is also the need to see if page one tie-ins are read and used any more or less than inside tie-ins sought out by readers who seek what they want and need, beyond what editors think they need to want on page one. Also worth pondering is the possibility that news of mainly local self-interest may ignore the larger world of collective interests and needs.

) As print tries to retain its local position, what if the future means larger TV stations devote more attention to national and world events and smaller stations devote more to local (Bernstein) ? Will the rapid speed and personalized visibility of growing global cable mean "now all they need is a catastrophe or two to attract a few viewers" ? (Economist). Print journalists already tend to omit global explanations since dramatic "event-driven, good-video stories like oil spills get much better coverage"(Maher). There is also the audience and economic pressure on newspaper web sites to emphasize local news and to "forget about national and international and concentrate on where their bread is buttered' (Phipps).

A critical concern also arises as global electronic media expand possibly without newspapers' "Sensitive, solid pieces. . . from remote backwaters and marbled with context by editors at home". Admittedly "No one has time to watch every wrinkle on a map even Rand McNally can't keep straight. The trick is knowing what to look for, and where. To follow the world, you need to separate out substance from the razzle-dazzle of packaging." Television "does not usually report the news it covers. Instead, it creates little sociodramas, known as packages, to represent the situation at hand" (Rosenblum, pp. 7-8.163).

Compared to the era of print,"satellites transmit messages direct from the Middle Ages. Nothing in a modern family's experience prepares it to be thrust into a Somali peasant's hut or a Serbian sniper's nest. But the vital context; wordy and complex, is the first to go" (Rosenblum.p.5). That's where the planned and pointed newspaper tie-ins might more effectively facilitate the meeting of the international and local.

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The Absence of Fairness in Two Philippine Newspapers

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- **Abstract**

Content analysis results of two newspapers, *Malaya* and *Manila Bulletin* in the Philippines, show little fairness in the coverage of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. Interviews with reporters and editors at those two newspapers suggest that fairness is not an objective of Philippine journalism, and is also the product of other factors such as laziness, "press release journalism" and "envelopmental journalism."

The purpose of this study is to understand the status of fairness in Philippine newspaper coverage. This exploratory research uses a case study approach to measure fairness and to illuminate influences that explain the status of fairness. After the Spanish-American War, (1898-1901) Americans started up newspapers in the Philippines, implanting the notion of fairness as an objective to journalism.[1] This study explores the existence of fairness in the coverage of the Catholic Church in two newspapers, *Ang Pahayagang Malaya* and *Manila Bulletin*. This case study uses content analysis and interviews to examine the status of fairness at these two newspapers during the 1986, 1992 and 1998 presidential elections.

- **Literature Review**

To my knowledge, no scholarly work has focused on the status of fairness in news media coverage in the Philippines. Textbooks used in journalism classes and journalistic credos state fairness, which is the coverage of opposing sides of a controversial issue, is a goal. The concept of fairness is taken from American journalism, which took root in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, courtesy of American ex-patriots and the U.S. military.[2] Fairness in the U.S. is implicit to the public service role of journalism advocated by the Hutchin's Commission near the close of World War II in 1947.[3]

Up until the mid-1990s, the bulk of research that assessed fairness in U.S. newspapers, focused on political campaigns. From 1960 to 1988, Guido Stempel et al.[4] conducted several studies that concluded prestige newspapers allotted the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates about the same amount of space. In two separate studies, Johnson[5] found prestige newspapers and network television gave candidates in the 1988 Democratic presidential primary equal amounts of space. More recently, Fico and Cote's[6] study of the 1996 presidential campaign by Michigan's nine largest dailies found half of the stories were fair.

Studies looking at issues aside from political campaigns conclude that at least half and in some cases, the majority of coverage measured, was fair. Fico and Soffin[7] looked at prestige and Michigan newspapers and found half of the stories on national, state and local issues, were fair. In an another study, Fico and Soffin[8] examined the treatment of a local controversial issue, East Lansing, Michigan wanting to detach themselves from the city to join a nearby township, and found most of the stories were fair. Simon et al.[9] in a study of large, prestige newspapers found 72 percent of the stories represented both sides of a conflict. Lacy et al.'s[10] study of prestige and large circulation papers found 85 percent of the stories on conflict were fair.

- **Case Study**

This research is a case study of four organizations in the Philippines: 1. The Catholic Bishops' Conference in the Philippines (CBCP), 2. The Archdiocese of Manila, 3.

Ang Pahayagang Malaya (*We Forum*) newspaper. and 4. *Manila Bulletin* newspaper. (A study of several newspapers was desirable for purposes of generalization. but unfortunately. a search of regional and national library holdings yielded only these two Philippine newspapers for the time periods under study.) The print media is being studied instead of the radio and broadcast media because it is less expensive to access. Taping news coverage of presidential elections or dubbing the coverage from archive tapes is costly. The print media is also arguably a better medium to study in the case of election coverage. Antonio Gatmaitan. consultant to a 1992 presidential candidate. believes newspapers are the medium of record. Gatmaitan and Luis D. Beltran. a broadcast and print journalist. believe television and radio get their news mostly from newspapers.[11]

Four organizations

1. The Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines. The office of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) represents 80 ecclesiastical territories. or dioceses. and archdioceses of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. The CBCP's main office is in Intramuros Manila. two blocks from the main office of the Archdiocese of Manila. As of 1997. 82 percent of the 70 million Filipinos were Catholic.[12] The Church owns and operates 1.300 schools. including 17 universities. 151 colleges. 400 secondary schools and seminaries. The total enrollment in 1991 was nearly 700.000 students. The church also runs hospitals. leprosaria and welfare shelters.[13]

2. Archdiocese of Manila. The Archdiocese of Manila is one of the 80 Roman Catholic dioceses in Philippines. Pope Gregory XIII established it as a diocese in 1579. Pope Clement established it as an archdiocese in 1595. The Archdiocese is the largest diocese spanning 946 square kilometers and encompassing eight cities of Manila (Caloocan. Pasay. Quezon. Mandaluyong. Makati. Muntinlupa and Pasig and seven municipalities: Parañaque. Malabon. San Juan. Navotas. Las Piñas. Taguig and Pateros.) As of 1994. the population of the Archdiocese of Manila was more than 8 million. 90 percent of which are Catholic. The Archdiocese has "299 priests. 55 religious institutes for men and 130 for women."[14] The breakdown of Catholic schools in the Archdiocese is "4 universities. and 132 elementary schools. high schools and colleges." The Archdiocese also oversees "6 Catholic hospitals. 13 dispensaries. 2 seminaries and 14 catechectical centers."[15]

Jaime Cardinal Sin. became the head of the Archdiocese in January 21. 1974. Auxiliary bishops. vicars general and episcopal vicars hold offices in the Archdiocese's administration. Cardinal Sin's political intervention led to the People Power Revolution in February 1986. which eventually led to the overthrow of President Ferdinand Marcos. and the installation of Corazon Aquino as president. He was also vocal. but less so during the past two presidential campaigns.[16]

3. *Malaya* (*We Forum*). The news media under study are *We Forum*. which became *Malaya* shortly before the overthrow of Marcos. and *Bulletin Today*. which became *Manila Bulletin* after the overthrow of Marcos. These two newspapers were primarily chosen because of their availability. and because they historically represent opposite ends of the political spectrum—*Malaya* is liberal. while *Manila Bulletin* is conservative.[17]

The first newspaper. *We Forum*. was first published on May 1. 1977 as a weekly newspaper written in Tagalog. the second most widely spoken language in the Philippines. (English is the first.) The readership consisted mainly of adolescents. In the early 1980s. that changed. *We Forum* started publishing information unavailable in the crony press. As a result. the newspaper's circulation grew and it began publishing three times a week. On December 7. 1982. the military shut down *We Forum's* operations and imprisoned its owner and several of its reporters. foiling attempts at publishing daily. When the owner was released from prison. he turned *We Forum* into an English language tabloid and called it *Ang Pahayagang Malaya*. or *Malaya* for short. On August 21. 1983. former senator Benigno Aquino. who had long been an opponent of the Marcos government. was shot and killed upon his return to the Philippines at Manila International Airport. Shortly thereafter. *Malaya* began publishing twice a week and then daily in response to increased demand. It is known as the first newspaper written in English to publicly criticize the Marcos regime. This "forerunner" of the alternative press gained such a large audience after the overthrow of Marcos, that it became a part of the established press, and holds that position today.[18] *Malaya's* readership consists of all economic groups, an equal number of male and female readers, and most of the readers range from 15 to 44 years old.[19]

__**4. *Manila Bulletin*.**__ The *Manila Bulletin* newspaper is the only mainstream, daily newspaper that survived the overthrow of Marcos. It is often referred to as part of the "crony" press because it was owned, operated and censored by one of Marcos' cronies during the martial law years (1972-1986). During the Marcos years, the members of the news media that dared publish information that conflicted with the government "were either in the stockades, in the hills, or six feet underground."[20]

Carson C. Taylor, a teacher from Illinois, served in the U.S. Army during the Spanish-American War. On February 2, 1900, Taylor began publishing the *Manila Daily Bulletin* while stationed in Manila.[21] It initially began as a shipping journal.[22] The newspaper grew in circulation, and in 1912 it was incorporated into the Bulletin Publishing Company. The only times the newspaper ceased operation was during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines from 1942 to 1946, and briefly when martial law was declared in 1972. The newspaper reopened in 1973.[23] The newspaper served the expatriate American community for the first half of the century. After World War II, newspapers that served the Filipino community overshadowed *Bulletin*.

In July 1957, faced with union problems and increasing intolerance toward American newspaper owners, the Taylor family sold Bulletin Publishing Co. to Brig. Gen. H. M. Menzi, a Swiss-German who was an industrialist in the Philippines. He changed the newspaper's name to *Bulletin Today*. Prior to martial law in 1972, *Bulletin Today* claimed a circulation of 5,000 to 10,000 nationwide.[24] Although characterized as timid, *Bulletin* was shut down along with all the other newspapers when martial law was declared in 1972. Menzi used his influence as a former Marcos aide to restart the newspaper in early 1973, provided other Marcos cronies owned one-half of the newspaper. A year later, *Bulletin Today* became the newspaper with the highest circulation. Menzi retained half of his ownership to the newspaper and his position as publisher of the newspaper through the Marcos years until his death in 1984. Don Emilio Yap, a Chinese-Filipino shipping magnate bought the newspaper shortly after Menzi's death.[25] Yap changed the newspaper's name to *Manila Bulletin* at the request of Corazon Aquino's administration. In 1998, the newspaper claimed a readership of 200,000 in Manila and a million nationwide.[26] In 1997, the demographics of its readership showed its readers were from 14 to 44 years old, and were predominantly male, and belonged to the middle and upper class.[27]

• Hypotheses and Research Questions

Based on scholarly research done on fairness in U.S. newspapers, the majority of coverage of the Roman Catholic Church in the two newspapers under study, *Malaya* and *Manila Bulletin* will be fair. Findings from the content analysis drove the research questions presented below. Document research, personal observations and interviews with upper level editors and owners of *Malaya* and *Manila Bulletin*, and clergy, who work for the Catholic Church in Manila, provided responses to the research questions.

H1a. The majority of the coverage of the Roman Catholic Church in *Malaya* will be **fair.**
H1b. The majority of the coverage of the Roman Catholic Church in *Manila Bulletin* will be **fair.**
R1a: What factors help explain the content analysis' measure of fairness in *Malaya*?
R1b: What factors help explain the content analysis' measure of fairness in *Manila Bulletin*?

- **Method**

1. Content Analysis

This study first used content analysis to examine the treatment of the Roman Catholic Church, and its affiliated organizations during the 1986, 1992 and 1998 presidential campaigns or elections.

-Operationalization measures for fair or sourcing effort

Fairness in the articles will be established by the existence of two opposing sides. For example, if the Archdiocese makes a negative statement about a candidate, the article will be fair if a source, either the candidate, or a spokesperson for the candidate, reacts to the Archdiocese's statement. A source can be a person, organization or document. A source can be anonymous, if anonymity is explicitly granted in the story. A source makes an assertion, which is the information that sources provide to reporters about their thoughts, feelings or self-described actions on the story topic. Sources are explicitly identified as such when news reporters quote or paraphrase information from them in stories. The means by which reporters publicly credit a source for story information is called **attribution.** Examples of these sources may include, but are not limited to the Pope, Jaime Cardinal Sin of the Archdiocese of Manila, Monsignor Pepe Quitorio or Archbishop Cruz of the Catholic Bishops' Conference, nuns, priests, and their spokespersons. Sources also include laypersons, such as leaders of church organizations or agencies, Ferdinand Marcos, Corazon Aquino, government officials, or any citizen of the Philippines.

-Data Analysis

This study used articles focused on activities of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, the Archdiocese of Manila, and Catholic lay groups, organizations, and charismatic groups. The content analysis periods vary for each newspaper, but represent an equal amount of days in each period. The study periods for *Malaya* began a few days before *Manila Bulletin* because the microfilm for *Malaya* either indicated the newspaper had missing pages, "no copy available," or was closed during some of the religious holidays. On Feb. 1 and 2, pages 9-12 had no copies available. The entire issues for Feb. 7, 1986 and April 17, 1992 were not available. *Malaya* closed April 9-11, 1998, to observe the days prior to Easter Sunday, Holy Thursday to Black Saturday. The 1986 content analysis period began late November, and ends February 26, 1986, the day after the fall of Marcos and the rise of Aquino. The 1992 study period began early February, and ended May 12, 1992, the day after election day. The 1998 study period also began early February and ended May 12, 1998, the day after election day. These exact study periods for each newspaper is shown in Table 1.

The author and her research assistants found the population of full text articles by scanning microfilm of *Malaya* and *Manila Bulletin* newspapers housed at the University of Michigan—Ann Arbor Graduate Library. The study only used straight news stories. Therefore, no obituaries, sports-related items, briefs or items containing fewer than 150 words, photos, graphics and illustrations from these articles are used. Articles were written by the newspapers' reporters or taken from national, regional or international wire services.

One example of a story fitting this description is when *Malaya* reported that Jaime Cardinal Sin may try to influence Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel to share a party ticket and run against Ferdinand Marcos's party at the February 1986 snap presidential election. Another example is when *Manila Bulletin* reported that the CBCP issued a pastoral exhortation on the elections, calling on Catholics to vote and to work toward eliminating cheating during the May 1998 elections.

-Validity and reliability measures

Five to six stories outside the study periods were used to pretest the coding protocol. After refinements, I used 10-15 other stories outside the study period to again test the protocol. Lacy and Riffe's formula determined 60 randomly selected articles out of 148 articles were needed for reliability testing. The articles were randomly sampled. Two-person coder reliability achieved nearly 100 percent agreement for the fairness variable. After the articles were coded, the data was entered into a computer SPSS program. The hypotheses were tested and conclusions reached by examining percentages. Tests of statistical significance were not employed because the population of articles used were not randomly selected. Each study period was compared to other study periods to determine notable differences.

2. Observation, Interviews & Document Research

After the content analysis this study used observations and open-ended interviews collected during the summer of 1998 to explain content analysis results. I interviewed people working for the four organizations under study (CBCP, Archdiocese of Manila, *Malaya* and *Manila Bulletin*), and scholars of Philippine media. Document research provides evidence and fills in historical gaps.

-Data analysis

For reporter/editor respondents, responses to all questions were considered, but responses to questions asked under the sections 3) organization 4) extra media, and 6) presidential elections, received more attention. (Future studies will use responses from the other sections). Responses to the questionnaire fleshed out the structures and member roles of the CBCP and the Archdiocese of Manila. The questionnaire also provided historical and current context to the interactions of these two organizations with the two newspapers under study, *Malaya* and *Manila Bulletin*.

-Validity and Reliability

I first analyzed the interviews collectively and then in groups determined by position (e.g. editor, reporter, church member, and media scholar). I then used inductive analysis to interpret the interviews, meaning I identified categories, themes and patterns in the responses. Please note that observation was only done for the time study period 1998.

- **Findings**

1. Content Analysis

H1a. The majority of the coverage of the Catholic Church in *Malaya* will be **fair.**

The data does not support this hypothesis, as shown in Table H1a. The results show that overall the majority of coverage of the Catholic Church was unfair (65 percent). The period that had the highest percentage of unfair stories was in 1986 with 80 percent, followed by 1998 with 64 percent. The 1992 period had an equal number of fair and unfair stories with 12 stories each.

H1b. The majority of the coverage of the Catholic Church in the *Manila Bulletin* will be **fair.**

This hypothesis was also not supported, as shown in Table H1b. The results show that overall the majority of coverage of the Catholic Church was unfair (88 percent). The period that had the highest percentage of unfair stories was in 1998 with 96 percent, followed closely by 1986 with 91 percent, and 1992 with 76 percent.

2. Observation & Interviews

R1a: What factors help explain the content analysis' measure of fairness in *Malaya*?

Interviews with owners, upper level editors and reporters of *Malaya* help explain why most of the coverage of the Catholic Church during the three time periods in *Malaya* was unfair. Jose Burgos,[32] the owner of the *Malaya* during the 1986 presidential campaign, said articles in his newspaper were not fair, representing only one side of the issue. He said the purpose of his paper was to persuade the masses to rise up against Marcos' regime and therefore, he and the reporters at his newspaper did not get the other side of many issue-oriented articles concerning the government. Jake Macasaet,[33] the owner of the *Malaya*, and upper level editors during the 1992 and 1998 presidential elections[34] also said fairness was not a goal at their newspaper.

Romuladez,[35] editor-in-chief of *Malaya*, said the lack of fairness in news coverage in *Malaya*, as well as other newspapers in the Philippines is the product of "envelopmental journalism." Envelopmental journalism is a journalistic practice in the Philippines which occurs when sources or interest groups give media members money, or any other material good in the exchange for coverage or more favorable coverage.[36] Romualdez abhors the practice when it involves large sums of money, but he is more lenient when it comes to small sums of money, or consumable goods so long as it doesn't involve compensating sources through newspaper coverage. According to Romuladez, envelopmental journalism and its lesser forms of giving small gifts to journalists have cultural roots, which explains its widespread acceptance as a phenomenon in Philippine journalism.

> Here you have Spanish and Chinese cultures influences. To accept the gifts of, let's say a book, a bottle of scotch, or a wallet or whatever, is not considered unethical. So for example, this one, these are giveaways (pointing to a pen)....They see nothing wrong with that. Most PR (public relations) people give cake, consumables. It's too much hassle to throw away so you say 'Okay, we have here some noodles.' Let's eat it. And they know that it is not meant to influence publication or special treatment. They (gifts) come after the fact. You print a story which will be printed anyway, with or without incentives."

Romualdez acknowledged that such gift giving is not acceptable in U.S. newspaper organizations, and cites the Protestant ethic in the U.S. as a reason for the intolerance toward gift giving in journalism.

R1b: What factors help explain the content analysis' measure of fairness in *Manila Bulletin?*

Interviews with owners, upper level editors, and reporters of *Manila Bulletin* and my observation of them, help explain why most of the coverage of the Catholic Church in *Malaya* was unfair. The reliance on press releases and the newspaper's "Don't Rock the Boat" policy contribute to unfairness in coverage. Editors and reporters at *Manila Bulletin* claim they merely rewrite press releases from organizations, including the CBCP and the Archdiocese of Manila.[37] Respondents at *Manila Bulletin* said they have little desire to get the other side, or sides of the issue or event on the press release because their "Don't rock the boat" policy emphasizes neutrality, and steers them away from creating conflict that may result by pitting sources against one another. Reporters and editors at this newspaper said they also do not have time to get additional sources outside from the sources used in the press releases. These constraints often lead to one-sided articles.

Ben Rodriguez,[38] editor-in-chief of *Manila Bulletin*, like Romualdez,[39] editor-in-chief of *Malaya*, said the lack of fairness in news coverage in *Malaya*, as well as other newspapers in the Philippines, is the product of "envelopmental journalism." Again, this practice has cultural roots:

> It depends on what kinds of favors or gifts you get. For example, if it's your birthday and you're a journalist and you have a lot of friends in Congress, so they send you gifts. It's part of the tradition in this country. Now the danger of course is when you accept gifts, since we Filipinos have a very strong sense of "utang na loob" (owing favors). When he gave you a favor and then in time he asks something from you, it's hard to resist help."

This obligatory exchange of favors was present in the church member and reporter relationship, and the church and editor or owner relationship, particularly at *Manila Bulletin*. For example, Emilio Yap, the owner of the newspaper, is a generous steward of the Catholic Church in Manila and also accommodates press releases and pastoral statements. To reward his acts of generosity on both counts, Cardinal Sin recommended him as a papal awardee, according to Msgr. Soc Villegas,[40] Vicar of the Archdiocese of Manila, Rector of Edsa Shrine, and Cardinal Sin's secretary. In turn, Yap continued his generosity not only monetarily, but through coverage of the Archdiocese of Manila.

- **Conclusions**

-Scope and Limitations

The case study and content analysis design limited the findings of this study. The challenges of gathering and analyzing qualitative data also limited the findings. These limitations however, do not compromise the overall output of this study.

First, this study's case study design limited generalizations to other newspapers in the Philippines because of the unique characteristics of those the newspapers under study, *Manila Bulletin* and *Malaya*. One of the unique characteristics is the ideology or orientation of each newspaper: in 1986, *Malaya* was liberal, and *Manila Bulletin* was conservative. Another example is circulation size. *Malaya* in 1986 had a circulation of 500,000[41] and in 1998, Macasaet,[42] the owner of the paper reported circulation at 40,000. *Manila Bulletin's* circulation has remained consistent since 1986 at 200,000.[43] Lastly, *Manila Bulletin* is much older than *Malaya*. *Manila Bulletin* began publishing in 1900, and *Malaya* in 1983. The strength of case studies, however, to act as an exploratory tool for future studies on multiple units of analysis, overshadows this limitation.

Second, the content analysis design limited findings to particular study periods, which were three months prior to each of the 1986, 1992 and 1998 presidential elections. Perhaps a longer period would be able to capture a better picture of the coverage of the Catholic Church in each of the election campaigns. The content analysis also failed to measure the news holes of the newspapers across the time periods, which may be related to the amount of news coverage. Moreover, this content analysis' focus on the specific issue of the Catholic Church's interactions does not aid in predicting the treatment of other issues in the two newspapers studied. Concentration on issues outside the Catholic Church's involvement would have blurred the focus of this study. Finally, the researcher is making an underlying assumption that the simple inclusion of opposing sides of an issue "within" a story achieves fairness. On the contrary, fair treatment may occur over time, rather than within stories when separate stories feature either side of an issue. In the interest of time and convenience, the study periods chosen for this project were limited to three, three month periods. Some may argue a lengthier period is needed to determine fair treatment. My response is that these periods are sufficient to explore the existence of fairness and that it is reasonable to measure fairness "within" articles because readers may not follow an issue over time to be equally aware of both sides of an issue.

The final limitation of this study revolved around the challenges encountered when gathering and analyzing qualitative data. My qualitative findings were limited because I was unable to locate key informants, especially reporters at both newspapers during the 1986 and 1992 elections.

-Suggestions for Further Study

This study's exploratory nature spurned several suggestions for further study in the areas of fairness, "utang na loob," and "press release journalism," as cultural phenomenons influencing Philippine newsmaking. As the mentioned above, the absence of fairness in the coverage of the Catholic Church in *Malaya* and *Manila Bulletin* can not be generalized to other issues, newspapers, or media in the Philippines. I suggest that a survey of news media organizations in the Philippines is needed to confirm or challenge the lack of fairness found in this study. Interviews with members of a wide range of media would also satisfy the calling to explore the existence of fairness in the Philippine news media. Interviews may also help pinpoint a historical departure from fairness as an objective in Philippine journalism, assuming fairness has indeed departed.

Another area thirsting for exploration involves "utang na loob," which essentially translates to the practice of owing a favor to someone who has done you a favor. This cultural theme permeates journalism in the Philippines. A cross-cultural study between the Philippine media and other media in other countries would further illuminate this cultural quality, as well as other cultural qualities embedded in the practice of Philippine journalism.

"Press release" journalism, the practice of re-writing press releases as stories rather than independently reporting on the story, and then writing a story, is also a fertile topic of study. Reporters and editors related this practice to laziness, as well as economic necessity. Newspapers engage in press release journalism primarily for ease and convenience. It is much easier and more convenient for editors and reporters to simply re-write the press release than to travel to an event or call sources. Press releases may also be used as a scapegoat to deflect responsibility from the newspaper on to the person or organization that sent the press release.

Table 1: Study periods for each newspaper

newspaper	**1986**	**1992**	**1998**
Malaya	Nov. 23, 1985 —Feb. 26, 1986	Feb. 11, 1992— May 12, 1992	Feb. 9, 1998— May 12, 1998
Manila Bulletin	Nov. 26, 1985 —Feb. 26, 1986	Feb. 12, 1992— May 12, 1992	Feb. 12, 1998— May 12, 1998

Table H1a: *Malaya's* **fair/unfair** coverage of the Catholic Church during 1986, 1992 and 1998 presidential campaigns

coverage	**1986**		**1992**		**1998**		**Overall**	
	Raw Score	Percent	Raw	Percent Score	Raw	Percent Score	Raw	Score
unfair	20	80.0	12	50.0	9	64.0	41	65.0
fair	5	20.0	12	50.0	5	36.0	22	35.0
N	25	100.0	24	100.0	14	100.0	63	100.0

Table H1b: *Manila Bulletin's* **fair/unfair** coverage of the Catholic Church during 1986, 1992 and 1998 presidential campaigns

coverage	**1986**		**1992**		**1998**		**Overall**	
	Raw Score	Percent	Raw Score	Percent	Raw Score	Percent	Raw	Score
unfair	31	91.0	19	76.0	25	96.0	75	88.0
fair	3	9.0	6	24.0	1	4.0	10	12.0
N	34	100.0	25	100.0	26	100.0	85	100.0

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From Globalization to Localization:

World's Leading Television News Broadcasters in Asia

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From Globalization to Localization:

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Abstract

This paper addresses globalization of CNNI, BBC World, and CNBC in Asia by analyzing and comparing program schedules of these three broadcasters. Globalization for them means adopting regionalization and localization in their programming strategies. CNBC Asia leads in its efforts of localization, followed by BBC World. While CNNI Asia Pacific has not moved beyond regionalization, it may soon adopt localization in Asia. Evidence is drawn from CNN's developments in Europe where joint ventures with local television stations to produce local versions of CNN have been established in Spain and Turkey. Co-owning local companies to produce country-specific programs is likely to become the dominant model for global news broadcasters' localization.

Key Words for Indexing

1. Globalization

2. Global Television News

3. International Communication

4. Asia

From Globalization to Localization:

World's Leading Television News Broadcasters in Asia

One of the most profound changes in international communication in the late 20th century was globalization of media, especially television broadcasting (Carveth, 1992; Ferguson, 1995; McQuail, 1997). Wide use of broadcast satellites and continuing policies of deregulation and privatization facilitated the evolution of television industry from a state of internationalization in the 1960s and 1970s, to multinationalization in the 1980s, and to globalization in the 1990s. This trend of globalization of television is continuing into the 21st century. The current stage of "global" television has transcended the international sale of television programs between two and more countries or the regional ambitions of multinationalism. It has made worldwide audiences available to the world's leading broadcasters by tearing down barriers posed by time, space, and national boundaries (Franklin & Chapados, 1993; Parker, 1995).

The development of "global" television has prompted a theoretical paradigm shift in international communication research from imperialism to globalization:

> What replaces 'imperialism' is 'globalization'. Globalization may be distinguished from imperialism in that it is a far less coherent or culturally directed process.... The idea of 'globalization' suggests interconnection and interdependency of all global areas which happens in a less purposeful way (Tomlinson, 1991: 175).

This shift toward theorizing about globalization, according to Sreberny-Mohammadi, Winseck, McKenna, and Boyd-Barett (1997), represents maturation of thinking in the field as "a way of pursuing a more fruitful encounter between political economy and cultural studies and of thinking through some of the sterile polarized arguments that have dominated the recent history of international communication scholarship" (p. ix).

This paradigm shift, however, does not render the term globalization a unified meaning. Some scholars still regard globalization as a continuation of imperialism. Globalization in this traditional conceptualization denotes an imperialistic world where the Western ideology and practice prevail and triumph over local efforts of preserving their cultures (Bredin, 1996; Massey, 1994; Miyoshi, 1996; Schiller, 1992; Schiller, 1993; Sepstrup, 1990). A more recent conceptualization of globalization refutes the imperialism thesis on that ground that it fails to grasp the power of local actors (Appadurai, 1990; Featherstone, 1996; Robertson, 1991; Rowe & Schelling, 1991; Smith, 1990; Tomlison, 1997; Zaretsky, 1995). Robertson (1991) argued that globalization is "a massive, twofold process involving the interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism" (p. 73). In Appadurai's view (1990), globalization involves the use of various instruments of homogenization or hegemony, e.g. advertising, technology, and language, which are absorbed into the local, only to be repatriated as heterogeneous dialogues of national or local culture.

Recent studies on globalization of television broadcasting tend to support the latter conceptualization that globalization is a two-way process involving "push" and "pull" or "exchanges" of power between global and local actors (Chan, 1994; Chang, 2000a; Chang, 2000b; Ferguson, 1995; Goonasekera & Lee, 1998; Gurnah, 1997; Johnson, 1995; Lovelock & Schoenfeld, 1995; Rajagopal, 1993; Schlesinger, 1997; Sparks, 1995; To & Lau, 1995; Tracey & Redal, 1995). Some refer to language and culture as the source of power for local actors when interacting with global forces. Some regard local governments' strict regulations on global actors as constitutingthe local's power. Others argue that local broadcasters have greater power over global broadcasters because most advertising money goes to local outlets.

Among the world's leading television broadcasters that have been sending "global" television programming are major news organizations, such as CNN International, BBC World, and CNBC. The concept of forming global television news networks began to take shape in the late 1980s. A series of world crises, including the Tiananmen Square uprising in China, the fall of the Berlin Wall in Eastern Europe, and the Persian Gulf War pushed Cable News Network (CNN) into international prominence. The whole world began to realize the power of 24-hour global news broadcasting with live coverage of world events (Friedland, 1992). The success of CNN triggered other news giants to venture into global television news business.

Ted Turner created the world's first global television news network – CNN International in 1985 to broadcast to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. It expanded to Asia in 1989 and Latin America in 1991. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) joined the competition of global television news in 1991 by establishing World Service Television, a service based on the reputation of 60 years of BBC World Service Radio. This channel, later called BBC World, was first launched in Asia and part of the Middle East in 1991. It then reached Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Consumer News and Business Channel (CNBC), NBC's financial and business news network established in 1989, also started its global reach to Europe and Asia in 1995. The trend of globalization for the world's leading television news broadcasters has brought about severe competition among these organizations to win over global audiences.

As the competition between these television news giants unfolded, Asia became an increasingly important market. This market has also proven to offer tremendous challenges to these global corporations. The multicultural, racial, religious and linguistic complexities; the former relative insulation of Asian mass audiences from Western television; and the popularity of domestically produced programs all make this vast market hard for global television broadcasters to penetrate (Ferguson, 1995). According to Iyer (1988), Asia seems to be the most complex setting for American cultural influence to clash with local culture because this huge and diverse region houses most of history's oldest and subtlest cultures.

Even though the Asian market remains complex, global television news broadcasters have all ventured into this market in the 1990s. Their developments in Asia reflect the recent conceptualization of globalization as a two-way process including "push" and "pull" power relationship between these broadcasters and local forces. In order to counteract local actors' power in resisting "global" television, global broadcasters have changed their programming strategy from rebroadcasting Western programs to adopting regionalization and localization (Chang, 2000a; Chang, 2000b; Chenard, 1995; Foote, 1995; Friedland, 1992; Lovelock & Schoenfeld, 1995; Servaes & Wang, 1997; Sinclair, 1997; To & Lao, 1995). While recent studies have demonstrated the importance of regionalization and localization for global broadcasters, few researchers have done so on the basis of primary data (Boyd-Barret, 1997; Negus, 1996; Youngs, 1996).

This study aims to improve this disadvantage by using primary data collected from program schedules of CNNI Asia Pacific, BBC World Asia, and CNBC Asia to address the following three research questions.

RQ1: To what degree have these global news broadcasters regionalized or localized in Asia?

RQ2: How similar or different have their regionalization or localization strategies been?

RQ3: What implications have these strategies had on our understanding of globalization of television news broadcasting?

This paper first looks at the Asian television market and the evolutions of these three global news broadcasters in Asia. It follows with descriptions of programming change toward regionalization and localization in individual channels and comparisons of strategies among them. The final part deals with the implications these broadcasters can offer to our understanding of globalization of television news broadcasting.

Uniqueness of the Asian Market

Asia's growing middle class is probably the most important reason that has prompted global broadcasters to plunge into this market. For the past two decades, Asia's economic growth has outstripped the rest of the world. Asia also has the bulk of the world's population. It was predicted that by 2000, the number of middle-class households in Asia with incomes over $30,000 would increase by 50% to 51 million (Lovelock & Schoenfeld, 1995).

As more Asians move into the middle class, they become strong consumers for satellite and cable television. According to the industry analyst, Baskerville Communications Corp., the number of multichannel TV households in the Asia-Pacific region, including cable, wireless cable, and satellite households, is expected to double from 78 million in 1996 to 178 million in 2005. The revenues for multichannel operations in this region will increase from $5 billion in 1996 to $27 billion in 2005 (Bates, 1998).

The growing Asian market has attracted global news broadcasters to venture into Asia. This market has, however, proven difficult to penetrate. First, advertising money is hard to come by ("An Asian sky," 1994; Clifford & Lesly, 1997; Karp, 1994). Second, when given choices, most viewers prefer local programming in their native languages (Straubhaar, 1991). Evidence in Asia can be drawn from countries such as Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, where TV industries are more commercialized and developed. A study of the ratios of local to overseas programs on the top twenty program list in some Asian countries found these figures: Hong Kong, 75%; Indonesia and Malaysia, 85%; South Korea and Thailand, 90%; the Philippines, 95%; and Taiwan, 100% (Lovelock & Schoenfeld, 1995). Third, some Asian governments remain hostile to global news broadcasters. Government controls in some Asian countries, such as China, Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam, constitute barriers for the developments of global television news broadcasters (Chan & Ma, 1996; Chenard, 1995; Servaes & Wang, 1997).

These challenges have initiated programming regionalization and localization among global television news broadcasters. Regionalization, according to Chan & Ma (1996), can be defined as the flow of Asian produced programming, the exchange of expertise within the Asian region, and the production and distribution of programming which is tailor-made for regional audiences. Localization can be defined as a language block-by-language block approach or country-by-country approach to deal with differences within a region. Localization strategies include use of local language via dubbing or subtitling, buying materials from local studios, production of local programming though co-production or forming joint ventures with local sectors, and rescheduling or repackaging programs to suit local viewing preferences (Albarran & Chan-Olmsted, 1998; Chenard, 1995; To & Lao, 1995).

In the context of this study, which focuses on program content, regionalization refers to distribution of programs that deal with Asian issues and are produced for Asian audiences as a whole. Localization means production of country-specific programs via buying materials from local studios, co-producing or forming joint ventures with local sectors.

Global News Broadcasters in Asia

CNNI Asia Pacific

The first global television news venture to arrive in Asia was Ted Turner's CNN International. CNNI started to broadcast to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa in 1985. CNNI Asia Pacific was launched in August 1989, followed by CNNI Latin America in 1991 and CNNI U.S. in 1995, which completed its global distribution network. This channel could reach more than 150 million households in 212 countries and territories through a network of 23 satellites in late 1999 (CNNI Asia Pacific web site, 1999a).

With regionwide distribution secured, CNNI watched its viewership in Asia grow. By January 1996, CNNI could reach 15 million households in Asia, up from 9.6 million in December 1994 ("CNNI hits 100m households," 1996). The number of viewership rose to 17 million by the end of 1996 ("Turner Broadcasting System in Asia," 1996). It could reach 26 million households in 29 countries in the Asia Pacific as of late 1999 (CNNI Asia Pacific web site, 1999a).

CNNI's popularity among global satellite broadcasters in Asia has also remained high. According to the International Air Travel Survey in 1996, 24.9% of 16,149 travelers surveyed in eight Asian airports said they had watched CNNI the previous day. The rating for BBC World was 11.6% ("CNNI still channel of choice," 1996). The first Pan Asian Cross Media Survey released in 1997 showed that 21% of high-income Asians, aged between 25 to 64, said they had watched CNNI or HBO in the last 30 days, beating other international broadcasters such as Discovery, STAR TV, NBC, and MTV. BBC World ranked 12th with 8% of viewership (Campbell, 1997).

The same survey released in 1999 confirmed that CNNI, for the third consecutive year, reached more affluent adults in Asia than any other global television network (CNNI Asia Pacific web site, 1999b). According to the 1999 Asian Target Markets Survey, CNNI took lead over other global news broadcasters by reaching 33% of upscale audiences, compared to 17% for BBC World and 15% for CNBC. CNNI viewers also watched the channel more frequently and for a longer time than they watched BBC World and CNBC (CNNI Asia Pacific web site, 1999c).

BBC World Asia

John Tusa, then managing director of BBC World, once said: "It is now recognized that for Britain not to have been in the international TV news business during the Gulf crisis was a major strategic error" (Friedland, 1992: 28). It did not take long for the BBC to get into the global television news business. BBC World's 24-hour news and information channel was launched across Asia and the Middle East, a joint venture with Hong Kong-based STAR TV, in October 1991. In this partnership, BBC World provided the news, while STAR TV was responsible for satellite distribution and advertising sales. Carried on one of STAR's five channels, BBC World could reach 38 countries in Asia and part of the Middle East with a potential audience of 2.7 billion people (Johnson, 1995).

In 1992, BBC World became available to viewers in Sub-Saharan Africa through South Africa-based M-Net International. A Canadian service also debuted in 1992 via the Canadian

Broadcasting Corporation's cable channel Newsworld. In 1994, BBC World launched a channel in Arabic to the Middle East and North Africa (Johnson, 1995). In 1995, it was launched in Europe. This channel reached Latin America in November 1996 and in 1998 it completed its global network by entering the U.S. market. BBC World was available in 150 million homes (63 million on a 24-hour basis and 87 million on a part day basis) in nearly 200 countries and territories in late 1999 (BBC World web site, 1999a).

BBC World's move into global news seriously threatened CNNI's world dominance and ignited a television news war. "It's a butt-to-butt fight," said Christopher Irwin, chief executive of BBC World, in 1991. "For the first time in international television, there will be an alternative to the world view of Atlanta" (Privat, McKillop, & Hall, 1991: 40). Irwin criticized CNNI for often being parochial, pro-American, and emphasizing pictures over analysis: "Historically, the Atlanta world view is narrower than the BBC world view." He said "CNN is brilliant reportage; I'm more dubious about its journalism" (Prokesch, 1991: 9).

CNNI was quick to respond to BBC World's criticism. Peter Vesey, then-director of CNNI, emphasized: "Our greatest single strength is that we provide live coverage of actual events in real time, in good context and with good supplemental reporting" (Prokesch, 1991: 9). Even though BBC World and CNNI had engaged in severe competition, they soon found that they both had to face another strong rival in Asia.

CNBC Asia

The arrival of CNNI and BBC World boosted the news market in the world. Starting from the mid-1990s, Asia and Europe witnessed another tide of news ventures. NBC extended its financial and business news arm, Consumer News and Business Channel (CNBC), into Asia and Europe in June 1995.

CNBC was launched in the United States as a cable business news channel in 1989. CNBC's birth triggered concerns in CNN, which soon announced that it would expand its business news division in its Los Angeles bureau and would add more coverage of business and financial news to its schedules (Stilson, 1989). CNBC later merged its competitor, Financial News Network, in May 1991, consolidating its lead in television business and financial news in the U.S. market (Walley, 1991). CNBC's viewership in the United States grew from 13 million subscribers in 1989 (Stilson, 1989) to 71.3 million in 1999 (CNBC Asia web site, 1999a).

This wave of competition between CNNI and CNBC extended from their home bases in the United States to the global market with the launchings of CNBC Asia and CNBC Europe in 1995. In Asia, CNNI was not the sole competitor for CNBC Asia. BBC World was also a challenge, but direct competition came from another business news venture called Asian Business News (ABN), a joint venture by Dow Johns and TCI. Dow Johns and TCI launched ABN and European Business News (EBN) in Asia and Europe in late 1993 (Deal, 1994).

ABN and CNBC Asia unfolded one of the fiercest competitions on the news stage in Asia. Both companies soon found that head-to-head competition hurt them badly and revenues were falling far short of expectations. In December 1997, CNBC and ABN announced their plan to merge their Asian and European services into CNBC: A Joint Venture of NBC and Dow Jones. This merged venture was launched in February 1998 ("CNBC and Dow Johns merger," 1998). CNBC Asia was available in 14.4 million homes and CNBC Europe could be watched by 29.5 million subscribers by late 1999 (CNBC Asia web site, 1999a).

Regionalization and Localization for Global News Broadcasters in Asia

CNNI Asia Pacific

CNNI started out as "the version of CNN that's distributed outside the United States" (Mahoney, 1992: 34). It featured the same news programs that were broadcast in the United States and redistributed them to the world. Because of this approach, CNNI was criticized for being too

U.S.-oriented without taking regional and local relevance into consideration (Mahoney, 1992). In a regional forum on the future of satellite television organized by the Singapore Press Club in 1993, participants urged CNNI to tailor its coverage of Asia to Asian audiences. CNNI's vice-president Peter Vesey defended the company's programming strategy of offering universal news to global audiences, but also acknowledged that going regional might be the solution in the future ("Asian focus yes, but news will still reach out to international audience: CNN," 1993).

CNNI's progress into regionalization has moved slowly but surely. In April 1995, CNNI officially opened its Hong Kong production center to produce regional news programs. It added a daily, prime time two-hour block of Asia-focused news, including "World News Asia" and "Business Asia," and debuted a weekend half-hour current affairs program, "Inside Asia" ("CNNI in HK debut," 1995).

To find out how far CNNI Asia Pacific has moved into regionalization or localization, current program schedules (displayed in a weekly format) were obtained from CNNI Asia Pacific's web site. The week from November 29 to December 5, 1999 was chosen for analysis. CNNI Asia Pacific offered a similar regional version of programs to all Asian countries. Programs in the weekdays were the same, but schedules differed due to time differences in various countries of this region. For example, in Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan, the schedule started with "CNN This Morning" at 6:00 a.m. In Japan and Korea, the morning started with "World News Europe" at 6:00 a.m. Weekend programs, however, differed among some countries. For example, in Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan, one hour of Asia-related news was broadcast on Saturday and Sunday. In Indonesia, Asia-related news took up one hour on Saturday and two hours on Sunday. Audiences in India and Pakistan could watch 1.5 hours of Asian news on Saturday and three hours on Sunday. Overall, CNNI supplied a similar version of regional programs to all Asian countries with minor differences in weekends (CNNI Asia Pacific web site, 1999d).

CNNI featured six Asian regional programs as of late 1999 (see Table 1). They included: "CNN This Morning," broadcast live every weekday which brings a mix of international and Asian news and features; "Asian Business Morning," a live daily show that looks at the coming Asian business day; "Asian Edition," a 15-minute daily program focusing on headline news and business updates; "Asia Tonight," aired every weekday during prime time offering breaking news, interviews with Asian leaders and feature stories; "Biz Asia," a half-hour program aired twice every weekday providing economic, corporate and political news; and "Inside Asia," a half-hour current affairs weekend program (CNNI Asia Pacific web site, 1999e). These programs (including reruns) ranged from six to eight hours per day during weekdays and one to three hours per day during weekends, making a total of 32 to 35 hours per week of Asia-related programs.

Table 1
Regional Version of Asia-Related Programs of CNNI Asia Pacific
(November 29 to December 5, 1999)

Asia-Related/Regional Programs	Total Hours
1. CNN This Morning (Weekday) 2. Asian Business Morning (Daily) 3. Asian Edition (Daily) 4. Asia Tonight (Weekday) 5. Biz Asia (Weekday) 6. Inside Asia (Weekend)	32-35 hrs

BBC World Asia

BBC World began in Asia with some regionalization in its programming. The early programs for BBC World Asia were mostly taken from the BBC's domestic output and partly tailor-made for Asian audiences, e.g. hourly 10-minute news bulletins for the Asian feed in English, which was simultaneously translated into Cantonese and Mandarin ("And nation shall speak guff onto nation," 1992). BBC World also introduced an Asian business program in November 1992 (Wroe, 1992). BBC World, in severe competition with CNNI, was proud to claim in 1992: "We are the only ones who regionalize" (Fiddick, 1992: 68). In late 1993, its Asian service featured news bulletins, business news, regionally targeted news, weather reports, in-depth interviews on major issues, and regional segments such as "Southeast Asia Today" and "Asia Today" (Johnson, 1995).

BBC World's regionalization in Asia has progressed slowly, but it has moved into some localization. According to program schedules for the week from December 8 to December 14, 1999, BBC World broadcast a regional version of programs to all Asian countries (see Table 2), except India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, which were covered by a specific feed to India.

Table 2
Regional Version of Asia-Related and Local Programs of BBC World Asia
(December 8 to December 14, 1999)

Regular Asia-Related/ Regional Programs	Total Hours
1. The World Today 2. Asia Today	14 hrs 30 mins
Regular Local Programs (about India)	
1. Madhur Jaffrey's Flavors of India 2. India Business Report (Sunday)	
Special Local Program (about Macao)	
1. Macao's People	

The schedules for the regional version differed among countries due to time differences, but program contents remained the same. This version carried two regular Asia-related programs, two regular local programs about India, and a special program featuring Macao (BBC World website, 1999b). All these programs accounted for 14.5 hours of a week's schedules.

BBC World began to introduce local programs produced specifically for audiences in India in early 1998. This was a step for BBC World to go beyond regionalization in its programming to localization. Several local programs were commissioned by BBC World to be produced by local television companies, e.g. New Delhi Television and United Television, in 1997 ("BBC to introduce India-specific program band," 1997). More India-specific programs, including current affairs and lifestyle features, were added to this dedicated feed in mid 1998 (Joshi, 1998). BBC World recently initiated aggressive marketing campaigns in India to boost advertising revenues. India, which constituted 80% of BBC World's Asian audiences, remains BBC World's most important market in Asia (Pande, 1999). The regional and local programs in BBC's dedicated feed to India, available in Pakistan and Bangladesh as well (BBC World web site, 1999b), accounted for around 24 hours of a week's schedules (see Table 3).

Table 3

Dedicated Feed to India: Asia-Related and Local Programs of BBC World (December 8 to December 14, 1999)

Asia-Related/ Regional Programs	Total Hours
Same as the regional version in Table 2	23 hrs 45 mins
Local Programs (Regional version)	
Same as the regional version in Table 2	
Local Programs (Shown only on India feed)	
1. Wheels 2. Film India 3. Question Time India 4. Mastermind India	

CNBC Asia

CNBC, the late comer to Asia, learned to enter the market with regionalization in its programming. Its early programs for Asian audiences consisted of news coverage from Asia, CNBC Europe, and CNBC in the U.S. (McConville, 1995). CNBC has continued its efforts of regionalization in Asia. Program schedules (displayed in a weekly format) for the week from November 29 to December 5, 1999 demonstrated that CNBC Asia featured a regional version of programs to most Asian countries, e.g. Malaysia, Korea, Hong Kong, Macao, the Philippines, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Nepal, and Cambodia (see Table 4). This version included 10 Asia-related programs and two local programs. These programs accumulated to 56 hours a week, that is, almost one third of a week's programs was devoted to regional (and some local) news.

Table 4

Regional Version of Asia-Related and Local Programs of CNBC Asia (November 29 to December 5, 1999)

Asia-Related/ Regional Programs	Total Hours
1. Asian Market Wrap 2. Asian Wall Street Journal 3. Far Eastern Economic Review 4. Asian Working Woman 5. Challenging Asia 6. Managing Asia 7. Asia Squawkbox 8. Power Lunch Asia 9. Asian Nightly News 10. Asia This Week (Weekend)	56 hrs
Local Programs	
1. Pakistan This Week (Weekend) 2. Australian Financial Review Market	

CNBC Asia has also ventured into programming localization. CNBC Asia's dedicated feed to India came out of its partnership with India's TV 18 and debuted in November 1999. This feed, also available in Pakistan and Bangladesh, featured six locally produced programs, which comprised around 30 hours of programming per week. Other Asia-focused programs offered in the regional version could also be seen on this feed for around 35 hours per week. Overall, more than 73 hours of regional and local programs per week were broadcast to India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (see Table 5).

In Japan, CNBC formed alliance with Nihon Keizai Shinbum (Nikkei) business television news service. Nikkei CNBC was launched in October 1999. This dedicated feed to Japan carried 115 hours of weekly programs that were specifically tailor-made for the Japanese audiences. Almost all the time slots from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 a.m. were local Japanese programs. Some Asia-related programs shown in the regional version were also available on this feed for 11 hours a week. Overall, the Asia-related and local programming took up 126 hours of a week's schedules in Japan (see Table 6).

Table 5

Dedicated Feed to India: Asia-Related and Local Programs of CNBC Asia (November 29 to December 5, 1999)

Asia-Related/ Regional Programs	Total Hours
Same as the regional version in Table 4	73 hrs 30 mins
Local Programs (Regional version)	
Same as the regional version in Table 4	
Local Programs (Shown only on India feed)	
1. IT Hour 2. Bazaar 3. India Talks 4. India Talks Weekend 5. India Business Morning 6. India Market Wrap 7. India Business Day 8. The Indian Manager	

Table 6

Dedicated Feed to Japan: Asia-Related and Local Programs of Nikkei CNBC (November 29 to December 5, 1999)

Asia-Related/ Regional Programs	Total Hours
Some programs shown in the regional version in Table 4	126 hrs
Local Programs (Regional version)	
1. Pakistan This Week (Weekend)	
Local Programs (Shown only on Japan feed)	
1. Nikkei Trade Presses, Nikkei News 2. Market Briefing, Stock Board 3. Nikkei Evening Edition 4. Analysts' Views 5. Tokyo Market Next Week 6. Cabinet Policy 7. Nikkei CNBC Special 8. Money Angels Etc.	

In Taiwan, Eastern Television formed partnership with CNBC Asia and launched a channel called ET-CNBC. The audiences in Taiwan could watch local programs for 88 hours a week (program names not available due to web site construction). Other Asia-related programs accounted for about 29 hours per week, making a total of 117 hours of local and regional programs on ET-CNBC (see Table 7).

Table 7
Dedicated Feed to Taiwan: Asia-Related and Local Programs of ET-CNBC
(November 29 to December 5, 1999)

Asia-Related/ Regional Programs	Total Hours
Same as the regional version in Table 4	117 hrs
Local Programs (Regional version)	
1. Pakistan This Week (Weekend)	
Local Programs (Shown only on Taiwan feed)	
'ET Programming' displayed in various time slots; Specific program names not available	

Implications for Globalization of Television News Broadcasting

The infrastructure built upon the advent of communication technology and policies toward deregulation and privatization has facilitated the world's leading television news broadcasters to form global networks and reach global audiences. Globalization for these broadcasters no longer meant rebroadcasting a universal version of news from the West to the world. Globalization has evolved into regionalization and localization in these broadcasters' program contents.

The purpose of this study is to find out how CNNI, BBC World, and CNBC have regionalized or localized in Asia; how they have differed in their approaches to regionalization and localization; and what implications these companies' programming strategies can bring to our understanding of globalization of television news broadcasting. While CNNI, BBC World, and CNBC Asia have all adopted regionalization and localization in their programming, they differ with regards to approaches to regioinalization and localization. CNNI still opts for regionalization without localization in Asia. It offers a similar version of programs to all Asian countries with 32 to 35 hours of weekly programming focusing on Asia-related news. These regional programs have increased to six over the years. CNNI Asia Pacific, however, has not ventured into providing country-specific news to local audiences. This does not mean that it will not adopt localization strategy in Asia. Evidence can be drawn from CNN's recent ventures in Europe.

CNN began to form joint ventures with local language news channels in Europe from 1999. CNN Plus, a 50:50 joint venture by CNN and a Spanish television company, was launched in January 1999 to provide 24-hour Spanish news to audiences in Spain. The news in CNN Plus are produced and presented by Spanish journalists and anchors. This was CNN's first 24-hour country-specific channel that was operated and controlled outside of Atlanta (CNNI Asia Pacific web site, 1999a). Commenting on the birth of CNN Plus, market analysts thought that this would not be the last local version of CNN ("CNN International," 1999). Soon, a second similar venture, CNN Turk, was born in September 1999 to target the Turkish audiences (CNN Asia Pacific web site, 1999a). Localization for CNN in the Asia Pacific has been limited due to the economic crisis in this region ("CNN International," 1999).

BBC World adopts a strategy that is more regional than local in Asia. Most Asian audiences, except those in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, watch the same regional version of programs. In this version, there are only two Asia-related programs and two local programs about India. Special programs about certain Asian countries are sometimes scheduled, but they are not regularly shown. Compared to CNNI's and CNBC's regional versions of programs, the number of Asia-related and country-specific programs shown in BBC World's regional version is the least and the hours devoted to these programs are also the fewest.

BBC World, however, has moved into some localization by having a dedicated feed to India. It features quite a few local programs specifically produced for the Indian audiences. The broadcast time for regional and local programs on this feed accounts for about 24 hours a week, still not an impressive figure. BBC World's localization also differs from CNNI and CNBC in that it commissions local programs to local companies instead of co-owning local television companies.

CNBC Asia has become the leading news channel in moving toward program localization. It first started in Asia with some regionalization. After CNBC merged with ABN and became the region's only global business news venture, it fastened its pace into localization. In India, Japan, and Taiwan, large amount of broadcast time is devoted to local programs. Regional and local programs on CNBC's India feed accounts for 45% (74 hours) of a week's schedules. In Japan and Taiwan, these programs take up around 75 % and 69% (126-117 hours) respectively. Localization for CNBC Asia is achieved via forming joint ventures with local news broadcasters. The local partners are responsible for producing local programs and marketing the channels. The same strategy is also adopted by CNN in its localization in Europe.

The developments of CNNI, BBC World, and CNBC in Asia have shown that they have adopted various degrees of regionalization and localization in their programming. It is likely that they will continue to make themselves more relevant to Asian audiences by providing more regional and local news. While CNNI, BBC World, and CNBC have all been engaged in regionalization, the pressure for localization may be increasing due to CNBC's efforts of launching several country-specific services.

Globalization for television news broadcasting may eventually mean more localization in programming. Further localization may follow two models: commissioning programs to local companies or establishing joint ventures with local television broadcasters. Co-owning local companies may become the dominant model for localization as demonstrated by CNBC's partnerships in India, Japan, and Taiwan and CNN's efforts of establishing CNN Plus in Spain and CNN Turk in Turkey.

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News Media Representation of the Yanomami Indians as a Reflection of the Ideal Audience

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ABSTRACT

Using Narrative Paradigm Theory and Narrative Analysis, this study investigates news media coverage of the Yanomami Indians, an indigenous tribe residing in northern Brazil and Venezuela. Eight themes are described and plausible interpretations of ideal audience member values are presented. This project explores the reflective nature of the news media, discusses insights into the question of human identity, and concludes recommending further study to assess how the Yanomami would tell their own story.

Introduction

The Yanomami, or, as their name translates, the "fierce people,"[1] are an indigenous Indian tribe who live in the rain forests and scattered grasslands along the Brazil/Venezuela border. They number about 23,000 in total and live in groups that range in size from one to 300 people. In most cases, the entire community lives in a large circular structure made of poles and thatch, or interwoven leaves. Gardening, particularly the crop plantain (a very large banana), occurs within villages and is their main source of sustenance.

Male and female Yanomami have short, dark hair, which is usually cut in a bowl-shaped style. Some wear loin clothes, but many - if not most - choose to be naked. One of the men's daily practices includes the use of hallucinogenic drugs, which they inject by blowing the substances into each others' noses through a long tube.

The discovery of gold in 1987 on Yanomami land exponentially increased media coverage of them. Previous to this event some media attention had been given to the Yanomami for three other reasons. One was because of anthropologist Napoleon A. Chagnon's efforts to let humankind know about this "last Stone Age tribe." A second related to the location of their home, the endangered Amazon rain forest. A third corresponded to the insight the Yanomami lifestyle gives into what is believed by many anthropologists, Chagnon included, to be a peek into humankind's beginnings; who our ancestors were, how they lived, and how humankind has progressed from their "savage" state[2].

Ironically, as news media coverage of this Indian tribe and their primitive existence has increased, concurrent insight into the understanding of humankind today has also emerged. A narrative analysis performed on newspaper coverage of the Yanomami reveals that the news media is reflective in its storytelling. The purpose of this study is to address how news reporters tell the story of the Yanomami, and how reporters' storytelling reflects elements of the ideal audience's identity. Walter Fisher's Narrative Paradigm Theory (1987)[3] provides the foundation for this argument. This paper's focus, use of narrative analysis and findings offer important implications for the interdisciplinary examination of international problems with human interest dimensions.

Background

The media's presentation of the Yanomami story fuses two disciplines, namely anthropology and communications. Since its inception, anthropology has sought to provide answers to basic questions, such as "Where have we come from? What are we? Where are we going?"[4]. Anthropology has struggled with how to present suggestions to these questions to an audience[5]. Discussion of the Yanomami in the news media is an understandable, "popular" and readily accessible manner to inform nonacademic publics of one possible answer to the dilemmas of human origin, purpose, and potential.

As the Yanomami story is presented by the media, two tales unfold. One concerns insight into who this tribe is. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the Yanomami are an indigenous tribe that live in the Amazon rain forest, straddling the Brazil and Venezuelan border. Information additional to basic descriptives regarding the Yanomami is difficult to cite; their exact nature has been a subject of debate among anthropologists for some time[6]. At the root of the controversy is the question of just how fierce this people really is and what role the introduction of civilization to them has played.

Although only a handful of persons, namely "skin hunters, rubber tappers, Brazil nut gatherers, missionaries, government personnel (for example, members of the Brazilian Air Force, the Health department, frontier-demarcating teams), and occasional scientists (anthropologists, geographers, geologists, botanists)"[7], were aware of the Indians before the 1960s, Chagnon's interpretations of them as a "fierce people" were the first ones to be widely distributed and uncontestedly accepted[8]. Additional research by others, particularly through long-term ethnographies like those performed by Salamone (1997)[9], Ferguson (1995)[10], and Good (1991)[11], depict a different understanding of this tribe's behavior. Further, they and others argue that Chagnon's interpretation disrupts, even contributes to the negative behavior of, the Indians[12]. A greater discussion of this controversy, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

The second story that emerges from the tale of the Yanomami provides understanding into the identity of the ideal audience. Referring to Fisher (1987)'s explanation and this author's interpretation, the ideal audience is defined as the generalized public to whom the media send their messages. The audience is "ideal" through persons' ability to relate commonly and similarly to events because of the common experience of humanity. This is not to say that audiences are to be "perceived as a group of observers, but [rather] as active, irrepressible participants in the meaning-formation of the stories that any and all storytellers tell in discourses"[13]. In other words, the media, as storytellers, and audiences, as story co-authors (in Fisher's terms), depict and experience an answer to the question, *"What is the essence of human nature?"*[14]

News media play a significant role in offering a solution to the anthropological search for clues to human origin. In that journalists retell events, they are storytellers. "(S)ome scholars suggest that one of the most important ways we learn about the world, and ourselves as well, is through narratives"[15]. As media storytellers transmit narratives, they influence, to an arguable extent, what their audiences think, what they think about, and how they feel. "(T)he numerous ways in which authors convey information to their readers [is] a means of shaping the readers' thoughts and *affecting their emotions"* [italics added][16]. When emotions are tapped into by storytellers meanings are transferred and identity is impacted. In brief, because"narratives provide us with access to people's identity and personality"[17], the stories that the media tell inform readers about the characters involved and about themselves as members of the ideal audience. Hence, study of news media representation of the Yanomami provides insight into the identity of the ideal audience.

Research Questions

The general directive which has guided this study concerns the interplay between communications and anthropology. It asks, "How does the media tell the story of anthropological discovery?" Recognizing the case of the Yanomami to be an example of anthropological discovery, and noting the amount of media coverage donated to this one particular tribe, the question has been narrowed to, "How does the news media tell the story of the Yanomami?" Further, "What does print media's presentation of the Yanomami story tell members of the ideal audience about themselves?"

Theory and Methodology

Narrative Paradigm Theory (NPT) and Narrative Analysis have been applied to newspaper lead articles, abstracts, and some full-texts to answer the previously stated research questions. NPT (Fisher, 1987) suggests that all communication is storytelling, and that all human beings are storytellers: "people are full participants in the making of messages, whether they are agents (authors) or audience members (co-authors)"[18]. Through the principles of narrative probability and narrative fidelity, reality and identity are dually constructed by storytellers and storyhearers. Storytellers, like the media, determine how well stories "hang together" externally, or in comparison to other similar stories, and internally, or how well the story transitions from one detail to the next. These principles of material and structural coherence, respectively, are influenced by other factors.

Many elements influence which stories the media, as storytellers, choose to report on and how they present them. National and international politics, economic considerations, cultural implications, individual dispositions, time and space, etc., affect which of society's stories are selected for print. How the facts of these narratives are arranged is the individual reporter's decision. Wolfsfeld (1997) labels this process *framing*[19]:

> The news media construct frames... by attempting to fit the information they are receiving into a package that is professionally useful and culturally familiar... The process is best understood as one in which journalists attempt to find a *narrative fit*... The attempt to find a narrative fit should be seen not as a mechanical process, but rather a cultural one in which journalists place the events of the day within a meaningful context.[20] (Italics added.)

Gitlin (1980)[21] informs Wolfsgeld's explanation by defining what media frames are:

> *Media* frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organize the world both for journalists who report it and, in some important degree, for us who rely on their reports. *Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual.* Frames enable journalists to process large amounts of information...: to recognize it as information, to assign it to cognitive categories, and to

package it for efficient relay to their audiences. (Italics by author)[22]

Together, Wolfsgeld's and Gitlin's discussion of media frames implies an inherent skill on the part of the reporter/storyteller to understand and to speak with an audience. Reporters tailor the information they receive into stories that will resonate with the ideal audience. This is successfully accomplished through the reporter's talent to communicate facts through the common language of human experience. The degree to which reporters are successful impacts their credibility, or the characterological coherence, of them as storytellers and of their stories.

Their success also influences a tale's narrative fidelity, or the degree to which the story "rings true," with the story participants. This depends upon the similarity of the values inherent within the story and those assumed to be within the ideal audience. Hence, stories experienced by storytellers and storyhearers, through the principles of narrative coherence and narrative fidelity, uncover morals or values and/or characteristics of the ideal audience.

In relation to news media coverage of the Yanomami, reporters, as storytellers, and members of the ideal audience, as storyhearers, participate in a reflective process of creating reality and understanding one's self by viewing another. To quote Fisher (1987),

> Regardless of the form they are given, recounting and accounting for constitute stories we tell ourselves and each other to establish a meaningful life-world. The character of narrator(s), the conflicts, the resolutions, and the styles will vary, but each mode of recounting and accounting for is but a way of relating a "truth" about the human condition.[23]

A large portion of the truth about the human condition is understanding elements of the ideal audience's identity.

Narrative Analysis[24] has been used to interpret selected newspaper article lead paragraphs, abstracts, and full-texts according to NPT. In order to create a research text for analysis, several CARS (Computer Assisted Research Service) searches were performed with the keywords Yanomami, Yanomamo and Yanomama to assess print coverage of the Amazon tribe. The author recognizes that electronic methods of gathering research material introduce specific limitations to any study. Those hindrances include lack of standardized procedures, such as when archiving begins, among newspapers for cataloging stories[25] and variances in keywords used by different newspapers for similar topics[26]. However, such factors as convenience, careful cross-checking of information for validity and reliability, and the type of methodology employed can, and in this study do, counter these limitations.

Approximately 1200 article portions surfaced from the electronic searches. To arrive at the research text, two basic steps were followed. First, the researcher read through all the information and noted different topics into which reporting on the Yanomami fell. Eight general categories surfaced. They have been termed environment, effects of "civilization," warfare/violence, massacre, gold miners, politics and reservation, Davi and religion, and adventures and art.

Second, once these themes were discovered, the main body of articles was reanalyzed. From it, articles that represented the general categories were purposively selected, i.e., chosen because they were stories cited by multiple news sources or because they represented a unique view, to create a research text. This text, which is comprised of 105 article portions, was examined further to determine subthemes, such as fire and flood within environment, and to draw conclusions about the ideal audience in relation to Fisher's NPT.

In sum, narrative analysis, or the interpretation of text to better understand identity[27], is the methodology which has been applied to Fisher's NPT. By it, the research text has been examined according to the principles of narrative coherence and narrative fidelity, with Wolfsfeld's and Gitlin's ideas on media frames informing narrative coherence. Although this is not an audience study, this type of application allows for assumptions regarding elements of the ideal audience's identity to be made.

Findings

As previously noted, eight general themes arose from a narrative analysis of newspaper coverage of the Yanomami. Results will be discussed in relation to each of those themes, with possible interpretations for elements of the ideal audience's identity being suggested. They are environment, effects of "civilization," warfare/violence, massacre, gold miners, politics and reservation, Davi and religion, and adventures and art.

Environment

News media stories about the Yanomami that concentrate on the environment in which they reside incorporate four main subthemes. One minor narrative grouping addresses the rain forest. News reports concerning it illustrate the need to preserve the forest for environmental reasons that affect all humankind. They explain that it

> is the greatest repository of life on this planet.
> Hidden beneath an oceanic canopy of trees are between 10 percent and 50 percent of the 5 million to 10 million species living on this planet.
> A fifth of the earth's fresh water flows through the forest, nourishing 2,000 types of birds, millions of different insects, and 2,500 species of fish. In the Amazon River and its tributaries, there are monstrous snakes, giant turtles and manatees; fish able to poison people or eat them alive; and mysterious black dolphins blamed in legend for the adulterous urges of Amazonian men.[28]

A second subtheme addresses the fire in the Amazon, which occurred in 1998. It was "the worst fire in the history of the northern Amazon"[29]. The fire began when land owners, who do so traditionally during the dry season, burned their land[30] after "months of drought" caused by El Nino[31]. "Those localized fires quickly began burning out of control. The fires then spread to the jungle, normally too wet to burn"[32]. Typically humid areas burned for three months in Brazil's northernmost state of Roraima[33]. In the end, the fire claimed "2,379 square miles of rain forest..., including parts of the Yanomami Indian reserve"[34].

The fire, hence, through its destruction of an area that provides numerous resources to persons all over the earth, affected humankind. In particular, it devastated Yanomami tribes by destroying their land, homes, gardens, etc.

A third subcategory addressing environmental reporting includes press stories about how the fire ended. Although numerous outside sources, such as the government, environmentalists, and firefighters, fought to put out the three-month old fire, it was not until the Yanomami applied religious methods that rain fell. "The rains [came] a day after two Caiapo Indian shaman [religious leaders] were flown in to the Yanomami reservation to perform a special ritual, which they believed would bring rain."[35]. The rain began to and eventually extinguished the fire.

As a fourth topic, press reports also discuss a flood.

> Floods have destroyed the crops and homes of several thousand Yanomami Indians, one [illegible] the last primitive tribes in the Western hemisphere.
> "They're... suffering a lot. They don't have anything to eat," said Jaime Turon, mayor of the Upper Orinoco municipality, 900 miles southeast of Caracas near the Brazil border.
> In late May, the Orinoco River in the remote Amazon rain forest starting (sic) overflowing, he said. It has left the reed homes of the Yanomami under about 13 feet of water.[36]

Stories regarding the rain forest, the devastating fire in it in 1998, how it ended, and a dangerous flood interlace the press' tales. Through their repetition of key environmental facts, these subthemes provide structural, material and characterological consistency to the environmental aspect of the Yanomami story.

Further, they "ring true" with common experience in a number of ways. One is the combination of other stories the press has told about the Amazon rain forest and the peoples who live there. Through these tales, audiences have learned that this is a precious and endangered habitat. Another is the work environmental groups engage in to let others know that the crises that occur in the Amazon and to its people are everyone's concerns as well. In fact, it was through such a movement that these indigenous Indians came to be known as the Yanomami[37].

Perhaps the most powerful reason for why this part of the Yanomami story resonates, though, is the individualistic effect it has upon members of the ideal audience. By isolating a particular people, the press has encouraged individual audience members to form emotional ties to the Yanomami and to the area. Ties to the land or garden through the Yanomami story enable members of the ideal audience to see their hope for a simplified, purer, perhaps even more primitive existence. It is the innate desire for a return to simplicity, to innocence.

Effects of "Civilization"

Newspapers have reported the introduction of various persons, such as missionaries, anthropologists, government officials, gold miners, etc., to the Yanomami. Like the ripples that extend from a rod being placed in a still pond, each of these groups of people have influenced the Yanomami way of life in both measurable and immeasurable ways. The press' narratives provide insight into some of the effects of "civilization" on the Yanomami.

Reports detail numerous changes that have come about in the Yanomami culture since their introduction to other peoples. The introduction of new technologies, for instance, has had negative effects, some moreso than others. For example, FUNAI, the Brazilian government Indian agency, calls the introduction of "civilization" by foreigners "`day-by-day genocide'"[38]. Alcohol, firearms, some violence and prostitution, different knives, flashlights, even new foods are disrupting "their primitive ways"[39]. Further, some suggest that "the modern world's intrusions - along with the indifference of the authorities that are supposed to protect them - are obliterating the indigenous group"[40].

There are other, perhaps less dangerous, signs that times are changing for the Yanomami. One involves their clothing. Whereas before they ran through the jungle bare-footed, now they are "trudging through the Amazon in Reebok sneakers"[41]. The significance of this marker cannot be understated. It represents an awakening for the Yanomami, and demonstrates that they pay close attention to detail. They have recognized that the human beings with whom they have come in contact are different from them. Further, because they have chosen to adopt a particular quality from them, namely the wearing of shoes, they must believe that this method is a better or at least a more convenient practice for them than what they have been doing. In that they have chosen to wear sneakers rather than, for example, shirts or pants, which one would assume is a more obvious difference between the Yanomami and any "civilized" visitor, the reader learns that the Indian is a highly intelligent person. This is a trait that readers would want to believe of themselves[42].

Newspaper stories also reveal that many Indians "have gravitated to missions and rural towns"[43]. Narratives describe, in a way Westerners will relate to, their new homes at missions in the following manner:

> The winding path through the forest is more like a corridor, or tunnel, walled and crowned by vegetation run amok. The scant sunlight that penetrates is soft and indistinct, blurring the edges of things. Leaves and branches crackle underfoot to break the velvet silence.
>
> Abruptly, the path spills into a clearing of cultivated fields. In the middle looms an enormous hut with a conical thatched roof, open at the top to vent a ribbon of campfire smoke. A naked man smiles as he ambles past toward the wall of forest, bow and arrow in hand - ***the local version of a commuter on his way to work.*** Children scamper about, comfortable and secure in their cozy neighborhood.[44] (Italics added.)

Yanomami health is another factor that has been affected by "civilization." Many Indians are sick and dying as a result of the introduction of other peoples and cultures into theirs. Whether intentional, as in the case of the gold miners who have no cares other than for the land, or unintentional, like with the reporters, anthropologists, missionaries, or any other group of people who visit the Amazon to mingle with and/or learn about them, disease is being introduced to the Yanomami. One of many reports states,

> Three miles down a dusty road outside this Amazonian gold rush town[45], Roman Catholic missionary Carlos Zacchini parks his pickup truck outside a cluster of low brick huts and hands out mangoes to Indian children who run to greet him.
>
> Behind them, moving slowly and smiling wanly, are the few adults at the Casa do Indio strong enough to stand. The others languish in hammocks, wracked by diseases unknown to them before gold was discovered on their land in the mid-1980s: malaria, measles, whooping cough, tuberculosis and leprosy. Of roughly 9,000 Yanomami Indians in Brazil, an estimated 15 percent have died in the last three years.[46]

How the Yanomami view the world is also changing. Although many of the Indians remain hidden in the Amazon forest, an increasing number of Yanomami are coming in contact with the "West."

> Gripping bows and long, slender arrows - one for shooting animals and one for shooting birds - the Yanomami hunters emerged from the Amazon underbrush last Sunday to warily inspect a Super Puma helicopter that had clattered out of the skies and into their village.

> "No visitors ever came here," Wakamanawa, the head man, explained to Napoleon A. Chagnon, an American anthropologist who was the first non-Yanomami to visit this village in the remote highlands of southern Venezuela.[47]

Two Indians in particular who have had their worldview altered are Davi Kopenawa Yanomami and Yarima Good, who will be discussed in greater detail later on in this study.

Yanomami technology, migration patterns, health, and worldview have all been influenced through the introduction of "civilization." As press stories describe the effects of "civilization" on the Yanomami, they expose a lesson to ideal audience members. It is the resilience readers see in them. The Yanomami do not adopt all that they see right when they see it. They wait, observe, and selectively take in to their culture what they admire about another. And by the choices that readers notice them make, such as the sneakers for their feet rather than clothes that would cling to them in the heat and humidity of the Amazon, they can be considered wise in their selections.

In short, the press, through its stories, takes members of the ideal audience into Yanomami territory and releases them with another vision of themselves. They see that there is a price for attempting to discover more about what humankind's ancestors are imagined to have been like. They also learn that if the stories read about the Yanomami are indicative of who humanity really is, then individuals are selective creators of their identity rather than mere discoverers.

Warfare/Violence

As mentioned in the background of this study, there is a lot of debate regarding the true nature of the Yanomami. Much of the controversy surrounds anthropologist Napoleon A.

Chagnon's affiliation with the Indians, including his presence[48] and the credibility of his work[49]. In addition, analysis of other reports suggests biological[50], cultural[51] and ideological[52] reasons for Yanomami violence.

Although a full-scale analysis of how violent the Yanomami truly are and why is beyond the purpose of this paper, it is important to note how the media reports their warfare/violence. One story, for instance, states,

> The Yanomamo Indians of the Amazon rain forest have long been known as one of the most violent societies on Earth.
>
> According to data gathered over the last quarter century, 44 percent of Yanomamo men over the age of 25 have killed someone, about 30 percent of adult male deaths are the result of violence and nearly 70 percent of the men and women over the age of 40 have lost a close relative to homicide. Most of the deaths occur in endless cycles of "blood revenge" attacks between warring villages, usually with arrows.[53]

Another reveals,

> Among the Yanomamo Indians of Venezuela, almost half of the men have killed someone, usually as an act of revenge for a prior killing. Napoleon Chagnon, an anthropologist at the University of California at Santa Barbara, reports this and other facts about Yanomamo violence in Science magazine.
>
> One might suppose that there is a pinch of Yanomamo braggadocio in these numbers, for killing is a prestigious activity in this fierce and warlike tribe. But there is surely no bragging on the other side of the coin: Nearly 70 percent of people past the age of 40 report having had a parent, child, or sibling slain.[54]

Such reports by the press can be interpreted as attempts to encourage rationalizations for angry and violent behavior within society. Because tendencies towards it exist within a group of people these ancestors are believed to resemble, feelings of anger can be justified, asserted to be correct, perhaps even used to excuse the actions that result due to them. Justifiable, abusive conduct can result from such an illusion that society, rather than the individual, assumes responsibility for actions.

The idea of excusable anger resonates because of the constant barrage of hostile images - crime, violence, devastation - seen and heard about daily through the media. Audiences wonder why bad events occur, and who is responsible. While many times there are no direct explanations, there is often a plea for justice to be done. An element of justice involves understanding motives for behavior, for anger, and where accountability resides. Although individuals do have the power to control their aggression and accept responsibility for their actions, members of the ideal audience can, through the press' depiction of Yanomami warfare, rationalize guilt away.

Massacre

In 1993 sixteen Yanomami were massacred. The press has given a lot of space to this element of the Yanomami story. It informs us, eventually, how the massacre was discovered, the confusion over how many Yanomami were killed, who was and how they were slaughtered, where the massacre happened, who did it, and why.

Perhaps the most disturbing elements of this part of the Yanomami story are the initial efforts to cover up the massacre and the details regarding it. In the beginning, the press claimed the deaths were a racial hoax:

> *Whites* in Boa Vista Brazil have asserted that accounts of a massacre of Yanomami Indians in the Amazon jungle by Brazilian gold miners are fraudulent. President Itamar Franco was so incensed over *contradictory accounts* of the massacre that he nearly dismissed the president of Brazil's Indian protection service. The *confusion* over such issues as the actual death toll and whether the attack occurred in Venezuela or Brazil is discussed.[55] (Italics added.)

Another proposed testimonies of authority figures against the massacre.

> Initial reports said 73 Yanomami were killed by Brazilian miners angry over their expulsion from Indian land. But *pro-mining lobbyists and politicians* counter that no massacre occurred.[56] (Italics added.)
>
> Additional investigation, however, revealed that
>
> Gold miners shot dead [16] Yanomami Indians - including 10 children - in a remote Amazon village, government officials said yesterday. The massacre in the village of Homoxi-Itu in Roraima state was the worst slaying of Indians in the Brazilian Amazon in recent years, the California-based Rainforest Action Network said in a statement.[57]
>
> Of the ten children slain,
>
> "Some of the children were decapitated with machete blows," Suami dos Santos, the agency's administrator in Roraima state said of the killings on Sunday. "What causes us great indignation and repulsion is that the murders were carried out with touches of cruelty and savagery."[58]

Three pregnant women[59] were also listed among the dead.

The volume of stories concerning the Yanomami massacre affirms the structural, material and characterological probability of the facts surrounding the murders[60]. Yet as uncomfortable a story as it is, this tale resonates within audiences. Two interrelated reasons are the victims and the emotional attachment involved.

The Yanomami women and children who were slaughtered were innocent. Because of their vulnerability, their story grabs the heartstrings of audiences. People recognize that injustice has been performed, and innate feelings of defense surface. It is the tale of the underdog so prevalent within American history, culture and media. Americans are perceived by themselves and others as desirous and capable of helping the less fortunate, as being "defenders" or "protectors." Yet the strength of those intentions ofttimes diminishes as the emotion of the situation and story dissipates.

The Yanomami massacre story began with an explosive amount of coverage, slowed to a trickle of reports, then stopped. This represents a common type of media attention span; the press' history is replete with examples of other stories that began with an amazing amount of coverage that later faded, even disappeared, over time.

Hence, members of the ideal audience learn from the story of the Yanomami massacre that desensitization to stories of victims disempowers the defender image. Energy and desire to do something about what may be considered an unjust situation fades as news media attention decreases.

Gold Miners

The elements comprising the mining aspect of the Yanomami story serve to increase readers' understanding of this indigenous people and their land. Through them it is apparent why the gold miners are present in Yanomami territories, what they are doing there, and what has been done about their intrusions.

The prospectors, according to media stories, discovered that the Yanomami land was rich in resources. They had hoped to better their lifestyle and make their fortune by capitalizing on the gold, diamonds, tin, and other minerals available. They built, according to press reports, "clandestine dirt airstrips... to reach Indian lands"[61] and established mining camps. Their presence directly and indirectly affected the Yanomami. Some miners purposefully sought to either establish relations with the Indians and/or killed them for their land, like in the case of the 1993 massacre, which was discussed in the last section. Others unintentionally brought diseases with them. Some of the illnesses relate naturally to biological differences.

Because of their isolation, the Indians have no immunity against common viruses and can

> easily die from flu or cold.[62]

Others correspond to physical contact between non-Yanomamis and Yanomamis.

> As a result of the invasion of Brazilian gold prospectors into the northern Amazon territory of Roraima, the Yanomami Indians are threatened by AIDS. Ministry of Health statistics show the region to have the third highest incidence of AIDS in the country because miners bring drugs and prostitution with them.[63]

These various elements comprise this part of the Yanomami story, that of the infiltration of Yanomami land by gold- and mineral- seeking prospectors. By them audiences learn that the Yanomami are, in many ways, a defenseless people. This fact reinforces itself through the structural, or the ways the ideas are presented, and material, or duplicity of notions represented, coherency of these stories. Characterologically speaking, the gold miners aspect of the Yanomami story maintains coherency through its similar portrayal of the gold miners and through the objectivity sensed through the reporters` writing. Like the other sections of the Yanomami story, this tale also resonates and informs of other dimensions of the ideal audience`s character.

In particular, the gold miners` impact on Yanomami life "rings true" to readers in three main ways. First, it reminds them of a hope for a better world. Like the gold miners, American pioneers came to the United States for a new life, and many ventured West to also "strike it rich"[64]. Second, it demonstrates the duality of human nature. While the Yanomami are shown to be a defenseless, vulnerable people, the gold miners are exploitative. Both represent different human emotions.

Third, the gold miners` impact mirrors the ideal. Press stories also tell of governmental efforts to remove the prospectors from Yanomami land[65]. In so doing, it reports a type of retribution for some of the injustices performed against the Indians. This mirrors the idealistic hope people have for themselves of overcoming their weaknesses. They hope to root out those elements of themselves with which they are unhappy, or that they feel need betterment. They also aspire to defend those elements of themselves that are good and wholesome and to preserve the qualities that many Americans cherish, such as specific liberties.

Politics and Reservation

Press narratives report that land, which, ironically, was first theirs, was geographically marked and politically arranged to provide an area in which the Yanomami could live freely. According to media reports,

> Venezuela signed a decree that reserves a stretch of Amazon forest the size of Maine as a permanent homeland for the country's 14,000 Yanomami Indians,[66]

and Brazil created a "new reserve," which would

> allow the Yanomami, South America's last major untouched tribe, to roam freely over 68,331 miles of Amazon wilderness, an area the size of Portugal.[67]

Internal and external pressures of government forces, individual lobbyists, foreign organizations, etc. melted opposition and enabled legislation to be forged that would establish a place for the Yanomami.

These components of the politics and reservation theme within reporting on the Yanomami contain structural and material coherency as well as characterological coherency. Further, the complexity of the number of options to consider in this process harmonizes with individual situations of persons in the ideal audience, and, as in the other elements of the Yanomami story, gives them greater insight into their character. More specifically, the passion within the Yanomami endeavor to receive a set place of their own coincides with ideal audience members' own yearning for location. This desire is a physical manifestation of identity.

The search for a home is the quest for stability, for shelter, for a perspective from which all life events can be viewed and interpreted. It is also the objectification of self onto something tangible and real. The Yanomamis, and those who actively work to protect them, want to maintain the Indian's self-concept and their sense of security. They, mirroring a value of the ideal audience, want and deserve a place of their own.

Davi and Religion

The press' stories of Davi Kopenawa Yanomami inform us of his purpose for being in Western society and Yanomami religion.

Davi is "the first [of his kind] to visit the United States"[68]. His purpose in visiting the United States and other countries such as Great Britain and Norway has been to represent his people and to request aid in securing a reservation for them. He plans to tell, among others, "the Secretaries General of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, to high officials of the World Bank and to anyone else who will listen" the plight of his people[69]. One of the press' stories is a part of the message he shares with Westerners.

> I want to speak, giving the message from Omai... the creator of the Yanomami who also has created all the shaboris that are the shamans. The shaboris are the ones that have the knowledge, and they sent two of us to deliver their message. The message is to stop destruction, to stop taking out minerals from under the ground, to stop taking out the steel with which all the metal utensils are made, and to stop building roads through forests. We feel that a lot of riches have already been taken out of the indigenous lands, and a lot of these riches are getting old and useless, and it would be much better if the Brazilian government would give these riches to the poor in Brazil. Our work is to protect nature, the wind, the mountains, the forest, the animals, and this is what we want to teach you

people.[70]

From the tone of this report, Davi's concern is for his people and his land. It is presented from a religious frame with a hint of warning. Considering that Davi is "a shaman in training" or a young religious leader among the Yanomami, the religious context is understandable and appropriate. It is also an indication of the power of religion within Yanomami society.

Through legends, for instance, the Indians make meaning of their world and the ideas with which they come in contact. Rituals and leaders provide an internal structure to their society and gateway to understanding others'. Religion also provides a solution to problems, as in the previously discussed story of the Caiapo Indians and the end of the three month fire in Roraima.

Davi's actions as a religious and secular leader among his people, including media coverage of his international visits and speeches, has brought his people's needs into the media spotlight through a religious position. By this focus on religion and through their commentary on our world, the coherency of the factors of this element of the Yanomami story reminds readers and reflects components of problems within their complex society. In this regard, the press has reported,

> Some outsiders liken the Yanomami's world to a kind of rain-forest Eden, innocent and idyllic. But there is much evidence of life's hardships.
> Many villagers bear swaths of scabs, welts and rashes from insects. Some have scars from apparent accidents. Anthropologists said the Yanomami periodically stage raids on other villages, killing the men and carrying off the women.
> But in thousands of years of existence, they've left the life-giving forest intact.
> "Their culture is superior to ours, in that it works in their environment," Brewer-Carias said.
> "Our civilization isn't working for us, so how can we push it on someone else?"[71]

In essence, readers yearn for natural innocence and simplicity. These are traits the media focus in on for members of the ideal audience and allow them to see in this element of the Yanomami narrative.

Adventures and Art

Other than Davi, only a few other Yanomami have left South America. One is Yarima Good. A young Yanomami, she left her Amazonian home with her husband, anthropologist Kenneth Good, and came to the United States[72]. The press captured this romance in reports such as

> The child who'd shared her plantains and fishing spots with him grew up. So did their fondness for one another. Against all odds, it bloomed into love.[73]

The cultural transition, however, was difficult for her. Her husband explains,

> "In the jungle, she never knew loneliness. Here, she has no one to talk to, day after day, week after week..."
> (I)t is hard - hard to watch her listen to tapes of loved ones with tears running down her cheeks; hard to hear her struggle to count to 10; hard to watch her walk into Dunkin' Donuts with the note he has written for her that says "two frosted crullers," words she still can't pronounce.
> "All this stuff makes her seem like a child, so helpless," says Ken. "But in the jungle, she kept me alive. She can get food from the inside of a log. In the jungle, she's a complete adult."[74]

Eventually, Yarima left her three children with her husband and returned to her jungle home:

> Yarima Good ultimately decided to remain with her people, and filed suit seeking custody of her daughter. The suit was later dropped, Ms. Truitt [a film maker] reports, after Mrs. Good realized the futility of asking an American judge to send a little girl into the jungle to lead a Stone Age existence.
> Mrs. Good is now living with her tribe somewhere in the rain forest. Mr. Good is back in the jungles of New Jersey, trying to figure out how to raise three children on his own.[75]

Yarima's story blends into the accounts of explorers, both voluntary and involuntary, who have traveled into the Amazon to meet the Indians. Artwork in numerous forms, including films[76], music[77], photographs[78], and books[79], has been inspired by these expeditions.

Media narratives regarding how the Yanomami have been represented in various art genres typify altruistic acts which result from visits among the Amazonian Indians. Westerners who visit the Yanomami act in the ways they know how to raise awareness of their situation and, in what is assumed to be to the best of their knowledge and power, attempt to improve the Yanomami condition. On the other hand, Yanomami, such as Yarima and Davi, who leave their home return to it.

The stories of adventures and art within the Yanomami tale, when compared to additional sources, maintain structural and material coherence through the ways in which the stories and their facts overlap. Further, character mannerisms, whether of the press in how the stories are told or of Yarima, Davi, or any of the adventurers, are linked. They connect story creators and characters with story participants, or ideal audience members, through reminding individuals of certain values.

The stories of those who have left the jungle to visit the "new world," and of those who have left the "new world" to visit the "old," harmonize with the internal instinct for exploration. In addition, there is a sense of escapism that readers see in the Yanomami reflection of ideal audience members. This sense of release is part of the power the media has. Audience members use it to entertain them, to inform them, to transpose their surroundings into something new, different, and exciting. The media are the audience's tool to adventure. By it, members of the ideal audience value living life.

Conclusion

The media reports of this study serve as a link between anthropological discovery and the communications discipline. Narrative analysis of the media's representation of the Yanomami Indians in the Amazon rain forest, which is founded in Fisher's NPT, suggests how a media story attempts to accomplish a holistic understanding of a primitive, natural people. Coverage can be categorized by eight distinctions, namely environment, effects of "civilization," warfare/violence, massacre, goldminers, politics and reservation, Davi and religion, and adventures and art. Each maintains narrative probability through its structural, material and characterological coherence.

This study also indicates how media reports speak through narrative to members of the ideal audience. Some of the elements that correspond to the various classifications include a desire for a return to simplicity, the power to create identity, the possibility to rationalize anger, desensitization, exploitation, the right to property, and inquisitiveness with zest for life.

This project presents a plausible interpretation of audience member values and explores insights into the question of human identity. In this sense, the media are storytellers who tell the audience about itself by telling it about others recursively. As the historian Harold Isaacs has stated, images, both verbal and visual, of another people may tell us "a great deal about [the Yanomami] ... but mostly we learn about ourselves"[xli] From the Yanomami, members of the ideal audience have a greater understanding of their humanity, particularly from where they possibly have originated and who they are. However, the story of the Yanomami told in media reports is not the Yanomami story per se. This analysis suggests the need to learn more directly how the Yanomami would tell their own story. It also recommends that greater attention be given to international news coverage to better assess what it is about stories that captivates the ideal audience

1. Associated Press. (1993, August 29). 'Fierce people' live in a culture of the Stone Age. Akron Beacon Journal, p. A2.

2. "'Of all the peoples in the Americas,' writes Post reporter Eugene Robinson, "they live most like their ancestors did when the New World was discovered by Europeans five centuries ago'". [See Up from the Stone Age. (1991, June 25). Washington Times, p. G2.]

3. Fisher, W. (1987) Human communication as narration: Toward a philosophy of reason, value, and action. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press.

4. MacClancy, J. (1996). Popularizing anthropology. In J. MacClancy, & C. McDonaugh (Eds.), Popularizing anthropology (p. 22). London, Routledge.

5. See Campbell, A. (1996). Tricky tropes: Styles of the popular and the pompous. In J. MacClancy, & C. McDonaugh (Eds.), Popularizing anthropology p. 58. London: Routledge.

6. See Sponsel, L.E. (1998). Yanomami: An arena of conflict and aggression in the Amazon. Aggressive Behavior (24), pp. 97-122; Palmer, A. W. (2000, March). Primitives among us: The paradox of the Tasaday and other "lost tribes." Science Communication 21(3), pp. 223-243; Salamone, F. A. (Ed.). (1997). The Yanomami and their interpreters: Fierce people or fierce interpreters? Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc.; Ferguson, R.B. (1995). Yanomami warfare: A political history. Sante Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research Press, Strathern, M. (1987). Out of context: The persuasive fictions of anthropology. Current Anthropology 28 (3), p. 256.

7. Anthropology Resource Center (ARC), International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), and Survival International (S.I.). (1979). The Yanoama in Brazil 1979 and Yanomami Indian Park, proposal and justification (IWGIA Document 37). Copenhagen, Denmark: Ramos, A. R., & Taylor, K. I, The Committee for the Creation of the Yanomami Park, p. 4.

8. See Chagnon, N. A. (1977). Yanomamo: The fierce people (2nd ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

9. See Salamone, F. A. (Ed.). (1997). The Yanomami and their interpreters: Fierce people or fierce interpreters? Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc.

10. See Ferguson, R. B. (1995). Yanomami warfare: A political history. Sante Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research Press.

11. See Good, K. (1991). Into the heart: One man's pursuit of love and knowledge among the Yanomama. New York : Simon & Schuster.

12. See, for example, news reports like the following:

> Napoleon Chagnon helped make the Yanomami Indians one of the most famous tribes on Earth...

> But Venezuelan officials don't want him anywhere near the endangered Stone Age tribe. They claim his accounts of wife-beating, club fights and deadly raids on enemy villages are exaggerations and that he provokes conflicts in the tribe.
> Venezuelan authorities have banned him from Yanomami territory on and off since the mid-1970s. In August [of 1998], they rebuffed his attempt to return after a five-year absence. [Jones, B. (1998, December 15). American fights ban on visits to remote tribe - Venezuela claims he promotes conflict. Seattle Times, p. C6.]

13. Fisher, W. (1987) Human communication as narration: Toward a philosophy of reason, value, and action. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, p.72.

14. See Griffin, E. M. (1997). A first look at communication theory (3rd ed.). New York The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., p. 322.

15. Berger, A. A. (1997). Narratives in popular culture, media, and everyday life. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 7.

16. Berger, A. A. (1997). Narratives in popular culture, media, and everyday life. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 42.

17. Lieblich, A., Tuval-Mashiach, R., & Zilber, T. (1998). Narrative research: Reading, analysis, and interpretation. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, p. 7.

18. Fisher, W. (1987). Human communication as narration: Toward a philosophy of reason, value, and action. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, p. 18.

19. Wolfsfeld, G. (1997). Media and political conflict: News from the Middle East. Cambrigde: Cambridge University Press.

20. Ibid, pp. 33-34, 36.

21. Gitlin, T. (1980). The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking of the new left. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

22. Gitlin, T. (1980). The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking of the new left. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 7.

23. Fisher, W. (1987). Human communication as narration: Toward a philosophy of reason, value, and action. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, pp. 62-63.

24. See Riessman, C. K. (1993). Narrative analysis. Newbury Park: SAGE Publications; Berger, A. A. (1997). Narratives in popular culture, media, and everyday life. Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications; and Lieblich, A., Tuval-Mashiach, R., & Zilber, T. (1998). Narrative research: Reading, analysis, and interpretation. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

25. Soothill, K., & Grover, C. (1997, August). A note on computer searches of newspapers. Sociology 31 (3), pp. 591-596.

26. Kaufman, P.A., Dykers, C. R., & Caldwell, C. (1993, Winter). Why going online for content analysis can reduce research reliability. Journalism Quarterly 70 (4), pp. 824-832.

27. See Riessman, C. K. (1993). Narrative analysis. Newbury Park: SAGE Publications, and Lieblich, A., Tuval-Mashiach, R., & Zilber, T. (1998). Narrative research: Reading, analysis, and interpretation. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 8.

28. Golden, T. (1989, August 6). Brazilian hopes fade like dust in the Amazon. New Orleans Times Picayune, p. A27.

29. Associated Press. (1998, March 18). Amazon fire imperils Indians' Home flames could jump narrow river. Lexington Herald-Leader, p. A9.

30. (Abstract). Bellos, A. (1998, March 28). Help slow to arrive as fires devastate Brazilian rain forest. Houston Chronicle, p 23.

31. Astor, M. (1998, March 17). Fire menaces Amazon tribe fueled by a drought blamed on El Nino, out-of-control blaze nears Stone-Age Yanomami. Seattle Times, p. A1.

32. (Abstract). Bellos, A. (1998, March 28). Help slow to arrive as fires devastate Brazilian rain forest. Houston Chronicle, p. 23.

33. Roraima "is the size of Britain with a population of 300,000. It is one third savannah and two-thirds rain forest" (Abstract - Bellos, A. (1998, March 28). Help slow to arrive as fires devastate Brazilian rain forest. Houston Chronicle, p 23.).

34. (Abstract). Schemo, D. J. (1998, September 13). Fires posing greater risk as Amazon grows drier. New York Times, p. 4.

35. Rains on Amazon fires. (1998, April 1). Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, p. A-4.

36. Associated Press. (1996, June 28). Amazon tribe loses homes, crops to flooding, flees to higher land. Seattle Times, p. A10.

37. Ferguson, R. B. (1995). Yanomami warfare: A political history. Sante Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research Press.

38. (Abstract). Rocha, J. (1994, August 23). Miners' invasion threatens lives of Brazilian Indians. Guardian, p. 9.

39. Up from the Stone Age. (1991, June 25). Washington Times, p. 2.

40. Herald Staff. (1993, September 1). Bloodbath in the Amazon. Miami Herald, p. 16A

41. (Abstract). Jones, B. (1996, September 9). Stone Age Indians catch up to present in rapid fashions. Chicago Tribune, p. 2.

42. It is also important to note that sometimes Yanomami will wear shirts and pants and shoes, or a kind of combination of clothing items. The wearing of shoes is highlighted to accentuate the idea of active identity creation.

43. Jones, B. (1996, September 29). Stone Age tribe leaps into 21st Century; Amazon: Influenced by missionaries and anthropologists, many of the Amazon's Yanomami Indians trade traditions for modernization. Los Angeles Times, p. 32.

44. Robinson, E. (1991, July 28). Yanomami 'world of poetry' is dying, it may be too late to save last indigenous Indian culture. Buffalo News, p. G10.

45. The journalist is reporting from Boa Vista, Brazil.

46. Wheaton, K. (1990, July 26). Gold rush killing off Brazilian Indians Amazonian hunters falling victim to diseases introduced with miners' influx. San Francisco Examiner, p. A1.

47. Brooke, J. (1990, September 23). First contact made with the Amazon Tribe. Daily News of Los Angeles, p. USW1.

48. News reports reveal some of the reasons why government officials feel hesitant to allow Chagnon to work among the Indians. One in particular states,

Napoleon Chagnon helped make the Yanomami Indians one of the most famous tribes on Earth...

> But Venezuelan officials don't want him anywhere near the endangered Stone Age tribe. They claim his accounts of wife-beating, club fights and deadly raids on enemy villages are exaggerations and that he provokes conflicts in the tribe.
>
> Venezuelan authorities have banned him from Yanomami territory on and off since the mid-1970s. In August [of 1998], they rebuffed his attempt to return after a five-year absence.

(Jones, B. (1998, December 15). American fights ban on visits to remote tribe - Venezuela claims he promotes conflict. Seattle Times, p. C6.)

49. Several anthropologists have critiqued the validity of Chagnon's work. One of the most succinct accounts argues that there

> ... are at least 10 problem areas in Chagnon's characterization, analysis, and interpretation of Yanomami aggression and warfare: the image of "the fierce people"; documentation of aggression; feuding as warfare; neglect of cross-cultural perspective; warfare as tribalization; the negative concept of peace; male sexism; the label "primitive"; the character of some of the debate; and research priorities and ethics. Some of these also apply in various ways and degrees to some other ethnographies of the Yanomami.

(Sponsel, L. E. (1998). Yanomami: An arena of conflict and aggression in the Amazon. Aggressive Behavior (24), p. 101.)

50. See, for example, Hilton, B. (1991, March 17). War the ultimate raging hormone. Fresno Bee, p. H1, and Rensberger, B. (1988, March 5). Sex drive found at root of Amazon Indians' violence. Sacramento Bee, p. A2.

51. See Rensberger, B. (1988, March 9). Researcher: Tribe is violent because action brings status. Miami Herald, p. 2E.

52. See Ferguson, R. B. (1995). Yanomami warfare: A political history. Sante Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research Press, pp. 6-7, and Lewan, T. (1996, September 29). Tribe targeting itself - with guns. Commercial Appeal, p. A8.

53. Rensberger, B. (1988, March 5). Sex drive found at root of Amazon Indians' violence. Sacramento Bee, p. A2.

54. Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (1988, April 10). Why do so many people kill? Blood revenge. Newsday, p. 06.

55. (Abstract). Brooke, J. (1993, August 29). Questions raised in Amazon killings. New York Times, p. 14.

56. Bruner, K. (1993, August 30). Mystery trails deaths in Brazil. Christian Science Monitor, p. 6.

57. Wire dispatches. (1993, August 20). Brazil Indians killed. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, p. A-4.

58. Brooke, J. (1993, August 20). Miners slaughter 20 members of primitive Brazil Indian tribe. Daily News of Los Angeles, p. N13.

59. Associate Press. (1993, August 22). Brazil massacre toll could hit 73 Indian death blamed on miners. Seattle Times, p. A15.

60. For a detailed description and explanation of the massacre, see Albert, B. (1994). Gold miners and Yanomami Indians in the Brazilian Amazon: The Hashimu Massacre. In B. R. Johnston (Ed.), Who pays the price? The sociocultural contest of environmental crisis pp. 47-55. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

61. Wire Reports. (1990, September 18). Brazil to expel miners. Oregonian, p. A03.

62. Hayward, S. (1988, January 3). Brazil's Yanomami caught in fight over gold, diamond deposits; Civilization threatens largest primitive Indian tribe. Los Angeles Times, p. 2.

63. (Abstract). Rocha, Jan. (1990, September 4). Goldminers and Aids threaten Brazil's forest Indians. Guardian, p. 8.

64. See A Brazilian stand. (1990, May 4). Akron Beacon Journal, p. A10.

65. See, among many press reports, Brazil will oust miners from area. (1993, February 3). Boston Globe, p. 4; Wire Dispatches and Staff Reports. (1996, August 22). Brazil clears miners from Indian lands. Washington Times, p. A13; and (Abstract). Brooke, James. (1993, September 19). Raids on miners follow killings in Amazon. New York Times, p. 10.

66. (Abstract). Brooke, J. (1991, September 11). Venezuela befriends tribe, but what's Venezuela? New York Times, p. A4.

67. Brooke, J. (1991, November 28). Stone Age tribe gets Amazon forest reserve. Daily News of Los Angeles, p. N 31.

68. Golden, T. (1991, April 17). Talk about culture shock: Ant people in sky-high huts. New York Times, p. B1.

69. Ibid, B1.

70. Yanomami, D. K. (1998, April 4). Worth remembering... 'What we want to teach you people.' Philadelphia Inquirer, A13.

71. Noblet, K. (1991, September 29). Culture gap is wide between Yanomami and Westerners. New Orleans Times Picayune, p. A27.

72. Shulins, N. (1992, January 12). Timeless love she was a member of a Stone Age tribe, he was an American anthropologist who'd come to the Amazon jungle to study them. Today, Ken and Yarima Good live in New Jersey with their three children. Theirs is a story of timeless love, part science fiction, part fairy tale. Press-Telegram, p. J1.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Dreher, Rod. (1993, March 28). 'Homecoming' in weird place up the river. Washington Times, p. D7.

76. Ibid.

77. Murray, J. V. (1991, April 23). Brazilian celebrates the web of life. San Jose Mercury News, p. 2E.

78. (Abstract). Chadwick, S. (1994, November 25). Saving race. Houston Post, p. 1.

79. (Abstract). Drewes, C. (1991, February 24). Americanization of a Stone Age Woman. San Francisco Chronicle, p. 3.

80. Perlmutter, D. D. (1997, April). A picture's worth 8,500,000 people: American news pictures as symbols of China. News Photographer v52n4, p. Ss4(4)

LOCATING ASIAN VALUES IN ASIAN JOURNALISM: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF WEB NEWSPAPERS

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Abstract

The two major positions in the debate over Asian values in journalism were tested by a content analysis of news stories posted to English-language Web newspapers in 10 Asian nations. The findings offer some support to each position. Asian values do appear in reporting by Asian journalists. But they are neither pan-Asia values nor applied uniformly to all news events. This work could provide a benchmark for future studies of Asian values in journalism.

Whether Asian journalism is informed by uniquely Asian values has been a much-debated question. But it is one that arguably has no clear answer.

Essentially, two schools of thought can be located in the debate. One answers the question in the affirmative: Asian journalism is noticeably different from Western journalism because of the influence of Asian values. The other answers in the negative, but not straightforwardly so. Both do appear to agree, however, on the "need to identify certain universal values which are rooted in the Asian context and to promote them in the professional [journalism] sphere" (Masterton, 1996, p. 171).

There is little direct empirical evidence to tilt the scale one way or the other. Studies of Asian journalism, or those that compare it with Western newswork, generally have not directly tested for normative journalistic values. Still, most of these works could be taken as offering indirect support to one or the other side in the Asian-values debate (see Elliott, 1999; Bublie & Sitaraman, 1998; Chandran & Atkins, 1998; Chang, Wang, & Chen, 1998; Zhu, Weaver, Lo, Chen, & Wu, 1997; Lee & Yang, 1995; Ha, 1994; Kitagawa, Salwen, & Driscoll, 1994).

The current work represents an attempt to advance the debate. To that end, Asian- and Western-source "hard" news stories uploaded to Asian online newspapers were compared on the basis of the values they emphasized. The goal was to determine whether Asian journalism, as contrasted to Western newswork, indeed conveys Asian values. Stories from Asian sources only were further analyzed to determine whether any observed emphasis on Asian values was specific to a particular sub-region of the continent or to restrictions on press freedom.

Journalism and Values in Asia

Xu notes that "ever since its inception, the concept of Asian values has been controversial" (1998, p. 37). Opinions about it have been many, varied and impassioned. A full discussion of them is beyond the scope of the current work.[1] However, the controversy generally has centered on perceptions of Asia's place in the modern, interconnected world.

The debate over Asian values could be defined as a rhetorical vehicle that allows the East to assert—or re-assert—itself against the West (Naisbitt, 1995; Yao, 1994; Peterson, 1992; Lowe, 1987). The idea behind the concept of Asian values, according to Xu, is to "safeguard national identity and cultural distinctiveness in the face of domination or monopoly by Western media, cultures and values" (1998, p. 38). It is about redefining the East-West relationship so as to take back for Asians the sovereignty of determining who they are and what values they will hold (Yao, 1994).

Globalization, modernization and a legacy as colonies of Western powers arguably are the chief forces at play in the Asian-values debate. Many of today's Asian nations were once colonial outposts of the West. Independent nationhood was won, at times violently, only in the last half of the just-ended 20th Century. Colonialism, nationalism and self-determination thus are potent and recent images. However, there is a general concern among many Asians that globalization, and its companion of modernization, are putting their independence at risk.

It is a double-edged sword: Asia must globalize to become part of the world capitalist system so that it can modernize for the prosperity of its people. Yet to globalize is in part to also allow back the influence of the former colonial powers, most noticeably as Western mass media and cultural products. In particular, "modernity/modernization can be said to bring about moral decline … simply because moralizing standards are no longer dependent on the traditional institutionally supported judgments of kinship groups, religious institutions and community leadership" (Yao, 1994, p. 44). The concern would appear to be that indigenous, pan-Asia values risk being subsumed again to foreign moralizing standards that new, border-crossing communication technologies are importing from the West.

Asian values are being re-asserted, therefore, as a way of countering the perceived pernicious influence of the Western norms that globalization is carrying back to the region. That is, as Asia forges a post-colonial relationship with the West, it seeks to not let go of its Asia-ness again. Asian values—as the best of pre-industrial, pre-modern Asia—provide a language for mediating the new conflict between Western individualism and Eastern communalism, and a refuge from Asia's rapid modernization (Naisbitt, 1995). Re-asserting them represents an attempt to re-distinguish East from West, to modernize but not necessarily Westernize, and to rediscover one's "true" Asian nature in an ever-changing landscape. "It ultimately is a game of reversal: The East or 'Asia' emerges as a sovereign subject while pushing the West [back] to the foreign space" (Yao, 1994, p. 40).

However, "there is no … general agreement on a definition of Asian values, nor on either of these key words," as Masterton (1996, p. 1) acknowledges in his introduction to *Asian Values in Journalism*. The book recounts a 1995 seminar held in Malaysia that aimed to identify the uniqueness of Asian journalism. While it did not reach that goal, it did reveal a clean division in the debate: the Asian practice of journalism either has a distinctly Eastern flavor, or it operates according to a global journalistic ethic or commercial motive.

Case for Asian values in journalism

For Asian journalists such as Endy M. Bayuni of Indonesia, "there is no doubt that we have a value system among our editors, and our values are different from those of our Western counterparts" (cited in Masterton, 1996, p. 39). The presumption of this argument is that among the nations of Asia, there is a shared set of journalistic values that can be distinguished from Western newswork norms (Quintos de Jesus, 1996).

Xu (1998) defines Asian journalistic values as those that are emphasized to a greater degree throughout the East than in the West. One is press freedom with responsibility, as contrasted with the adversarial nature and sensationalism of Western news reporting (Syed, 1996; Zulkarimein, cited in Masterton, 1996; Menon, 1994). In the ideal practice of Asian journalism, the journalist is aware of cause and effect; she is mindful of the potential consequences of her reporting for her readers and the nation (Xu, 1998; Bayuni, cited in Masterton, 1996). Ideally, responsible press freedom means being sensitive to words, phrases and information that hold the potential to provoke and inflame. "It [is] for the sake of unity and harmony in a multi-racial society that all quarters, including politicians and the mass media[,] should exercise discipline and restraint. The concern … is that reporters should not be carried away and report news that would hurt communal sensitivities" (Syed, 1996, p. 154).

Harmony, as well as consensus and a respect for order and authority, are commonly identified as Asian values (Xu, 1998; Snijders, 1994; Hauvel & Dennis, 1993; Chu, 1998; Lent, 1979). And it is through the concept of press freedom with responsibility that they are transformed into Asian journalistic norms.

Many of Asia's nations are aggregations of ethnically, religiously and linguistically diverse populations. One consequence of this reality, notes Indian academic V.S. Gupta (cited in Masterton, 1996), is the notion of journalistic sensitivity. To preserve national unity, therefore, Asian journalists must take care to not unsettle communal harmony when writing about their countries' constituent ethnic, religious and language groups. It is perhaps a matter of national loyalty, which is a "common thread throughout Asia. So is a heightened sense of the community with which the media interacts [sic]" (Datta-Ray, 1998: 28-29; see Menon, 1999).

The value of maintaining harmony is not limited to inter-community relations within a nation-state. Conflict-avoidance journalism ideally is also exercised when reporting on neighboring nations. The *Code of Ethics for ASEAN Journalists*, for example, institutionalizes the preservation of harmony as a newswork norm. It enjoins journalists to use their craft to promote "closer friendly relations" between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' member states (Pak, 1997, p. 14; see Nair, 1993).

Pakistani journalist Owais Aslam Ali connects the Asian-values debate to development journalism, which was "[o]ne of the first major attempts to break away from Western concepts of news" (cited in Masterton, 1996, p. 147). Development journalism basically gives journalists the responsibility of helping to advance their countries toward modernity.[2] For the "Confucian journalism" of East and Southeast Asia, journalistic responsibility means fostering and sustaining the kind of political and social stability that government leaders may perceive as crucial for rapid economic development (Latif, cited in Masterton, 1996).

Given this, it perhaps is not surprising that maintaining a close working relationship with government also is a commonly cited attribute of journalism in Asia. The ASEAN model of journalism, for example, calls on journalists to support government efforts to build up the nation and instill in citizens a sense of national identity (Menon, 1998). The model, "which appears to be gaining currency in the region" (Chua, 1998, p. 153), would predict a press that plays a positive societal role and is government's ally in national development.

Case against uniquely Asian or pan-Asia journalism

In writing of the South Asia press, Menon (1994) acknowledges the potency of indigenous values but suggests that Western journalistic norms need not be dismissed out of hand. Instead, Asian journalists "should take [from the West] whatever is useful and put this in the context of [their] society's social structure, cultural values and religious beliefs" (Menon, 1994, p. xii). Journalism of the East, in other words, may not be purely Eastern or imbued with a pan-Asia set of values. Critics point to Asia's geographical vastness and cultural diversity, and to colonial and post-colonial globalization, as the chief reasons why the presence of Asian values in Asian journalism may not necessarily be a given.

"Are there Asian values? Of course, but … relative to what?" asks Hong Kong journalism professor Lee Chin-Chuan (cited in Masterton, 1996, p. 59). The history, culture and traditions of the Japanese in East Asia are different from those of the Indonesians in Southeast Asia and the Pakistanis of South Asia. Even within individual countries, populations are not homogeneous. By way of illustration, the ethnic Chinese, Malays and Indians citizens of the city-state of Singapore live both within the national culture and strong "home" cultures that can be defined by language, ethnicity and religion. India and China—the giants of Asia—are composed of an amalgam of races and language groups. The diversity of the continent would seem to work against the existence of a single, universally Asian value system.

Asia also holds a diversity of political systems. "The practice of journalism," as Quintos de Jesus notes (1996, p. 3), "mirrors the political and social systems of the community at large. … [For example,] authoritarian governments limit journalistic activity to those values that observe the primacy of the state administration." Gunaratne (1999) argues that the press-freedom restrictions imposed by a number of Asian governments in the cause of nation building may be more reflective of authoritarian rule than of a pan-Asia value system.

On the other hand, Philippine academic Crispin Maslog suggests that a pan-Asia brand of journalism likely has not evolved because of the historical—and present day—influence of Western journalistic norms. "Journalism as we know it came to Asia from the West … Like Americans, we still practise [sic] the journalism of exception and adhere to the principle that news is [about] something unusual" (Maslog, cited in Masterton, 1996, p. 140-141). Journalistic norms, such as definitions of newsworthiness, also could be largely the same throughout the world because of the commonality of human curiosity and the professionalism of journalism (Masterton, 1996).

Or it also could be that the practice of journalism across Asia is more reflective of today's global marketplace than of any local or pan-Asia values. Sundarat Disayawattana, of Thailand's Bangkok University, among others, argues that Asian journalism "has no Asian or Western values, only economy-driven ones" (cited in Masterton, 1996, p. 58). In other words, business is business, no matter where it is conducted. Profit is the chief guiding value. And journalism is a business (see McManus, 1995, 1994).

Research Questions

The cases for and against Asian values in Asian journalism are persuasive. But neither one convincingly carries the day, perhaps because both are based largely on anecdotal evidence and personal belief. Stronger forms of evidence are needed.

If the proposition that Asian journalism is informed by Asian values is true, evidence of it should be observable in news-media content. One should be able to discern a distinctly Asian tone in the reporting. Conversely, if it is not influenced by Asian values, then it could be reasonable to expect Asian and Western journalism to be relatively indistinguishable. "Harmony" is frequently cited as a value of which journalists throughout Asia must be mindful. It is contrasted with the Western norm of emphasizing—some would say sensationalizing—conflict and drama. "Supportiveness," such as working as government's nation-building ally, also is an often-mentioned attribute of journalism in Asia. Its polar opposite would be Western journalists' penchant for adversarial and critical reporting. To test the validity of this logic, two research questions were posed:

> RQ1: To what degree do Asian journalists adhere to the Asian value of harmony by keeping conflict out of their news reports?
>
> RQ2: To what degree does their reporting reflect the Asian, or nation-building, value of being supportive?

It is argued that if Asian values exist in journalism, then their influence likely is not uniform across the continent. Journalists in Asia's main sub-regions could have varying levels of involvement with seemingly pan-Asia values. It also could be that any such differences reflect the intensity with which a national government constrains freedom of the press. A third question was posed to explore this notion:

> RQ3: Does the extent to which Asian journalism conveys Asian values vary between the continent's sub-regions or by national levels of press freedom?

Method

A list of the online companions of printed-page newspapers published in Asia was compiled from the databases of *American Journalism Review* (http://arj.newslink.org/nonusa.html) and *Editor & Publisher* (http://emedia1.mediainfo.com/emedia/asia.htm), and from a supplemental Yahoo search. Next, the sampling frame was narrowed to only Web sites maintained by general circulation, English-language daily newspapers. From that pool, 10 online newspapers in 10 Asian countries were selected. Their names and Internet addresses are reported in Figure 1.

The choice of English-language Web newspapers was based on the fact that English is a commonly used lingua franca in Asia. It typically is spoken among a country's educated class and expatriate community, and often is the language of business and tourism. It is used for communication between vernacular-language groups, particularly within the region's former British colonies. Also, newspapers publishing in a shared language tend to be among a nation's most influential (Merrill, 1991).

The unit of analysis was the current day's "hard" or "straight" news story. This was defined as articles about international, regional, national and local/metro news events, as well as business and sports news. Excluded were stories related to entertainment or celebrities, opinion-editorial content, photograph captions, "old news" from the Web newspaper's archives, and advertisements.

Each news story was coded for the home country of the online newspaper in which it appeared, that country's Freedom House (1999) press-freedom rank, and whether it was supplied by an Asian or Western source.[3] Asian and Western news values were measured by whether a story reported conflict and whether it was explicitly supportive or critical of the actions or actors it reported. It was assumed that the Asian value of harmony could be inferred by the absence of conflict as a central story-telling device, and that the value of nation building would be reflected in reporting that conveyed a sense of supportiveness.

Stories also were coded for their ethnocentric orientation. This variable was intended as a measure of cultural proximity (Galtung & Ruge, 1965), or the perceived cultural distance between news events, the journalists covering them and news audiences. Specifically, it tested for whether Asian newspaper and news agency journalists emphasized Asian values across the board or only in stories about cultural proximate actions and actors. Wilke & Rosenberger's (1994) news-ethnocentrism categories—"home news at home," "foreign news at home," "home news abroad" and "foreign news abroad"[4]—were adapted to the present study.

Conflict was deemed to be present if a news story focused predominantly on disagreements among or between parties central to the reported event. The disagreements could be verbal, such as arguments or debates between individuals, nations or world regions. Or they could be physical, with armed conflict being an extreme example. This definition was adapted from Salwen and Matera (1992).

To define "supportive" or "critical" news stories, we turned to the work of Yu (1996). A story was coded as being supportive it if emphasized political, economic or social stability or strength, or social cohesion or cooperation, either separately or in some combination. A story was judged to be critical if its journalist-author focused predominately on political, social or economic instability or weakness, or social conflict or disorganization, or some combination of these qualities.

Eleven communication-studies graduate students from a major Asian university performed the coding. One student coded the *Boreno Bulletin* and

Indonesian Observer, the smallest Web sites in the sample. Two coders split up the work on Hong Kong's *South China Morning Post* and two others divided Singapore's *Straits Times Interactive*; both were large Web sites. The remaining six sites were coded by one student each. The online newspapers were visited in the late afternoon for three randomly selected days, from late July to mid-August 1999.[5]

The coders met for a final check of intercoder reliability after completing their assigned coding. Together, they worked on two of the sampled Web newspapers and their level of agreement was calculated using Holsti's formula (1969). Simple agreement ranged from .83 for the "supportive/critical" variable to .94 for "enthocentric orientation." The coders agreed 92% of the time in discerning whether a story emphasized conflict and in judging whether a story was supplied by an Asian or Western source. The widely accepted minimum level of intercoder reliability is 80% (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 1998).

Findings

A total of 1,845 news stories were harvest from the 10 Asian newspaper Web sites. Nearly one-fourth of them (n=425) were from Singapore's *Straits Times Interactive*. The *Philippines Daily Inquirer* and Japan's *Daily Yomiuri On-Line* contributed the fewest stories, at 79 and 63 respectively.

More than half of the stories (n=1,010) were produced by the Asian newspapers' staff reporters or individual Asian news-wire agencies. Western news agencies produced about a quarter of the total (n=418). The remaining stories were excluded from the analysis because their origins were not clearly identified by the Web newspapers, or because they were assembled from a combination of Asian and Western sources.

The first research question concerned the prevalence of the Asian value of harmony in Asian journalism. Its opposite in Western journalism would be the traditional story-telling element of conflict. If Asian values inform Asian journalists, one conceivably would expect them to emphasize conflict to a lesser extent than would their counterparts in the West.

This expectation was not reflected in the data. Stories from both Asian and Western sources were indistinguishable in the use of conflict as a story-telling device. About 42% of all Asian-source stories and 44% of those from Western sources emphasized conflict ($chi^2=.78$, df 1, $p< .40$). However, this gives a somewhat misleading picture of Asian journalists' use of the Western news value of conflict and, by implication, its Asian-value antithesis of harmony. There was a significant ethnocentric dimension to their use of conflict ($chi^2=10.49$, df 3, $p< .02$), as Table 1 shows. Proportionally, they emphasized it the most in covering "foreign news abroad" (53.3% of 137 stories), or stories about Westerners and non-local Asians involved in events outside of a journalist's home country. Its salience decreased in the journalists' at-home or abroad coverage of their nations' citizens, and in their reporting on foreigners involved in local events.

RQ2 focused on the presence in Asian journalism of the Asian, or nation-building, value of generally conveying a sense of support for the reported actions or the actors involved in a news event. Its opposite would be the Western journalistic norm of adversarial reporting, or of being generally critical of reported actions and actors. These two qualities were observed in 880 (61.6%) of the 1,428 stories with clearly identifiable Asian or Western origins.

Supportive story-telling elements held the least salience for both Asian and Western journalists. However, the quality of supportiveness was observed in proportionally more Asian- than Western-source stories, or 46% of 655 and 28% of 225 stories respectively (chi^2=22.26, df 1, $p< .0001$). Like harmony-cum-conflict, there was a clear ethnocentric aspect to the Asian journalists' adherence to the Asian value of supportiveness (chi^2=17.98, df 3, $p<. 0001$), as Table 2 shows. It was most apparent in their coverage of home-country citizens involved in news events abroad (56% of 25 stories). It was largely absent from their reporting of non-local-citizens involved in foreign events (26.1% of 92 stories). Nation building, as a journalistic value in Asia, also likely is reflected in the essentially equal percentages of supportive and critical "home news at home" stories. For example, some local-news topics like the commission of crimes or social inequities would have negative implications for national development.

The third research question focused on whether Asian values exist in journalism either as a phenomenon of the continent's sub-regions, or because of the intensity of individual nations' restrictions on press freedom. The data reported in Table 3 show that they were far more influential for the six Southeast Asian online newspapers. Conflict was emphasized in only one-third of their Asian-source stories, but was present in more than half of those uploaded to the East and South Asian Web newspapers (chi^2=47.24, df 2, $p< .0001$). Conversely, proportionally more stories in the Southeast Asian Web newspapers conveyed a sense of support for the reported actions or actors (chi^2=46.64, df 2, $p< .0001$). These findings reflect Southeast Asia's often mentioned centrality to the Asian-values debate. Indeed, two of its leaders—Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad and Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew—are widely acknowledged as staunch and leading supporters of Asian values (Mahathir, 1998; Yao, 1994; Mehra, 1989).

In addition, Asian values held the greatest salience for Asian journalists in nations with highly constrained press freedoms. Evidence of this was particularly strong in their adherence to the value of supportiveness, as Table 4 shows. It was emphasized in nearly three of every four Asian-source stories at Web newspapers in countries ranked by Freedom House as journalistically "not free." In contrast, far more critical reporting was observed at online newspapers in "free" and "partly free" Asian press systems (chi^2=109.06, df 2, p< .0001). Similarly, the online newspapers in highly restricted press-freedom environments published substantially fewer conflict-oriented stories from Asian sources (chi^2=30.89, df 2, p<. 0001).

These data, too, reflect the strong salience of Asian values within Southeast Asia. But they also suggest that it may be concentrated in three of the sub-region's nations: Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei—the only journalistically "not free" countries in the online-newspaper sample. Freedom House ranks Southeast Asia's Philippines and Thailand, and East Asia's Japan, as "free" press states. It finds "partly free" press systems in Indonesia (Southeast Asia), South Asia's India and Pakistan, and East Asia's Hong Kong.[6]

Conclusions

Asian values indeed can be observed in Asian journalism, as this study of selected English-language Web newspapers has shown. And they serve to distinguish journalism in the East from its practice in the West, particularly for the nation-building value of supportiveness. These findings lend some quantitative support to anecdotal assertions that Asia has evolved a unique journalistic form based on uniquely Asian values.

But they also offer some support to the case against a uniquely Asian form of journalism. For one, there was a strong ethnocentric orientation to the journalistic application of Asian values. Asian journalists embedded Asian values into their stories most often when they reported on home-country citizens, yet they tended to be more Western-like when covering foreigners and foreign events. The least conflictive and least critical Asian-source stories generally were those that may have held the highest relevance to home-country readers: local news or news of local citizens engaged in activities abroad. In this sense, Asian values may be situational values for Asian journalists, applied locally but not globally.

The findings also suggest that Asian values are not pan-Asia values, at least for journalists. They were emphasized the most at Web newspapers in Southeast Asian countries that provide few press freedoms, albeit according to Freedom House. By contrast, Asian-source stories uploaded to Web newspapers in East and South Asia—and in "partly free" and "free" press-freedom states—were noticeably more critical and focused on conflict more often.

It could be, however, that the ethnocentric use of Asian values stems from some witting or unwitting attempt by Asian journalists to cement an East-West divide in their readers' minds. That is, Asia's cultural sovereignty could be preserved, and the superiority of "the Asian way" demonstrated, by presenting its modern global competitor and former colonizer—the West—in a generally negative light. Critical reporting is an Asian value, in other words, when it serves to set East apart from West.

It also could be that negative reporting by Asian journalist merely reflects conflict or criticism that are inherent parts of some news events. It would be difficult, for example, to craft a positive news report—one that avoids conflict and conveys supportiveness—of the recent riots in Indonesia or the frequent disputes between India and Pakistan. Political news, too, tends to focus on conflict and criticism because they are natural facets of the political process, particularly in liberal democracies. Future research of Asian values in Asian journalism should consider variables that account for these naturally occurring news-story attributes.

Investigating Asian values in journalism from a larger sampling of Asian media—print, broadcast, online, and the vernacular press—also should be a consideration of future research. In the current study, the Web newspaper sample was skewed toward Southeast Asian online newspapers, which potentially could have influenced the findings. More work also is needed to identify a wider range of Asian values in journalism. And the potential influence of commercial, or market-based, factors on the inclusion of Asian values in news should be tested.

The debate over Asian values undoubtedly will continue. Yet it appears that both sides of the debate may be partially correct. Asian values are conveyed by Asia journalism. Yet as the current work suggests, they are neither pan-Asia values nor able to fully inoculate Asian journalists against the influence of either Western newswork norms or some universal journalistic ethic.

Notes

[1] According to one common view, the debate over re-asserting Asian values in Asian journalism is a response to complaints that the Western news media portray developing nations in general, and Asian specifically, in a generally negative light. There is empirical support for this critique (see Poornananda, 1998, for a compact discussion; also McBride, 1981; Masmoudi, 1979). In this case, "Asian values" essentially becomes a rhetorical device for elevating newswork practices in the East over those in the West, and for re-locating Asia in the post-colonial, global space.

[2] There have been a number of iterations, and a great deal of criticism, of development journalism. Romano (1999), who offers a concise review of its history, notes that a principal complaint is that development journalism "has been co-opted by governments in order to push their own ideologies, as a mere apologia for dictatorial leadership" (p. 185). The concept also was caught in the crossfire of the New World Information and Communication Order (see Roach, 1987; Altschull, 1984).

[3] "Asian source" was defined as stories provided to a Web newspaper by its local/staff reporters or an individual Asian-based, news-wire agency. Examples include Bernama, which is Malaysia's official, government sponsored national news agency, and its Indonesian counterpart Antara, as well as Kyodo (Japan) and Xinhua (People's Republic of China). "Western source" was defined as international news agencies based in Western nations. Examples are Reuters (Britain), Agence France-Press, Bloomberg News (USA), and *Los Angeles Times-Washington Post* and *New York Times* news services.

[4] "Home news at home" referred to news events that occurred *inside* the Web newspaper's home country, and were about or involved the country, its citizens or residents, government, businesses, and so on. "Foreign news at home" was defined as news events that occurred *inside* the Web newspaper's home country, and which were about or involved a foreign country or non-resident foreigners. By "home news abroad" we meant news events *outside* of a Web newspaper's home country but which involved the home country's citizens, government, businesses, etc. "Foreign news abroad" was conceptualized as news events *outside* of the Web newspaper's home country and involving foreigners only.

[5] Li (1998) offers precedence for short coding intervals for content analyses of Web news sites, and reports that a site's appearance tends to be stable over time. Coding Web news sites over a few days within either a week or month appears to be the current standard for Web-journalism research.

[6] Hong Kong is subsumed under the "China" heading in the past two years' press-freedom reports (Freedom House, 1999; Sussman, 1998). It was covered separately in the 1997 Freedom House report (Sussman, 1997), which rated it as a "partly free" press state. The media likely remain partly free, since Hong Kong essentially functions today, as a special administrative region of China, as it did in 1997, as a home-ruled British colony.

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Figure 1: Asian online newspaper sample*

Brunei	*Borneo Bulletin On-Line*	www.brunet.bn/news/bb/front.htm
H.Kong	*South China Morning Post*	www.scmp.com/
India	*The Times of India*	www.timesofindia.com/
Indonesia	*Indonesian Observer*	www.indoexchange.com/indonesian-observer
Japan	*Daily Yomiuri On-Line*	www.yomiuri.co.jp/index-e.htm
Malaysia	*New Straits Times*	www.nstpi.com.my/
Pakistan	*The Nation*	www.syberwurx.com/nation/
Phil'pines	*Philippine Daily Inquirer*	www.inquirer.net/
Singapore	*Straits Times Interactive*	straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/
Thailand	*The Nation*	www.nationmultimedia.com/

* New Straits Times Press recently redesigned its flagship newspaper's Web site into a company portal called NSTP E-media. The *Straits Times Interactive* and *South China Morning Post* also were recently redesigned.

Table 1

Asian-source stories emphasizing conflict, by ethnocentric orientation

	Conflict present	Conflict absent	Totals
Home news at home	314 (40.4%)	464 (59.6%)	778
Home news abroad	16 (35.6%)	29 (64.4%)	45
Foreign news at home	16 (32.7%)	33 (67.3%)	49
Foreign news abroad	73 (53.3%)	64 (46.7%)	137
	419 (41.5%)	590 (58.5%)	1,009

chi^2=10.49, df 3, p< .02

Table 2

Asian-source stories conveying supportiveness, by ethnocentric orientation

	Supportive stories	Critical stories	Totals
Home news at home	249 (49.3%)	256 (50.7%)	505
Home news abroad	14 (56.0%)	11 (44.0%)	25
Foreign news at home	14 (43.8%)	18 (56.3%)	32
Foreign news abroad	24 (26.1%)	68 (73.9%)	92
	301 (46.0%)	353 (54.0%)	654

chi^2=17.98, df 3, p<. 0001

Table 3: Asian-source news: Sub-regional distribution of conflict and supportive/critical stories

	Conflict present	Conflict absent	Totals
East Asia *Japan, Hong Kong*	83 (54.6%)	69 (45.4%)	152
Southeast Asia *Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand*	220 (33.6%)	434 (66.4%)	654
South Asia *India, Pakistan*	116 (56.9%)	88 (43.1%)	204
	419 (41.5%)	591 (58.5%)	1,010

chi^2=47.24, df 2, p<.0001

	Supportive stories	Critical stories	Totals
East Asia	23 (22.5%)	79 (77.5%)	102
Southeast Asia	213 (56.8%)	162 (43.2%)	375
South Asia	65 (36.5%)	113 (63.5%)	178
	301 (46.0%)	354 (54.0%)	655

chi^2=46.64, df 2, <.0001

Table 4: Asian-source news: National press-freedom rankings by conflict and supportiveness

	Conflict present	Conflict absent	Totals
Free	49	79	128
Japan, Philippines, Thailand	(38.3%)	(61.7%)	
Partly free	213	199	412
H.Kong, India, Indonesia, Pakistan	(51.7%)	(48.3%)	
Not free	157	313	470
Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore	(33.4%)	(66.6%)	
	419	591	1,010
	(41.5%)	(58.5%)	

chi^2=30.89, df 2, p<.0001

	Supportive stories	Critical stories	Totals
Free	28	58	86
	(32.6%)	(67.4%)	
Partly free	94	226	320
	(29.4%)	(70.6%)	
Not free	179	70	249
	(71.9%)	(28.1%)	
	301	354	655
	(46.0%)	(54.0%)	

chi^2=109.06, df 2, p<.0001

Int'l

Communicative Distance and Media Stereotyping in an International Context

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Communicative Distance and Media Stereotyping in an International Context

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Abstract

This paper transfers the constructs of communicative distance and stereotyping commonly found in the interpersonal communication literature into an international communication context. It hypothesizes that stereotyping by the media of one nation, of news from another nation, is positively correlated with the communicative distance between the two nations. Using innovative operationalizations of the communicative distance and media stereotyping constructs, the paper presents six international content analyses in support of the above hypothesis.

Communicative Distance and Media Stereotyping in an International Context

Introduction

The initial seeds of thought that ultimately grew into this paper were planted when I visited the United States for the first time in 1994 and read a copy of *The New York Times*. Reading this fabled newspaper's coverage of my home country (India), I couldn't help thinking: "Is it really my country that they are talking about? They make it sound far worse than it is in reality!" However, it was more than five years later as a graduate student in mass communication that I got an opportunity to study this phenomenon from a more serious, academic perspective.

Fishman (1982) said that the media of different nations have different "schemes of interpretations" with which they see different events in the same displays of behavior (p. 221). In reporting international affairs, Paletz and Entman (1981) also found a similarly unbalanced picture drawn by the media. They pointed out that the media often provide a "narrow perspective," speak in a "monolithic voice," limit the "public knowledge" of international affairs, and fail to report "important aspects of complex but not unfathomable foreign events" (p. 215). A veritable cornucopia of research studies exists in the journalism literature (Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1980; Gitlin, 1980; Bagdikian, 1980; Altschull, 1984; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Shoemaker and Reese, 1991) that shows how the media build up their news frames on ideology and use them to interpret world events.

While acknowledging the indisputable role of ideology (and of the complex underlying racial, ethnic, linguistic, historical, political, social, and economic factors) in influencing media bias, this study tries to describe the phenomenon of biased media coverage of foreign nations from an innovative perspective. This perspective, borrowed from the realm of interpersonal communication, involves the constructs of 'stereotyping' and 'communicative distance.'

Theoretical Perspectives

This section provides a brief overview of some theoretical perspectives on stereotyping and communicative distance that are found in the communication, sociology and psychology literature:

Stereotyping: Lippmann (1922) said: "Stereotyping is not merely a way of substituting order for the great, blooming, buzzing confusion of reality. It is not merely a shortcut. It is all these things and more. It is a guarantee of our self-respect; it is the projection upon the world of our own sense of value, our own position and our own rights" (p. 63-64).

The origin of the word 'stereotype' has been lost in the recesses of linguistic history. The original stereotype was called a flong, which was a printing plate that facilitated reproduction of the same material. The typesetter could avoid recasting type by using the stereotype. Thus, a stereotype imposes a rigid mold on the subject and encourages repeated mechanical usage. When we are tempted with the use of stereotypes, we are attempting to evade the need to think anew about situations and people (Enteman, 1996).

Our stereotypes constrain strangers' patterns of communication and engender stereotype-confirming communication. Stereotypes bias information processing concerning ingroup and outgroup members and facilitate the creation of self-fulfilling prophecies. We tend to see behavior that confirms our expectations even when it is absent (Cook, 1984; Cooper and Fazio, 1986; Hamilton and Trolier, 1986; Linville, Salovey and Fischer, 1986; Neuberg, 1989; Stephan, 1985, 1989; Stephan and Rosenfield, 1982; Stephan et al, 1993). Our stereotypes tend to be activated automatically when we categorize strangers and when we are not communicating mindfully. We ignore disconfirming evidence, and thus cannot avoid stereotyping when communicating on automatic pilot (see von Hippel, Sekquaptewa and Vargas, 1995).

Stereotypes often serve to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup (Stroebe and Insko, 1989). Stereotypes influence the way we process information. We remember more favorable information about our ingroups and more unfavorable information about our outgroups (Hewstone and Giles, 1986). Our processing of information is biased in the direction of maintaining the preexisting belief systems. These processes then, can produce the cognitive confirmation of one's stereotypic beliefs (Hamilton, Sherman and Ruvolo, 1992, p. 138).

Communicative Distance: Interpersonal communication literature says that the attitudes we hold influence the way we communicate with others. The way we speak may be varied in order to generate different feelings of distance between us and the strangers with whom we communicate (i.e., to make the distance seem smaller or greater). Peng (1974) used the concept of 'communicative distance' to explain this phenomenon of psychological distance between people. He said: "A communicative distance cannot be measured directly. It is not even visible. But we can be sure of its presence when we hear certain words or expressions. In other words, our awareness of a communicative distance in the midst of a conversation depends to a large extent on certain linguistic devices, which serve, from the speaker's point of view, to set up the communicative distance, or from the hearer's point of view, to let the hearer know that it has already been set up by the speaker" (p. 33).

Still within the realm of interpersonal communication, Lukens (1978) expanded Peng's conceptualization of communicative distance to cover ethnocentric speech, which is reflected in three communicative distances: (1) The Distance of Indifference, (2) The Distance of Avoidance, and (3) the Distance of Disparagement. As Lukens described, "In essence, speech in accordance with the three communicative distances may be used: (1) to demonstrate lack of concern for persons of other cultures and reflect an insensitivity to cultural differences (the Distance of Indifference), (2) to avoid or limit the amount of interaction with out-groups (the Distance of Avoidance), and (3) to demonstrate feelings of hostility towards out-groups and to deride or belittle them (the Distance of Disparagement).

Conceptualizing the Variables for this Study

Transplanting the constructs of stereotyping and communicative distance into an international media context involves making some changes/adaptations from the way these constructs have been traditionally used in the interpersonal communication literature.

Media Stereotyping: Following the definitions by Cook (1984), Cooper and Fazio (1986), Hamilton and Trolier (1986), Linville, Salovey and Fischer (1986), Neuberg (1989), Stephan (1985, 1989), Stephan and Rosenfield (1982) and Stephan et al (1993), stereotyping in general can be defined as **the biased processing, by members of one group, of information concerning members of another group, facilitating the creation of self-fulfilling prophecies**. Paraphrased in a media context, the above definition becomes "**the biased coverage, by the media of one nation, of news/information concerning another nation, facilitating the maintenance of preexisting belief systems regarding the latter nation**" (see Hamilton, Sherman and Ruvolo, 1992, p. 138).

Communicative Distance: Peng (1974) introduced the construct of communicative distance in an interpersonal context as involving the setting up of different 'feelings of distance' between persons, by means of their communications. Translating this construct from an international perspective, one could possibly redefine communicative distance as "**the psychological distance between two nations as a function of the transport and communication linkages between them.**" In other words, the stronger the transport and communication links between two nations, the smaller the communicative distance between them. Conversely, the more tenuous the transport and communication links between two nations, the larger the communicative distance between them.

Theoretical Hypothesis

Having conceptualized the two variables, we put forward a theoretical hypothesis in this study that **stereotyped coverage, by the media of one nation, of news from**

another nation, is positively correlated with the communicative distance between the two nations. The theoretical rationale for this hypothesis, however, does not come from the sociological or psychological literature. Rather, the rationale derives from the vast body of journalism literature that describes how the media display a clear pattern of dichotomization in news coverage based on serving a wide range of 'extra-media' interests (Altschull, 1984; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Shoemaker et al, 1991; Krishnaiah, Signorielli and McLeod, 1993).

It must be noted here that by no means am I implying any causation. The current nomological network does not allow for a categorical statement to be made that communicative distance causes media stereotyping, or vice versa, without causing considerable laughter at the researcher's naivete. A positive correlation between communicative distance and media stereotyping may very well be due to the simultaneous impact on both variables by several other variables (racial, ethnic, linguistic, historical, political, social, geographic, and economic). In other words, the above hypothesis does not look at communicative distance and media stereotyping as 'independent' or 'dependent' variables, but simply as two covariants. A logical future extension of this study might possibly be an inquiry into aspects of causation.

Operationalizing the Variables

Media Stereotyping: According to Stephan et al (1993), three techniques for empirically determining stereotypes have achieved considerable acceptance: The first is the checklist technique, originally devised by Katz and Braly (1933). The checklist seeks to reveal the consensus of one group's views of another, by asking respondents to select, from a list of adjectives, those that they believe best describe the group. The stereotype consists of those traits that are nominated by the greatest number of respondents. The second is the percentage technique, which seeks to determine the prevalence of a set of traits in a given group (Brigham, 1971). Respondents are asked to indicate the percentage of group members who possess each trait; the stereotype consists of those traits perceived to be possessed by the highest percentage of group members. The third is the diagnostic ratio technique, which seeks to determine the traits that distinguish a given group from people in general (Martin, 1987; McCauley and Stitt, 1978). The respondents are asked to indicate the percentage of people in general who possess each of a list of traits, and in addition are asked to indicate the percentage of members of the group in question who possess these traits. A diagnostic ratio showing the degree to which this group is perceived to differ from people in general is then calculated for each trait. The stereotype consists of those traits with the highest ratios. Techniques have also been derived from work on cognitive information processing. The first technique is based on research on prototypes (Rosch, 1978). The second technique focuses on the structure of information in memory (Cantor and Mischel, 1977; Rosch, 1978; Stephan, 1985; Wilder, 1984).

However, none of the above measurement methods are suitable in the context of this study, since they deal primarily with interpersonal and inter-group stereotyping. In the specific context of media stereotyping, however, Linn (1996) says that one of the ways stereotyping by journalists can be measured is through a qualitative examination of their selection of examples, or cases, to illustrate stories. Another way that journalists add opinion and prejudice to stories is through the use of generalities and qualitative adjectives (those that apply judgment to the subject rather than describing something that can be observed). The extent of stereotyping in a story can thus, he adds, also be determined by examining the **number of qualitative adjectives used** in the story. In other words, the more the qualitative adjectives used in a story, the more the stereotyping in the story. Conversely, the fewer the qualitative adjectives used in a story, the less the stereotyping in the story.

In this study we decided to use the latter method to operationalize media stereotyping, so as to avoid subjectivity in the coding of "examples or cases," and to provide an objective, quantitative measure that can be coded in a relatively straightforward manner.

Communicative Distance: Finding a way to operationalize communicative distance was a very challenging task. Peng (1974), the originator of this construct, has himself admitted, "A communicative distance cannot be measured directly. It is not even visible..." (p. 33). The conceptual definition adopted in this study (a function of the transport and communication linkages between nations) was somewhat easier to operationalize. The following logic was used:

Our conceptual definition of communicative distance was "how closely two nations are linked in terms of transport/communication." Indicators of this could be:

1. Transport services, i.e., volume of air, rail, road, sea and other forms of traffic;
2. Postal services, i.e., volume of surface/air mail;
3. Telephone services, i.e., volume of telephone calls; and
4. Electronic mail services, i.e., volume of e-mails/Internet messages.

Volume of surface/air mail is essentially a function of volume of transport traffic, because postal services depend upon transport services to carry mail. Meanwhile, it is very difficult to obtain data on volume of telephone calls, e-mails, etc. Therefore, from a practical perspective, the only readily operationalizable measure of the communicative distance between nations was **volume of transport services** between them.

Research Hypothesis

On account of the above operationalizations, we are provided with a rather unusual research hypothesis, that "**the number of qualitative adjectives in the stories about Nation A that are featured in the media of Nation B, is negatively correlated with the volume of transport services between Nation A and Nation B**." It must be noted here that the "positive" correlation in the wording of the theoretical hypothesis becomes a "negative" correlation in the wording of the research hypothesis, because higher volume of transport services implies less communicative distance while lower volume of transport services implies more communicative distance.

As shown in the subsequent sections of this paper, empirical data supports the above research hypothesis.

Method

Collecting Media Stereotyping Data

Deciding to use a purely 'behavioral' perspective and (ergo) an 'unobtrusive measurement' approach, we adopted **content analysis** as the suitable method to use in obtaining media stereotyping data (i.e., number of qualitative adjectives used in media stories).

Defining Boundary of Relevant Content: It was decided to use newspaper content as opposed to television or radio content, because newspapers have a greater specialization in reporting foreign events. Compared with the electronic media, newspapers carry greater amount of and more detailed information about international events. Also, newsgathering and editing processes in the electronic media follow those of newspapers (Cohen, 1963, p. 8). Television news organizations heavily depend on the print media for their sense of newsworthy events (Fishman, 1982, p. 236). Therefore, newspapers are a satisfactory representation of media coverage of foreign affairs (Cohen, 1963, p. 9). It was also decided to look at "newspapers of record" only, because of their elite and prestige status (Stempel and Windhauser, 1984), and the fact that they are the rest of the media's references for subjects to be covered, stories, and perspectives on the news (Paletz and Entman, 1981, p. 7).

Further, in keeping with the current 'new media' revolution, it was decided to collect the content from the 'online' editions of the above newspapers. It was reasoned that online editions would carry a significant amount of international coverage, because of the 'global' nature of the Web medium. Moreover, it was easier to obtain access to Web editions of newspapers from far-flung countries. Meanwhile, logistically speaking, it was also easier to handle and process electronic content as opposed to print content, thanks to handy word-processing tools such as 'word count.'

Sampling of Content: All stories (hard news, features, editorials, etc.) appearing in online editions of the newspapers of record of particular nations, regarding other nations, within a given time period, were used in the analysis, so as to avoid bias (random or systematic) in sampling from this universe. The time-period was thus kept suitably short so as to avoid the collection of a cumbersomely large amount of content.

Unit of Analysis: In keeping with our operational definition of media stereotyping, the unit of analysis was the individual story. Qualitative adjectives were collected from the universe of words in the content samples.

Quantification System: The qualitative adjectives collected were quantified as a percentage of the total number of words in the given story.

Intercoder Reliability: An additional coder was employed in parts of the adjective-collection process to verify if the primary coder was reliable in selecting the "qualitative adjectives" from the content. Using Holsti's Percentage of Agreement measure (Holsti, 1969), intercoder reliability was computed to be approximately 98 per cent.

Category Construction: The most challenging decision was choosing which nations' newspapers to include in the study. Table 1 shows the list of newspapers that was finally drawn out.

<Insert Table 1 about here>

The purposive selection shown in Table 1 was made for a several reasons. One was to look at both Western (U.S.A., Britain, and Australia) as well as Eastern (U.A.E., India, and Singapore) nations' newspapers. Another was to look at newspapers from nations of diverse sizes, populations and geographical locations. Yet another was to consider newspapers from a variety of socio-political milieus: democratic republics with free presses (U.S.A. and India); democratic republics with highly censored presses (Singapore); constitutional monarchies with free presses (Britain and Australia); and absolute monarchies with highly censored presses (U.A.E.). Of course there are other socio-political milieus in the world, but it was reasoned that if our research hypothesis managed to hold true in the above instances, there was a good chance it would hold true in other instances also. After all, as Cohen (1990) says, a successful piece of research doesn't conclusively settle an issue, it just makes some theoretical proposition to some degree more likely. Only successful future replication in the same and different settings (as might be found through meta-analysis) provides an approach to settling the issue. Meanwhile, a major constraint was that linguistic limitations compelled the researcher to restrict this study to nations that had newspapers of record that were published in English, thus excluding a host interesting possibilities such as Germany, Japan, Brazil, Russia, Ivory Coast, etc. A logical direction for future inquiry might be to replicate this study using newspapers of record published in other languages.

Another decision to make, after choosing which nations' newspapers to analyze, was to choose which nations' coverage in those newspapers to analyze. To do this, each newspaper was scrutinized over a short period of time to see which nations were receiving regular coverage, followed by the selection of three nations' coverage per newspaper. The selection of these nations was further complicated by constraints in the operationalization of 'communicative distance', which will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. Once this selection was finalized, the coverage of these nations was studied over a period of two weeks each (staggered over December 1999-March 2000). Table 2 shows the final sample of content that was analyzed in this study.

<Insert Table 2 about here>

Collecting Communicative Distance Data:

It has been discussed earlier in this paper that the only readily operationalizable measure of the communicative distance between nations was the **volume of transport services** between them. However, even this convenient operationalization posed potential problems. Data regarding international surface transportation (especially in certain less-developed parts of the world) was difficult to obtain and/or of questionable accuracy. The only transportation data for which reliable, standardized, worldwide figures were available was air transportation.

This study, therefore, took the **number of airline seats per week between the newspaper's city of publication on the one hand, and the largest cities of the nations covered in the newspaper** (data obtained from Travelocity by SABRE, Inc.), as the sole measure of the communicative distance between those nation-pairs. 'Number of seats per week' is the common unit used by International Air Transport Association (IATA) member airlines to describe their services between city-pairs.

This also constrained our choice of nation-pairs in Table 1 to nations that did not share land transportation links, and were sufficiently far apart to preclude the possibility of passenger transport by water. For example, coverage by *The Times* (London) of South Africa, Japan and Australia was studied because there are no land or water passenger transportation links between Britain on the one hand and South Africa, Japan or Australia on the other.

Table 3 shows the data on airline seats per week between the largest cities of the nation-pairs given in Table 2.

<Insert Table 3 about here>

Findings

Table 4 shows the percentage of qualitative adjectives found in the coverage of the different nations by the newspapers employed in this investigation.

<Insert Table 4 about here>

As can be seen by comparing Table 3 with Table 4, there was, in accordance with our research hypothesis, a marked negative correlation between the number of airline seats per week (between the newspapers' city of publication and the largest cities of the nations covered in the newspapers) on the one hand, and the percentage of qualitative adjectives (in the coverage of each nation) on the other. The two figures were inversely proportional. As the number of airline seats increased, the percentage of qualitative adjectives decreased. Conversely, as the number of airline seats decreased, the percentage of qualitative adjectives increased.

Meanwhile, during the collection of qualitative adjectives from the coverage of different nations, certain differences in the kind of these qualitative adjectives were noticeable. In some stories the qualitative adjectives were seen to be largely 'positive' in nature, in others they were noted to be often 'negative' in nature. Out of curiosity, we decided to code the collected qualitative adjectives into categories by kind, to see if any nation-wise patterns emerged. We used a simple, binary 'positive' and 'negative' coding system, once again testing for intercoder reliability. With many qualitative adjectives the coding was very straightforward. "Putrid" was coded as 'negative,' while "magnificent" was coded as 'positive.' However, in cases where the qualitative adjectives were seemingly 'neutral' at face value (e.g. "huge", or "widespread"), the polarity of the qualitative adjective was determined by examining the context in which it was placed, most usually by examining the subsequent noun. As a result, the "huge" in "huge success" was coded as 'positive,' while the "widespread" in "widespread destruction" was coded as 'negative.' The intercoder reliability score for this coding by Holsti's Percentage of Agreement measure (Holsti, 1969) was approximately 91 per cent. When the data generated by this new coding scheme were tabulated, an interesting pattern was noted. Table 5 displays this pattern.

<Insert Table 5 about here>

As can be seen from Table 5, in 15 cases out of 18 (i.e., 83 per cent of the cases), the polarity of the qualitative adjectives was correlated with the percentage of the qualitative adjectives and, therefore, with the number of airline seats. Positivity of the adjectives was inversely proportional to the total number of adjectives and directly proportional to the number of airline seats. Conversely, negativity of the adjectives was directly proportional to the total number of adjectives and inversely proportional to the number of airline seats.

Discussion

Looking at the data presented in tables 3-4, there appears to be a correlation between the number of airline seats per week (between the newspapers' city of publication and the largest cities of the nations covered in the newspapers) on the one hand, and the percentage of qualitative adjectives (in the coverage of each nation) on the other. Comparing tables 3-4 with table 5, there also appears to be a correlation between the above two variables on the one hand, and the polarity of the adjectives on the other hand. Therefore, if it is agreed that (1) the number of airline seats is a sufficiently valid measure of international communicative distance as defined in this paper, and (2) the percentage (and possibly, polarity) of qualitative adjectives is sufficiently a valid measure of international media stereotyping – in other words, if this study is deemed to satisfy the conditions necessary for construct validity – then it could be suggested that, in an international context, communicative distance and media stereotyping may go hand in hand.

Such an inference, if convincingly substantiated, would have wide-ranging implications in the field of international journalism. On the one hand, it would sensitize consumers to the fact that the media do not follow the same standards of journalism in their coverage of different parts of the world, and that, therefore, not all international stories appearing in a particular newspaper or program should be considered to be of a similar face value. On the other hand, it would alert media practitioners that there is an inherent (and possibly unconscious) predilection to provide biased coverage of nations that are further away in terms of communicative distance, and that, therefore, care should be taken to avoid stereotyping while covering such countries. The result could be an increase in the quality and accuracy of international journalism.

Conclusion

Within the limited bounds of this study, a tentative case has been advanced that stereotyping by the media of one nation, within news from another nation, is positively correlated with the communicative distance between the two nations. Of course, on no account has this solitary paper irrefutably verified this hypothesis. First of all, the particular operationalizations used here are not the only operationalizations of communicative distance or media stereotyping. Neither is content analysis the only method to test this hypothesis. Meanwhile, this study has not looked at all possible country-combinations in the world, nor has it looked at newspapers of record that are published in languages other than English. Further, it has not looked at stereotyping by other media such as television or radio.

Additional research to improve the viability of the above hypothesis will be needed. Also, our nomological network in this complex field of inquiry will be greatly enriched by a more in-depth investigation of the underlying racial, ethnic, linguistic, historical, political, social, economic and ideological milieus in which the forces of communicative distance and media stereotyping operate, with attention given to unearthing aspects of causation.

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Appendices

Table 1. Newspapers Content-Analyzed in this Study:

Nation	Newspaper of Record	City of Publication
U.S.A.	*The New York Times*	New York City
Britain	*The Times*	London
Australia	*The Sydney Morning Herald*	Sydney
U.A.E.	*The Khaleej Times*	Dubai
India	*The Times of India*	Bombay
Singapore	*The Straits Times*	Singapore

Table 2. Content Samples Analyzed in this Study:

Newspaper of Record	Nations Covered (Two-Week Periods)	Content Analyzed (# Stories)	(# Words)
The New York Times	Britain	44	23,797
	India	43	26,459
	Ivory Coast	23	13,278
The Times	South Africa	09	5,077
	Japan	05	2,028
	Australia	12	6,315
The Sydney Morning Herald	U.S.A	28	13,087
	Indonesia	30	13,416
	Austria	10	4,981
The Khaleej Times	Britain	28	9,069
	Egypt	04	1,269
	Russia	17	5,826
The Times of India	U.S.A.	40	19,640
	France	11	3,548
	China	21	9,324
The Straits Times	Japan	40	8,393
	Britain	11	4,431
	Russia	17	5,227
	TOTAL:	**393**	**175,165**

Table 3. Airline Seats Per Week between the Newspapers' City of Publication and the Largest Cities of the Nations Covered in the Newspapers:

Newspapers' City of Publication (A)	Largest Cities of Nations Covered (B)	Airline Seats Per Week Between (A) and (B)
New York City	London	58,506
	Bombay	5,336
	Abidjan	672
London	Johannesburg	15,905
	Tokyo	15,049
	Sydney	7,684
Sydney	New York City	4,240
	Jakarta	1,558
	Vienna	1,112
Dubai	London	13,398
	Cairo	4,500
	Moscow	1,000
Bombay	New York City	5,336
	Paris	3,675
	Beijing	0
Singapore	Tokyo	18,786
	London	14,720
	Moscow	750

Table 4. Percentage of Qualitative Adjectives in the Coverage of Each Nation:

Newspaper of Record	Nations Covered (For Two-Week Periods)	Qualitative Adjectives (# Adjectives /Total # of Words)	(% of Adj. to Total # of Words)
The New York Times	Britain	204/23,797	0.9
	India	363/26,459	1.4
	Ivory Coast	309/13, 278	2.3
The Times	South Africa	91/5,077	1.8
	Japan	42/2,028	2.1
	Australia	215/6,315	3.4
The Sydney Morning Herald	U.S.A	185/13,087	1.4
	Indonesia	242/13,416	1.8
	Austria	165/4,981	3.3
The Khaleej Times	Britain	124/9,069	1.4
	Egypt	19/1,269	1.5
	Russia	148/5,826	2.5
The Times of India	U.S.A.	257/19,640	1.3
	France	50/3,548	1.4
	China	290/9,324	3.1
The Straits Times	Japan	116/8,393	1.4
	Britain	125/4,431	2.8
	Russia	167/5,227	3.2
	TOTAL:	**3,112/175,165**	**NA**

Table 5. Polarity of Qualitative Adjectives in the Coverage of Each Nation:

Newspaper of Record	Nations Covered (Two-Week Periods)	Percentage of Positive Qualitative Adjectives	Percentage of Negative Qualitative Adjectives
The New York Times	Britain	71	29
	India	47	52
	Ivory Coast	31	69
The Times	South Africa	69	31
	Japan	60	40
	Australia	58	42
The Sydney Morning Herald	U.S.A	53	47
	Indonesia	34	66
	Austria	41	59
The Khaleej Times	Britain	45	55
	Egypt	84	16
	Russia	32	68
The Times of India	U.S.A.	68	32
	France	50	50
	China	51	49
The Straits Times	Japan	48	52
	Britain	41	59
	Russia	40	60

Int'l

The Relevance of Mass Communication Research in a Global Era: Localization Strategies of International Companies Entering India.

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The Relevance of Mass Communication Research in an Era of Globalization: Localization Strategies of International Companies Entering India.[1]

Global media companies that have recently entered India epitomize the synergistic integration of world-wide media operations. To many, Disney, MTV and Fox are the harbingers of a global consumerist ethos "shaping the world's preferences into homogenized commonality."[2] Evidence, then, that these companies are getting involved in the *localization* of cultural products becomes interesting, since it is invariably a more expensive proposition. One must surmise that powerful countervailing forces are at work that discourage the recycling of cheap software from existing libraries.

In the absence of quotas or other restrictions that limit foreign content on cable or satellite channels in India, explanations for the surprisingly local face of some so-called "Western media invaders" must lie in other than the regulatory domain. These answers must be predicated on the presence of a cultural-linguistic market that ensures adequate returns for new programming, domestic companies with the production capability of providing culturally proximate choices and audiences that are loath to accept recycled and dubbed product. I will argue that international companies try and enhance their own 'localness' as an adaptive coping strategy to gain greater acceptability among audiences, as well as advertisers and regulators who monitor audience viewership.

Audience considerations alone do not determine the extent of localization by a media company. It would appear that well entrenched global companies such as Disney and MTV find it harder to accommodate localization for fear of diluting corporate identity and control. Upstart companies like Zee or even Channel [V] do not bear this burden, and have nimbly moved beyond cosmetic localization. Channels that are not trying to 'fit' an existing brand identity controlled and directed by a centralized decision-making headquarters, but are flexible and decentralized enough to evolve and adapt to the changing local requirements are likely to be more successful at localization. This seems to suggest that decentralization of decision-making control is both a prerequisite for and a feature of successful localization.

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[1] This article is adapted from a larger project that the author is working on, based on her dissertation. Geetika Pathania, "When Global Companies Localize: Adaptive Strategies of International Media Corporations Entering India." Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1998.

[2] Theodore Levitt, "The Globalization of Markets," *Harvard Business Review* (May/June 1983); reprint, in *The Marketing Imagination* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 48 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

This paper tries to look at localization strategies of companies that are the progeny of corporate alliances between global corporations and local partners, as well as specific practices that make these strategies work. To truly understand just what international media companies are selling to their Indian partners, one has to look not so much at the content that appears on the television screen, but examine instead the new sophistication in the mechanisms for delivering Indian audiences to global advertisers. Even as programming appears at first glance to be more variegated and culturally proximate, it is the homogenization in the modes of production that merit closer scrutiny, as evidenced by the growing convergence with international industrial practice and conventions in areas such as distribution and marketing in the domestic television industry.[3] The tendency for conglomerates to integrate 'downstream' into distribution, for instance, is pushing out the *cable-wallahs* and their artisanal mode of distribution.[4]

Some limited natural protection does exist for creative aspects of local cultural production from the forces of international integration. The unfamiliar local cultural-linguistic environment confounds standardization by intensifying the inherent "uncertainty over the precise ingredients of a best-seller formula" exhibited by cultural products.[5] As a coping strategy, creative production is decentralized to local employees or 'out-sourced' from local partners. These local companies literally become the collaborators that offer a foot-hold "for outsiders to acquire inside positions in country markets."[6] In turn, even as they help their global partner to localize in India, companies such as UTV and Zee have used Newscorp distribution infrastructure to further their own ambitions of global presence, as they export software to pockets of linguistic expatriates outside of India.

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[3] This term has been used by Marx to suggest the combination of productive forces and relations of production which form the economic base of capitalism. According to Marx, "In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces." I use the phrase 'mode of production' more narrowly to refer to the production practices which include means and processes of production. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1968), 182.

[4] Here, I use Porter's definition of vertical integration, "the combination of technologically distinct production, distribution, selling and/or other economic processes within the confines of a single firm. As such, it represents a decision by the firm to utilize internal or administrative transactions rather than market transactions to accomplish its economic purposes." In Michael Porter, *Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors* (New York: Free Press, 1980), 300. On page 302, Porter clarifies that the "upstream firm is the selling firm and the downstream firm is the buying firm in the vertical chain."

[5] Paul Hirsch, "Processing Fads and Fashions: an Organization-set Analysis of Cultural Industry Systems," *American Journal of Sociology* 77 no. 4 (1972): 643.

[6] Rosabeth Moss Kanter, "Collaborative Advantage: the Art of Alliances," *Harvard Business Review* 72, no. 4 (1994): 99.

What is clearly emerging is a split between the creative aspects of cultural production, including the creative products themselves on one side, and other aspects of industrial practice and structure such as marketing and distribution on the other. While the former are largely unaffected by this tendency towards standardization, the latter, which are undergoing a process of industrialization and harmonization with global practice, are clearly responding to a 'global' impetus sans territoriality and affiliation, in the process hastening the integration of Indian cultural industries with the world television system.

If recycled programming itself is more scarce on television screens, for instance, the audience need not go to the trouble of decoding *Dallas*, or resisting *Remington Steele*, and may instead view relevant and culturally proximate programming. Thus, even if one is sceptical of the "cheerful cul de sac"[7] of un-dupable active audiences who freely construct their own meanings regardless of the source of programming they are watching,[8] culturally proximate programming leaves little grounds for criticism on cultural grounds. Localized programming in India, then, would seem to lessen the specter of cultural imperialism, at least in the face of evidence of increasing local *content* on Indian television screens. What continues to merit the attention of international cultural communication scholars however, is the one-way flow of 'expertise' to local subsidiaries that is evident in most aspects of cultural production, such as planning, production, technology-training, marketing and distribution. The most notable exception to this pressure to standardize is in the creative functions, which are afforded natural protection from bureaucratization by the unfamiliar local cultural environment and language. It is this "set of industrial arrangements," both structural and financial, as well as a "body of values about ideal practice," where one sees the greatest inward influence and the greatest homogenization.[9]

In the pages that follow, I frequently quote the television executives whom I interviewed in Bombay, India, in April 1996. These television executives were drawn from companies that represented a global-local collaborative alliance, and were actively involved in localization efforts.

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[7] John Sinclair, "Culture and Trade: Some Theoretical and Practical Considerations," in *Mass Media and Free Trade: NAFTA and the Cultural Industries*, ed. Emile G. McAnany and Kenton T. Wilkinson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 55.

[8] For exemplars of work within the active audience theory, see Elihu Katz and Tamar Liebes, *The Export of Meaning: Cross-cultural Readings of Dallas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) as well as Ien Ang, *Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination* (London: Routledge, 1989).

[9] Oliver Boyd-Barrett, "Media Imperialism: Towards an International Framework for the Analysis of Media Systems," in *Mass Communication and Society*, ed. James Curran, Michael Gurevitch, and Janet Woollacott (London: Sage, 1979), 120.

ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES

Hirsch suggests that "at the output boundaries, cultural organizations confront high levels of uncertainty concerning the commercial prospects of goods shipped out."[10] By moving closer to their market and nurturing relationships with local collaborators, international companies manage uncertainties that exist in entering an alien cultural and regulatory landscape. Of course, entering this alien landscape itself reflects a broader strategy itself, one of internationalization and within it, what Hoskins and McFadyen refer to as a "market segmentation strategy" of customizing to cultural-linguistic regions rather than serving cross-national segments.[11] An important issue is how these corporations, as they pursue their goals of profit maximization, resolve the inherent tension between the cheap, standardized programming that is in their interests to provide, and the costly, customized programming that audiences prefer. This paper will deal with what Schlesinger refers to as "the strategies, games and bargains which so substantially affect the cultural field and the imaginery world of the public."[12]

(1) Localization

Maxwell points out that "the decision to buy goods or services is always, in a key sense, about feeling safe or 'close to home.'"[13] While Levitt seems to view "inherited old varieties of culture-bound national attributes"[14] as something of an irritant, based on an inconvenient adherence to "inherited preferences and ancient practice,"[15] businesses are coming around to recognizing the importance of the diverse belief systems, esthetic codes and narrative style to audiences that watch programming. Seen from the practitioner's perspective, cultural appropriateness becomes an important 'input' for the encoding of commercially appealing programming. Shamin Desai recounts the 'death' of a recycled program, which fails to appeal to an 'after-market' audience:

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[10] Paul Hirsch, "Processing Fads and Fashions: an Organization-set Analysis of Cultural Industry Systems," *American Journal of Sociology* 77 no. 4 (1972): 646.

[11] Colin Hoskins and Stuart McFadyen, "International Marketing Strategies for a Cultural Service," *International Marketing Review* 8, no. 2 (1991): 45

[12] Philip Schlesinger, "Trading in Fictions: What do we Know about British Television Imports and Exports?" *European Journal of Communication* 1, no. 3 (1986): 285.

[13] Richard Maxwell, "Out of Kindness and into Difference: the Value of Global Market Research," *Media, Culture and Society* 10, no. 1 (1996): 105.

[14] Theodore Levitt, "The Globalization of Markets," *Harvard Business Review* (May/June 1983); reprint, in*The Marketing Imagination* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 44 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

[15] Theodore Levitt, "The Globalization of Markets," *Harvard Business Review* (May/June 1983); reprint, in*The Marketing Imagination* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 39 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

> It makes sense only to recycle stuff which has not been created specifically for some audience in mind. Let's say, we had this problem when we recycled a show called *Music Update Tokyo*... but the moment we started recycling that, we found that the VJ was Japanese, who kind of created that kind of barrier. Although the software was pretty common across the board . . . but no response, I mean it just kind of died, no sponsorship, nothing.[16]

This quote substantiates how programming made with a certain audience in mind does not 'travel' well. Recognizing this, programming meant for export is carefully designed at the planning stage, with no topical references, and no specific geographical referents. To be locally accepted, the programming must tap into local conventions and historical practice. Sunita Chowla and Rajiv Sahai confess that Indian audiences have not responded enthusiastically to animation because of the belief that animation is a genre meant for 'kids.' In a country where the most likely cinematic images of white men are of British colonial masters suppressing Indian freedom-fighters, or the occasional caucasian like Tom Alter on Bollywood's pay-rolls, who speaks in convincingly accented Hindi, dubbing poses a new challenge. Sunita Chowla of Disney admitted to me somewhat ruefully that "it does look odd when a white man is speaking in Hindi or another language" but is quite unconscious of any irony in two 'brown' women conversing in English though they come from the same linguistic region in India. The common colonial linguistic legacy is an accepted part of social memory, barely worth a thought, but dubbing English programming into Hindi is new, strange, unfamiliar and threatening. Any 'foreign-ness' in the programming, then, must be carefully managed, and executives strive to retain the link with localness that is so important for audience acceptance. Conversely, the cultural forms which are familiar to audiences are appropriated and subsequently adapted to television. Cultural appropriation spreads its search-light over greater and greater areas of local cultural forms, selecting those that can be successfully commoditized. Formats such as *Antakshri*, a singing contest that is one of the most popular Indian games, played by children and adults alike, is now a television game show on Zee T.V. that is successfully exported abroad to the U.K. Another popular board game, *Saanp aur Seedi* (Snakes and Ladders), is a game show on Zee T.V. While the search for inspiration from local sources may be driven by a functional necessity, it undeniably has the desirable outcome of providing audiences with culturally proximate programming

Specific practices ensure that such localization 'works.' As the following sections suggest, localization can take the form of a) localization of programming content, which includes i) splitting satellite beams and ii) creative autonomy to local employees and partner firms as well as iii) culturally specific made-for-market programming, iv) visibility to local artists and v) local programming based on American formats and b) the cosmetic localization of programming through i) dubbing, ii) sub-titling, and iii) using local hosts to 'link' programming.

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[16] Shamin Desai, Executive Producer - India,Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 30, 1996.

(a) Localization of Programming Content

i) Channel customization

Under a strategy that STAR TV refers to as 'marketization,' cultural-linguistic markets are customized. Technology assists in this process by allowing customized 'beams' to target geographical areas within the satellite footprint. Andrew Carnegie describes the process and the rationale behind splitting satellite beams to customize markets:

> You can't make money out of pan-Asian or pan-European advertising. It has to be market specific. Which is why we split all the channels. Some go north, some come south to India. Some go North to China. There's new channels going into Japan, there's new channels going into Indonesia. So the answer is you have to quickly make them culture-specific. . . Well, you have to split your channel. You try and have something that is dedicated. . . If you only have one channel, you turn totally Hindi. It goes to China, but it doesn't have much to do with China. So you need to either you decide you don't care about China, or you have to have two channels, and the one you make Chinese, of some description, and one you make Indian.[17]

MTV splits its beams into a North and South beam as well. The significance of this retreat from a pan-Asian STAR footprint as originally envisaged by STAR's Hong Kong promoters becomes evident when one considers the additional costs involved in customization, or what Carnegie refers to as making "culture-specific."

ii) Creative Autonomy to Local Employees and Local Partner Firms

It has been suggested that the unfamiliar local cultural-linguistic environment confounds the standardizing tendencies of global firms by intensifying the inherent uncertainty "over the precise ingredients of a best-seller formula."[18] There are few other courses of action available to corporations for whom the local terrain is unfamiliar and fraught with the danger of a potential cultural *faux pas*. As a coping strategy, creative production is decentralized to local employees or 'out-sourced' from local partners.

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[17] Andrew Carnegie, General Manager - India, STAR T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 25, 1996.

[18] Paul Hirsch, "Processing Fads and Fashions: an Organization-set Analysis of Cultural Industry Systems," *American Journal of Sociology* 77 no. 4 (1972): 644.

a) *Traduttore/Traditore*: Role of Local as Translator/Traitor.[19]

As Stephen McDowell has pointed out, the strong film industry as well as a "reservoir of private distribution and marketing experience " that could be transferred to the television industry in India meant that local talent existed, and could be tapped.[20] The fact that several television executives, such as Noshir Desai, Shashank Ghosh, Ram Mirchandani and Sunita Chowla had backgrounds in advertising suggests that local managerial and creative talent was available. Similarly, Chandni Sehgal and Rakesh Sharma had previously worked in the print media. There also seemed to be indications of common educational backgrounds among executives.

Here, Jules Fuller's remarks highlight the importance of being in touch with the sensibilities of the audience for a show to be successful, a trait that clearly provides locals with an edge:

> Jaaved is a very talented guy who has been given a platform to work on. Shows like *Timepass* and shows like *Flashback*..[21] We couldn't have brought any show in that would have done the same thing that Jaaved has done. Because the shows are written from this office, by a guy who knows the humor, that knows the films, that knows the sensibilities of the audience, that's what makes it funny . . . And that's where it becomes successful, we created him here. That's how everything works.[22]

Jules Fuller gives credit to the local employees for creative aspects of the show, advocating a complete hands off approach from the content, which is left in the hands of the locals, whose 'culturally- appropriate' subjectivities allow them to encode commercially appealing programming:

> My background is production, fifteen years of production in England and Europe. And the first thing I did was to say, "Well, I'm not touching the production. If I understand these shows, you're doing it the wrong way.

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[19] I came across this interesting word-play in the following paper: Francois Heinderyckx, *Language as the Irreducible Impediment to Transnational Television Programmes*, paper presented at the Turbulent Europe Conference, London, July 1994, 12.

[20] Stephen McDowell,. "Globalization and Policy Choice: Television and Audiovisual Services Policies in India," *Media, Culture & Society* 19 (1997): 152.

[21] *Timex Timepass* and *Videocon Flashback*, to be more precise, which reflects the names of the sponsoring companies. See chapter 7 for a more detailed analysis of how media companies nurture institutional links with advertising sponsors.

[22] Jules Fuller, Deputy General Manager - India, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 15, 1996.

Because I'm not the audience." So Shamin's the creative genius behind the shows.[23]

b) Imagining the Audience[24]

'Imagining the audience,' what their tastes were like, what they would find appealing was an important role that local employees performed. These executives would never meet all the members of the audience, yet would spend much of their energy trying to attract and please them. This iterative relationship between the delivery of cultural products and the market information that feeds back to devise strategies regarding future delivery thus operates within the logic of voting decisions as to what people 'want' within a pre-determined menu of choices.

Given this relationship with them, characterizations of the audience were illuminating. Ram Mirchandani of Modi-New World referred to "audiences which are starved for good programming." Manish Popat of UTV likewise felt that pressing audience needs had to be filled, claiming that "people are dying, they're hungry for Indian software." Many executives felt that the audience was not receptive to dubbed programming,[25] that they thought animation was for children,[26] and were both astute and quality-conscious.

Zee T.V. executive Nadeem Ansari was eager to dispel any lingering misconception about the audience being stupid:

> G.P.: You have a very loyal audience, easy to reach?
> N.A.: The audience is very very loyal, I mean, they may be very loyal, but they're not stupid. Sometimes, we have to take off adverts because the audience doesn't like them.[27]

Likewise, MTV executives Rakesh Rao and Parul Gupta corroborated Noshir Desai's assurance that the audience was very savvy and 'hip' and not dazzled by a foreign label.

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[23] Jules Fuller, Deputy General Mgr. - India, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 15, 1996.

[24] With respects to Benedict Anderson and Ien Ang.

[25] Rajiv Sahai, Director, CEO, Modi Entertainment Gp., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, May 6, 1996; Meenakshi Madhwani, Managing Director, Ambience SpaceSellers, interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 22, 1996.

[26] Sunita Chowla, Manager, Production & Dubbing, Buena Vista T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 19, 1996; Rajiv Sahai, Director, CEO, Modi Entertainment Group, interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, May 6, 1996.

[27] Nadeem Ansari, Head of Air-time Sales, Zee (U.K.), interview by author, tape recording, London, September 27, 1995.

> P.G.: People . . . they are not fools, just because we're an American brand. No, if you don't give us quality, which is equal to or better than what we were getting, then we don't want any. Just because it's got a foreign label, we don't have to buy it . . . they're very aware . . .
>
> R.R.: And it's like, cases where they're more hip. I mean we just consider Bombay as being the kind of urban capital, and see a lot of hip people over here, attitudes and values, Western values, but that's entirely wrong, in fact the entire country is like that. Only in Bombay you have a higher, the percentage, the density is kind of more out here.[28]

This image of hip people all over India, harboring Western values is probably comforting for a niche channel like MTV, which sets out to exclusively cater to this audience. More interestingly, here were Western values being discussed by a local employee of MTV, a company that had been criticized in the Indian press for spreading such values. I wondered if he thought of himself as hip and Westernized as well. When I asked Chandni Sehgal, the CEO, whether she considered herself part of the target audience that MTV was aiming at, she said that she did, at least till her next birthday, when she would turn 35. This is an interesting case of self-identification with the audience being 'imagined' and 'delivered.' This, then, is the utility of the local collaborator to her partners, because for her 'imagining the audience' is as easy as looking in a mirror.

It was somewhat puzzling that so many executives felt the need to point out the savviness of the audience, but it reminded me of the pithy maxim expounded by David Ogilvy, 'father of advertising' who said that "the audience is not a fool, she is your wife." Perhaps investing the audience with critical skills is akin to suggesting that they are not exploiting vulnerable, easily duped populations. This may be a way to refute what John Downing refers to as the "complete mental plasticity"[29] that is implied by discourses of cultural imperialism, which seemed to color much of the criticism in the press about the effects of television. Rather than accept any responsibility for the alleged ill-effects of television, these executives are instead issuing a *caveat emptor* to the audience, which, after all, is no fool. Yet, the provision of localized programming itself points to the resilience of audience loyalty to familiar and local forms of programming, attributes that television executives ignore at their own peril.

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[28] Rakesh Rao, Assistant Manager, Events & Marketing, MTV interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 18, 1996.

[29] John D. H. Downing, *Internationalizing Media Theory: Transition, Power, Culture*, Sage: London, 1996, 223.

iii) Culturally Specific Made-for-Market Programming. Local language, cultural iconography and local humor are three distinguishing features that serve to set such localized programming apart.

a) Local Language

Global companies recognize that audiences will invariably "prefer information content encoded in its own language"[30] but forms of catering to this preference can be seen as a continuum, with simple dubbing or sub-titling of existing programming into the local language at one end, and original programming in the language of that particular market at the other.

According to Ronald Screwvala, Director, UTV, a software production company, advertising Television Rating Points (TRPs) for Hindi programming are about ten times those for comparable English programming. He attributes this to "just - language, and the cultural barrier that comes with language."[31]

The following Table 6.1 shows that the top rated programs in November 1995 were all Hindi programs.

Table 6.1. Average Television Rating Points (TRPs) in All 15+ Years Audiences in T.V. Homes

Channel	Program	Delhi	Bombay	Calcutta	Madras
DD 1	*Chandrakanta*	67.2	44.8	48.0	47.5
	Alif Laila	52.2	33.2	43.5	09.3
	Friday Film	60.8	43.8	69.2	52.3
DD 2	*Shri Krishna*	62.0	37.5	56.8	45.3
	Superhit Muqabla	53.5	37.0	59.8	51.0
	Mahabharata	50.5	31.3	53.8	26.0
Zee	*Antakshri*	09.6	15.5	-	00.5
	Philips Top 10	08.1	15.7	-	00.3
	Banegi Apni Baat	08.0	16.5	-	00.2

Source: Doordarshan.

Hoskins and Mirus have described this barrier as a "cultural discount."[1] In a similar vein, Pendakur argues that unique language was one of the "cultural screens" with which the Indian film industry was blessed, "which offered a natural protection to the development of an indigenous film industry."[32] Collins has made a persuasive argument for the importance of language as a factor which contributes to the success or failure of traded cultural products.[33] Collins refers to English as "the language of advantage," anglophones being not only "the largest and richest world language community" but English being the preferred second language.[34] Wildman and Siwek suggest that populations with common languages constitute 'natural markets' for media products.'[35]

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[30] Richard Collins, "Trading in Culture: the Role of Language," *Canadian Journal of Communication* 19, no. 34 (1994): 389.

[31] Ronald Screwvala, Director, UTV, interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 11, 1996.

In India, while Hindi remains the dominant language, the 2% of Indians who speak English have indigenized its use, resulting in hybrid forms of linguistic expression that the international media companies have been quick to embrace. An interesting example of such linguistic adaptation is 'Hinglish.'

Channel [V] has championed the use of colloquial slang or 'Hinglish' in its programs, reflecting the patois of its young, urban viewers. Shamin Desai describes Hinglish as "not pure Hindi, it's not even street Hindi, it's just like Channel [V] has created a whole new brand of the English language." While it is debatable whether Channel [V] has 'created' Hinglish, it has certainly appropriated it to its advantage.

By choosing to portray the way its 'imagined' audience actually speaks, Zee T.V. effectively legitimizes the everyday discourse of the audiences that it seeks to attract. For instance, a refrain on a hit song by Alisha Chinai, a singer popularized by Channel [V] is "*Dil chahiye* that's made in India." (Wanted: a heart that's made in India). Audience culture is thus appropriated to best recreate television programming replete with referential signifiers, including iconography, discussed in the next section.

b) Cultural Iconography: "Holy Cows, Camels and Other Signifiers."

Culturally appropriate 'inputs' that go into localized programming include imagery that will be recognizable. Again, the local collaborator is an important ally to identify iconography that will evoke a response in the audience. Ed Sharples suggests that his role is "to show you where the things are, and to make sure you don't overstep the market, and to make sure you're not doing something blatantly and obviously stupid."

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[32] Manjunath Pendakur, *Indian Cinema: Industry, Ideology, Consciousness* (Chicago: Lakeview Press, forthcoming).

[33] Richard Collins, "Trading in Culture: the Role of Language," *Canadian Journal of Communication* 19 (1994): 389.

[34] Richard Collins, *Television: Policy and Culture* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990b), 211.

[35] Steven Wildman and Stephen Siwek, "The Economics of Trade in Recorded Media Products in a Multilingual World: Implications for National Media Policies," in *The International Market in Film and Television Programs*, ed. Eli Noam and Joel Millonzi (Norwood: Ablex, 1993), 23.

> You have to be in the country to get the images, and you have to have a local person saying, look, you're not going to a country and say, Dubai, and say, oh look, there's a camel, yeah. I must get that. Shashank, a camel, eh, haven't seen one of that one before. That's great, we'll put that in. But for Dubai, which is for the Arabs, they see camels every day. So Badat would say, look, don't put a camel in, it's blatantly obvious. So it's that kind of thing. You have to have, you bring in the production, the knowledge and the experience, and you have the locals help you do it, or do it. And then they can do it themselves later on.[36]

Most managers acknowledge that the locals know best, but occasionally even they need a little bit of guidance. Here, Jules Fulle recounts how he dissuaded the presenters of Channel [V] show *Jumpstart* from including a cow in the show. For most Hindus, the cow is sacred in an absent-minded sort of way, the object of benign neglect unless a threat of some sort serves as a reminder of its religious venerability. The show used a dinosaur instead, a creature whose extinct status would render it unlikely to provoke religious squabbles:

> I was just like, boys, sit down. Sit down. Think about what you're saying to me. You're going to put a cow on the show, and they all clicked at the same time, they went, ah, fine fine o.k., done.[37]

In a similar vein, Rodriguez reports that national advertisements aimed at Hispanics in the 80s made use of "national origin symbolism," with major groups each meriting "separate iconography: advertisements that targeted Puerto Ricans featured *salsa* music and cityscapes; for Mexicans and Mexican Americans, the music was *ranchera,* the landscape featured cactuses; for Cubans, cigars and palm trees."[38] The value of emblematic representation for national markets have long been recognized by advertising agencies in the business of selectively distilling cultural difference for re-insertion into localized messages. Yet there is arguably no cultural nuance that poses as much of a challenge as notions of what is considered funny. A discussion follows.

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[36] Ed Sharples, General Manager, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bangkok, July 19, 1996.

[37] Jules Fuller, Deputy General Manager - India, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 15, 1996.

[38] America Rodriguez, "Objectivity and Ethnicity in the Production of the *Noticiero Univision,*" *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 13 (1996): 63.

c) Local Humor

It's easy to be seduced by the cheekiness of some of Channel [V]'s tongue-in-cheek offerings, and their playful appropriation of India's own kitschy cinematic traditions. Watching clever caricatures of familiar Indianisms one is reminded of Raymond William's analysis of how popular commercial entertainment selectively incorporates elements of audience culture into pleasurable products that are then offered back to audiences.[39]

Channel [V] has been extremely successful in soliciting the assistance of local employees in this endeavour. 'Campy,' self-referential humor encourages the audience to share in an 'inside' joke and contains criticism by including the audience. In the *Sony Yallah* promo Channel [V] refers to itself as a 'cultural imperialist,'[40] and in the 'old geeks' promo, the man suggests that despite Channel [V] having incited the ire of the *Mahila Mandal* (Women's Committee), it still gave him a "good bowel movement" to watch it.[41] Channel [V] is actually acknowledging that many people think it is a bad influence, and it is encouraging the audience to see for themselves how absurd that notion is by caricaturing the critics.

The blending of influences from local and global sources is seamless, almost involuntary. Shamin Desai points out how Indian films have been tapped for creative inspiration for a character that is modeled after a Western crime-fighter like *Batman* or *Superman*.

> We have a whole stable of film directors which have made some of the most kitschy cinema that this world has ever seen, all in the sixties and seventies. And we've been kind of recycling stuff from there, the warped dialogue lines, the absolute absence of a coherent narrative. Based on that, we've made promos out of that, it's like, fantastic, we have a character called Aunty 303, who is a house-wife in the morning, and a crime-fighter at night . . . which is essentially a very Batman-ish, Superman-ish kind of character model. And that is what, we blend it with a lot of Indian spies, and Indian B movie cliches. So that works perfectly, a lot of characters work perfectly.[42]

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[39] Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

[40] This award-winning promo, made for the Dubai market, was eventually removed in the face of government criticism that it showed Dubai in a bad light. It is more fully described in Ed Sharples' quote in the following section on cultural sensitivity in this chapter.

[41] This promo, made by Shameen Desai, caricatures an elderly Punjabi couple and their earnest discussion of Channel [V]'s social impact.

[42] Shamin Desai, Executive Producer - India,Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 30, 1996.

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A significant effort of the international media companies is not only to 'insert' culturally proximate themes but to delete those which are likely to cause offence. The next section discusses the importance of cultural sensitivity.

d) Cultural Sensitivity[43]

The importance of cultural sensitivity is not lost upon STAR's executives, who have frequently taken pains to appease local sensitivities. In 1993, Newscorp issued a statement saying they planned to make STAR TV a service that "Asian families can enjoy in their homes and a service which governments in the region will find both friendly and useful." Gus Fischer of Newscorp stated that STAR TV is "acutely aware of the political sensitivities" across its vast thirty-six country foot-print, and would be working closely with local governments to avoid problems.[44] STAR demonstrated this concern when it edited profanity and even Australian vernacular out of a police miniseries, *Phoenix*, which was rebroadcast in Asia.[45]

There is no doubt that STAR TV has made concerted efforts to be culturally inoffensive to the host countries in its foot-print. Still, cultural sensitivity is a relative terms, and in some eyes, STAR TV can not try hard enough. Its very presence in Asian air-waves is an irritant. It would certainly appear that local-language programming as well as cultural sensitivity, which I argue is a form of localization, is a coherent strategy to counter criticism from cultural guardians and regulators who are concerned about the expanding repertoire of programming now available to Indian citizens. Again, if we view localization as an attempt to appear culturally proximate while minimizing the cost of doing so, cultural sensitivity, as evidenced by alterations to programming content and greater care to issues of audience receptivity is a way of localizing to the demands of the local media system. If the audience is uncomfortable with sexually explicit material, editing it out makes such programming appear culturally proximate and hence enhances the acceptability among the local audience.

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[43] A mis-step in China served to effectively remind Murdoch that being in the good books of national governments was critical to the continued operations of STAR TV in Asia. China was angered by Murdoch's declaration that satellite TV was an "unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere"[43] and threatened to ban STAR T.V. Mr. Murdoch told author William Shawcross that cutting off the BBC was critical to Star's acceptance in China. "They hate the BBC," Mr Murdoch said. "[Critics] say it's a cowardly way, but we said that in order to get in there and get accepted, we'll cut the BBC out."Chinese authorities are wary of all outside news coming into China but had been particularly vociferous about a BBC documentary criticising late Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung. Rupert Murdoch, "Dawn of the Convergent, Interactive Era." *Business Times*, 17 September, 1993; "Murdoch Concedes he Yanked the BBC to Placate Chinese," *Wall Street Journal*, 14 June 1994.

[44] Adam Dawtrey, "Euro High-rollers set to Join Murdoch's new Global Effort," *Daily Variety*, 7 September 1993, 1.

[45] Kevin Murphy, "Asians Resist a Western Media Invasion; As Murdoch Moves In, Concern Over Values and Revenues." *International Herald Tribune* (Hong Kong). 12 August 1993. Section: News.

Pre-censoring new programming to screen out objectionable content is a similar attempt at enhancing palatability. Several interviewees mentioned that the bypassing of cultural regulators and gatekeepers is an important goal. The two most important ways in cultural sensitivity manifests itself, at a programming level, is through avoidance of controversial local topics, and a focus on entertainment. This theme repeatedly came up in my conversations with executives. The first excerpt is from my conversation with Jules Fuller:

> J.F.:. . . if you want to know about politics, great, but you have to get it from somewhere else. We've got entertainment.[46]

Rao of MTV reveals that

> Most of the programming, across channels, it's very entertainment-based. We're not touching any touchy issues.[47]

That this is not a chance occurence but a "systematically cultivated" image is evident in this quote by Shamin Desai:

> We don't usually take anything that's controversial, we don't do anything with politics. . . If it's a youth channel, you're free to air (your) views as long as you don't offend anybody. We can't show any kind of cigarette consumption, alcohol, people smoking, we have very very systematically cultivated a very clean image of which we're proud of.[48]

In this context, it is interesting to note that MTV in Asia didn't show Madonna's controversial "Erotica" video, though it sister network in the U.S. did.[49] Don Atyeo, who was then with MTV, and later became Channel [V] head, explained that "[Erotica] is obviously designed to shock and outrage, and we're here to entertain."[50]

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[46] Jules Fuller, Deputy General Manager - India, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 15, 1996.

[47] Rakesh Rao, Assistant Manager, Events & Marketing, MTV interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 18, 1996.

[48] Shamin Desai, Executive Producer - India,Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 30, 1996.

[49] Marcus Brauchli, "Star-Struck: a Satellite TV System is Quickly Moving Asia Into the Global Village,"*Wall Street Journal*., 5 October 1993, 1.

[50] "The Madonna MTV Will Not Show," *South China Morning Post*, 9 October 1992, 25.

Ed Sharples noted how the 'cheeky irreverence' that Channel [V] programming displayed was always within certain self-imposed boundaries:

> We poked fun, ya, we poked fun at Indians so that they could laugh at themselves. And they'd never done that before. They'd never really done that before to the extent that we did it. And to the cheekiness. We were cheeky, we weren't offensive. We didn't touch on religion, or sex, or politics . . . . You don't need to, you're just going to ruffle some feathers.[51]

On occasion, the Channel [V] cheekiness did ruffle some feathers, as when the Dubai government decided that Channel [V] images were inappropriate:

> The *Sony Yallah* promo won the most prestigious award. But I actually had to take it off air . . . it was beautifully, beautifully shot. But the voice-over, it was in Arabic, but they had the script at the bottom in English, ya. And it was again poking fun, it was something like, "how lovely that the United Nations have finally borne fruit. Those cultural imperialists Channel [V] have given us our own *Arabic Top Ten Countdown*." Right, so it's quite funny, and a lot of the young Arabs they thought it really funny. And all the images were like gadgets, and kids running around, sitting under sun-lamps, it was all very nice, ya. I got a call from the government in Dubai, and they were saying "All you're showing, you're not showing modern Arabia, you're just showing stereotypes, deserts and camels and shit like that. You must show the high-rise, and you must show our free-ways and stuff like this" . . . So that's it. We had to change the voice-over. Change the script.[52]

Though direct government intervention as in this case may not be as common, government regulations serve to restrain the executives from areas deemed inappropriate. To most employees at Channel [V], the most visible reminder of this need to be culturally sensitive is the Standards and Practices (S&P) manual published by the Hong Kong Broadcasting Authority.

Jules Fuller, for instance, corroborates that the Hong Kong Standards and Practices for Channel [V] remain the more immediate external motivater behind the active eschewing of controversial content. Lack of advertisers interested in sponsoring controversial programming further helped to mark certain subjects as 'off limits:'

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[51] Ed Sharples, General Manager, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bangkok, July 19, 1996.

[52] Ed Sharples, General Manager, Channel [√], interview by author, tape recording, Bangkok, July 19, 1996.

> To the point where all the producers are saying, we want to do stuff on AIDS, we want to . . . we never really had a client doing stuff on AIDS because it's morally incorrect . . . Having said that, that's coming out of our Hong Kong Standards and Practices department, they're really tricky about our doing something like AIDS, can't show a condom.[53]

Meenakshi Madhwani from Zee T.V. further elaborates:

> M.M.: We are very clearly a Hindi entertainment channel . . . We don't cover religion at all, because that is a company decision, as well as we are governed by uplink out of Hong Kong, so uplink rules out of Hong Kong apply to us, and religion is a topic that one is not allowed to cover. As far as politics are concerned, we are interested in political reportage, but not having a political point of view, or a political standpoint, for a channel. So we report on political goings-on.[54]

Self-censorhip is quite evident on recycled U.S. serials such as *Valley of the Dolls* aired on Doordarshan, which is subjected to further scrutiny upon its arrival in India and relieved of any unsavory characteristics that might detract from its wholesomeness.

> S.C.: There's a separate company tie-up with New World for instance, and they release something called *Valley of the Dolls*, three times a week, on DD Metro. That I think we do our own censoring, we censor it before we send it, the amount of kissing, and things. We just know what they're going to accept and what they're not going to accept.
> G.P.: Right, why give them the trouble.
> S.C.: We just do it ourselves. 'Cause they'll do it for us.[55]

The above comments help us see attempts at cultural sensitivity as a form of localization, given that content that is deemed inappropriate in the local culture is omitted.

At Walt Disney, Sunita Chowla finds herself in the happy situation of not having to make any alterations to the squeaky clean family-oriented Walt Disney animation that Doordarshan censors readily accept:

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[53] Jules Fuller, Deputy General Manager - India, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 15, 1996.

[54] Meenakshi Madhwani, Managing Director, Ambience SpaceSellers, interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 22, 1996.

[55] Sunita Chowla, Manager, Production & Dubbing, Buena Vista T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 19, 1996.

> There's nothing to censor on these animated things. There's just basically animation . . . This is not live action, this is just all animation . . . Walt Disney, there's nothing to censor.[56]

We can see that the attempt to stay away from political controversy and to stress entertainment are way in which these channels hope to avoid controversy. Andrew Carnegie comments here on how STAR has self-selected a narrower role for itself:

> A.C.: We're not doing any political stuff right now. There's nothing we're doing has any controversial content in it whatsoever, because we don't. That's not what we're about right now.
>
> G.P.: And you choose to be a completely entertainment oriented program channel. Do you feel somehow that limits your impact or do you feel somehow that you might be missing out some important issues that need to be discussed?
>
> A.C.: We could certainly contribute to the political debate in the country, by having political shows, current affairs programs, stuff like that, but right now we don't want to do that.[57]

It is worth reflecting however, that attempts to be overtly 'ideology-free' actually serves to endorse the status quo in India of an affluent and entertained minority and a poor and under-served majority.[58] In an environment that encourages only those forms of diversity that are likely to pay, there is little grounds for optimism that a public sphere free of commercial agendas can emerge.

iv) Visibility to Local Artists

Encouraging local artists is yet another way in which localization strategies are operationalized into working practices, besides the earlier mentioned strategies of channel customization, providing creative autonomy to locals and making culturally specific programming.

Attempts at localization flatter viewers by seeking to share in an 'insider' cultural perspective. The threatening face of transnational intrusions is shielded by a veneer of familiarity and cultural sensitivity. Indian employees, and their soothingly local names and faces are thrust into the limelight, as proxies that the press quotes most often. Sharples explains:

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[56] Sunita Chowla, Manager, Production & Dubbing, Buena Vista T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 19, 1996.

[57] Andrew Carnegie, General Manager - India, STAR T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 25, 1996.

[58] Peter Shields and Sundeep Muppidi, *Integration, the Indian State and STAR TV: Policy and Theory Issues*, paper presented at the International Communication Association conference, Chicago, Illinois, 23-27 May 1996, 20.

> So we promoted Shashank, we promoted Shamin, we said these are the guys, I'm not. Fuck, I'm not doing it, these are the guys, Indian, ya, they're doing it. Like here, I'm not promoting me. I've got a Thai guy, who's going to be the face, who'll do all the press.[59]

In a similar vein, Channel [V]'s promotion of a 'Video Jockey (VJ) system' that parallels the Hollywood (and Bollywood) 'star system' appears to be a strategy to foster brand loyalty. Viewer identification with particular presenters is encouraged by naming shows after them: *Sophiya Rewind* and *Planet Ruby*, among others. Not unlike the satellite channels that they work for, these VJs have an air of hybridness about them. Ruby Bhatia of Channel [V] and Kamal Sidhu of MTV are both Canadians of Indian descent, Sophiya Haq of MTV was in Ed Sharple's words, a "half-Bangladeshi girl, who's basically from London."

Kretschmer and Klimis believe that encouraging what they refer to as "institutions facilitating social intercourse and cohesion"[60] such as fan clubs, fanzines, lobbies, discussion groups on the internet makes good business sense, and here we see how it is used to commoditize a valuable and carefully nurtured 'brand,' the VJ. One such event is the 'road-show,' a traveling marketing-cum-production opportunity where bands play to live audiences in different cities. These 'events,' which are taped for subsequent broadcasts, represent an important way of showcasing the 'talent,' or as Ed Sharples puts it, of "marketing the VJs."[61]

v) Local Programming Based on American Formats:

Much of what passes as local is merely Hollywood formats with an Indian twist. Here, Ed Sharples describes how a local form of cultural expression, Hindi film music, is appropriated by 'packaging' it within a standardized format that has worked in other markets:

> You try and put Hindi film music in a rock and roll environment. So, you show that in a count-down. You take a count-down structure, you get a count-down, twenty down to one, ya, we're at number nineteen, you've

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[59] Ed Sharples, General Manager, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bangkok, July 19, 1996.

[60] Martin Kretschmer and George Michael Klimis, *Managing Increasing Returns in Cultural Industries*, paper presented at the Research Perspectives on the Management of Cultural Industries conference, New York University, New York, NY, May 9-10, 1997, 14.

[61] Ed Sharples, General Manager, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bangkok, July 19, 1996.

> got, whatever, *Ama dekh*,[62] blah blah blah. You make nice, cool packaging, you put a sexy girl in there, speaking, you know, Hinglish, and you make it a fast-paced program. Ya, and you've got a count-down. And it worked. They liked it. So I just took Hindi film music, and replaced pop music with Hindi film music.[63]

Similarly, Disney uses formats "followed in a lot of countries across the world"[64] to recycle its animated library software.[65]

(b) Cosmetic Localization of Programming

It makes intuitive sense that the advantage for the global players lies in 'creating consumers' for the software that is the cheapest for them to supply, and to leverage the global apparatus that aids them in the capture of this local audience, such as distribution and hardware. Disney has stayed closer to this model, by supplying library software from its U.S. studio library for its Indian subsidiary to adapt in a rather top-down fashion. The following conversation is an interesting account of the process by which Disney products are sent to the Indian market. An executive in L.A. decides what is sent to India, and an executive in the Indian subsidiary is left to figure out what to do with it, and how to localize it to make it more relevant. The role of the executive in the subsidiary is not of a 'creator', but of an 'adaptor,' who makes marginal alterations to a finished product to enhance its local acceptability. The following suggests that Sunita Chowla, who works for Disney subsidiary Buena Vista has little autonomy in how material is chosen for dubbing.

> G.P.: . . . Why choose *Lion King*, rather than . . .
> S.C.: I don't do the programming at all.
> G.P.: O.K.
> S.C.: Somebody in L.A.
> G.P.: Can you give me a name?
> S.C.: I have no clue who that person is. We have a programming division, somewhere in L.A. They decide what's actally dubbed. And I have no control over that at all.
> G.P.: So you don't think it's driven by audience preferences . . . ?

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[62] "Look, Mom" the lyrics for a popular Hindi song.

[63] Ed Sharples, General Manager, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bangkok, July 19, 1996.

[64] Vineet Puri , Senior Business Manager, Buena Vista T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 26, 1996.

[65] See the section on "Imported Programming 'Linked' by Local Hosts" in this chapter for a detailed discussion.

> S.C.: It is, in a way. Like movies, they'll say, o.k. we'll send you a silent video or this is not a silent video. And sometimes we get a programming, and we don't have a clue what to do with it. So the marketing guys go to Doordarshan, they see it, if they think maybe it's going to sell in India they show it to their sponsors or they show it to Doordarshan, and they decide if it's going to do well, and then if they need it dubbed, or however they want it, then that's how they release it.[66]

One of the "marketing guys," Vineet Puri, corroborates the role of the local subsidiary executive as a match-maker between Disney library products and local audiences, generating ever more revenue-enhancing windows for library software:

> G.P.: . . . How do you gauge how a particular program gets chosen out of Disney's library? What you think will work? Where do you fit into the total picture.
>
> V.P.: . . . Depending upon the kind of stocks we're getting, our research department fills me in on . . . who watches programs in those slots . . . Based on research like that . . . we go back to the library and eventually pick up something which we feel is most relevant . . . pick out a slot, where there are children watching, or where there are people who speak English watching.[67]

Again, this employee has little say in what stocks he will get, his role being restricted to finding a 'window' for them, breathing new life into old programming. A new incarnation can be created relatively easily through cosmetic localization. Dubbing, sub-titling and linking programs with local hosts are three such manifestations.

i) Dubbing Imported Programming[68]

At the time these interviews were conducted, Disney had been pursuing a rather limited bid at local language programming, choosing to dub mostly animated fare from its existing libraries. While there is a market for English programming among the English-educated Indian elites in the metros (metropolitan cities), the programming is dubbed into Hindi for the majority of the country.[69] Vineet Puri, Senior Business Manager for Buena Vista Television explains how an animated series runs on two Doordarshan channels simultaneously:

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[66] Sunita Chowla, Manager, Production & Dubbing, Buena Vista T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 19, 1996.

[67] Vineet Puri, Senior Business Manager, Buena Vista T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 26, 1996.

[68] Indian viewers are somewhat intolerant of dubbed programming.

[69] As a result of the politicised Indian educational system, Hindi is often understood by other linguistic minorities as well.

> DD1 is a mass-based channel, and . . . I have to dub it into Hindi. That's the common language . . . And to provide people in Metros, who are predominantly English speaking . . . I run the English version. I'll give you the example of *Aladdin*, I run *Aladdin* simultaneously on the National Network, in the dubbed form, and on the Metro service, in the English form . . .[70]

Sunita Chowla of Buena Vista suggests that the pressure to dub into Hindi comes from advertising sponsors, who "generally don't want to sponsor English programs."[71] Audience acceptance of dubbing is very low, however. Rajiv Sahai of Modi feels that "dubbing is going to take a long time before it's really accepted."[72] Meenakshi Madhwani of Ambience believes that historically low exposure to dubbed product may contribute to low tolerance by Indian audiences to dubbed programming, an argument similar to that which has been put forward to explain why there is so little foreign programming on American airwaves.[73]

> See, the dubbed programmes is overseas product. Whether its Hollywood, England, or any other part of the world, it doesn't ever get the kind of response that original Hindi product gets. And the key difference is if you look at, say other South East Asian markets . . . they all have a large amount of Hollywood shows, which are dubbed in the local language and run. But on the other hand, India, historically, has not had to look at overseas product. Because India has had it's own product, and it's own product has been primarily in the area of films. So you've had these twelve hundred films being generated every year. India's films always find their way into television, so you always had enough product for television. So Indian audiences are not really in that sense familiar with that product.

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[70] Vineet Puri, Senior Business Manager, Buena Vista Television, interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 26, 1996.

[71] Sunita Chowla, Manager, Production and Dubbing, Buena Vista T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 19, 1996.

[72] Rajiv Sahai, Director, CEO, Modi Entertainment Group, interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, May 6, 1996.

[73] Colin Hoskins and Rolf Mirus, "Reasons for the US Dominance of the International Trade in Television Programmes," *Media, Culture and Society* 10 (1989): 509; Jean-Luc Renaud and Barry Litman, "Changing Dynamics of the Overseas Marketplace for TV Programming: the Rise of International Co-production," *Telecommunications Policy* 9, no. 3 (September 1985): 257.

> And don't react to it very positively. And if at all you put on a dubbbed programme, you end up getting a very very small niche audience.[74]

Of course, there are cost considerations that favor dubbing. The cost of dubbing is about $1,000 per half hour, compared to new programming, which as Table 6.2 shows, can range from between four and fifteen times that of dubbing, not including Disney animation:

Table 6.2. Cost Comparisons per Half-Hour of Programming ($1=Rs 35)

Company Name	Make ($)	Dub ($)	Make/Dub
Zee	4,000[*]	900[#]	4.0
Disney animation	10,000,000[+]	1,000[^]	10,000.0
Disney live action	12,857	1,000[~]	13.0
STAR	15,000[&]	(none)[@] ($857)	17.5
Industry average	3,658[**]	857[##]	4.3

Source: Interviews, Jardine Fleming Report.

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[74] Meenakshi Madhwani, Director, CEO, Modi Entertainment Group, interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, May 6, 1996.

[*] Andrew Carnegie, General Manager - India, STAR T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 25, 1996.

[#] Averaging Meenakshi Madhwani's estimate of dubbed costing 1/4 to 1/5 of live action. Meenakshi Madhwani, Managing Director, Ambience SpaceSellers, interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 22, 1996.

[+] Rajiv Sahai's response (CEO of Modi Entertainment Group) suggests that animation costs about 800 times that of live action. Rajiv Sahai, Director, CEO, Modi Entertainment Group, interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, May 6, 1996. An article in Newsweek, too set the cost of Disney's latest 77 minute animation film "Toy Story" at $30 m."High Tech in Toon Town." *Newsweek*, 4 December 1995, 46-48.

[^] According to Rajiv Sahai ($1000). Rajiv Sahai, Director, CEO, Modi Entertainment Group, interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, May 6, 1996.

[~] According to Vineet Puri ($1000). Vineet Puri ,Senior Business Manager, Buena Vista T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 26, 1996.

[&] According to Andrew Carnegie, General Manager - India, STAR T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 25, 1996.

[@] No dubbing on STAR, only sub-titling, acc to Rakesh Sharma. This figure is arrived at by taking a dubbing avg. of $857. {Tabassum Inamdar, *The Great Indian Media Race: Industry Review*. (Mumbai: Jardine Fleming Publications, 1995).}

[**] Average costs for hindi serials, movie-based programs, game shows, talk shows and news-based programs. Adapted from Tabassum Inamdar, *The Great Indian Media Race: Industry Review*. (Mumbai: Jardine Fleming Publications, 1995).

[##] According to Tabassum Inamdar, *The Great Indian Media Race: Industry Review*. (Mumbai: Jardine Fleming Publications, 1995).

The continued presence of dubbed programming in Indian television often reflect such cost-based realities. One can only assume that these over-ride audience preferences when programming decisions are made. In terms of functionality, sub-titling and dubbing are very similar strategies.

ii) Sub-titling Imported Programming:

According to Star TV Executive Rakesh Sharma, sub-titling allows the networks to expand into "the next demographic." Sharma reports that

> practically every single STAR TV film is sub-titled, and that we feel helps, because a lot of people are able to use the sub-titles, to relate to the film better. And it could be the case of someone who has just begun to practice English, is not using English as a means of communication at home, and hence may not use English as a means of entertainment. But he or she is able to relate to the film because they occasionally revert back to the sub-title if they miss a certain dialogue, or if they can't comprehend a certain kind of accent and so on. So it's being used more as an aid, more as a tool of some kind. But I would say that the viewership that is following the film purely on the basis of sub-titles would not be very high.[75]

Historically, the use of sub-titles to enlarge the multi-lingual audience base is a strategy that has been extensively employed by the 'Bollywood' film industry. The use of sub-titles has been especially prevalent in Indian film before the coming of sound. According to the 1927 Indian Cinematograph Committee, films often had subtitles in three or four languages. Northern Indian prints usually carried Hindi, Gujarati and Urdu sub-titles, whereas Southern prints might have Tamil, Telegu, and English sub-titles. According to Barnouw and Krishnaswamy, as each sub-title appeared "a rumble swept over the theatre, as people who could read proclaimed the words for those who could not. A few theaters had official readers" who stood and explained the scene to those who couldn't read.[76]

While dubbing and sub-titling tend to be somewhat intrusive, 'linking' by local hosts, dealt with in the next section, tends to be less noticeable as a means of recycling old programming.

iii) Imported Programming 'Linked' by Local Hosts

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[75] Rakesh Sharma, Network Executive Producer (India & Middle East), STAR T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 24, 1996.

[76] Eric Barnouw and S. Krishnaswamy, *Indian Film* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 43.

Many of the cheaper 'studio' shows that were being done in Hong Kong or Singapore were 'blue screen' shows. John Owen of Channel [V] refers to these dismissively as "very very basic, fundamental programs . . . which is basically VJs in front of some high-tech backgrounds, that's the lowest kind of show."[77] Both Channel [V] and MTV were doing less of these shows and trying to get more footage of actual people on the streets, through road-shows and other events that served as marketing as well as production opportunities.

The difference that a local host can make to the popularity of a show is suggested by Jules Fuller:

> On our Northern beam, international music wasn't selling very well at all . . . we were making programmes in the Southern beam in English, and putting them on the Northern beam in the Chinese beam and they weren't rating. So we put exactly the same program, exactly the same music, but we just put a Chinese veejay, doing the same script. And so, up went the ratings. It's little things like that.[78]

As Vineet Puri from Buena Vista suggests, Disney uses this format to make its animated library software more relevant:

> One of the programs that we run on Doordarshan, which my colleague Rita makes, is a format that is followed in a lot of countries across the world. Where the hosting of the program, it's a hosted program, which has half an hour program for instance, it's about ten or fifteen minute of hosting, and the hosting is done by a local team. So that programming is made relevant, it's . . . packaged in a way the presenter presents Disney to you.[79]

The foregoing instances of cosmetic localization is not grounds for a great deal of optimism for enhanced diversity of program offerings in international flows of television. Sunita Chowla's remarks about Disney's plans of global presence points towards a continued recycling of library software in the few remaining countries on the world map where Disney does not have a presence, opening opportunities for ever-more formerly 'deprived' third world audiences to share in the Walt Disney dream:

> S.C.: I think they're almost everywhere else in the world, and they wanted to target a third world country. Right now, they're hoping to get into

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[77] John Owen, Creative Director,Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 30, 96.

[78] Jules Fuller, Deputy General Manager - India, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 15, 1996.

[79] Vineet Puri, Senior Business Manager, Buena Vista T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 26, 1996.

> Pakistan and Bangladesh, and I'm hearing that they're hoping to get into Vietnam. So they just plan to get into the third world countries first . . . they're just trying to step in gingerly at this moment into the market. So they're just using whatever software that's already available.[80]

The real hope, then, comes from the presence of viable domestic producers who can provide an alternative to recycled programming. Audiences tend to 'forgive' lapses in programming proficiency if the programming relates to their lives. For instance, emerging evidence seems to indicate that when there is a trade-off involved between "slick" programming with high production values but not as much local relevance, and "rough at the edges" culturally proximate programming, the audiences have overwhelmingly chosen the latter. Ed Sharples elaborates:

> Localization works. Zee often is a crappy television channel. It's production values are low. It's graphics are bad, blah blah blah. But still, it gets watched much more than any other satellite channel. So it shows you what works.[81]

He goes on to attribute the success of Channel [V] in India to its relevance to the audience, despite its initially amateurish look:

> People were warming to it, because it wasn't made by *farangs*,[82] or whatever, and it wasn't made in Hong Kong. It was obviously Indian, ya, sometimes it was a bit rough around the edges and maybe it wasn't as massively slick and the amount of money put in as MTV had, because they could pull from resources in America, or Europe . . .[83]

Economists such as Wildman and Siwek, while acknowledging that audiences prefer local programming, tend to automatically equate the quality of cultural products with the cost of its inputs.[84] The foregoing remarks seem to suggest that this approach may have overlooked the importance of cultural factors such as relevance and familiarity in the audience's perception of programming 'quality.'

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[80] Sunita Chowla, Manager, Production & Dubbing, Buena Vista T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 19, 1996.

[81] Ed Sharples, General Manager, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bangkok, July 19, 1996.

[82] Foreigners.

[83] Ed Sharples, General Manager, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bangkok, July 19, 1996.

[84] Steven Wildman and Stephen Siwek, *International Trade in Films and Television Programs* (Cambridge: American Enterprise Institute/ Ballinger Publication, 1988).

CONCLUSION

Business strategies, spawned within relatively narrow considerations of cost and profitability, often have cultural ramifications that extend beyond the immediately obvious. As global corporations become increasingly central to the study of international media, traditional mass communication research must rise to the challenge of including them in the analysis. The rest of the paper discusses some such issues.

One can argue in the Indian context that business firms oblivious to or unconcerned about the larger implications of their decision-making can exacerbate inequitable relations of power, such as the privileging of large, wealthy cultural-linguistic communities at the expense of smaller, less wealthy communities. Whether unintended by executives preoccupied with the business of staying in business, or ignored as unproblematic by those who deem them undeserving of attention, such cultural consequences are nevertheless noteworthy.

Patently, the tendency of profit-oriented international companies to 'cream-skim' in the realm of localized production represents an instance of market failure. The ultimate limitations of localization become obvious when one realizes that localization means adapting to smaller and smaller, decreasingly profitable communities from whom profit-seeking firms walk away. The promise of global corporations purveying localized programming is a powerful one. Yet it is only in larger cultural-linguistic markets such as Hindi and Chinese that we see this 'customization' taking place. Smaller communities that are not as attractive are bypassed, and supposedly will have to make do with either state-supported or imported programming.

The emergence of a potential 'communication gap' whereby large linguistic communities are privileged at the expense of poorer, smaller communities seems imminent. Fiske discusses this tendency for the global corporation to "serve at best only those local cultures it can turn into market segments and only those voices within those cultures tht can advance its economic mission. This still leaves many populations whose cultural survival depends only on their own efforts."[85] Countering strategies need to be formulated to manage market failures such as 'cream-skimming', and reduce the consequent 'communication gap.' Turow discusses how the strategies of contemporary media conglomerates give preferential treatment to the more "attractive" consuming audiences, and the implications of the consequent information gap between "preferred and unpreferred" members of society.[86] I posed this question to Vineet Puri of Disney, who seemed to misunderstand my interest in the poorer (and hence invisible) sections of society, confusing it with the 'effectiveness' of television advertising:

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[85] John Fiske, "Global, National, Local? Some Problems of Culture in a Postmodern World." *The Velvet Light Trap* 40, (1997): 66.

[86] Joseph Turow, "The Organizational Underpinnings of Contemporary Media Conglomerates," *Communication Research* 19, no. 6 (1992): 703.

> G.P.: There's another issue here which is when you have a commercial system, some communities, let's say in India, they're the people who don't have purchasing power that advertisers are interested in, they may be left out of one's calculations when one is trying to make programming, so you end up getting a lot more programming aimed at the middle class and not any programming that is aimed at poorer sections of society which don't have any purchasing power really.
>
> V.P.: . . . The only disadvantage in television for a lot of people is that there is a spillover effect, a very substantial spillover, because if you don't want to get to a certain number of people, you want to get to some others, you still have to pay the price to get in. That's the kind of disadvantage some clients face. But in terms of cost-efficiencies of the value of the money spent, television is still the best medium.[87]

Vineet Puri's answer to my question reminded me of the rather obvious need for television marketing executives to safe-guard the interests of their multinational clients. To them, people who are unlikely to constitute a market are like uninvited guests to a wedding *baraat* (party): the show isn't really for them, but everyone knows they're there anyway. I suppose it is only to be expected that television marketing executives look at the world from the perspective of their clients, the advertisers. If the poorer, underprivileged sections of societies were paying their salaries, they would surely incorporate their interests as well. Given the current affiliations, the prospect of anyone tailoring any programming for non-consumers is rather remote, especially if the rapid proliferation of media channels by satellite pushes up demand for programming to fill channel capacity which is beyond the productive capability of local companies.

The following excerpt of my conversation with Jules Fuller serves to highlight the limits to which global firms are willing to go to localize to cultural-linguistic markets:

> G.P.: Let me ask you about who gets to have programming tailored to them. I think maybe the Hindi language is a huge market and the Tamil language is another huge market, but is anyone really thinking of smaller communities . . . Can commercial television ever really get to them . . ?

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[87] Vineet Puri , Senior Business Manager, Buena Vista T.V., interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 26, 1996.

> J.F.: There's two answers to that, there's the politically correct answer, and there's the financial answer.
>
> G.P.: And they're not the same, are they? I think I'll just take my cue from that.
>
> J.F.: . . . No, really, you want to try and cater to as many groups as you can . . . it's not the case of we're ignoring minority groups, but we've only got set amount of hours in a day that we can put stuff on. . . where do we go next. . . . We've talked a lot about breaking Channel [V] into three, four, twelve different strands. We'd love to be able to beam a northern Indian version and a southern Indian version and an international one in the middle. . . but then how many buttons are you going to get on your t.v. eventually[88]

This can be likened to an extrapolation of the assessment of "preferred and unpreferred" audience members to entire communities, whereby only 'attractive' cultural-linguistic communities who pass the stringent criteria of profitability undertaken by global firms are catered to, to the exclusion of others.

Fiske points out that "the sphere of consumption has become one of the key sites for the struggles over who controls social differences and whose interests they can be made to serve . . . capitalism is pliable (flexible) only for those social forces from which it can profit."[89] In India, one has seen that as channels proliferate, they have served to enlarge the space for commercial speech to promote products and images to middle and upper class audiences,[90] encouraging only those forms of diversity that are likely to pay. Thus a well-off minority will be catered to, while excluding religious and other minorities. Further, new satellite channels are likely to exacerbate the tendency for these companies to shun any serious coverage of social issues, which is marginalized within an entertainment-based format. International mass communications researchers need to voice their criticism of such an outcome if any change is to be expected.

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[88] Jules Fuller, Deputy General Manager - India, Channel [V], interview by author, tape recording, Bombay, April 15, 1996.

[89] John Fiske, "Global, National, Local? Some Problems of Culture in a Postmodern World." *The Velvet Light Trap* 40, (1997): 59.

[90] Peter Shields and Sundeep Muppidi, *Integration, the Indian State and STAR TV: Policy and Theory Issues*, paper presented at the International Communication Association conference, Chicago, Illinois, 23-27 May 1996, 20.

Economic News: What's the Deal?

Dutch audience's use and interpretation of economic television and print news

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Abstract

In this paper focus groups show that the public's relative disinterest in hard economic news is caused by the perceived gap between the issues covered and people's daily lives. Television programs are perceived to increase the tangibility of economic news. Also, trust in the accuracy of economic coverage was found to be related to people's confidence in the future state of the economy. The results furthermore suggest that people believe economic news does have more impact on others than on themselves.

Economic News: What's the Deal?

Dutch audience's use and interpretation of economic television and print news

Economics have always been closely interrelated with politics. In our modern post-Cold War society economic affairs largely seem to have replaced military power as the determining factor of a nation's international power position. Moreover, as the world economy has become unmistakably more interrelated in the past decades, increasingly slump or prosperity in foreign regions has impact on national economies as well. The state of the international and national economy, and especially the public's perception of this state, may therefore be of even greater importance for politicians in a democratic society than it used to be. The state of an economy, however, does seem abstract and not easily assessable for average citizens. We know that the media have strong impact on people's perception of reality, especially when this reality is beyond their personal experience, and that news stories can help people to organize their experiences by presenting a structured, summarized account of occurring events (e.g. McCombs & Gilbert, 1986). The structural complexity of economic relations and the increasing inter-relatedness of the world economy might even increase the mediating role of the mass media in this respect.

Average citizens, however, are not likely to rely exclusively on mass mediated information when judging the economic situation. People experience direct impact of prosperity or decline on their daily lives, for example in terms of spending power and employment. Such personal experiences are likely to affect people's perception of the economic situation in the first place. The state of an economy, however, is not exclusively determined by this kind of directly observable components. There are many other factors that have substantial impact but are less directly perceptible for average citizens, such as trading results, budgetary policy, and international business developments. It is therefore expected that people base their judgements about the economic situation in their own and other countries not only on their personal situation, but also on mass media content.

At the moment there is a still small number of studies that explore the relation between media coverage of economic affairs and public opinion. Present evidence suggests that economic media coverage does indeed have impact on people's opinions (e.g. Sanders, Marsh, & Ward, 1993; Kosicki & Becker, 1995; Gavin & Sanders, 1996; Gavin, 1998). The majority of available studies, however, focus on economic television news, whereas print media coverage for example received relatively little attention. In case of television, the complex nature of economic news was found to cause viewers difficulties identifying their own interests in the stories, which consequently had a negative impact on their attention for the coverage (Goddard, Corner, Gavin & Richardson, 1998). Although generally inclined to accept the truthfulness of economic facts offered in the news, viewers were also found to display skepticism concerning the accuracy and reliability of presented economic statistics (Goddard et al. 1998). So far, little attention has been dedicated to the actual use people make of economic news coverage in the different media, their understanding of the coverage and the effects this has on their perception of the state of the economy. At this time, research teams in the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands are conducting a cross-national comparative study to investigate these issues —among several related matters. In this international study, it is investigated how audiences in three different cultures use economic news and perceive the economic situation. Furthermore, it is examined in all three countries how journalists and economic governmental experts perceive the economic situation, and what they consider the most important economic issues. An additional topic that will be addressed for the journalists is the sources they depend on in producing economic news. The design of the international study allows a comparison of the different groups (the public, journalists, and economists) within and between countries. Such cross-national comparison is important in the light of the increased internationalization of modern economies: cultural differences may affect the production, reception and interpretation of economic news. This paper deals with the Netherlands as a single country and it presents the first results of focus group sessions that were held to gauge the media use behavior and the opinions of Dutch citizens in relation to the economy and economic news. The main purpose of the focus group sessions was to determine to what extent and how average citizens use the mass media to form an opinion about economic affairs.

Methods

Three group interviews were conducted in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, in December 2000, with on average 7 participants in each session (N=21). As stated above, the economy in principal affects all citizens' daily lives. The focus group composition therefore aimed to represent roughly a cross section of Dutch society. Participants were recruited through a mini ad in the Saturday editions of three national Dutch newspapers and they were paid 50 DFL (approximately US$22) for their participation. The ad invited people to participate in research at the Communications Science Department of the University or Amsterdam; it did not state anything related to economic news. In total, over 40 people responded. No specific criteria were applied to select the participants: the first 24 individuals that called were invited to participate. Finally, 3 individuals were not able to be present: two due to illness, and one because of busy traffic. Participants had very diverse professional backgrounds; they were for example housewives, primary school teachers, pensioners, self employed, and people entitled to welfare. Nine respondents were females and 12 were males. Their age varied between 24 and 77 years and the average age was 41,5 years. Nobody worked in market research, and none of the respondents had participated in focus groups during the past year. A trained moderator in the final stage of her Masters study in communication sciences conducted the sessions in cooperation with a Ph.D. candidate. All three sessions were tape-recorded and then transcribed.

For the purpose of our study (see above) we had to address the following themes:

1. Media use behavior in relation to economic topics: which media are used to find out about economic issues and what does economic news mean to people?
2. Estimation of the comprehensibility, appeal, accuracy and reliability of media coverage of economic affairs
3. Perceived current and future state of the national and international economy in relation with media use patterns
4. Perceived causes and consequences of economic prosperity or decline in relation with media use patterns

The transcripts of the sessions were systematically content analyzed on three different levels, starting on the macro level and gradually descending into the micro level. First, the most important themes and issues that were addressed in all three groups were identified. Next, it was examined how the groups dealt with those issues and which standpoints prevailed. Then, the analysis concentrated on individual participants and it was determined whether it was possible to deduce opposite or characteristic views from respondents' utterances.

Results

The results of the focus group sessions call attention to four issues, which will be discussed below.

(1) Hard economic news generally does not attract people's attention

Despite the fact that the major part of the participants perceives economic affairs as important, none of them mentioned economic news when asked for the topics in the media that have their special interest. Two respondents even expressed explicitly that they never read or watch economic, financial news. A frequently heard reason for the low interest was that economic news was too complex due to the use of economic vocabulary and jargon. Economic news is highly associated with rates of exchange and market-reports. This kind of hard economic coverage is not at all salient to many people, particularly not to those that do not invest in stocks and shares. Ronald, a 32-year-old social worker said for example:

> -"Always the twaddle about shares. It's just like gambling: a big bucket shop for people who have a lot of money. If they want to do that, that's fine with me, but I don't find it interesting at all."

However, not all the economic coverage leaves the public indifferent. Some respondents indicated that they liked to watch television programs or read articles that enabled them to compare their own economic, financial situation with other people's situations. Others mentioned examples of television programs they liked, which approached economy-related topics from a human-interest perspective. Anita, a 38-year old sculptress gave the following example:

> -"...there was this program about an organization that gave credit to poor people in India who then could buy a cow they could milk (...) like that they would earn some money which they could invest again. After some time you saw that they owned a real little business and they were much better off (...) When I saw that, I started thinking. I found it really interesting, because it was so much tied up with their daily lives. But that's an aspect you do not find in many programs."

Furthermore, respondents were most interested in the outcomes of economic policy debates that potentially affected their own financial situation, such as changes in the system of taxation, or pay-as-you-drive bills. The decision-making process preceding such outcomes did not interest the greater part of our respondents and several of them indicated that they find such coverage rather incomprehensible or even boring. Louke, a 66-year-old retired woman said for example:

> -"I start skipping the news when I cannot determine any longer who's right or wrong. Then I just tell myself: I'll hear it soon enough when the politicians have made up their minds."

Personal involvement increases people's interest in economic matters. As soon as there is a connection to their own personal situation, people try to keep up with economic news just like they try to follow other issues. Daoud, a 54-year-old self-employed market-vendor told us:

> -"... a couple of years ago the Asian crisis, that really concerned me, because I am half Indonesian. When you see how things start to change for the good again now (...) I follow that through newspapers and other media like CNN. I find that very exciting and interesting, because I hope to get my share of it as well."

Diana, a 30-year-old advisor at a housing society, remarked that what one considers interesting and worth reading changes in the course of one's life.

> -"Your attention shifts according to what concerns you at a specific moment in your life. For example, when I was a student I was very much interested in developments that related to scholarships and universities. Now I skip those kind of articles. I have a child now and that makes me much more interested in children's daycare."

(2) Economic television news is preferred because it is livelier and more convenient

Respondents rarely actively search for programs or articles that deal with economy-related issues; in fact, some people rather tried to avoid economic topics. Besides personal experiences, the daily television news was found to be the most important information source for economic issues for most participants. This is probably related to what can be called *forced consumption*: television news simply dishes up economic news nestled among other issues. Respondents indicated that they find it troublesome to zap to another channel when economic news is presented and then get back into the news report later on without missing other issues of the news. Consequently, they just watch the economic news as well.

Multiple respondents complained that economic news coverage —especially in the print media— was too complicated, too much figure-oriented, and required too much background knowledge. Hence, a majority of the respondents displayed a clear preference for television to stay informed about economic affairs. Television coverage was said to present economic issues in a livelier and more comprehensible way than the press. Moving images make television coverage more personal and attractive. Another reason why people favored television news was the time-consuming character of print media; television was regarded as a quick and comfortable way to stay informed about the most important news facts. Television news was furthermore perceived to be timelier than print media news. Diana, who does not have television said:

> "You really miss the faces. You can read a newspaper every day, and they do have pictures as well, but I notice that when I see television somewhere I think: Oh, so that is minister so-and-so. It's much more alive when you see a face along with it. Photos are less than television images (...) and you also feel that you are a bit too late with all the news. Most of it is publicly known the evening before."

Respondents who more frequently used the print media indicated that they not only preferred this to television in case of economic news, but also for news in general. They considered television news as too superficial, mainly because newspapers provided more detailed and profound background information. An important advantage of print media above television was the possibility to choose for oneself what to read and what to skip. Participants said that they liked the fact that it is easy to turn over a newspaper's leaves without reading an article or after just reading the headlines or a part of it. Reading headlines gave most respondents the idea that they were at least partially informed about what was going on. Sometimes an article in the print media incited respondents' interest in television coverage about the same topic. The other way round this was not the case.

A few respondents indicated that they also used the radio to stay informed about current economic developments. The diversity of radio coverage —news alternated with music— and radio's characteristic ability to react promptly to sudden and unexpected developments was highly estimated by these individuals.

Participants were generally aware of the fact that the media have to select among a huge amount of events available for publication. In particular television news was regarded as showing only a fraction of all possible events that could be covered. Especially some of the male respondents displayed interest to know what exactly was withheld from them and some indicated that they actively gather information from other sources such as governmental information services and Internet sites from professional news agencies. However, these people reported they rarely do this to find out about economic issues.

(3) Economic news, an unconsciously effective information source?

Participants' judgements about the present economic situation at first sigh seemed based on their own observations rather than on mass mediated information. Respondents noticed in their own environments that the expenditures on houses, travelling, and consumer goods have risen drastically, which was perceived as an important indicator for economic prosperity. Nevertheless, when speaking about the reasons for the increase, the media seemed to play a more important role. Two reasons for the perceived expenditure increase were frequently mentioned in all three sessions: (1) social pressure, which continuously incites consumption and (2) a large number of contracted mortgages and consumer credits. In both cases the media were perceived to affect *other* people's attitudes and behavior, but most respondents did not believe the media had any impact on themselves. First, the media were accused of boosting consumption by suggesting that material possession is necessary to gain and maintain one's prestige. Most participants asserted that they did not subscribe to this viewpoint, but that they noticed in their own environments that others did. Only two female participants admitted that they themselves experienced a fierce pressure from the media, especially from women's magazines, to consume ever more.

-"It's all in there as if (...) it makes you think that everybody thinks that you need those things (...) I remember that Easter used to be Easter. Then these articles started appearing saying: you need Easter Bunnies and Easter bouquets and so on, if you don't have them your child is short of something" (Louke, 66)

-"In the Christmas addition there was this Marcs & Spencer ad which said that you could buy a turkey for 87 guilders. Then I thought: oh, I must get one, I've never tasted turkey (...) but then I realized, I'm alone, what should I do with an eight-kilo turkey?" (Fleur, 24)

-"You can buy small pieces as well" (Louke)

-"It was just... I never thought about buying it and then I see it and I start thinking I need it." (Fleur)

Furthermore, the media were perceived to encourage people to negotiate heavy mortgages and consumer credits. Several individuals claimed that though they themselves would never consider taking out a heavy mortgage on a house or to spend more than they actually earn, they expected that other people would do so on the basis of the media's optimistic portrayal of the economic situation. The following excerpt of the discussion illustrates this:

> -"Oh yes, we are doing so well in the Netherlands, but I sometimes wonder if it really is like that. Is our salary enough to buy all those things or do we have to take a credit to pretend we're richer than we really are? Maybe the media even try to stimulate that, in that they hold out great hopes to us?" (Paul, 28)
>
> -"I don't know whether they really hold out great hopes, but there might be people who take all the positive information and then think: we must not fall behind and then buy more than they can actually afford." (Eric, 30)

(4) Trust in the media, trust in the future

Respondents' confidence in the future stability of the Dutch economic situation was found to be related to their confidence in the accuracy and veracity of media coverage of current economic affairs. Confident respondents, who saw no indication for economic decline at long or short notice, often based their expectations on the positive information they received through the media:

> "Last week there was this article in the newspaper: the baby-boomers are coming. If they are 60 and retire nobody will have seen anything like it before. They will dine out, travel, and buy expensive things. How old are they now, 50, 55? They've always earned a lot of money, they've paid their houses so they can play ducks and drakes with their money" (Louke, 66)

Naturally, the more pessimistic people were (e.g. the more convinced they were that the present economic abundance would not continue unceasingly), the more skeptical they were about the current prosperous image depicted by the media. Consequently, their impression of the trustworthiness of the media ranged from a critical view about the media's ability to be accurate to a profound distrust:

> "Objectivity does not exist. They try to be objective, by hearing both sides, but it goes through so many channels. It goes through the editors, the editor-in-chief, there's the reporter's own opinion, where does the information come from? The truth doesn't exist" (Ronald)
>
> "Oh yes, I also watch this lying bunch of storytellers…" (Mr.W., 77)

Conclusions

The focus group sessions show that economic news in general, and in particular purely factual, financial, and business oriented economic news, does not attract the attention of the majority of the audience. The main reason for the public's relative disinterest in hard economic news, is that many people experience the coverage as dull, and incomprehensive. An exception in this respect are news items that (1) deal with topics that have a direct relation with people's daily lives and financial situation, or which (2) provide the audience with a frame of reference to compare their own economic situation with those of other people. These findings are in line with the results of other studies, which have stressed that personal involvement in a topic affects the amount of attention people dedicate to media coverage about a specific topic (e.g. McCombs & Gilbert 1986; Goddard et al. 1998). Moreover, they are supportive of theories that suggest that the media play an orienting role for people in social environments (e.g. Schönbach & Becker 1995).

Second, although people rarely actively search for mass mediated information about economic affairs, in general they do have an idea about the state of the economy. These ideas are to a considerable extent based on personal experiences and observations, but people also refer to mass mediated information when speaking about the economy. This implies that they consciously or unconsciously do observe economic news. An indicator that there is indeed a relationship between economic news coverage and public opinion, is the fact that individuals who were most confident in the future prosperity of Dutch economy frequently based their judgements on positive mass mediated information.

The focus groups show that most economic news reaches the public when it is presented among other kind of topics in a daily news broadcast: for the sake of convenience viewers continue to watch. The daily television news appears to be not only an important, but also the most appreciated economic information source for most people. This preference emanates from the fact that television programs are perceived to make economic news more tangible, more lively and more comprehensive, especially in comparison to economic print coverage. However, television news is perceived as less exhaustive and less profound than print news.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from the results is that mass mediated economic news is expected to have impact on *other* people's behavior and attitudes, as opposed to one's own. It is assumed that other people will be disposed to spend more as a result of positive economic coverage, whereas people believe such media coverage does not have any effect on their own spending behavior. The media are also perceived to affect other people's attitudes toward material possession, and their willingness to negotiate mortgages and consumer credits. Again, our respondents did not experience such impact on themselves. These findings suggest that the third person effect (Davison 1983; Schönbach & Becker 1995) occurs when people judge the effects of economic coverage on themselves and on other people. The media are expected to have more impact on others than on oneself. The question remains, whether respondents overestimate media impact on others or underestimate media impact on themselves. Experimental evidence suggests that the former is the case (Lasorsa 1989). However, given the fact that respondents —at least in case of spending behavior— mostly based their judgements on directly observable actions of people in their own environments, it is suggested that the latter is the case here. After all, there is no reason to believe that people's willingness to participate in the study is related to their spending behavior: therefore, it is assumed that our participants in this respect do not differ substantially from people in their own environments. It is rather expected that economic media coverage is an unconscious information source for them: consequently, people might not be aware of the fact that they themselves are affected by it. However, especially in this case, another possible explanation should be considered as well: it may be so that admitting that economic news affects one's actions and attitudes as described would make one feel less virtuous. After all, it is plausible that attaching great value to material possession and buying on credit are evaluated negatively in Dutch society.

Discussion

In view of the small-scale character of the study presented in this paper no attempt has been made to draw generalizing conclusions. Although focus group sessions are an adequate and highly informative method to explore people's experiences and perceptions of their environment, the method also has limitations. Certainly, in a group conversation some individuals may be more active and more dominantly present than others. Nevertheless, this is the case in ordinary conversational settings as well and it does not mean that the contributions of less active participants are less valuable. Focus group interviews may be considered artificial imitations of normal group conversations, this however is not a severe problem for the purpose of the described study; the news has always been a rewarding subject for daily conversations among people. A more serious problem is that, as in all situations where people communicate face to face, social desirability may prevent people from expressing their real opinions and thoughts. Particularly when discussing media impact on oneself and others, a more anonymous setting, or even completely different, more experimental, methods would be desirable.

Despite its limitations, various tentative conclusions could be drawn from the data presented here, especially because of the illustrative character of the gathered material. Still, the first results presented in this paper, give rise to a number of other questions future research should address. To what extent, for example, are the mass media an unconscious information source for economic issues, and is it true that people underestimate media impact on their own economy related attitudes and behavior? As described earlier, the presented results are the first findings of a more comprehensive cross national comparative study. When all material from the international research project will be available, a more in-depth comparison within and between groups and countries will be allowed. Only then, we will be able to find out more about the differences and similarities between publics, news producers and sources in different cultural settings.

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Int'l

(11,560 words)

Prospects and limitations of world system theory for media analysis: The case of Middle East and North Africa

Shelton A. Gunaratne

Abstract

This essay points out the potential of applying the world system theory to global communication- and media analysis as a "humanocentric" enterprise covering both the present and the past. It attempts to identify the world's core countries using a weighted index of a country's size of the economy (GNP) and of the exports. It applies the index to rank order the countries in the Middle East and North Africa region to ascertain the likelihood of a core-periphery structure within the region itself and to test whether media freedom and media penetration follow the pattern of that structure. It concludes that such symmetry is unlikely to exist in a regional core-periphery configuration where the scores separating the countries are relatively negligible. It also suggests that under informational capitalism, economic power blocs should replace individual countries as the unit of analysis for configuring the global core-periphery structure.

Keywords: World system theory/ core-periphery/ Middle East and North Africa/ media freedom and penetration/ new media/ human rights/ Human Development Index/

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Introduction

Considering that the digital revolution has brought about a highly interconnected global economy, can the world system theory serve as a framework for conducting communication research at the global or regional level? If so, what criteria are pertinent to classify the world into the center-periphery structure that the theory presumes to exist? Can a classification of countries (or economic blocs) based on competitive capital accumulation, as presumed in the world system theory, serve as a predictor of old-media and new-media penetration, media freedom and commitment to human rights?

Historian William McNeill concluded that if the notion of a world system were tied more explicitly to a communication network and if more attention were paid to changes in that network, the notion of a "world system" would gain greater clarity and power (Frank & Gills, 1993, p. xiii). Whether the theory is sound historically has been debated over more than a quarter century resulting in subsequent refinements. McNeill's conclusion shows that communication researchers can play an important role in tracing the dynamics of communication networks in relation to the world core-periphery structure. This paper uses secondary data to explore the possibilities of classifying the world into the center-periphery structure and to test the hypotheses implicit in the final question: that media penetration, media freedom and commitment to human rights follow a symmetrical pattern within the core-periphery continuum. This hypothesis is consistent with the presumptions of the Eurocentric dominant paradigm, which identified mass media as the "great multiplier" associated with economic development (or capital accumulation) and political participation, a liberal interpretation of which should include concerns with civil and political rights.

For this study, the operational definitions of the variables were as follows:

- World core-periphery continuum: the rank order of countries based on a weighted score of a country's gross national product and share of exports as explained in Footnote 6.
- Old-media penetration: the daily newspaper circulation and the number of radio and television receivers per 100 inhabitants.
- New-media penetration: the number of telephones and personal computers per 100 inhabitants and the number of Internet hosts per 1,000 inhabitants.
- Media freedom: the scale of freedom available to print and broadcast media based on laws and regulations, political pressures and controls, economic influences and repressive actions that affect media content. The indicator used was the composite score, zero through 100, assigned to each country by Freedom House in its 2000 press freedom report[1] (Sussman, 2000).
- Human rights commitment: the scale of commitment as reflected by the number of human rights instruments ratified by a country. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 1999) has highlighted eight selected instruments. The indicator used was the percentage of the instruments ratified by each country.

The Core countries are the economic powerhouses of the world. The dominant paradigm associates a high level of mass media penetration and freedom, as well as political participation, with those countries. If the world's Periphery also had a core-periphery structure, then the "small c" core countries should also be ahead of other countries in that structure on the identical variables. Therefore, these variables are compatible elements (not "apples and oranges") derived from the dominant paradigm that merit examination through the world system theory perspective.

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[1] A reviewer of this manuscript questioned the validity of the Freedom House data thus: "The organization has a long and sordid historical connection with the U.S. press lobby in whose interest it is to constantly find the U.S. press as the 'free-est' in the world. Freedom House almost single handedly led the charge in the '70s and '80s against a call from developing countries for a more equitable global distribution of communication resources. Freedom House is a political organization, not an independent evaluator of 'press freedom.'" In the 2000 survey, Freedom House ranked 14 countries ahead of the United States. The reviewer's reference may be to the World Press Freedom Committee. The author has not found an alternative set of press freedom data considered less controversial.

First, this paper explores the potential of applying macro theory, particularly the Frank-Gill interpretation of the world system theory, for investigation of global communication phenomena. It attempts to devise a method for placing the countries or economic blocs in the core-periphery continuum—an area that has received little attention. Second, it applies that method to configure a core-periphery structure in a peripheral region (viz., the Middle East and North Africa) that once contained world centers before the emergence of European domination. Third, it tests the research hypotheses within the regional core-periphery structure. Finally, it discusses the problems and prospects of applying the world system theory to analyze communication phenomena.

Need for Macro Theory

Frank and Gills (1993) have argued the case for applying the world system theory across disciplines because it provides a humanocentric alternative to the systematic distortions of Eurocentrism. One could see "a common river and unity of history in a single world system [that is] multicultural in origin and expression" (p. 17). They have shown the applicability of this approach to the study of political geography, development studies, gender-ethnic-and race relations, international relations and international political economy, among others.

Although micro-level and mid-range theories have their uses, a clear need exists to use and refine macro-level theories in the age of globalization. Thus international communication research fits into the Frank-Gills approach because it enables scholars to dissect the reality of the world as an interconnected unit. Galtung (1993) lamented:

> Surprisingly little is known about the world, geo, gaia, as one economic system. Liberal economics is the economics of countries (national economics, Volkswirtschaftslehre in German—VWL) or the economics of enterprises (business administration;

> Beltriebswirtschaftslehre in German—BWL); and their relations. Marxist-Leninist economics is the economics of class relations, within and among societies, and is more global. Liberal economics focuses on growth, Marxist economics on distribution. Both are necessary, neither of them sufficient to answer the key question: how is the world doing, seen as one country, one enterprise, one class? (pp. 33-34)

Frederick (1993) classified macro-level theories into four types: 1. Political economy, 2. Systems, 3. Geopolitical and environmental, and 4. Power and international communication. Within the political economy framework, scholars have used three approaches: structuralism and dependency, Marxist, and liberal-economic and modernization. Systems theories, which owe much to cybernetics, the systematic study of communication and control in organizations, are exemplified in approaches such as those of the integration theory, which examines the volume of interaction between and among political entities, and the regime theory, which examines how regimes such as the WTO and IMF operate. Geopolitical theory looks at the political consequences of geographical variables, such as population, communication and information; and environment theory is explicated in approaches such as memetics that applies biological models to the evolution, spread, and persistence of ideas, within, between, and among cultures. Theories of power and international communication include the realist approach, which study power in international relations, and the idealist or normative approach.

Baran and Davis (1995) have classified the macro-level political economy approach—the Marxist and, presumably, the structuralism and dependency approaches—under the rubric of critical cultural studies. They have placed McLuhan's (1964) vision of the global village also under the same rubric. They refer to the systems theories of communication processes as limited-effect paradigms that fall into Lazarsfeld's administrative research category (Lazarsfeld, Berelson,.& Gaudet 1944) because "they are best at explaining and controlling the status quo, not in discovering methods for transforming it" (Baran & Davis 1995, p. 271). They identify critical cultural studies as "heuristic," but they recognize that this approach provides "a useful challenge to mainstream media theory" (p. 339).

Considering the multiplicity of approaches, Frederick (1993) called for an integrative theory of global communication that could consolidate the many partial theories, accommodate their differences, harmonize their similarities, and thus explain and predict "global communication phenomena in a unified way" (p. 208). The problem with devising an integrative theory, however, "is that there are many types of communication on the international level," as well as "many disciplines contributing important theoretical statements about global communication" (p. 208). Mowlana and Wilson (1990) also have called for a "dynamic paradigm that can take the social, economic, political, and structural variables into account" (p. 91).

Wallerstein (1974) conceptualized a world-system as a social system that has "boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence" (p. 347). He said that conflicting forces held it together by tension, and tore it apart as each group sought eternally to remold it to its advantage. It had the characteristics of an organism. Core states and peripheral areas constituted a world-economy. Semiperipheral areas, a necessary structural element in a world-economy, existed "between the core and the periphery on a series of dimensions, such as the complexity of economic activities, strength of the state machinery, cultural integrity, etc." (p. 349). A hierarchy of occupational tasks characterized a world-economy, where "tasks requiring higher levels of skill and greater capitalization" were reserved for higher-ranking areas (p. 350). Wallerstein insisted that the modern world-economy was, and only could be, a capitalist world-economy, where the bourgeoisie claimed to be the universal class and sought to organize political life to pursue its objectives. Within a world-economy, state structures were relatively strong in the core areas and relatively weak in the periphery.

Wallerstein (1974) applied the term world-economy to describe the widespread economic links that European colonialism had fostered in the late 15th and early 16th century.[2] Frank and Gills (1993) have attempted to document the thesis that the contemporary world system, the motor force of which is the process of capital accumulation, has a long history. Their "humanocentric thesis" challenges Eurocentrism: More specifically, their thesis asserts that "the contemporary world system has a history of at least 5,000 years"; and "the rise to dominance of Europe and the West in this world system is only a recent –and perhaps a passing—event" (p. 3). The thesis is based on five observable components of the world system: the world system itself, capital accumulation as its motor force, its core-periphery structure, the hegemony-rivalry alternation within it, and the phenomenon of economic cycles within it.

[Figure 1]

Thus a world-economy, viz., an economy in which capital accumulation proceeds throughout the world, prevailed long before the advent of the current Third Communication Revolution.[3] Castells (1996), however, makes a distinction between the pre-Information Age world economy and the cotemporary global economy. He says, "A global economy is something different [from a world economy]: it is an economy with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale" (p. 92). Castells argues that the global economy emerged as a result of the "new infrastructure provided by new information and communication technologies" (p. 93). The global information infrastructure (GII) has replaced national borders with "cyberspace" and enhanced the power of transnational capital over nation states to conduct global business at a velocity hardly imaginable before. Both Wallerstein (1974) and Frank (1993) agree on the "capitalist" characteristic of the world material economy. Both used structural theories to explain how the world works. Galtung and Vincent (1992) applied structuralism to explain the phenomenon of world communication heavily colored by "occidental cosmology" (p. 13). Moreover, structuralism was the framework that dependency theorists used to analyze the core-periphery phenomenon (Gunaratne & Conteh, 1988). Because economic power, enhanced by new technology, reflects the ability of states to compete in the world material economy, a structural division of the world based on economic criteria, such as the share of world exports, appears to be quite pertinent for analyzing how the world works.

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[2] Chitty (2000) has criticized the Wallerstein model because it emphasizes "the role of economics in world structuration and social change at the expense of culture" and because "it is not a model that is consistent with postmodern conditions" (p. 14). Chitty has proposed what he calls a "matrix model"—a political economy/cultural framework.

[3] Stevenson (1994) refers to "the development of printed language" and "the development of printing with moveable type" as the first and second communication revolutions (p. 317). The first revolution "ended the power monopoly of the elders who preserved and passed on the oral sagas and poems that contained the accumulated knowledge of preliterate tribes" while the second revolution "challenged the authority of church and crown and allowed the flowering of vernacular languages and, eventually, democracy" (p. 262).

Galtung (1980), who published his structural theory of imperialism in 1971, however, theorized the existence of five types of imperialism (or dominance) in the core-periphery relationships: economic, political, military, communication, and cultural. He said he had "no theory that one is more basic than the others, or precedes the others" (p.274). On the other hand, it is viable to argue on the basis of the Frank-Gill thesis that the global influence of the United States—the core of the Center countries—in the political, military, communication and cultural spheres would not have been possible had it not first established its economic dominance. The American economy expanded and matured at a remarkable rate in the decades after the War of 1812. By the late 19th century, the United States had become a formidable economic power. In 1877, the annual value of U.S. exports—exclusive of gold, silver, and re-exports—was about $590 million. By 1900, it had increased to $1,371 million (Encyclopedia Britannica). Thus economic dominance can indeed be more basic than the others. Economic success enabled the Four Dragons, also called "the China Circle" (Castells, 1996, p. 109), to reach the level of Asia's semi-periphery.[4] (However, as anti-Communist bastions, they had the political and military backing of the United States to achieve such economic success.)

Galtung (1980) explained his structural theory thus: "The world consists of Center and Periphery nations; and each nation, in turn, has its centers and periphery. Hence our concern is with the mechanism underlying this discrepancy, particularly between the center in the Center, and the periphery in the Periphery" (p. 261). He described the phenomenon of the Core-Periphery inequality as a major form of structural violence. Disharmony of interest existed between the periphery in the Periphery and the periphery in the Center while harmony of interest prevailed between the bridgeheads at the center in the Periphery and the center in the Center. Galtung asserted: "But the basic idea, absolutely fundamental for the whole theory ... is that there is more disharmony in the Periphery nation than in the Center nation" (p. 265). Galtung's structural formulation placed within the Frank-Gill thesis provides a plausible construct upon which to build a global theory sans the bias of what Frank (1993) calls ideal-"isms" of the right or the left.

The basic premise of dependency/world-system theory has been the focus of the work of Barnett, Jacobson, Choi and Sun-Miller (1996), who examined the global telecommunication network structure, and the structure of physical communication—trade volume, mail, etc. Their examination of telecommunication indicators such as system density, connectedness, centrality and integrativeness revealed a similar structure for the network at three points in time. The results supported the basic premise of the dependency/world-system theory "that position in the world communication system affected a country's economic and social development" (p. 40). A group of Western industrialized countries were at the core; and most developing countries and the former Soviet Union were at the periphery. Barnett et al. found a similar structure in the international transportation network. Their extended research examines international computer networks as well. Various other researchers (e.g., Bollen, 1983; Brams, 1966; Breiger, 1982; Chase-Dunn, 1975; Smith & Nemeth, 1988; Snyder & Kick, 1979) have also analyzed aggregated cross-national data to test the dependency/world-system theory. Chang (1998) used the world system perspective to identify the possible determinants that might affect the structure and process of the international news flow and coverage. A major problem for researchers using this theoretical perspective is the difficulty of gathering global data showing dependency.

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[4] WTO (1999) reported that in 1998, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan were the 11th, 12th, 14th and 15th largest exporters in the world merchandise trade. In world trade in commercial services, Hong Kong ranked

Frank and Gills (1993) have observed that the trinity of core-periphery, hegemony-rivalry, and ascending-descending (or A/B) economic cycles has been a recurring phenomenon of the world system. They have tentatively traced this trinity from the Bronze Age (3000 B.C to 1000 B.C.) through the Iron Age and classical periods (1000 B.C. to A.D. 500) and the medieval and early modern periods (A.D. 500 to A.D.1500) to the modern world system period (A.D. 1500 onwards). Figure 2 traces the cyclical shifts across the world before the Christian era.

[Figure 2]

The application of the world system theory for international communication analysis requires the identification of the core-periphery structure of the world at any historical juncture on the basis of competitive capital accumulation.[5] The obvious criteria relevant to measuring the economic power of countries in the contemporary world are the Gross National Product (expressed in U.S. dollars using the Atlas method or in international dollars using the purchasing power parity method), the GNP per capita (Atlas), the GNP per capita (PPP), and the share of world exports in merchandise and services. The Atlas method uses a three-year average of exchange rates to smooth the effects of transitory exchange rate fluctuations. The PPP method uses factors based on the International Conversion Program's most recent round of price surveys in 118 countries, as well as statistical models to account for those not in the survey, to derive a standard measure of real price levels across countries. An international dollar in the PPP method

10th; South Korea, 15th; Singapore, 17th; and Taiwan, 19th.

has the same purchasing power over GNP as a U.S. dollar in the United States. The top 10 countries under each of these criteria appear in the rank order shown in Table 1.

[Table 1]

The 10 countries with the highest GNP (left column) accounted for 72 percent of the world economy in 1998. The 10 countries with the highest share of exports of goods and services (right column) accounted for almost 59 percent of the world exports in 1998. (The top countries ranked on the basis of per capita GNP include a number of smaller economies, which cannot qualify as core countries despite their economic strength.) A reality check shows that the core countries are those that occupy top ranks on both the left column (GNP or size of the economy) and the right column (exports). Although the capital accumulated through world trade (i.e., exports minus imports) is a constituent element of a country's GNP, the size of exports clearly represents a country's ability to expand into the global economy on a competitive basis. Therefore, it seems reasonable to allocate proportional weights of 55:45 to these two indicators (reflecting the performance of the top 10 countries) to generate an index that roughly reflects a country's capital-accumulation capacity in the global material economy.[6]

The data provide a clear idea of the world's super Center—the United States (see Footnote 6). With a score of 100 assigned to the United States, the next economic powerhouse is Japan, which gets a score of 72. Germany comes next with a score of 54. The sequence of the other economies in the top 10 in GNP and exports appears as follows: France (36), the United Kingdom (31), Italy (28), China (20), Canada (18), the Netherlands (16), Spain (14), Belgium-Luxembourg (13) and Brazil (12). The difficulty is in determining the cutting points of the Semiperiphery. Perhaps more scholarly discussion is necessary in this regard.

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[5] Some researchers have taken the view that the classification of countries as core, semiperipheral or peripheral in the world system depended "on the flows involved" based on "a priori substantive criteria" (Chang, 1998, p. 539).

[6] Such an index may give the top score of 100 to the United States and proportionately allocate scores for the other countries. I tried the formula {[(%GNP x 55%) + (%Exports x 45%)] x 10}, which gave the United States a score of 151. Making 151 equivalent to 100, the scores of other countries were multiplied by 0.66 (= 100/151).

A majority of the countries are in the Periphery because a few players have won the game of capital accumulation in the world material economy as reflected in their huge slice of the world GNP and exports. Most of the former Soviet Union has disintegrated into the world's Periphery as another phenomenon of the world-historical process accommodated in the alternating-economic-cycles aspect of the world system theory. Using our formula, Russia gets a score of 8 compared to Switzerland's 9 and Sweden's 7. Asia's Four Tigers are in the same league or better: South Korea (11), Hong Kong (11), Taiwan (9) and Singapore (7).

Galtung's (1971) structural theory states that the core-periphery structure prevails within each periphery country as well. Anderson (1974), who applied Galtung's structural theory to examine the advertising power relationships within and between Asian nations and the Center countries, found considerable support for the hypotheses derived from it. Other researchers have gone beyond Galtung's theory to test the possible existence of a core-periphery structure within peripheral regions as well. For instance, Gunaratne (1999, 2000) attempted to identify the core-periphery structure in Asia proper and its sub-regions—the East, the Southeast and the South. Using export data as a measure of competitive capital accumulation, he found Japan to be the core country in Asia with China and the Four Dragons ("the China Circle") constituting the first-tier semiperiphery. The purpose of the current project was to further ascertain the divisibility of the world system into regional core-periphery components. The project hypothesized the existence of a core-periphery structure in the Middle East and North Africa region and tested whether the communication-and media phenomena in that region followed the pattern of the hypothesized structure.

Defining the region

The Islamic heartland encompassing the Middle East (West Asia) and North Africa has more than 437 million or 7.3 percent of the world's 1999 estimated population of 6 billion. It covers 23 economies ranging in population size from Bahrain's 0.6 million people to Egypt's 67.3 million. Cyprus and Qatar, each with fewer than 0.7 million people, are only slightly larger than Bahrain in population. The two other population giants are Turkey (65.6 million) and Iran (65.2 million). Although since 1996 Turkey has had a customs union arrangement with the European Union, geographically it is part of West Asia except for the small northwest section surrounding Istanbul that juts into Europe.

Ogan (1995) identified 22 economies in the region. A truncated Palestine (West Bank and Gaza) has emerged as a separate political entity since the election of the first Palestine Legislative Council in January 1996 following the Oslo peace accords signed in late 1993. Kamalipour and Mowlana (1994) also identified these economies as constituent parts of the region, but went too far by including Pakistan as well. Boyd (1999), on the other hand, applied the term Middle East only to the Arab world thereby excluding Cyprus, Iran, Israel and Turkey. Boyd approximated the Arab world with the Arab League minus Mauritania and Somalia.

The World Bank (1999) has placed five economies in the region in the high-income category—Cyprus, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar and United Arab Emirates; six in the upper-middle-income category—Bahrain, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Turkey; nine in the lower-middle-income category—Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Palestine (West Bank and Gaza); and three in the low-income category—Afghanistan, Sudan and Yemen.

Although we have called the region the Islamic heartland, it is also home to a large Jewish and Christian population. The Middle East, an early 20th century term that replaced the older term Near East, was the birthplace of Judaism, the mother religion of both Christianity and Islam, as well as of Zoroastrianism, the religion of the Parsees of India and the Gabars of Iran. In addition to Arabs, the region has Persians, Turks, Kurds, Berbers and others who each use their own languages. Kamalipour and Mowlana (1994) point out that the Middle East is a diverse region that "frequently defies generalization" (p. xvi).

Before the 15th-and 16th century rise of the world system centered in the West, the Middle East played a central role in the world system centered in the East. Frank and Gill (1993) point out that the trinity of core-periphery, hegemony-rivalry and alternating phases of economic cycles were recurring structures and processes of the world system for some 5,000 years. More than 3000 years before Christ, the Sumerians in southern Mesopotamia (Iraq) founded the region's first civilization and devised the cuneiform system of writing while the Egyptians also built a civilization and the hieroglyphics system of writing almost as early.

The Middle East was a world Center during the periods of the Hittite empire based in Anatolia (Turkey) and Mesopotamia in the late 17th century B.C. and the empire of New Kingdom Egypt (1430 B.C. to 1200 B.C.); the Assyrian empire in northern Mesopotamia in the early ninth century B.C. to the end of the seventh; the Achaemenid Persian empire (612 B.C. 333 B.C.) that preceded Alexander the Great's conquest of West Asia; the Parthian empire stretching from the Euphrates to Bactria, north of Afghanistan (129 B.C. to A.D. 226); the Persian Sassanid empire (A.D. 226 to A.D. 630) and the Abbassid caliphate (A.D. 750 to A.D. 1258); and the Ottoman empire (founded in the 14th century), which exerted profound influence over European and Middle Eastern affairs for some 500 years.

Core-periphery structure

If one were to judge global competitiveness on the basis of the share of the world exports in merchandise and services (Gunaratne, 1999, 2000), the Middle East and North Africa scores very poorly. The contribution of the region to world exports in 1998 was about $259 billion—3.8 percent of the world total[7] (WTO, 1999)—or only slightly more than the exports of the Netherlands. In 1990, the region's share was 5 percent. That share reached a low of 4 percent in 1995, rose to 4.3 percent in 1997 and dipped to the decade's lowest in 1998 because of a severe decline in oil prices. Clearly, despite its oil wealth, the region—which had been a world center over several cycles from the Bronze Age through the Iron Age axial and classical periods to the medieval period—has fallen into the Periphery of the contemporary world system.

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[7] In comparison, the 15-member European Union, which has a population of 375 million, exported merchandise and commercial services valued at $2.7 trillion—or 41.6 percent of the world total—in 1998.

In terms of real Gross Domestic Product per capita, six smaller economies occupy the top rankings in the region—Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Israel, Bahrain and Cyprus (Table 2). In terms of the Human Development Index, the same six countries top the region with Israel in the lead, followed by Cyprus, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and UAE (Table 2). But neither of these two indexes is sufficient to demarcate them as the core of the region.[8]

[Table 2]

The World Economic Forum (1997-1999), however, ranked Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey as the most competitive economies of the region based on eight factors: openness, government, finance, technology, infrastructure, management, labor and institutions. Israel topped the region's list in recent years with the other three showing wider fluctuations (Table 3). In 1998, Israel ranked 28th of the 59 economies the forum analyzed. Jordan ranked 40th, Turkey 44th and Egypt 49th.

[Table 3]

The WEF promotes the importance of microeconomic conditions for economic development in the belief that macroeconomic policies are necessary but not sufficient to ensure a prosperous economy. Its eight criteria for judging competitiveness, as well as its selection of countries for annual analysis, reflect this economic philosophy. The inclusion of Egypt and Jordan, which have not been major players in world trade competitiveness, despite the more solid economic strength of Iran and the UAE, shows a philosophical partiality. In the 1990s, Egypt's exports of merchandise and services failed to exceed $13 billion for any year while Jordan's failed to exceed $3.6 billion for any year. At the end of the '90s, the reality was that four economies—Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel and UAE—accounted for almost 60 percent of the region's exports. The next four contributors—Iran, Egypt, Algeria and Kuwait—added only 18 percent to that total. Moreover, the value of Egypt's annual imports has been double that of its exports. Israel and Egypt share about 40 percent of the annual foreign-aid allocation of the United States.[9] The competitive economies in the region profiled by the WEF are highly tied to the United States.

In the Middle East and North Africa, the exports are predominantly agricultural and mining products, rather than industrial and information products. For instance, petroleum constitutes about 90 percent of Saudi Arabia's merchandise exports and commercial services make up less than 10 percent of its total exports. Egypt exports more commercial services than merchandise at a heavily lopsided ratio approximating 70:30. Petroleum products make up more than a third of its merchandise exports. However, Turkey, Saudi Arabia's nearest trade rival, has a different exports make-up: Slightly less than one-half of its export earnings come from commercial services while some 40 percent of its merchandise exports constitute clothing and textiles. Israel, which earns more than a quarter of its export income from commercial services, is the major high-tech-merchandise exporter of the region.

The world-system theory makes no distinction in the nature of products and services that leads to capital accumulation. Frank and Gills (1993) have described the process of capital accumulation as the motor force of (world system) history. Success in capital accumulation through infrastructural investment in agriculture and livestock, industry and new technology, etc., determined the core-periphery and the hegemony-rivalry structure of the world system at any given time. They further argued that the process of capital accumulation, changes in core-periphery position within the world system, as well as hegemony and rivalry within it, were all cyclical and occurred in tandem with each other.

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[9] The 1998 GNP for Cyprus, Kuwait, Qatar and four other economies—Afghanistan, Iraq, Oman and Palestine—were not available in the World Bank database. However, as our earlier analysis showed, the high per capita income of smaller economies does not necessarily place them as core countries.

Table 4 shows the 1998 share of exports of the countries in the region. The shifting export shares in the region show the volatility of economies dependent on mining products such as oil and gas. Oil constitutes the predominant export of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Iran, Libya and Iraq. Applying the formula described in Footnote 6, thereby allocating weights in the proportion of 55:45 to share of the economy and share of the exports, we constructed a score for each country that had both sets of data. We estimated the size of the economy using past World Bank data for countries with missing GNP data for 1998 except for Afghanistan and Iraq. The constructed scores (left column, Table 4) produced the region's probable core-periphery structure though the cutting points we used may be open to dispute.

[Table 4]

- Turkey (with a score of 4.7) has slightly surpassed Saudi Arabia (with a score of 3.9) as the largest exporter thereby creating a dual **center** in the Islamic heartland. (Note that these two countries respectively occupy the 10th and seventh ranks in the region in terms of the real GDP per capita but the first and second ranks in GNP—or size of the economy.)
- Israel (2.6) leads the **first-tier semi-periphery** followed by Iran (2.1). (Note that these two countries respectively occupy the fourth and 12th ranks in the region in terms of the real GDP per capita. Iran and Israel have the third and fourth largest GNP in the region.)
- The UAE (1.6), Egypt (1.5) and Algeria (1.0) form the **second-tier semi-periphery**. (Note that these three countries respectively have the fourth, fifth and sixth largest GNP in the region, but the real GDP per capita of the last two countries is relatively low: $3,050 and $4,460.)

[*] In 1997, the U.S. Congress approved $13 billion in foreign aid out of which $3 billion went to Israel and $2.1 billion to Egypt. In 1999, the Congress approved $15.3 billion in foreign aid, but $1.8 billion of that increase was earmarked for the Middle East peace process.

- All other countries are in the **periphery** with scores of less than 1.0. (Note that in terms of the real GDP per capita Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Cyprus and Oman respectively occupy the first, second, third, fourth and eighth rank.)

Turkey, which had a gross national product of $200.5 billion in 1998, is the economic leader of the region. Saudi Arabia, with an estimated GNP of $146.8 billion, is next in rank followed by Iran ($109.6 billion), Israel ($95.2 billion) and Egypt ($79.2 billion), When coupled with their share of world exports, Turkey and Saudi Arabia emerge as the dual center of the region. Israel is a significant player in the first-tier semiperiphery. Iran and Egypt are also in the semi-periphery while Jordan, with a GNP of $6.9 billion and a score of 0.3, is behind seven other countries.

Press freedom and human rights

Elaborating on the annual Freedom House ratings on political rights and civil liberties, Karatnycky (2000) asserted that the roots of democracy and freedom were weakest in the Middle East (excluding North Africa). Cyprus and Israel were the only "free" countries; Jordan, Kuwait and Turkey were the only "partly free" countries; and the rest were "not free." Cyprus, Israel and Turkey were the Middle East's only electoral democracies. In the Arab world, Karatnycky observed, Morocco was the only other "partly free" state apart from Jordan and Kuwait. None of the 16 other Arab states was "free."

The annual Freedom House ratings on press freedom—measured by four criteria founded on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—showed that Cyprus and Israel were the region's only countries with a "free" press. Kuwait, Morocco, Jordan and Turkey had a "partly free" press. In the other countries in the region, the press was "not free" (Sussman, 2000). Press freedom and rankings on civil and political rights usually go together.

[Table 5] and [Figure 3]

Six countries in the region—Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and UAE—have so far not ratified both of the 1996 international human rights covenants: the one on civil and political rights, and the other on economic, social and cultural rights. The same countries (except Turkey) plus Iran, Sudan and Syria have not ratified the 1979 convention on discrimination against women. Seven countries—Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Syria and UAE—have not ratified the 1984 convention against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. Contrary to the hypothesis in this study, the data (see Table 8) showed no statistically significant correlation between the core-periphery index score and the score on commitment to human rights instruments.

[Table 6]

The Middle East and North Africa region provides no evidence that media freedom and co-periphery status (as measured by the GNP and the share of world exports) follow a symmetrical pattern as hypothesized in this study. However, as Table 8 shows, the correlation between media freedom and per capita GNP is statistically significant at better than the 0.05 level. Saudi Arabia, one of the two centers in the region, has no "press freedom" just as in the case of Singapore, the center in Southeast Asia. Turkey is only "partly free" and Saudi Arabia "not free" in political rights and civil liberties. In the semi-periphery, Israel stands out as the second "freest" in the region while Egypt, the UAE and Iran are "not free." Cyprus, the "freest" country, is in the hypothesized periphery.

Old and new media

The core-periphery structure based on share of exports and overall GNP does not parallel the penetration of the old or the new media in the Middle East and North Africa. Even though the hypotheses related to the two types of media indicators failed, the correlation between per capita GNP and all the media indicators was statistically significant at either the 0.01 level (for newspaper, telephone and personal computer penetration) or the 0.05 level (for radio, television and Internet host penetration). Table 7 shows the penetration of traditional media, telephones, computers and the Internet in the countries classified into four income categories based on per capita GNP.

[Table 7] [Table 8]

An analysis of the seven media penetration indicators shows wide variations across the hypothesized core-periphery structure. A comparison of the core and the semi-periphery countries on the seven selected media indicators with all other countries in the region produced the following ranks:

	Newspaper penetration	Radio penetration	TV penetration	Telephone penetration	Cellular penetration	Internet penetration	PC penetration
Turkey	8	20	6 or 8	5	8	5	9
Saudi Arabia	9	9	9 or10	9	10	9	6
Israel	2	5	8 or 6	2	1	1	1
UAE	3	8	11 or 7	3	2	3	3
Iran	17	14	19 or 14	10	13	15	8
Egypt	12	10	12 or 17	16	17	11	12

One or more periphery countries rank higher than the selected center and semi-periphery countries in the penetration of daily newspapers, radio, television and telephones. Israel tops the other five countries in all the media indicators except in TV penetration on which it ties with Turkey. Israel and UAE are ahead of the other four in all indicators except TV penetration. Israel leads the region in the new media signified by personal computers, the Internet and cellular mobile subscribers. Cyprus ranks first in mainline telephone density, Kuwait in newspaper penetration, Lebanon in radio penetration and Oman in TV penetration.

Discussion and conclusions

Our theoretical core-periphery structure of the Middle East and North Africa is not a good predictor of the media penetration pattern of the region. The scores separating the hypothetical core (3.9 – 4.7) from the semi-periphery (1.0 – 2.6) and those separating the periphery (0.01 to 0.9) from the semi-periphery in this region are so low (in relation to the United States = 100 as the maximum) that researchers should be cautious about applying the core-periphery distinction to Periphery regions where countries cluster around low scores.

The per capita income index is generally a better, though not a sophisticated, predictor of media penetration in a region with several high-income small economies. This is the case with the Middle East.[10] Table 8 shows that each of the media indicators has a statistically significant correlation with per capita GNP, but none with the core-periphery index configured for the region. Daily newspaper penetration is highest in Kuwait (38 copies per 100 people), Israel (29), UAE (17) and Qatar (16)—all in the high-income category. (The United States has a newspaper penetration of only 21 copies per 100 people. This indicator may no longer reflect the world system structure because of the declining newspaper circulation in core countries.)

Radio penetration cuts across the first three income levels with Lebanon (91 per 100 people) in the second tier beating Kuwait (68) in the first tier. Oman (61) and Bahrain ((58) in the second tier have better penetration than the other first-tier countries. Even Sudan (27) in the low-income category competes well with the lower-middle-income countries, as well as Turkey and Libya in the upper-income level, on this indicator. TV penetration generally conforms to the structure of the first two income tiers with Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain heading the list.

The telecommunication and Internet-and computer indicators clearly follow the pattern of the four income tiers. In telephone density, Cyprus (58 per 100 people) is at the top followed by Israel (54) and UAE (39). Turkey and Bahrain (25 each) in the second tier are on par with Kuwait and Qatar in the first tier. Cellular-mobile-subscriber penetration is highest in Israel (36 per 100 people) while Lebanon (16) and Bahrain (15) in the second tier have a density matching that of Cyprus, Kuwait and Qatar in the first tier. In Internet penetration and personal-computer penetration, Israel is the region's super leader.

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[10] The correlation of GNP per capita with each of the media-penetration indicators was statistically significant at p values ≤ 0.03. The Pearson r was 0.86 with PCs, 0.78 with newspapers, 0.75 with telephones and cellular subscribers, 0.67 with television (ITU estimates), and 0.48 with Internet hosts. The correlation of the same indicators with the core-periphery index scores did not produce statistically significant results.

Massey and Levy (1999) have suggested that "a global competitiveness indicator based on the percentage share of regional goods and services may not precisely approximate a country's position in the world capitalist system" (p. 534). They concluded that the core-periphery classifications cut from global competitiveness indicators offered little help in explaining variations in the interactivity of English language Web newspapers between and within subregions of Asia. The hypothesized co-periphery structure for sub-regions in Asia also suffers from the same low-score syndrome along the structural continuum. Applying the formula in Footnote 6 to Southeast Asia, Singapore (= 6.7) emerges as the core; Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines as the semi-periphery (= 2.6 – 4.6); and the other Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries as the periphery (<1.0). In South Asia, India emerges as the core (= 7.1), Pakistan as the semi-periphery (= 1.2) and the other South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries as the periphery (<1.0). The three tiers of the structure carved out of tight scores at the very low end may not produce results in the expected direction. Thus the application of the world-system theory for international communication research certainly needs greater sophistication.

Galtung (1971) introduced the concept of "bridgeheads" to identify the elite that constitutes the center in a Periphery country. He theorized that these bridgeheads had more in common with the center in the Center countries than with the periphery in the Periphery countries. Massey and Levy's (1999) study of interactivity related to Asia's English-language dailies on the Web. In short, they did not take into account that Web access to the English-language press was the privilege of the bridgeheads—the center—in the Periphery countries. This could be another explanation why their null hypotheses prevailed.

Any type of core-periphery classification will suffer from some degree of arbitrariness because no one can precisely determine the cutting points that shift some economies from one category to the next. Moreover, the indicators we chose to construct the capital accumulation index—the overall GNP and the share of exports—tend to place richer small economies, such as Bahrain, Cyprus, Qatar, Oman or Brunei Darussalam in the periphery. The exceptions are entrepôt economies like Hong Kong and Singapore, which the World Economic Forum continues to place at the top of world competitiveness. A solution may be to analyze the richer smaller economies outside the core-periphery configuration. The WEF's (1999) competitiveness rankings, which place United States second, Japan 14th and Germany 25th, are not suitable for configuring the world's core-periphery structure. UNDP's Human Development Index ranks the United States third, Japan fourth and Germany 14th (after the United Kingdom, 10th, and France, 11th). The tripartite division of the HDI—45 countries in the high HD category, 93 in the medium HD category and 30 in the low HD category—does not appear to parallel the tripartite division of the world system theory. It is more likely that the Core and the Semi-periphery are both in the high HD category.[11]

An essential component of the world system theory is the hegemony-rivalry phenomenon. This is particularly relevant to the analysis of the global communication flow. The interests of the core countries in selected Periphery countries can distort the expected pattern of information flow to and from a regional core-periphery cluster. For instance, the intense commitment the United States and other core countries in the West have in the preservation of Israel makes Israel and its Islamic rivals more newsworthy than their economic power in the world system warrants. This distortion occurs, however, because of the overall economic power of the Center. As Castells (1996) puts it, the Middle East is "highly dependent on the avatars of the world's geopolitics" (p. 146).

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[11] Castells (1996) makes the point that although the global economy is deeply asymmetric, attempts to compartmentalize it into a center, semiperiphery and a periphery is "simplistic" because "there are several 'centers' and several 'peripheries' and because both North and South are so internally diversified as to make little analytical sense of using these categories" (p. 108). However, Chang (1998) identified core countries as the United States, European Union (as a single unit), United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan and Canada. His semiperipheral countries comprised the other Western European countries, Russia, China, and "relatively advanced economies" such as South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Argentina, Mexico and Egypt. These, he claimed, were "consistent with common classifications" (p. 539).

Hugill (1999) and Fortner (1993) are among those who have examined world communication phenomena within the framework of world-system theory. These two authors used Innis' (1950) empire-and communications model, which distinguished between Type 1 durable (or heavy) communication media that allowed cultures to control time, and Type 2 ephemeral (or portable) communication systems that allowed cultures to control space. Whereas Frank and Gills (1993) saw the possibilities of the world system theory to move away from the Euro-centric mode to a humanocentric mode, Hugill confined the theory to the "capitalist world-system only as it has developed over the past 150 years" (p. 16). He looked at the geopolitics and technologies of the respective communication systems of Britain, imperial Germany and the United States as they struggled for hegemony. Eurocentrism, as well as his implication of capitalism as the superior "ism," differentiates Hugill from Frank and Gills, who use capitalism in a neutral sense—as the motor force of capital accumulation affecting the world as a single unit. Despite his bias, Hugill makes a useful assertion: that "in the period of multipolarity we are now entering" (p. 18), the chosen communication strategy of regional power groupings—e.g., North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) and Japan-led Asia—will determine their ability to achieve hegemony. Perhaps we should move away from the country-specific approach to configure the world's core-periphery structure in reference to these economic power blocs.

Castells (1996) describes the "architecture and geometry of the informational/global economy" (p. 145) as an asymmetrically interdependent phenomenon organized around three major regions—Europe (EU and the European economies affiliated with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), North America (or NAFTA) and the Asian Pacific (Japan and the "China Circle"). He identifies the G-7 countries as "the core of the system" because they accounted for 90.5 percent of high technology manufacturing in the world (in

1990), and also held 80.4 percent of global computing power. Furthermore, he says that an economic hinterland has sprung up around each of the three major regions with Africa increasingly marginalized in the global economy. Combining these observations of Castells and Hugill, communication scholars can test a global system theory to research the information flow among and within the three regional centers and their respective economic hinterlands. High-technology manufacturing and computing power may serve as the criteria for measuring competitive capital accumulation under informational capitalism, the nerve center of which is the "global financial networks, and their networks of management," which constitute "the actual collective capitalist" (Castells, 1998, p. 363). Informational capitalism is what Tehranian (1999) calls "informatic imperialism," which, in his view, is bifurcating the globe into the "high-tech and high-growth centers" and the "disintegrating peripheries" (p. 26).

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Table 1
World rank of top 10 countries on four economic indicators

Rank on size of the economy (GNP, Atlas method) 1998	**Rank on GNP per capita (Atlas) 1998**	**Rank on GNP per capita (PPP) 1998**	**Rank on share of exports of merchandise and services 1998**
United States ($7.9 trillion) 27.4%	Luxembourg ($43,570)	Luxembourg ($37,420)	United States ($922.5 billion) 13.7%
Japan ($4.1 trillion) 14.2%	Liechtenstein (n.a.)	Liechtenstein (n.a.)	Germany ($618.6 billion) 9.2%
Germany ($2.1 trillion) 7.3%	Switzerland ($40,080)	United States ($29,340)	Japan ($449.7 billion) 6.7%
France ($1.5 trillion) 5.1%	Norway ($34,330)	Bermuda (n.a.)	France ($389.4 billion) 5.8%
United Kingdom ($1.3 trillion) 4.5%	Bermuda (n.a.)	Singapore ($28,620)	United Kingdom ($328.4 billion) 4.9%
Italy ($1.2 trillion) 4.0%	Denmark ($33,260)	Cayman Islands (n.a.)	Italy ($308.9 billion) 4.6%
China ($928.9 billion) 3.2%	Japan ($32,380)	Switzerland ($26,620)	Netherlands ($250.3 billion) 3.7%
Brazil ($758 billion) 2.6%	Cayman Islands (n.a.)	Norway ($24,290)	Canada ($244.6 billion) 3.6%
Canada ($612.2 billion) 2.1%	Singapore ($30,060)	Canada ($20,020)	Belgium-Luxembourg ($213.9 billion) 3.2%
Spain ($553.7 billion) 1.9%	United States ($29,340)	Monaco (n.a.)	China ($207.8 billion) 3.1%
72% of gross world product			**59% of world exports**

Sources: World Bank Database; WTO (1999)

Table 2
Middle East and North Africa
Human Development Index 1997

Country	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1997	Adult literacy rate (%) 1997	Combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd-level gross enrolment ratio (%) 1997	Real GDP per capita (PPP$) 1997	HDI value 1997	HDI rank 1997
Israel	77.8	95.4	80	18,150	0.883	23
Cyprus	77.8	95.9	79	14,201	0.870	26
Kuwait	75.9	80.4	57	25,314	0.833	35
Bahrain	72.9	86.2	81	16,527	0.832	37
Qatar	71.7	80.0	71	20,987	0.814	41
United Arab Emirates	74.8	74.8	69	19,115	0.812	43
Libya	70.0	76.5	92	6,697	0.756	65
Lebanon	69.9	84.4	76	5,940	0.749	69
Saudi Arabia	71.4	73.4	56	10,120	0.740	78
Turkey	69.0	83.2	61	6,350	0.728	86
Oman	70.9	67.1	58	9,960	0.725	89
Jordan	70.1	87.2	66	3,450	0.715	94
Iran	69.2	73.3	72	5,817	0.715	95
Tunisia	69.5	67.0	70	5,300	0.695	102
Algeria	68.9	60.3	68	4,460	0.665	109
Syria	68.9	71.6	60	3,250	0.663	111
Egypt	66.3	52.7	72	3,050	0.616	120
Iraq	62.4	58.0	51	3,197	0.586	125
Morocco	66.6	45.9	49	3,310	0.582	126
Sudan	55.0	53.3	34	1,560	0.475	142
Yemen	58.0	42.5	49	810	0.449	148
Afghanistan	45.0	33.0	…	…	…	…

… Not available
Source: UNDP (1999) Human Development Report

Table 3
WEF's global competitiveness rankings of economies in the Middle East and North Africa

Economy	Rank 1996	Rank 1997	Rank 1998	Rank 1999
Israel	24	24	29	28
Jordan	28	43	34	40
Egypt	29	28	38	49
Turkey	42	36	40	44

Source: WEF (1999) Global Competitiveness Report

Table 4
Middle East and North Africa: Hypothetical core-periphery structure based on 1998 GNP and share of exports

Score on index (US=100)	Country	Merchandise US$ billions	Services US$ billions	Total US$ billions	Share of regional exports
	Dual Center				
4.7	Turkey	25.9	23.1	49.0	18.9%
3.9	Saudi Arabia	42.3	4.4	46.7	18.0%
	Semi-periphery 1				
2.6	Israel	23.3	9.0	32.3	12.5%
2.1	Iran	12.6	(1997) 3.2	15.8	6.1%
	Semi-periphery 2				
1.6	UAE	22.5	...	22.5	8.7%
1.5	Egypt	3.1	7.8	10.9	4.2%
1.0	Algeria	10.3	...	10.3	4.0%
	Periphery 1				
0.9	Morocco	7.2	2.5	9.7	3.7%
0.8	Kuwait	8.5	1.5	10.0	3.9%
0.8	Libya	7.1	...	7.1	2.7%
0.6	Tunisia	5.7	2.7	8.4	3.2%
0.5	Oman	5.5	1.2*	6.7	2.6%
0.4	Syria	2.8	1.5	4.3	1.7%
0.4	Qatar	5.4	0.8*	6.2	2.4%
	Iraq	5.0	...	5	1.9%
0.3	Jordan	1.8	1.8	3.6	1.4%
0.2	Bahrain	3.3	0.8	4.1	1.6%
0.2	Lebanon	0.7	...	0.7	0.3%
0.2	Cyprus	1.1	1.1**	2.2	0.8%
0.2	Yemen	2.5*	0.2	2.7	1.0%
0.1	Sudan	0.6	0.0	0.6	0.2%
0.0	Afghanistan	0.1*	...	0.1	0.0%
	Total	197.3	61.6	258.9	100.0%

... Not available *=1997 **=1995

See Endnote 5 for formula used to derive index score for ranking.

Sources: WTO Annual Report 1999; World Bank Database.

Table 5

Press freedom in the Middle East and North Africa, 2000

Country	Media type	Laws & regulations that influence media content (Scale: 0-15)	Political pressures & controls on media content (Scale: 0-15)	Economic influences over media content (Scale: 0-15)	Repressive actions: killings, violence, censorship, arrests, etc. (Scale: 0-5)	Total media restriction score F=Free, PF=Partly Free, NF=Not Free	Rating on political rights and civil liberties (Scale: 0-7
Cyprus	Broadcast	2	5	2	0	16	1
	Print	2	2	3	0	F	F
Israel	Broadcast	3	2	2	2	30	2
	Print	8	6	2	5	F	F
Kuwait	Broadcast	9	11	0	1	48	5
	Print	9	11	4	3	PF	PF
Morocco	Broadcast	11	6	0	0	49	4.5
	Print	11	10	10	1	PF	PF
Jordan	Broadcast	12	10	6	0	57	4.5
	Print	12	9	4	4	PF	PF
Turkey	Broadcast	11	11	3	0	58	4.5
	Print	11	9	8	5	PF	PF
Lebanon	Broadcast	12	12	7	1	61	5.5
	Print	9	10	9	1	NF	NF
Qatar	Broadcast	7	13	10	0	62	6.5
	Print	8	14	10	0	NF	NF
Yemen	Broadcast	14	14	0	1	68	5.5
	Print	13	13	9	4	NF	NF
Iran	Broadcast	10	15	8	0	68	6
	Print	12	10	8	5	NF	NF
Egypt	Broadcast	8	14	9	0	69	6
	Print	11	12	10	5	NF	NF
Oman	Broadcast	15	13	0	0	71	6
	Print	15	13	15	0	NF	NF
Syria	Broadcast	15	15	7	0	73	7
	Print	15	13	7	1	NF	NF
Tunisia	Broadcast	15	15	0	0	74	5.5
	Print	15	15	9	5	NF	NF
Bahrain	Broadcast	15	15	7	0	75	6.5
	Print	13	14	10	1	NF	NF
UAE	Broadcast	15	15	6	0	76	5.5
	Print	15	15	10	0	NF	NF
Algeria	Broadcast	15	15	10	2	83	5.5
	Print	13	10	15	3	NF	NF
Sudan	Broadcast	15	15	7	0	85	7
	Print	15	15	13	5	NF	NF
Saudi Arabia	Broadcast	15	15	15	0	90	7
	Print	15	15	15	0	NF	NF
Libya	Broadcast	15	15	15	0	90	7
	Print	15	15	15	0	NF	NF
Afghanistan	Broadcast	15	15	15	0	90	7
	Print	15	15	15	0	NF	NF
Iraq	Broadcast	15	14	15	5	98	7
	Print	15	14	15	5	NF	NF

Source: Sussman (2000); Karatnycky (2000).

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Table 6
Middle East and North Africa: Commitment of countries to selected human rights instruments

	Inter national covenant on economic, social and cultural rights 1966	International covenant on civil and political rights 1966	International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination 1966	Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 1948	Convention on the rights of the child 1989	Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women 1979	Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 1984	Convention relating to the status of refugees 1951
				Dual Center				
Turkey			O	●	●	●	●	●
Saudi Arabia			●	●	●		●	
				Semi-periphery 1				
Israel	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Iran	●	●	●	●	●			●
				Semi-periphery 2				
UAE			●		●			
Egypt	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Algeria	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
				Periphery				
Morocco	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Kuwait	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Libya	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Tunisia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Oman					●			
Syria	●	●	●	●	●			
Qatar				●		●		
Iraq	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Jordan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Bahrain			●	●	●		●	
Lebanon	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Cyprus	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Yemen	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Sudan	●	●	●		●		O	●
Afghanistan	●	●	●	●	●	O	●	

● Ratification as of Feb. 1., 1999
O Signature not followed by ratification

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Table 7
Demographic and media penetration indicators in the Middle East and North Africa

	GNP per capita (World Bank estimate) 1998	Population (U.S. Census Bureau estimate in millions) mid-1999	Newspaper circulation per 100 people (Unesco estimate) 1996	Radio receivers per 100 people (Unesco estimate) 1997	TV receivers per 100 people (Unesco estimate) 1997	TV receivers per 100 people (ITU estimate) 1998	Main telephone lines per 100 people (ITU estimate) 1998	Cellular mobile subscribers per 100 people (ITU estimate) 1998	Internet hosts per 1000 people (derived from Network Wizards July survey) 1999	Personal computers per 100 people (ITU estimate) 1998
					High-income					
Qatar	20179	0.7	16.1	45.0	40.4	80.8	25.99	11.36	0.04	12.09
UAE	18220	2.3	17.0	35.5	13.4	29.4	38.90	20.96	4.74	10.62
Kuwait	17056	2.0	37.7	67.8	50.5	49.1	23.59	13.80	2.30	10.49
Israel	15940	5.8	28.8	52.4	28.8	31.8	53.95	35.88	25.43	21.72
Cyprus	12481	0.7	11.1	40.6	32.5	16.7	58.51	16.83	6.25	n.a
					Upper-Middle- Income					
Bahrain	7660	0.6	11.7	58.0	47.2	41.9	24.57	14.34	1.76	9.34
Saudi Arabia	7150	21.5	5.9	32.1	26.2	26.0	14.26	3.11	0.86	4.96
Oman	6897	2.4	2.8	60.7	69.4	59.5	9.23	4.33	0.27	2.10
Libya	6660	5.0	1.4	25.6	14.0	14.3	8.36	0.33	0.00	n.a.
Lebanon	3560	3.6	14.1	90.7	37.5	35.2	19.43	15.67	1.74	3.92
Turkey	3160	65.6	11.0	17.8	33.0	28.6	25.41	5.25	1.98	2.32
					Lower-Middle-Income					
Iraq	2400	22.4	2.0	22.9	8.3	8.2	3.10	n.a.	0.00	n.a.
Tunisia	2050	9.5	3.1	22.4	10.0	19.8	8.06	0.42	0.01	1.47
Iran	1770	65.2	2.6	26.3	7.1	15.7	11.18	0.59	0.01	3.19
Algeria	1550	31.1	3.8	24.2	10.5	6.8	5.32	0.06	0.00	0.42
Jordan	1520	4.6	4.2	27.1	8.2	5.2	8.55	1.18	1.53	0.87
Egypt	1290	67.3	3.8	31.7	11.9	12.7	6.02	0.14	0.07	0.91
Morocco	1250	29.7	2.7	24.7	11.5	16.0	5.44	0.42	0.03	0.25
Syria	1020	17.2	2.0	27.8	7.0	6.8	9.54	n.a.	0.00	0.17
West Bk & Gaza	n.a.	2.7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a	n.a	5.78	1.45	0.00	n.a.
					Low-Income					
Yemen	300	16.9	1.5	6.4	2.9	27.3	1.34	0.11	0.00	0.12
Sudan	290	34.5	2.7	27.2	8.6	14.1	0.57	0.03	0.00	0.19
Afghanistan	n.a.	25.8	0.6	13.2	1.3	1.2	0.14	n.a	0.00	n.a

Note: GNP per capita figures for Afghanistan, Cyprus, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Palestine (West Bank & Gaza) and Qatar are not in the World Bank database. GDP per capita from ITU (1999) were substituted where available; n.a. = not available.

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Table 8
Data for the Middle East and North Africa:
Pearson correlations for variables related to hypotheses

Indicator	Correlation with core-periphery index score	Correlation with GNP per capita
Newspaper penetration	0.150 (p = 0.528)	0.784 (p = 0.000)
Radio penetration	-0.213 (p = 0.367)	0.465 (p = 0.033)
TV penetration	0.013 (p = 0.957)	0.528 (p = 0.014)
Telephone density	0.209 (p = 0.376)	0.751 (p = 0.000)
Cellular density	0.101 (p = 0.680)	0.750 (p = 0.000)
PC penetration	0.206 (p = 0.412)	0.865 (p = 0.000)
Internet host density	0.272 (p = 0.246)	0.481 (p = 0.027)
Human rights score	-0.086 (p = 0.718)	-0.382 (p = 0.087)
Media freedom score	0.077 (p = 0.746)	-0.493 (p = 0.034)

Figure 1
Components of the world system and their relevance to IC research

Components	**Explanation**	**Applicability to international communication**
1. World system itself	Principal features of the world political-economic system, identified below, stretch back to several thousand years. It long predated the rise of "capitalism" in Europe and Europe's hegemony in the world. The feudalism-capitalism-socialism transition process is inconsistent with world system theory	• Enables taking the world system as a whole as the unit of analysis—to go beyond country-or-region-centered studies • Encourages humanocentric study of communication
2. Process of capital accumulation as the motor force of (world system) history	Capital accumulation—the imperative of ceaseless accumulation—has played a central role in the world system for several millennia. Capital = surplus transfer through infrastructural investment in agriculture and livestock; industry and new technology; transport; commerce; military; legitimacy; education and training of "human capital."	• Establishes economic power as the antecedent to international communication power
3. Core-periphery structure in and of the world (system)	Core-periphery structure of world system is applicable to premodern and ancient history, as well as prehistory.	• Establishes core-periphery framework for study of international communication
4. Alternation between hegemony and rivalry	Hegemony-rivalry = political-economic predominance by a center of accumulation, which alternates with periods of rivalry among several such centers of accumulation. Shifting systems of economic, political and military alliances create, maintain and dismantle hegemonic imperial power.	• Enables historical study of international communication over time to document changes in communication power
5. Long (and short) economic cycles of alternating ascending (A) phases and descending (B) phases.	Process of capital accumulation, changes in core-periphery position within world system, as well as hegemony and rivalry within it, are all cyclical and occur in tandem with each other	• Enables tracing communication power shifts on the basis of cyclical shifts in the preceding trinity

Source: Adapted from Frank & Gills (1993)

Figure 2
The world system shifts before Christ

B Phase	1700 BC-1500/1400 BC (Disintegration of hegemonies and economic disruptions)	Hittites and Kassites conquer Anatolia and Mesopotamia	Hurrians and Hyksos overrun Levant and Egypt	Aryans inundate the Indus at decline of Harappan civilization	Shang aristocracy established in north China
A Phase	1400 BC-1200 BC (Economic recovery)	Hittite empire	Empire of New Kingdom Egypt		
B Phase	1200 BC-1000 BC	Collapse of Hittite empire and Kassite dynasty in Babylonia	Libyan mercenaries and Nubians seize power in Egypt. Dorians, Aramaeans and Phoenicians overrun Mycenaeans in Greece and Levant		Barbarian Zhou oust Shang
A Phase	1000 BC-800BC	Assyrian empire in northern Mesopotamia	Phoenicians supplant Mycenaeans		
B Phase	800 BC-550 BC	Decline of Assyria Rivalry among Babylonians, Medes and Persians.	Economic decline of Phoenician cities	Iron technology spreads in north India	Zhou hegemony gives way to independent states
A Phase	550 BC-450 BC	Zoroastrianism, Hebrew prophets (Ezekiel and Isiah). Rise of Achaemenid Persian empire in West Asia	Pythagorianism, Ionian philosophy. Expansion of Greek cities	Buddhism, Jainism	Confucianism, Taoism
B Phase	450 BC-350 BC	Hellenic conquest of Persia	Decline of Greek cities. Macedonian hegemony of Greece. Celts invade Italy and sets up Galatia kingdom in Asia Minor.	Breakaway of the Indus from Persian empire.	
A Phase	350 BC-250/200 BC	Alexander the Great re-conquers Persia.	Hellenistic economic expansion	Maurya hegemony in northern India and Central Asia	Qin dynasty hegemony
B Phase	250/200 BC-100/50 BC		Economic decline of Egypt. Decline of free peasantry in Greece and Italy	Decline of Maurya empire	Power struggle a among Chinese, Xiongu and Yuezhi
A Phase	100/50 BC- AD 150/200	Parthian Empire.	Economic prosperity of Roman Empire	Indian expansion into Southeast Asia. Kushan unification of Central Asia	Great Wall of China

Source: Adapted from Frank & Gills (1993)



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Int'l

The Image of Muslims as Terrorists in Major U.S. Newspapers.

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The Image of Muslims as Terrorists in Major U.S. Newspapers.

1. Introduction.

a. Concern about stereotyping of Muslims in the American press.

For the past several years there has been a growing concern that American mass media help generate and enforce negative stereotypes about Muslims. Scholars, social and political activists and organizations like Muslim Public Affairs Council and Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) called the public's attention to this issue. They accuse the mass media of biased reporting on Muslims. Nohad Toulan says about the American media's coverage of Islam that "The tone and substance of such coverage leave many Muslims concerned about the negative image that is being relayed to an American public" (Toulan, 1996). The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) at its 35th annual convention in 1998 in St. Louis discussed a survey of religious stereotypes in the American print media, which indicated that "80 per cent of Muslims were seen as terrorists, corrupt and abusive toward women" (El-Mahdi and Abu-Jabr, 1998). Soha Saiyed wrote to the Courier-Journal in November 1999 that "The crash of EgyptAir Flight 990 showed once again how the American media misrepresent Islamic culture" (Soha, 1999). Public organizations also urge the mass media to fight stereotyping. In 1996 a joint statement of 22 NGOs in Malaysia called on the American mass media "to stop insulting and defaming Islam in their work" (New Straits Times, 1996).

A number of essays and forums describe the anti-Muslim stereotypes in press. However, no quantitative study of such stereotypes appeared either on Internet, or in periodicals and books. In light of the growing importance of the issue and the absence of quantitative data about the print media's stereotyping, I undertook the present research. This paper will investigate the existence of the reportedly most common stereotype about Muslims in the American press, namely linking Muslims to the image of international terrorism.

b. General overview of reported stereotypes.

Several negative stereotypes and generalizations frequently appear in the press and on TV. The format of the present study does not allow for a full investigation of all stereotypes, but this chapter will give a brief overview.

As mentioned before, the most common stereotype is the view of Islam as a violent, militant religion whose members are terrorists. Cases like the EgyptAir Flight 990 and the Oklahoma City bombing demonstrated that Muslims are often the first suspects in acts of terrorism. It is common to imagine that they are anti-democratic and especially anti-American. In the past years "Islam has taken over from the Soviet Union as the west's reflex enemy" (Stubbs and Sukhvinder, 1997). The publication further quotes Clare Hollingsworth, defense correspondent for the *International Herald Tribune*, saying: "Muslim fundamentalism is fast becoming the chief threat to global peace and security, as well as a cause of national and local disturbance through terrorism" (Stubbs and Sukhvinder, 1997).

One complaint by Muslims is that the press always identifies a terrorist's religious identity if he is Muslim but fails to do so for terrorists-members of other religions or for atheists. Another contribution to the association with violence is misunderstanding of *jihad*. The "holy war" is often understood by the media as a call to violence and terrorism. Hassan says that "Many Muslims feel that this term has been purposely emphasized by the mass media in another attempt to cripple the image of Islam" (Hassan, 1995). Meanwhile, the Quran and Islamic law *Shariah* give only two meanings to *jihad*: self-defense and spiritual struggle to become a better humanbeing in the path of God.

Another stereotype that offends many Muslims is a belief that Islam allows for abuse of women by men. It is a sensitive issue not only because women face discrimination everywhere, but also because in regions like the Middle East many tribal societies have been traditionally male-dominated before the spread of Islam. Some Muslim countries are still male-oriented because of their governmental policy and not religious teachings of Islam. On the other hand, African-American Muslim women do not have that problem. One should remember that Islam was the first religion in the world to grant women property rights. It also guaranteed them "the right to be educated and to take part in the economic and social aspects of the community" (Hassan, 1995). The media often fail to distinguish between the teachings of the religion and traditional practices of the governments of Muslim-populated countries.

Because of the media's preoccupation with events in the Middle East, Arabs are often the only people with which the public associates Muslims. After a number of internal and international conflicts in the Middle East in the 1970-s, the words 'Arabs' and 'Arab violence' became synonyms for 'Islamic violence and terrorism.' The problem is that "although 'Arab' and 'Muslim' are often used interchangeably, only about 20 per cent of the more than one billion Muslims worldwide are Arabs" (Husseini, 1995). The largest Muslim state is Indonesia.

Muslims say that while they are often presented as violent, intolerant, anti-democratic, somewhat barbarian, corrupt and backward, many of their cultural contributions to world civilization often go unappreciated and even unacknowledged. Even their holidays and religious events go with little notice from the media, unlike Christmas and Easter. Currently, there are 5 millions Muslims in the USA.

c. *Significance of this study.*

Because Muslims are such a large group in the world and such a rapidly growing group in the USA, a study of how the American press treats this group is timely. Journalism students are often reminded about the significant impact that the media has on public opinion. The authoritative agenda-setting theory suggests that "Mass communication is an important influence in formation and change of public opinion, mainly through its ability to raise the salience of certain issues and certain aspects of those issues" (McCombs, Einsiedel and Weaver, 1991). The press, as part of mass media, has power to direct and shape public opinion; therefore, systematically biased reporting can have a negative effect on social relations within the country, especially in such a "salad bowl" as the USA. The media have a serious responsibility to be accurate and fair in its cultural reporting.

Are the print media fair and objective when reporting on Muslims, especially on the issue of terrorism? Accusation of terrorism and violence is the most common stereotype; it also seems to cause the most bitterness among followers of Islam. One can almost hear despair in Samia Yakub's words: "Why are Arabs and Muslims the media's scapegoat for terrorism in the United States?" (Yakub, 1997). To find out whether such complains and concerns about stereotyping have ground, the following questions were posed:

1. **What language does the American press use when reporting on Muslims involved in terrorism;**
2. **Whether such use of language helps generate a stereotype that Muslims are generally terrorists.**

This paper is a presentation of the findings and discussion of the results.

d. Method of research.

The four national dailies with the largest circulation in the US are a sample for this study: the *New York Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, *USA Today* and the *Washington Post* (Editor & Publisher, 1999). The reasoning behind it is that these national dailies reach the largest number of readers and, therefore, have more impact on shaping public opinion or at least serve as the source of information for the largest number of people, compared to other newspapers. They are also well-established "prestige press", which again makes them influential in terms of public opinion.

The research uses the collections of Lexis-Nexis database for the quantitative search and content analysis of articles. The key words for search in each newspaper are: "*terrorism* or *terrorist*" to determine the general number of articles on terrorism in each newspaper; "*terrorism* or *terrorist* and *Islam* or *Muslim* or *Muslims*" for number and content of articles on Muslims' involvement in terrorism; "*Muslims* or *Islam*" for the general number of stories about Muslims and Islam, and "*Muslims* or *Islam* and *terrorism* or *terrorists*."

The time frame is January-December of 1999 -- latest full year. This study also draws some data from January-December of 1995 because of the Oklahoma City bombing, the case that demonstrated the link the press and public made between Muslims and terrorism. It is interesting to compare the numerical data from 1999 with 1995, especially because the results were very different from the expected.

The first part of the study is a quantitative description presenting the number of articles that discuss the *Muslims' involvement in terrorism* in proportion to the total number of articles about *terrorism* in the four newspapers in 1999. It also gives the number of articles on *terrorism and Muslims* in proportion to the total number of articles about *Muslims* in 1999 and compares it with the corresponding data from 1995. Finally, it counts articles mentioning other types of terrorism and their proportion to the total number of terrorism articles in 1999. The subsequent discussion contains comparison of the four newspapers.

The second part of the study is the qualitative or language analysis -- it discusses what language the four newspapers used in their articles on terrorism involving Muslims in 1999. The discussion of comparison follows.

2. Quantitative research - results and discussions

Before starting an investigation of the stereotype that links Muslims to terrorism, it would be useful to find out how much attention the press gives to terrorism in general, and out of that number how much it focuses on Muslims in relation to terrorism. However, no numerical data on that aspect of print journalism in the US is available. Therefore, the primary task of the present study consisted in gathering and categorization of such data. This was a very straightforward and simple count; it did not use any scientific methods for statistical analysis. The research method consisted in looking at the complete collection of full-text articles on the subject in each particular newspaper within the time frame and eliminating the irrelevant types of stories like letters to the editor, opinions, book reviews, sports stories and so on. This study took into account only articles specifically about terrorism, terrorists and/or Muslims and Islam, whether it was a news piece, or a commentary on the news. The overwhelming majority connected Muslims with terrorism.

All conclusions concern only the sample-space of articles researched for this paper.

a. Terrorism vs. Muslims in relation to Terrorism in 1999.

First, the total number of articles about terrorism in each of the four newspapers in 1999 is compared to the number of stories about Muslims in relation to terrorism in the same year.

The largest number of stories about terrorism in 1999 was in the *New York Times* - the total is 888. Out of this total about 25% talked about Muslims' involvement (approximately 225 articles).

The next largest number of stories on terrorism in 1999 is in the *Los Angeles Times* - 446, and 27% (approximately 121 articles) involved Muslims.

Close to the *Los Angeles Times* stands *Washington Post* - total articles on terrorism is 438, of which 30% (130 articles) is on or mentions Muslims' involvement.

USA Today has a total of 271 articles on terrorism in 1999, and 24% (64 stories) mentioned Muslims.

Clearly, the four newspapers have a different rate of interest in terrorism issues, according to their totals. But despite their difference in the total number of articles on terrorism, the percent of stories about Muslims among all terrorism articles for all 4 dailies converges to a narrow range: 25 to 30 per cent.

b. Muslims vs. Muslims as Terrorists in 1999.

How many articles about Muslims appear in the four dailies in 1999? These cover any topic on Islam or Muslims. In particular, what is the percent of articles on Muslims as terrorists or Islam as a violent religion over all articles on Muslims or Islam?

The *New York Times* had the largest number of stories about Islam or Muslims - 713. Of them 23% (164 articles) link Muslims with terrorism.

Second largest in number is the *Los Angeles Times* - its total is 395 articles on Muslims or Islam in 1999. But its percent of Muslim-terrorist articles exceeds the *New York Times* - 29% or 114 articles.

The highest percent of articles on Muslims as terrorists is in the *Washington Post* - 36%. Of 372 articles on Islam and Muslims, the newspaper published 133 on Muslims in terrorism.

USA Today had also a comparatively high percent in 1999 - 29%; of 112 total stories on Muslims and Islam, 32 relate Muslims to terrorism.

The percent of articles about Muslims as terrorists among articles about Islam or Muslims again converges to a rather narrow range among all four dailies despite their different totals: 23-36 per cent. They also correspond to the percentages of terrorism-by-

Muslims articles among articles on terrorism in the four dailies: 25-30 per cent. Whenever in 1999 these four largest newspapers reported on terrorism or Muslims and Islam, 25 to 30 per cent of these reports linked Muslims to terrorism and cited their involvement in terrorist acts.

c. *Muslims vs. Muslims as Terrorists in 1995.*

Now compare the numbers of articles about Muslims and articles on Muslims as terrorists in 1999 with 1995. In April of 1995 the tragic Oklahoma City bombing that claimed peoples' lives was also tragic in another sense - it revealed once again the prejudices of society. Before any investigation was conducted, Muslims immediately became the first suspects in the bombing and were accused on TV and in press. FAIR reported on April 26, 1995 that after these accusations "Across the country many Muslims were harassed and threatened" (Cohen and Solomon, 1995).

The press and television were in part responsible for that. Columnist Georgie Anne Geyer reported on April 21, 1995: "The indisputable fact that [Oklahoma terror act] has every single earmark of the Islamic car-bombers of the Middle East" (Geyer, 1995). She quoted Steve Emerson as an expert saying that the Oklahoma City area is "one of the centers for Islamic radicalism outside the Middle East." She also said: "The Islamic radicals hate us, even while they use America for fund-raising and safe haven."

In light of such reporting, it is interesting to compare the number of general articles on Muslims and Islam in 1995 to the number of reports of Muslims as terrorists in the four dailies. The result is somewhat unexpected.

The *New York Times* had a total of 753 articles about Muslims, and 32% of them (240 stories) were on Muslims as terrorists.

The *Washington Post* was second: the total about Muslims and Islam was 609, but only 18% of them (108 pieces) were on Muslims in regard to terrorism.

The same pattern reappeared in the *Los Angelės Times:* among the total of 492 articles on Muslims and Islam, and only 98 stories, (20%), link Muslims with terrorism.

USA Today ran a total of 188 general stories about Muslims and 26 of these articles - 14% - were about Muslim terrorists.

The above numbers suggest that with the exception of the *New York Times*, these dailies linked Muslims and Islam to terrorism less often in 1995 than in 1999: 14-20% in 1995 versus 23-36% in 1999.

d. Terrorism vs. Other types of terror groups in 1999.

Azizbek Bakiev, a Muslim student from Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia, asked why even though the press normally does not identify terrorists by their religion, it always does so if terrorists happen to be Muslim. In this study articles on terrorism by non-Muslim groups in 1999 are compared to the total number of terrorism articles in 1999 in the four newspapers.

The *New York Times* ran articles on Christian, right-wing and racist terrorists or terror groups. Of 888 total articles 2 - only 0.2% - were on Christian terrorism, which is a serious and growing threat to U.S. domestic security. There were 4 articles (0.4%) in 1999 on racist and white-supremacist terror groups. 9 of 888 articles were on right-wing terrorism (1%).

The *Los Angeles Times* for 1999 printed 2 articles (0.4%) on Christian terrorism; racist groups were in 6 stories (about 1%), and right-wing were in 2 stories (0.4%); all that is out of a total of 446 articles on terrorism in 1999.

The *Washington Post* in 1999 ran 11 articles on right-wing terrorism (2.5%); 6 stories on racist terrorism (a little over 1 %); and 4 stories identifying Christian terrorists (0.9%). The total number on stories about terrorism in 1999 was 438.

Finally, *USA Today*, out of 271 total stories on terrorism in 1999, had only 2 articles identifying Christian terrorists (0.7%), 1 article on racist terrorists (0.4%) and no stories mentioning right-wing terrorism.

As the figures show, the number of "non-Muslim" terrorism or terrorists of other religions identified in these four dailies is negligible.

e. Discussion.

All findings are limited to the four major newspapers in the sample. These are among the most influential national dailies due to their reputation among readers and availability in all regions of the country. These newspapers are the standard for the press. Also the consistent percentages signify a common trend.

The percentage of articles on Muslim involvement in terrorism among all terrorism stories in 1999 is approximately the same for all four newspapers: 25 to30 per cent. Compared to the number of articles on other terrorist groups in 1999, and especially those articles that identify the religion of non-Muslim terrorists, this percentage is very large. Other terrorist groups constituted at most 2 per cent in each newspaper, often even less. With the scant exception of 2 to 4 articles that identified the religion of Christian terrorists, Muslims are the only group whose religious identity is often linked by the press to acts of terrorism.

A similar percentage appears for the number of articles on Muslims as terrorists compared to the total number of stories about Islam or Muslims in 1999. In all four dailies it is nearly the same: 29-36 per cent (23 per cent for the *New York Times*). Again, this match of the two data sets suggests that whenever in 1999 these four largest newspapers reported on terrorism or Muslims and Islam, 25-30 per cent of these reports linked Muslims to terrorism.

Standing alone these figures do not suggest any tendency of stereotyping, but when one compares them to the number of stories about Christian terrorism, for instance, one cannot but ask why the difference is so huge and why the newspapers identify only Muslims by their faith.

When the Oklahoma City bombing occurred in 1995, the percentage of articles on Muslims as terrorists vs. all stories on Muslims and Islam was significantly lower than in 1999. It appears that, with the exception of the *New York Times* whose percentage dropped from 32% in 1995 to 23% last year, the three other newspapers increased their reporting on Muslims in terrorism by approximately 81% per cent in 1999. The total number of stories about Muslims did not increase in 1999 compared to 1995, but the percentage of stories on Muslim terrorism increased significantly. Does this suggest a growing tendency among the leading newspapers to emphasize their focus on Muslims as terrorists? Does identifying terrorists as Muslims if they are followers of Muhammad help reinforce a negative image of Islam?

3. Qualitative (Language) Analysis - results and discussions.

It would be impossible to find out whether any negative stereotyping exists taking into account only the above given numerical data. The language of an article and its content are in large part what enforces or ruins stereotypes. Biased language and prejudice of the story's gist are responsible for creating negative images. Therefore, in addition to the quantitative data this study needed to conduct a content analysis of articles on Muslims involved with terrorism.

The next step of this study was to read through all articles in the four dailies for 1999 on Muslims in connection to terrorism to see what language the newspapers use to identify terrorists. The task was to find out if the language generalized Muslims as terrorists and contributed to the common image of a Muslim as a terrorist or if each newspaper was neutral in its language and reporting. This section discusses the results of content analysis of the four major daily newspapers in 1999.

a. New York Times in 1999

In 1999 approximately 225 articles in the *New York Times* linked Muslims with terrorism. Almost all identified terrorists by their religion, Islam. The following terms were used with the words Muslim, Islamic and Islam:

- terrorists - in 15 articles
- extremists - in 1 article
- violent - in 2 article
- fundamentalists (this term was not introduced by Muslims and bears the negative connotation of fanatism) - in 6 articles
- international terrorist threat to the USA - in 4 articles
- fanatics - in 1 article
- militant - in 19 articles
- radical - in 3 articles

The serious problem with these numbers (20% of all articles) is that they still show the negative generalization. All these damaging terms appear in close junction with the name of the religion and show up to be its identifiers.

Saying that these terms were linked with the words 'Islam' or 'Muslim' or 'Islamic', in this paper means that they were used in a context that generalized Muslims as violent. Only the most obvious and clear cases of stereotyping were picked out, where the use of these epithets contributes to the negative image of all Muslims. For instance, the following cases would be omitted: when a word 'Islamic' was used in a junction with a term 'militant' as a part of an official name of a military group. The study took into account only those cases where such identification by religion was not necessary, but it was rather a label used by a journalist.

In the *New York Times* several articles misrepresented *jihad* as a justification for violence against members of other religions. For instance, "Arrest at U.S. Border Reverberates in France" talked of the "Islamic terror groups in Europe and elsewhere" and "globalization of Islamist terror" adding that "What most of these groups have in common [...] is a heritage from the Islamic 'holy war'" (Burns, 1999).

A number of other articles showed again that Muslims are frequently the first suspects without evidence in acts of terrorism. Stories on Chechnya in September were full of suggestions that the Moscow blasts were done by "Islamic rebels" (Wines, 1999) from neighboring Dagestan. Indeed, stories about Chechnya in 1999 in *The New York Times* always used words like 'Islamic militants' and 'Muslim rebels', but they never mentioned 'Islamic civilians'.

b. Washington Post in 1999

Around 130 articles in the *Washington Post* during the previous year linked Muslims with terrorism and identified terrorists and terrorist groups by their religion, Islam. The newspaper used almost the same terms as the *New York Times* in labeling Muslims. The language analysis showed the following:

- Muslim/Islamic terrorists - in 14 articles
- extremists - in 8 articles
- violent - in 2 articles
- fundamentalists - in 2 articles
- international threat to America and Americans - in 10 articles
- militant - in 9 articles plus all stories about the war in Chechnya

- radical - in 2 articles

In 4 articles the notion of *jihad* was clearly misrepresented, and in 12 articles Muslims were reported as the first suspects without enough evidence. So 27% of the 130 articles explicitly used epithets in linking Muslims to terrorism.

Here are three examples of articles from the *Washington Post*, in which the terms were used as labels. On August 7, 1999 the newspaper reported on the explosion in Kenya saying that the U.S. embassy was "the target of the attack allegedly carried out by Muslim terrorists waging a holy war against the United States" (Vick, 1999). *Jihad*, or holy war, is again severely misrepresented here, and the terrorists are vaguely labeled as Muslim. The article did not name any specific terrorist group involved or suspected in the bombing, but they readily termed them as Muslims. Such labeling is very frequent in the four newspapers, and it will be discuss in more details in section 2-E.

Another speculative accusation appeared in the *Washington Post* around Christmas of 1999. In early December of that year one of the most important holidays for Muslims -- a holy month of Ramadan -- began. During that month Islam's followers must fast and spend time praying and reflect over their life in the path of God. The *Washington Post* "greeted" Muslims by several articles warning travelers outside the US about planned terrorism attacks connected to Ramadan. One article quoted an anonymous governmental official saying that Americans were under threats and these "threats were connected to [...] Ramadan, the Islamic period of fasting" (Washington Post, 1999). However, the official refused to be specific about the exact nature of these threats. Therefore, these insulting allegations about violence during the Islamic holy month were unsupported by evidence and reported anonymously, appearing in several stories.

On December 23, 1999, after an Algerian was arrested at the Canadian border with bomb-making supplies, a follow-up from a Paris-based reporter linked the Algerian man to "a loose network of Islamic radicals who carried out violent armed robberies in north-west France" (Trueheart and Swardson, 1999). The article used the phrases 'Islamic radicals' and 'Islamic holy war' in a number of paragraphs as a common name for the extremist groups in Algeria and France.

c. Los Angeles Times in 1999.

In the 1999 the most common terms linked with 'Islam' and 'Muslim' were "fundamentalists" and "militant". The problem with the term "fundamentalists" is that it was not suggested by Muslims, but came from outside of Islam to mean inflexible, harsh and conservative dogma. It is definitely not a compliment to the religion.

- Islamic terrorists - in 4 articles
- extremists - in 8 articles
- violent - 1 article
- fundamentalists - 12 articles
- suspected without evidence - in 2 articles
- fanatics - 1 article
- militant - in 21 articles
- radical - in 3 articles
- Muslim guerrilla - in 2 articles

It was "Islamic militants" (Filkins, 1999) and "Muslim extremists" who hijacked an Indian airplane in December 1999; it was "an international constellation of Islamic terrorists whose main bond is a common hatred for the U.S." (Farley, 1999) who were linked to the Algerian man arrested at the border around Christmas; and it was a "growing threat from armed Islamic fundamentalists" (Paddock, 1999) that CIS countries and China faced last year. As in the previous two newspapers, there is a tendency to identify and label the terrorist groups as Muslims and Islamic without being more specific. 28% of 120 articles used explicit pejorative terms when linking Muslims to terrorism.

d. USA Today in 1999.

Compared to the other three newspapers, *USA Today* had a smaller number of stories on Muslims' involvement in terrorism - about 64 articles in 1999. But the same labeling occurred even within this smaller group.

- Islamic terrorists - in 3 articles
- Extremists - in 1 article
- Violent - in 1 article

- Fundamentalists - in 4 articles
- Threat to international security - in 2 articles
- Militant - in 9 articles

In all, 27% of these 64 articles used explicit epithets in linking Muslims to terrorism. 'Militant' seems to be the term used most with 'Islam' and 'Muslims'. A typical case of such labeling in the *USA Today* would be: "Police blamed attack on Islamic militants opposed to the peace process" (Kalman, 1999). The story does not explain who these "Islamic militants" are. Why the reporter used such label is not even clear from the text of the article. But the blame falls on Muslims as a result of such identification.

e. Discussion

The language analysis of the four newspapers suggests that there is a set of terms frequently used in these dailies in 1999 in their reporting on Muslims and terrorism. These terms help characterize Islam as a violent religion and create a negative stereotype of its followers. Reporters used the epithets like 'militant', 'extremist', 'fundamentalist', 'terrorist' and 'radical' that generalized Muslims as terrorists. In most cases such identification by religion, used exclusively for Muslims and not other religions, was not necessary; in other words, the term 'Islamic' or 'Muslim' was not a part of an official name of the terrorist group. In many cases journalists did not identify any specific groups responsible or at least suspected in a given terrorist act, but they readily labeled them as Muslim.

Articles also misrepresented *jihad* by saying that it is a "holy war" waged against the West and U.S. in particular. The fact that some terrorist groups claim that they lead such a "*jihad*" against America does not excuse journalists who follow this claim and present it as a valid interpretation of the Quran accepted by all Muslims.

Although the four dailies largely ignored celebration of the major Islamic holiday, the holy month Ramadan, they mentioned it in the context of possible terrorist threats. Despite the lack of evidence and anonymity of governmental sources, the reports warned Americans traveling outside the U.S. against terrorist attacks by Muslims. Apparently, the single basis for the warnings was the Muslim holiday. With very few exceptions, this was the only coverage Ramadan received in 1999.

4. Final discussion:

Obviously, these four dailies do not openly state that "all Muslims are terrorists." But they don't have to. The consistent use of 'Muslim' and "Islamic' identifications coupled with the reporting on terrorist groups without being specific about who these groups really are, creates a negative image that the reading public extends to all representatives of Islam. Can it be that we, the public, are so used to seeing "Muslim extremists" that we are tempted to say, "Muslims are extremists"?

When my Muslim friend visited me in the USA for the first time, one of my American friends asked me whether he liked America. She was surprised at the "yes" answer because she said: "Usually Muslims don't like America." She could not explain why she had that idea; she just knew it. She has never met a single Muslim in her life.

Maybe it is easier just to say 'Islamic terrorists' than engage into a deeper investigation of an issue or event. It is a convenient label. Probably, reporters do not act out of malice but rather out of ignorance when they resort to labeling. They take at the face value declarations by certain extremist groups who say they "lead a 'holy war' against the West" but in fact misrepresent the teachings of Quran.

Quran says: "Allah does not love aggression." (2:190) There are militant groups who pronounce themselves as Islamic extremists, call for a "*jihad*" against Americans and commit acts of terrorism. It would be very unfair, however, to say that about all 1 billion members of the religion that denounces any form of violence in its teachings. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon wrote on January 4, 2000 about terrorists like Osmana Bin Laden and their pseudo-*jihad* that "the violence at its core -- rejected by most Islamic authorities and anathema to most Muslims -- reflects how deeply alienated these extremists are" (Benjamin and Simon, 2000). Media make a mistake when they accept the terrorists' claim that these groups are leading the Islamic holy war against the West. This is not the meaning of the holy war as written in Quran and understood by most followers of Islam. This is a tactic used by bandits for political purpose, and the press falls into the trap. The terms 'Islamic' or 'Muslim' are also inappropriate in this context.

Agenda-setting theory indicates that media have power of telling the public which issues are important and which are not. The attention that the press give to Muslims in the context of terrorism and which is demonstrated by the numbers in the first part of this study, contributes to the violent image of Islam by putting the agenda: "Muslims are terrorists" on an important place for the public. The "exception" that the press makes for the members of Islamic faith in media's tendency not to identify terrorists by their religion contributes to the negative image.

Why does the American press fall into this type of labeling? Is it because of its reliance on the governmental sources for information? If yes, is this the reason why press coverage often seems to be in amazing accordance with U.S. foreign policy?

Or is that because of the lack of political and cultural education on the part of reporters who are not willing to investigate deeper into the background of complex cultural and religious issues?

The results of this study raise a number of questions and concerns about how the press and, consequently, American public should treat the members of the fastest growing religion in the world, among whom 5 million members live in the United States and call it their home.

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Int'l

MEDIA LITERACY AND INDIA'S RAMAYAN IN NEPAL: ARE TV AESTHETICS UNIVERSAL OR CULTURE-BOUND?

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ABSTRACT

MEDIA LITERACY AND INDIA'S RAMAYAN IN NEPAL: ARE TV AESTHETICS UNIVERSAL OR CULTURE-BOUND?

BY DR. ELIZABETH BURCH

This case study examines media literacy as it relates to the encoding and decoding of messages intended for non-western viewers. A qualitative methodology of contextual aesthetics examines how production techniques clarified and intensified the narrative of Ramayan -- one of India's first Hindu soap operas produced for television and aired in India and Nepal in the late 1980s. The purpose is to identify whether televisual conventions are culturally-bound or universal. The study finds that culture plays a key role in the way television messages are constructed and perhaps interpreted.

MEDIA LITERACY AND INDIA'S RAMAYAN IN NEPAL: ARE TV AESTHETICS UNIVERSAL OR CULTURE-BOUND?

INTRODUCTION:

This paper examines the topic of media literacy within a Third World cultural context. A qualitative methodology of contextual aesthetics provides a framework in which to begin to understand production standards of one of the first and most popular religious soap operas produced in India and aired on Nepal television at the end of the 1980s. The purpose is to take a step back and deconstruct aesthetic standards of a culture newly introduced to television. Through understanding how production techniques in television are bound by cultural constraints, important insights on media literacy will be gained.

LITERATURE REVIEW:

Culture, Media Literacy and Aesthetics

A UNESCO publication defines culture as "a related whole of more or less formalized ways of thinking, feeling and acting which, learnt and shared by a number of people, serve, both objectively and symbolically, to make of those people a special, distinct collectivity" (1983, p. 17). When examining culture, one communications scholar says that culture refers to all socially transmitted and shared ways of thinking and acting" (Goonasekera, 1987, p. 7).

Culture is, according to Reddi, "the way of life of a people, a composite of historical and living traditions, beliefs, values and practices, reflected as much in patterns of childbirth, marriage and death, as in the music, dance, drama, theater, clothing, public tastes and clues, and in the religious practices of the given social system" (1989, p. 395). "People are," as Max Weber is quoted by the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, "animals suspended in webs of significance that they themselves have spun. I take culture to be those webs" (1973, p. 5).

According to Potter, "media literacy is a perspective from which we expose ourselves to the media and interpret the meanings of the messages we encounter" (1998, p. 5). The concept of media literacy has been used in particular to demonstrate not just the possible problems associated with comprehension of messages, but how audiences can potentially be manipulated by messages that are particularly persuasive in nature (Lewis and Jhally, 2000). Given the importance of culture as a factor in understanding how people make sense of media messages, the topic of media literacy should be discussed within a cultural context.

Are there cultural differences in the way people interpret information presented through media? In terms of the decoding process, studies conducted by Elihu Katz and Tamar Liebes (1988) examined one program in order to find out if varying cultural groups interpreted texts differently. Fifty four groups of five to six members in Israel and the United States were assembled to view and discuss one episode of Dallas. Within Israel the groups included Arabs, Moroccan, Jews, new immigrants from Russia, and second-generation of Israelis living on a kibbutz (a collective farm). Americans living in Los Angeles were also included in the study. It was found during a "re-telling" of the episode, that cultural background did indeed affect the way people interpreted the story.

As Hobbs points out about first-time or relatively new viewers, comprehension of messages remains a concern for producers. "If broadcasting is to be used to communicate information about nutrition, health care, sanitation, and agriculture, systematic efforts to examine the comprehension skills of television-naive viewers are essential" (1988, p. 34). Given the great expense of the medium, researchers concerned with international development today might agree.

Seeing objects in reality is not the same as perceiving those objects in pictures (McFee, 1978). McFee explains that object recognition in pictures often depends on prior experience. If people have a previous experience that a flat picture can represent three-dimensional objects, then they will be better able to understand that the images in those pictures connect with reality. Familiarity with the subject also helps with recognition. When Scottish and Zambian children were compared in their recognition of motor vehicles and animals, it was found that the Scottish children could more readily separate the vehicles from the animals. Because the Scottish children had more experience with machines, and also more experience with seeing pictures of animals, they were better equipped to interpret the information (1978).

In one UNESCO report on cross-cultural broadcasting (1976), Contreras discusses a community development project in Vicos, Peru, in which a film on hygiene was shown. Documents by Holmberg in 1960 revealed the visual aid had failed to convey its intended message. The problem lay in the fact that each scene (and in some cases even each shot) was perceived by the audience as a complete and separate incident. Villagers could not understand that the information related to their own lives. When cutaways of lice under a microscope were shown, people concluded that what they were seeing was an animal, not a bug that could get on a person's body (or their bodies).

In its most distilled sense, media literacy deals with the "interpreting of media messages (Silverblatt, 1995, p. 11). Aesthetic analysis, which examines how messages are created, is one important way to begin to understand this interpretation process (Zettl, 1998; Barker, 2000).

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 'aesthetic' derives from the Greek word meaning "through the senses". Thus, consistent with its original denotations, the first use of the word anaesthetic in English in 1721 meant, "a defect of sensations, as in a paralytic or drunk person" (Abbs, 1989, p. 77). Hegal writes, "Aesthetics means, precisely, the science of sensation of feeling" (1979, p. 1).

MEDIA LITERACY AND INDIA'S RAMAYAN IN NEPAL: ARE TV AESTHETICS UNIVERSAL OR CULTURE-BOUND?

To focus the discussion on the examination of how people perceive film and its stepchild, television, one must look to Herbert Zettl for a more specified definition of aesthetics (1973, 1990, 1998). "Aesthetics means for us a study of certain sense perceptions and how these perceptions can be most effectively clarified, intensified, and interpreted through a medium, such as television or film, for a specific recipient. Since all media elements interconnect and are ultimately shaped by our perceptual sensitivities, we call the 'operational field' within which we conduct our examination 'contextualistic aesthetics,' or simply 'contextualism' (Zettl, 1973, p. 2)." According to Zettl, contextual analysis involves identification of five aesthetic "fields." They are: Light and Color, Two Dimensional Space, Three Dimensional Space, Time and Motion, and Sound.

To answer the question of whether television aesthetics are universally understood or culture bound, one can examine how indigenous program producers encode texts in order to gain "preferred readings" by audiences (Fiske and Hartley, 1978; Hall, 1980). In 1966, Worth and Adair engaged in a study in which they taught one group of Navajo Native Americans how to use film cameras. They did this study in the hopes that the Navajos would create films that depicted their culture and themselves as they saw fit (1972). Consequently, narratives that were edited using a different set of conventions than that of the typical traditional Western approach were quite successful within the non-western context.

In the country of Nepal, health workers typically come to villages in person to disseminate information on health issues because most people in the country do not have access to television. One study was conducted in which VCRs were brought to a few, select villages and the local people were shown a program on how to make rehydration solution (Ogden-Gurung, 1989). It was found that comprehension of the information in the video was low, primarily because Western editing conventions confused viewers. In the video, viewers were to learn that they needed to put three handfuls of sugar into a glass of water with salt in order to make rehydration solution. Western aesthetic standards would demand that the scene be edited down into a number of shots that provided various perspectives on the action, such as close-ups and medium shots of the health worker. In fact, if the audio information were describing the activity in the form of narration, such as: "Now add three handfuls of sugar," American editors unfamiliar with the village audience would most likely cut at least one of the shots of the hand actually pouring the sugar into the glass. Yet, indigenous editors who knew their communities well, or even serious students of the culture, would instead edit the scene as one complete segment without any cuts. To those more bound by Western aesthetic standards of montage, this scene might "feel" excruciatingly slow and boring. Yet the village editor would be right in refraining from cutting the action. Understanding that viewers would not be able to read the picture information otherwise, the non-western aesthetic choice would be the more successful communication route.

In order to identify whether aesthetics are universal or culture-bound, one must limit a study to specific production elements and specific cultures. Since the soap opera genre has been successfully applied within a development context (Singhal and Rogers, 1989), what then can be said about the choices made in the encoding of purely entertainment texts in India and Nepal?

METHODOLOGY

Applying Zettl's theory of contexualism (1990), in which he concludes that symbolic associations are culturally learned, the author conducted a qualitative, aesthetic analysis of one widely-renowned Hindu soap opera that was produced for television in India and then aired in both India and Nepal. An examination of the five aesthetic fields that were clarified and intensified in the production revealed certain patterns unique to the encoding process that has evolved from those two South Asian cultures.

The five fields involve a number of variables. These are composed of: 1) conventional usage of light and color, 2) two-dimensional space (area and vectors or directional forces on the screen), 3) three-dimensional space (screen volume through articulation of X and Z axes; and visualization of field of view, camera angles and subjective camera), 4) time and motion (through motion vectors and editing), and 5) sound (literal and non-literal). Definitions of the terms above will be presented in the context of the analysis.

Through analyzing aesthetic variables one can begin to see the societies in question through indigenous producers' eyes. It should be mentioned, however, that although the author of this study has spent a number of years in the two countries under observation, research findings will be subjective. In future case studies, reader response studies, in-depth interviews with program producers, as well as a quantitative textual analysis, should be conducted if one is to draw any generalizable conclusions from the data herein.

AESTHETIC ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RAMAYAN IN NEPAL: INDIAN TELEVISION'S HINDU EPIC

Into an atmosphere of modernization Nepal's government introduced television in 1985 in much the same way as it was introduced in India: as a tool for education and rural development. Today, the small landlocked country is still a nation in deep trouble. Classified as one of the poorest in the world by the United Nations, it is not necessarily the "Shangrila" touted in the tourist guidebooks.

Television quickly became a popular medium in Nepal, a nation of over 24 million people. Starting with only one government-controlled station, today Nepal has 6 broadcast stations. Yet, because most Nepalese live in remote mountain villages that have no electricity, the majority of citizens do not receive the benefits of TV. Today only 45,000 televisions are in use in the country (The World Factbook, 1999).

By the time Nepal started television broadcasting, the medium was already firmly established in India where it began over 25 years before in 1959. Nepalese producers, who have a proud and rich cultural tradition to draw program ideas from, do create their own shows. Still, Nepal's audiences have come to expect the high budget, technological wizardry found in Indian films produced by the nearby Mumbai cinema industry. Audiences have typically clamored for more entertainment programs from that nation, as well as from other more developed countries.

Along with the entertainment and temporary distraction from problems at home has come a pattern of commercial sponsorship by advertisers happy to cash in on the new wave. The result has been an influx of soap operas that offer only spiritual, rather than economic solace to Nepal's poor (Bista, 1989).

Culture and religion have traditionally been bound together in Asian societies. Thus, when television producers in India recreated a Hindu epic called, Ramayan, they were thrilled to find the show had an estimated following of over 70 million regular viewers in 1988 (Bhatia, 1989). So important was the epic to the Hindu population that, in some places in India, actual riots broke out whenever electricity was turned off during air-time. In response, the government made it illegal for work to be done on electrical lines during airings of weekly episodes.

Yet, Ramayan is clearly not just India's religious epic alone. The story comes originally from Hindu mythology, which crosses many geographical borders. Hinduism is known to have arisen in the Ganges Valley in the second half of the first millennium BC. According to government reports, 90 percent of Nepalis are Hindus (5% Buddhist, 3% Moslem, 2% other)

(The World Factbook, 1999). It is no surprise then that the program was so popular in Nepal in its time. Since then other religious epics have been turned into soap operas, such those based on Mahabharat and the Bhagvad Gita.

Ramayan chronicles the life of a hero, Ram, a human incarnation of Vishnu, the God of preservation. Ram was born to a king on earth, in order to grow up and restore the balance of good and evil in the world, threatened at the time by the demon king, Ravana of Sri Lanka. The epic was shot for television by the famous film director, Ramanand Sagar. Still, critics of the over 100 episodes call the show "the opium of the masses" (Bhatia, 1989, p. 75). What is it then about Ramayan that so suits the Nepalese sense of aesthetics?

STRUCTURING THE FIRST AND FOURTH AESTHETIC FIELDS: LIGHTING, COLOR AND MOTION

Ramayan, because it is a television version of a Hindu myth, draws a great deal of its imagery from India and Nepal's very ancient art, sculpture and architecture tradition (Waldschmidt, 1970). The main characteristic of the traditional forms is that the work is usually very ornamental, and, therefore, considered very beautiful. Within the context of Hinduism, Sen describes a Hindu's enjoyment of a work of art as being similar to a "mystic experience" (1978, p. 254).

The story of Ram is retold in dance performances and puppet shows throughout India and parts of Nepal during seasonal ritual worship periods. In a sense, Ramayan promoted a revival in Nepal. By creating a demand for the imagery, television producers have reached back into the pool of ancient Hindu art treasures and recreated the pictures for television.

MEDIA LITERACY AND INDIA'S RAMAYAN IN NEPAL: ARE TV AESTHETICS UNIVERSAL OR CULTURE-BOUND?

Painters and sculptors have always understood the importance of light in their work. According to Zettl, in television, the first aesthetic field is light. Most of the scenes to be analyzed in the first episode of Ramayan used typical television high key, flat lighting techniques known as "Notan". Notan lighting uses light to provide basic illumination (The other very important use of light is Chiaroscuro lighting, which creates light and dark contrasts to emphasize volume). There was also use of internal lighting effects, such as chromakey or matting effects in scene one, which produced some very interesting images. Images seemed almost painted. The use of internal lighting is not unique to Ramayan, or Hindu culture, yet when combined with the extension of the first field, color, it can be said an aspect of Hindu spirituality was expressed.

Color perception is universal, except for those who are color blind. Color on television functions in three principle ways. It can either be informational, expressive or compositional. Zettl writes that color associations are learned. That statement is certainly the case in the context of this Hindu soap opera. In every scene of Ramayan, color is used to relay information. This information is used to conjure associations (metonomy) in viewers' minds. Therefore, without prior exposure to Hindu mythology, a person would simply never be able to understand the significance of this story.

The colors used in the production are as bright and saturated as those found on the American show Star Trek. It is interesting to note that, like the first series of Star Trek, Ramayan also deals with life forms beyond earth. Star Trek as a science fiction show was primarily about contact with other life forms existing in space beyond the human race. Ramayan has the same premise but on a more religious level wherein gods and goddesses abound and human life on earth is answerable to these deities.

MEDIA LITERACY AND INDIA'S RAMAYAN IN NEPAL: ARE TV AESTHETICS UNIVERSAL OR CULTURE-BOUND?

Scene one of Ramayan depicts a conversation between the three gods -- Vishnu, Shiva and Bramha. Shiva and Bramha convince Vishnu, the god of preservation, that he must be reborn on earth in order to save the world from destruction. Shot completely as though the scene is taking place on the sun, the lower half of the screen is filled with a shot of the ocean, which is soft wiped against the upper portion of the screen. In the cosmic sense, Vishnu was supposed to be interpreted as the ocean, "Nara", which was spread everywhere before the creation of the universe, but he is also called Narayana, "moving in the waters". In Ramayan, Vishnu is represented in human form in the upper portion of the screen with the other gods.

All three, including their followers, float suspended, electronically matted against a dense background which is "painted" (or clipped in the switcher) to be sometimes a shimmering reddish orange and other times purple. The shimmering may have been created by a key effect done in the switcher. In this case, colors have an informational function, that is to tell us that the gods are on the sun, yet the purple adds an abstraction to that information, and therefore, begins to take on an expressive function. In the expressive function colors can provide drama and excitement. The colors have become the dramatic event themselves.

Within one part of this scene, the background moves from left to right, which gives the reverse impression that the gods are flying from right to left. This is created by use of a "induced motion vector." A vector is a directional force. A motion vector can be movement that goes in a certain direction. This movement can also be illusionary, induced by secondary motion (which is camera motion: including pan, tilt, pedestal, crane or boom, dolly, truck or zoom) on a static event to stimulate primary motion (event motion in front of the camera). This animation effect may have been possible by having two cameras pan across a very long painting. By wiping the image together over and over again with soft horizontal wipes (a wipe is an editing transition that seems to push one image off the screen while another image appears in its place), a loop could be created. This could have been taped and later matted behind the live action in the studio where the actors were standing, with a second tape of the ocean soft-wiped into the bottom third of the screen.

Internal lighting effects are used in one more shot in scene one. The shot depicts the demon king's reign of terror over the earth. Ravana's laughing face is chromakeyed behind a foreground of fighting warriors. Because of the size relationship (the face large and the warriors small), one can tell that Ravana is inciting war among the humans. One must know the mythology involved to understand what this scene means: the destruction of human kind, and the imbalance of evil over good.

Again, because colors can function as information, the gods and other characters can be identified by their costume colors and skin colors (Ions, 1967). Vishnu's skin is blue. He has four arms and is shown reclining on a coiled serpent, which is a kind of boat for him and his mistress Lakshmi. Brahma, though usually seen with red skin and riding a goose, in Ramayana, can not be recognized so easily. Instead, he is dressed as his "other self" for prayer and sacrifice in austere white robes. He floats on a lotus petal. Legend has it that the lotus arose from his navel, though at the same time legend states he arose from the lotus. Either way, he represents the god of creation and is very important in this scene because Vishnu must be reborn on earth. Brahma's followers are spirit-priests. This is known because they are dressed in the traditional orange robes that are worn by priests in Nepal and India.

The third god in the scene is Shiva, god of destruction. He is dressed in a tiger cloth and has matted hair in which rests a crescent moon. Although Shiva represents the end of time and completes the Hindu cycle of creation, preservation and destruction in Hindu mythology, out of the end comes the beginning and therefore, Shiva is also associated with fertility. Shiva is a very important to the Nepalese who honor him with a festival every year they call, "Shiva Lingum". He is the god of the national shrine, the Temple of Pasupatinath.

By knowing who these gods are, one can follow subsequent scenes in which they are alluded to through the use of cutaways edited into scenes throughout the epic. The cutaways are used to project the fact that the gods are always watching over the earth and deciding the fate of human-kind. That is why religious Hindus believe they must perform pujas (rituals) to keep the gods happy.

Another expressive function of color is to establish mood. Zettl says the more intimate or introspective an event becomes, the more one can treat outer reality as low-definition. In terms of color this means that a subdued color scheme or a single, dark hue would be appropriate since it would not distract viewers from the latent narrative. Thus, the more introverted an event is, the less important color becomes. In some ways this rule does apply to a Hindu sense of aesthetics. When a person is in mourning, he or she will wear solid colors -- only white for instance (not black, as in American culture). Still, Zettl's rule seems to be broken when depicting the spiritual life of the Hindu gods and goddesses. As previously mentioned in Ramayan, high energy colors were used to portray the cosmos and the gods themselves, which is a pretty ethereal and introverted scene. Even in real life, Brahmin priests, who are the guardians of Hindu spirituality and the "inner reality", wear only bright orange robes, a high energy (or external) color by American standards.

In scene two of Ramayan, a human king asks for advice from his priest. He wants to have an heir, but can not seem to get any of his three wives pregnant. Again, colors are used as information in this scene. The priest is recognizable by the orange robes he wears. The priest is of Brahmin caste, which is the highest caste in the Hindu hierarchical system. Priests perform the religious and social duties associated with marriage and death, and are, because they are literate and educated, considered quite influential. Of course they serve as important opinion leaders.

Critics, who felt the airing of Ramayan in Nepal contributed to a kind of Hindu imperialism, say the maintenance of the caste system only helps the Brahmins keep their high status in society (Bista, 1989). Yet there is a kind of modernization that has set in in Nepal. Many of the urban youth respect the Hindu tradition, yet firmly refuse to participate in ridged fundamentalism. One such individual commented on the programs, saying he and his friends liked Ramayan simply because it was interesting (A. Gurung, personal communication, 1990).

The king and his wives in Ramayan can be identified as royalty because they wear a great deal of gold. Gold represents wealth in Nepal and India, as it does in the rest of the world. In Nepal, gold ornaments are highly coveted and worn whenever possible during festivals, weddings and feast days. In general, only royalty or the very rich would wear a great deal of gold on a regular day.

Another point can be made about color throughout Ramayan. Zettl writes, "The compositional function of color is to help establish form. Colors can define certain screen areas. They can emphasize some areas and de-emphasize others, in order to bring the energies of the pictorial elements into a balanced, yet dynamic interplay." (1973, p. 97) This concept is highly subjective. What is a dissonant or unbalanced color combination in one culture, may be seen as very beautiful in another.

The color combinations used throughout Ramayan are often highly saturated and, thus, are not considered at all harmonious by American aesthetic standards, according to Zettl. Given the rule of compositional function, color combinations throughout the episode could said to be constantly clashing.

In scene six, the story has progressed to the point where, because the king followed the priest's advice to make a puja to the gods, all three of his wives gave birth to children. Consequently, the whole village has a festival in which a great dance takes place. The core of most societies has always been the family. Thus scene six is a very joyous scene.

To give a sense of reality to the event, exterior scenes were shot on film and edited in with the studio scenes on tape creating a juxtaposition. The effect was a mix of true earth tones on film and highly saturated colors on tape.

Within the scene, a dancer jumps on a ball of red powder, which explodes around her feet. The color red is traditionally used by Hindus during festival ceremonies. A bit of red powder and water, sometimes mixed in with flower petals, is placed on the forehead, where the third eye is said to be. This is called a "tika". Red powder represents holiness. Red, in this case is used in its expressive function, as the dramatic event itself. Yet it is also informational, it tells us that there is a reason to celebrate -- Ram has been born.

Women who are about to get married also use red in the form of a dye called henna. It is the custom to dye their hands and feet in the rinse. Women who are already married may put a line of red powder down the part of their braided hair. Arnheim makes an interesting point when he writes, "Cultures that stress the difference between men and women will produce other color habits than those that favor similarity and comradeship. What is suitable for a woman to wear will depend upon whether she is considered the man's partner of his plaything. Thus, once the expression of color is reliably explored, studies of color preference are likely to yield a reliable picture of the cultural setting" (1969, p. 335).

It is significant that the standardization of the aesthetics of color has come not from artistic practice, but from industry need to manufacture pigments for mass production (Arnheim, 1969). To explore the origin of colors in Asia, one might have to speculate on the spices (masala) of the region. Chili peppers are of course red and green. Cumin and coriander are used for curries and are a kind of light brown. Tumeric is bright orange. Saffron is another type of orange. It is possible that South Asians began dying their clothes in their spices. Later the colors could be synthetically produced. Either way, color is of central importance throughout Nepalese and Indian culture, as clearly portrayed throughout Ramayan.

The colorful sets and costumes help create an elaborate supra-reality, yet several scenes in Ramayan are shot outside in nature, which seems to be more real. The natural colors of turquoise blue sky and dense green forests compliment the unreality of the studio scenes. Perhaps in a society so burdened by poverty, fancy costumes and jewelry are simply out of reach. Therefore, natural colors reflect the wealth in nature to a dominantly agricultural society. The Indians and the Nepalese are very proud of the sheer physical beauty of their countries. Beauty, reflected through a deluge of colors, also helps to lift the spirit from the banal into the cosmic.

Colors that are used in the ritual arts, according to some interpretations, add meaning and creativity to the individual and social life. Yet it is the ritual, not just the colors, that is important in Nepalese culture. Rituals bring people together into a common aesthetic expression. Strict adherence to traditional religious codes of behavior bind a community even further, and give order and meaning to their universe.

THE FIFTH DIMENSIONAL FIELD: SOUND

Zettl writes that the three functions of television sound are, "to supply essential or additional information, to establish mood and aesthetic energy, and to supplement the rhythmic structure of the screen event" (1973, p. 330).

In the information function, dialogue is called "literal sound", that is, sound that is referential. All the dialogue in Ramayan is of course spoken in Hindi. Yet, this does not pose a problem in Nepal because of the prior language knowledge of the audience who can receive television, such as those in the Kathmandu Valley and the Terai. Most tribes in the Terai (the lowlands of the Himalayas), are similar in race and language to their Indian counterparts. The majority population of Newars in the Kathmandu Valley are also able to understand most of the Hindi in Ramayan. This makes sense because many of the verb roots and nouns are the same between Hindi and Nepalese, and the written letters (called Devangari) are the same. Similarities with Hindi can also be found in a number of other localized languages in India, such as Bengali and Urdu.

The fact that most television watching is done collectively in Nepal, with family or friends, makes it likely that missed information will be explained by a member more fluid in Hindi. Interestingly, Tamil speakers of southern India probably understood less of what was going on in Ramayan than the Nepalese. Of course, those unable to understand any of these languages would be the most confused of all.

An understanding of what is being said by whom is also very important in the story. If one can not decipher who the "bad guys" are, as opposed to the "good guys," then a great deal of meaning is lost. It should also be noted that the musicians and actors in Ramayan were already firmly established stars due to their past work in Indian films. Because the audience recognizes the stars they must relate to the television show differently than someone unfamiliar with the world of Hindi cinema. The audience took notice of Ramayan, because after all, this was a show filled with very famous personalities.

Of course, language is culture-bound. As Zettl writes, "literal sounds create a literal imagery, only if their symbolism has been learned" (1973, p. 332). Where this fact becomes even more important is in the use of literal sound combined with descriptive non-literal sound. Non-literal sounds have no literal meaning. The most common form of this kind of sound is music. Songs in the case of Ramayan are thematic. Sung throughout the epic, broken only occasionally by a few short scenes, they make up a big part of the total screen experience. In fact, there is so much rich music in Ramayan that when it takes pause, the scene seems to really lack something in this genre.

Songs that are sung underneath the main visual action generally add information to the telling of the myth. To miss this information, is to miss much of the inner meaning. Songs sung by the actors portray their "inner feelings" about the events. Songs are the psychology of the moment.

Still, "music has a way", according to Prendergast, "of bypassing the human's normal, rational defense mechanisms" (1977, p. 210). One might assume the feeling of the music could be portrayed across cultures. Yet even this, may not be true. If feelings are translated, they come across only on a superficial level.

To illustrate, in scene six during the festival, villagers sing about the birth of Ram. It is likely that the joy presented in the rendition of this song is multiplied by the audiences recognition of it. In the absence of high levels of literacy in villages, festival songs, as well as much of Hindu mythology, are passed along, through a strong oral tradition. They are the songs of the people. Thus, there is a shared meaning among even literate Hindus who feel a bond to village life. It is a common frame of reference that goes deeper than the obvious emotions portrayed in the music establishing a metaphorical meaning.

For instance, to religious Hindus, birth means reincarnation. There is an attitude about time, which enables the individual to perceive the past and the future as part of present life. This may be interpreted as the consonant harmonies in the music. Yet, there is tension in the music as well as a kind of dissonance. The joy is tempered with the sorrow connected to human existence. To be reborn means, to a certain extent, that one must experience more human suffering. For Ram, this leads into an even more obscure aspect of joy, such as the fact that in spiritual idealism, a person's greatness is found not in what he achieves, but what he renounces. Much later in the epic this becomes significant when Ram must endure thirteen years of exile.

The songs sung on screen in Indian films and television are always over-dubbed. Often, they are not over-dubbed with complete precision. Because the Nepalese are used to this style from their experience with the Hindi film genre, they do not object. On the other hand, many Americans who see the over-dub technique used for the first time might automatically respond by pointing it out as seeming humorous, fake and "low-budget". When an aesthetic convention strikes such a strong response cross-culturally, it is likely the convention can be deemed to be culture-bound. Any time something seems absurd, unless it is intended to be perceived as such, then it is a sure sign of a miscommunication. Conversely, if something is supposed to be seen as funny, but audiences overwhelmingly do not get the joke, then communication has not occurred.

Non-literal sound also includes pure instrumental music. Descriptive non-literal sounds, such as a descending scales that accompanies a picture of someone falling, thereby increasing the magnitude of the screen event, is common across many cultures. What is unique to Indian television is its expressive non-literal sound.

Because its roots stem from the improvisational mastery of classical Indian music, and the snappy, singable melodies of commercial Indian films (Ghosh, 1989), the music of Ramayan does not lose its emotive, sensual qualities on television. Making liberal use of the raga-tala structure, Ramayan's overall sound is altogether culture-bound. This is because even instrumental music carries with it certain learned associations and nuances that those outside the culture are apt to miss. To an American ear, the sounds are exotic. To an Indian or Nepali, they are the sounds of home.

Scales and chords are simply artifacts of our culture. The fact that a minor scale may induce a feeling of sorrow among many people in different cultures may be profound, but the association was still learnt somewhere. Indian music employs scales and rhythmic meters quite different than those used in the European musical tradition. The instrumentation is also unique. Therefore, the television music is different from that found in the West.

Ragas are melodic scales that employ varying combinations of the twelve basic musical notes, along the subtle micro-tonal intonations (Rao, 1989). They are also differentiated by the apparent emphasis of certain notes in the scales over others. Each raga stresses a few particular emotions or musical ideas that the musician improvises upon in order to bring out its inherent mood.

Talas or rhythmic cycles are best thought of as patterned divisions of a circle. The circle represents a unit of time. Once the patterns are run through and the circle is completed the whole process is then repeated, perhaps embellished differently on the repetition.

Indian classical music has two schools: Karnatik from the South and Hindustani from the North. Both streams have evolved from the raga-tala structure. It could be said that Indian classical musicians almost have a culture all their own, as has been said about all people who share a similar career. The deeper the meaning of the music may not come across to the general population at large. Indian music, though enjoyable to most, does require a somewhat educated ear to be appreciated.

Traditionally, particular ragas were played only at certain times of the day or year. There are morning ragas, ragas for the spring or winter, etc. The gradations are so fine that one may hear an early morning raga such as one played at six a.m., sounding completely different in mood from a five a.m. raga. This is most appropriate. Indian concerts are generally all-night affairs. At a concert the author attended in Calcutta several years ago, Ravi Shankar, the star of the night, was not even brought on stage until 4 a.m. Mr. Shankar's 4 a.m. raga was very dreamlike. On the other hand, his six a.m. raga brought on the start of a new day and was exhilarating. The difference between the two was clearly apparent.

With the advent of recording, Indian music can be played at any time of day, therefore some of the significance of the music gets lost. Still, throughout Ramayan, ragas that accompanied the story were probably somewhat matched to the appropriate 'story time' within the narrative.

The whole phenomenon of time and music is unique to Indian culture. The recognition of the folk songs by the greater Hindu audience in Nepal and India alike means that the television music was understood in essence by only that culture. Interestingly, Zettl points out that where there is a strong reliance upon color to intensify a narrative, music is sure to follow. This has definitely proven to be the case in Ramayan.

BEYOND MUSIC AND COLOR IN RAMAYAN:

A few points must be said about the aesthetic principles involved in the shooting of the dance scenes in Ramayan. As Daumal points out, "It would be artificial to speak separately of Hindu music and dance" (1982, p. 27). If music is the clarification of the spiritual world of Hinduism, then the symbiotic relationship of music and dance is its intensification. In scene six, when Ram is born, the ensuing festival is alive with dancing. The dancers, trained classically, are used to dancing for the screen from their previous experience in cinema. In Ramayan, the dancers do not fail to meet the audience's expectations. Likewise, the cinematography is far from amateur. The music is of course accompaniment.

To the Nepalese, dance (which is event motion in aesthetic terms) is said to be like a prayer. Through the use of gestures in which each have a signification as precise as a word, the dancers use their bodies to recount complicated legends about the gods and goddesses. The gestures are all familiar to a well-versed Hindu spectator. In this way, the total experience of Ramayan mirrors the active forms of religious worship in India and Nepal. Needless to say, the gestures would not make a bit of sense to most Americans, nor to anyone else outside the culture.

The festival dance is shot in such a way as to intensify the screen space by editing together endless perspectives (based on multiple fields of view and camera angles) of the scene. Though this kind of complexity editing is not unique to Ramayan, the fast pace of the cuts sets up a kind of tribal rhythm that conjures up village life. Authenticity is the result. It also expresses within the story the simultaneous joy felt throughout the world that Ram has come to save humankind.

Countless camera angles increase the energy as viewers follow the dancers around the set through fast paced secondary camera movements. Ignoring Zettl's warning that an over use of fast zooms using z-axis motion vectors (motion toward or away from the camera) could annoy the viewer, a kind of "swish zoom" is used repeatedly (wherein the object seems to be hurled quickly along the z-axis toward the screen and the viewer). If it is a special effect, it is a powerful one when combined with the whole aural/visual adventure of Ramayan. What would be annoying within a Western aesthetic, therefore, is the norm in Ramayan.

Index vectors motivate the editing in Ramayan. Index vectors are directional forces that point unquestionably in a specific direction. Eyes are excellent index vectors because they look in a specific direction, which causes viewers to look that way as well. Eyes are also very important communicators within a culture so diverse in language as India and Nepal. They can project joy or sorrow. In Ramayan, characters use their eyes to briefly flirt with other on-screen personalities. Perhaps that is why the scene is cut to a fast beat. In a country as conservative in its attitudes about sex as Nepal, a brief flirtation among the stars, one that lasts about one musical measure, is just long enough to provide a quick, safe and vicarious outlet for its audiences.

In conclusion, it was found that the five aesthetic fields were often used quite differently between Indian and American television. Because of these findings, one can safely hypothesize that some of the aesthetics principles in the television version of the Hindu epic are definitely bound by an Indian and Nepalese cultural paradigm.

CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that film and television technology originated in the West and was an innovation that was diffused to Third World producers through training sessions, Indian artisans did not fully embrace traditionally Western techniques of production. Although the 'rules' of aesthetics would have been taught during the dissemination period of the technology, they seem to have been left behind in multiple ways by the so called 'trainees'. It was found that the producers of Ramayan ignored certain aesthetic principles standard in American television production. One can also conclude that because American rules were repeatedly broken, conventions that may have been previously thought to be universal, did not seem to be so in this case.

There are several kinds are video/audio interference referred to in Zettl's book Sight, Sound, Motion. Given the findings of this paper, it would be appropriate to add one more category to the list: "inter-cultural interference." Inter-cultural interference, as the author would define it, would be a kind of informational interference in which a person from one culture encounters symbols (aesthetic elements of production) from another culture, but can only misinterpret them, experiencing them as nothing more than noise. Like wrong information, inter-cultural interference inhibits the intended interpretation of messages across cultures. Understanding that what is 'right' information in one culture is 'wrong' information in another may help to break down the barrier of intercultural communications.

Hopefully, the analysis of how cultural views get translated through aesthetic conventions of television production dealing with the entertainment genre has provided some new insights, especially for those concerned with the topic of media literacy within a Third World context. Television can be a highly creative medium. It can also be a force for social change and a strong educational tool. It is, therefore, worthwhile for media educators to study aesthetic standards of television in the Third World, especially when productions are targeted to viewers less familiar with the medium. In this way, communication across borders may become easier for all in the future.

MEDIA LITERACY AND INDIA'S RAMAYAN IN NEPAL: ARE TV AESTHETICS UNIVERSAL OR CULTURE-BOUND?

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Between the Government and the Press: The Role of Western Correspondents and Government Public Relations in Reporting on the Middle East

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Abstract: Although the source-reporter relationship forms the focal point of news gathering in any political conflict, most of the source-reporter literature focuses on the routines and values of the reporter. This is the first study of its kind that investigates the power dynamics involved in the relationship between the Western correspondents stationed in Egypt and Israel and the two government's press relations officers. Almost 88 percent of the Western correspondents in Egypt and Israel, and the three top government press relations directors were interviewed in late 1998 to determine their role perceptions within the context of two theoretical models: the newsmaking model and the public relations two-way asymmetric model. Correspondents said analysis of complex issues was their primary role and the government officials said theirs was provision of information to correspondents. Correspondents said Israeli officials are far more accessible than their Egyptian counterparts and this makes them easier to work with, but makes correspondents more skeptical of the information they provide. The newsmaking model best describes the relationship.

Keywords: Middle East, news correspondent, public relations, newsmaking, journalist

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Between the Government and the Press: The Role of Western Correspondents and Government Public Relations in Reporting on the Middle East

In the last half century, the Arab-Israeli conflict has led to six major wars in the Middle East and has cost thousands of lives. It has left the Palestinian people stateless and dispersed, creating frustration and exacerbating regional tension. Moreover, the conflict has diverted billions of dollars from productive investments to the purchase of armaments and has blocked regional cooperation for economic development that would have permitted a more rational and effective use of national resources (Granham & Tessler, 1995).

This study investigates how access to information about the Middle East conflict by Western correspondents in both Egypt and Israel is affected by professional role perceptions held by the government's press officials and by the correspondents themselves. The importance of this study emanates from the argument that decision makers rely on information available to them via the news media to formulate state policies. This information, reflecting the concerns, capabilities, and orientations of their adversaries, is a key factor influencing government negotiation strategies in periods of conflict.

At the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a recurrent pattern of misunderstanding and failed communication between governments. (Cohen, 1990). Western correspondents generate an important portion of inter-governmental communication. How they do so can potentially reduce or exacerbate misunderstanding. Their performance, in turn, is affected by the actions of the governments themselves as represented by official press relations officers. The symbiotic relationship between reporter and government spokesman is critical to understanding how the intentions and motivations of governments are communicated to other states as well as to the international audience.

Egypt and Israel were chosen for investigation because virtually all Western correspondents operating in the Middle East are stationed in either Cairo, Jerusalem, or Tel Aviv. And though Egypt is not the only country arrayed in opposition to Israeli policies, it is the largest and most influential in both Arab and Western circles. For this study, a Western correspondent is a citizen of the democratic industrial nations of Central and Western Europe, North America, and Australia, (Safire, 1993) stationed in the Middle East and reporting to an international audience.

The three government press relations directors were the individuals directly responsible for providing accreditation and technical services to correspondents and distributing communiqués and press releases composed by various ministries to local and foreign correspondents. In Israel, the two press relations directors interviewed were the general director of the Government Press Office in Jerusalem (the GPO is responsible for representing the government's position to correspondents), and the director of the GPO's Tel Aviv branch (responsible for dealing with correspondents in Tel Aviv). In Egypt, the press relations director was the head of the State Information Service (the SIS is responsible for assisting correspondents covering news about Egypt).

The study identifies and assesses obstacles in the flow of information between governments and correspondents. The study also investigates the nature of the relationships between the governments and the press. These relationships are discussed in the context of two mass communication models: the newsmaking model and the two-way asymmetric model of public relations.

Review of the Literature

The term "foreign correspondents" was defined as "media personnel who report and interpret the actions and events of different societies for a selected audience of readers not native to the country". (Starck & Villaneuva, 1992, p.2). As important gatekeepers in the flow and formation of international news, foreign correspondents contribute to the way people perceive other cultures and societies. The foreign correspondent plays a vital role in the process of cultures communicating with and across other cultures and may be an important factor in the sensitivity and understanding of people of other cultures. As the desire for peace among peoples grows, the role of the foreign correspondent becomes increasingly important and requires closer examination.

The Source-Reporter Relationship

According to Boulding and Senesh, "knowledge is power" in the sense that there is a close relationship between those who wield political power and those with superior knowledge. (Boulding & Senesh, 1983). Based on that argument, political systems always attempt to enhance the knowledge process by communicating their decisions to all the interested parties through the news media (Boulding & Senesh, 1983). Public relations officials attempt to relate their organizations' viewpoints to reporters and in turn to relate reporters' questions and views to their organizations. In the process, the official press relation officers' relationships with the reporters can undergo tension and mistrust (Dimmick, 1974).

A number of surveys have compared how journalists and public relations practitioners assess each other. Feldman (1961a, 1961b) was the first to conduct such a study, using a Likert-type attitude scale with pro and con statements. Feldman's survey subjects were 746 city editors of newspapers and 88 officers of local Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) chapters across the United States. Findings of this study did not report statistics, only narrative interpretations. This inaugural study, like all subsequent studies in this vein, found discrepancies in the attitudes of the two groups on dimensions such as credibility, occupational status, and professionalism.

Kopenhaver (1985) surveyed 47 Florida journalists and 57 PRSA members about their perceptions of the news values and their assessment of public relations practice. Results showed that news values of the two groups were virtually identical but that their views toward public relations practice conflicted. The journalists viewed public relations practitioners as obstructionist and their news releases as publicity disguised as news.

Press and Politics in Egypt and Israel

The state regularly intervenes in knowledge creation and diffusion, believing its actions will affect knowledge in use which, in turn, will produce behavior supporting state goals. In doing so, the state can either allow for a free flow of information with minimal restrictions or it can exercise considerable control over the news media by direct operation censorship, restrictive codes, and control of materials. (Boulding & Senesh, 1983).

Both Egypt and Israel have a history of censorship dating back to the origin of the state. In Egypt, President Nasser practiced direct censorship over the press and made Egypt the first Arab country to link newspapers with a political organization (McDermott, 1988). Succeeding leaders have reduced censorship and political control of the media to the point where today the press experiences little direct government interference and acts with considerable autonomy. Since the founding of Israel in 1948, the country's press has been subject to a "self-imposed" constraint on its autonomy due to concerns about state security. Throughout its history, security and foreign affairs have remained sensitive matters and there has been widespread agreement that the news media should be restricted in these matters. The Military Censor has had direct responsibility for preventing the publication of any material that would endanger the security of the state. While the Military Censor remains in place today, the recent past (especially after the 1973 War) has witnessed a new era where more emphasis has been devoted to the public's right to know (McDermott, 1988).

Power Dynamics in Source-Reporter Relations

Direct censorship and political control of the press are not the sole avenues by which a government can exercise influence over the press. Governments also influence the news media by undertaking public relations strategies aimed at convincing journalists of the soundness of government policies and conveying official viewpoints on political, economic, social, and other issues to the journalists and the general public (Nimmo, 1964).

Only two articles alluded to the question of power between source and reporter. Nicolai and Riley (1972) state that editorial gatekeepers occupy positions of power relative to public relations practitioners, "whose livelihoods depend on the decision-making power of editors to use their material" (p. 371). And in a brief article, Newsom (1983) provides a sketch of what could be called the adversary theory of the press. Newsom portrays pressure groups and the media as a combined force holding an unfair advantage over the public relations practitioner. Newsom's article plays a trailblazing role in addressing the important issues of power and the adversarial function of the reporter.

Johnstone et al. categorized journalists' roles as "neutral" and "participant" (Johnstone, et al. 1976). Under the neutral role, the news media constitute an impartial transmission link dispensing information to the public; in this case, the journalist is a spectator to the ongoing social process and his main job is to transmit faithfully and objectively accurate communications about it. Under the participant role, the journalist plays a more active role in imposing his own point of view on the events. This is a more challenging role for the journalist who is actively involved in the newsgathering process (Johnstone, et al. 1976). Other roles were identified by Weaver and Wilhoit's later replications of the Johnstone et al. study including interpretive (investigating government claims); disseminator (getting information to the public quickly); adversary (having a skeptical attitude toward the government); and populist mobilizer (setting the political agenda) (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996).

Newsmaking Model. According to this model, officials and reporters contribute to the selection of events reported to the public according to established criteria. Selection is made according to factors such as timeliness, professional values and organizational interests, rational acceptability, and other elements common to both sources and journalists. Newsmaking is also accomplished under various organizational pressures existing in a particular source organization, e.g. material and technical resources, freedom of information, and organizational visibility. "Through these processes, the source organization eventually transforms the occurrence into an event which is potentially available to the reporter as news" (Ericson, et al. 1987, p. 40).

According to Roscho, "the term 'newsmaking' is intended to indicate that news content, overall, is the end-product of a social process that results in some information being published while other information is ignored or discarded. By viewing news as a social phenomenon, one is led to examine the routine procedures underlying news-media performance" (Roscho, 1975, p. 4). Published news has a "dual origin." As a social product, the press' content reflects the society from which it emerges; as an organizational product, press content is a result of the workings of specialized organizations whose function is to gather and dispense news. "Together, these intermingled conditions constitute the sociology of news" (Roscho, 1975, p. 5).

The single element binding the literature is that the public relations practitioner is a news source. A source is defined as any person conveying information to a news reporter that can be used in a news story. This is one of many recognized functions of public relations in organizations (Ryan & Martinson, 1988).

The relationship between the government as source and a news organization is one where governmental bureaucrats act as public relations practitioners, mediating between the senior members of the government and the media to ensure that the right information is released and access assured. Sources are continually deciding whether certain information should be revealed, which details should be highlighted or discarded, and when the story should be offered to the press (Ericson, et al., 1987).

Information Subsidies

One of the most popular techniques used by governments to control their news sources is the information subsidy. According to Gandy (1982), an information subsidy increases the demand for certain information by lowering its price to the consumer. "Just as brand names provide consumers with some basis for evaluating the quality of a product with which they have no experience, the credibility of the information source carries some indication of the quality of information in relation to its price" (Gandy, p. 198).

More sources are heard when reporters resist the temptation to use subsidized information. Likewise, verification of source information is more likely to occur when reporters approach sources with skepticism. Additional work using the information subsidy approach must address how the free exchange of ideas suffers when information is readily available from sources who work expertly to maintain the best possible relations with the press. The other concern, equally important, involves the suppression of information by sources to penalize reporters, to manage crisis situations, or to reify an authoritarian culture that suppresses ideas and issues (Morton & Warren, 1992).

The Two-Way Asymmetric Model. This public relations model, developed by Grunig and Hunt in 1984, describes a process where official sources use social science knowledge to initiate a persuasive public relations campaign. The underlying concept is that the source organizations need not change their attitudes, values, or actions; the public relations task is to gain compliance from the public (Grunig & Hunt, 1984).

Grunig described an asymmetric model as "the manipulation of public behavior that focuses, among other things, on attitude and behavior change, and means of persuasive communication" (Grunig & Grunig, 1989, p. 121). According to Grunig and Hunt, asymmetric model practitioners try to understand and anticipate journalists' behavior so that they can develop messages that suit the communication habits of the journalists (1984). Official sources operating under the asymmetric model have the upper hand over the journalists, as the news does not take place until the source agrees to release information to the reporter (Turk, 1986).

One of the major public relations tools used by government officials is the press conference. Journalists who attend a press conference can have access to "on the record" information with regard to government policies. However, the main disadvantage of a press conference is that it makes information so widely available that it becomes devalued (Tunstall, 1971). The government also uses informal or "quasi-routine" techniques to attract journalists. One of these techniques is the "backgrounder," where the source invites a selected group of reporters to discuss current events. Information dispensed during backgrounders is usually "off the record (Sigal, 1973, p. 111).

Research Design and Method

Both a cross-sectional survey (a quantitative tool), and a series of personal interviews (a qualitative tool) were used to collect data. The primary researcher traveled to Egypt and Israel to administer the survey and to conduct the interviews with all Western correspondents in the two countries and the three senior-most press relations officers in Egypt and Israel.

A self-administered paper questionnaire given to correspondents included close-ended questions using mainly Likert-type scales to assess the correspondents' reporting roles and their access to government officials. Journalistic roles were measured using a scale developed by Johnstone et al. in 1971 and modified by Weaver and Wilhoit in 1986 and 1996. Correspondents were also asked a series of predetermined questions derived from the literature during a face-to-face interview. The three press relations directors were interviewed using a less structured set of questions based on research by Grunig and others.

One of the main advantages of surveys is that large amounts of data can be collected with relative ease from a variety of people (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997). However, a survey might not yield enough details needed for a ground-breaking study of this kind and so the structured interviews were done. The interviews with the three press relations directors were based on a predetermined set of questions, but the respondent was free to range considerably in conversation. The interviews have several advantages over the survey. They allowed for more flexibility in asking questions and they gave the respondents the opportunity to express their views in a more comprehensive way. Moreover, they enabled the researcher to establish rapport with the respondents and gain their trust (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997).

The data was conducted in late 1998[1] using population lists provided by the Foreign Press Association bureaus in Egypt and Israel.[2] The researcher interviewed 94 of the 106 correspondents in Israel (88.7%) and 74 of the 85 correspondents in Egypt (87.1%).

Research Questions. This study was designed to answer the following research questions:

1) How do Western correspondents view their role in the government/media relationship and are the roles similar for correspondents in Egypt and Israel?
2) How do government press relations directors view their role in the government/media relationship and are the roles similar for press relations directors in Egypt and Israel?
3) Does the government press relations apparatus in Egypt have the same level of accessibility among Western correspondents as the Israeli government information establishment has among Western correspondents?

These research questions address the perceived relationship between governments and news media in Egypt and Israel as well as any differences between the professional roles undertaken by correspondents and government officials.

Findings

Though there is no such thing as an "average" correspondent, a statistical profile provides some insight into how the journalists interviewed differed from the average domestically-based journalist. More than two thirds were male (67.9%) with a median age of 42 years (65.5% were between 35 to 54). The average time working in the Middle East was 8.24 years. A third of the correspondents were from the United States (33.9%) and nearly all the rest were from Western Europe (56%) with Germans (14.9%), French (9.5%), and British (8.3%) making up the largest contingents. Though there were more Jewish correspondents in Israel than there were Moslem correspondents in Egypt, the majority in both countries practiced no religion. Arabic was more widely spoken by correspondents in both countries than Hebrew. Virtually all had college degrees (94.6%). On average then, western correspondents working in the Middle East were quite similar to American journalists generally, although somewhat older (median age of U.S. journalists was 36 in 1996).

The Role of the Western Correspondents. The newsmaking role in this study was measured using scales created by Johnstone et al. and modified by Weaver and Wilhoit in their studies of U.S. journalists. Correspondents were asked to rate 13 items about the role of the news media using a range of one to four, where one meant *extremely important* and four meant *not really important.*[3]

First, a comparison was made between foreign correspondents' answers (in both countries combined) and the answers of the U.S. journalists from Weaver and Wilhoit's 1996 data, then correspondents in Egypt were compared to those in Israel. Three journalistic items were rated *extremely important* by a majority of Western correspondents: providing analysis of complex problems (67.3%), investigating government claims (55.4%), and getting information to the public quickly (54.8%). These same items had been ranked highly in the Weaver and Wilhoit study, but where journalists in the U.S. said getting information to the public quickly was the most important item, western correspondents said providing analysis of complex problems was most important. Other items showed considerable difference in that the correspondents were much less concerned with items like entertainment and expression of views by the public. The primary emphasis in the U.S. is getting the news out quickly. In the Middle East, the main role is to provide analysis of the complex problems existing between governments. (See Table 1).

TABLE 1
U.S. Journalists' and Middle East Correspondents' Ratings of the Newsmaking Roles (Percent saying "extremely important")

News Media Roles	U.S. Journalists W&W 1996 Study		Middle East Correspondents	
	rank	%	rank	%
Get information to public quickly	1	69	3	54.8
Provide analysis of complex problems	3	48	1	67.3
Investigate government claims	2	67	2	55.4
Avoid stories with unverified content		49		38.4
Discuss national policy		39		35.8
Serve as adversary of government		21		29.4
Serve as adversary of business		14		24.4
Set the political agenda		5		4.2
Concentrate on widest audience		20		24.0
Provide entertainment		14		3.0
Develop intellectual/cultural interests		18		18.0
Influence public opinion		na		13.4
Let people express views		48		25.7

Given the heightened priority of analysis by western correspondents, a comparison of correspondents in Egypt and Israel again suggests agreement on the most important roles, but a difference in emphasis. Correspondents in both Egypt and Israel agreed that it was extremely important that they provide analysis of complex problems, investigate government claims, and get information to the public quickly. And while both said analysis was absolutely the most important role, correspondents in Israel said investigation of government claims was more important than did the correspondents in Egypt.

Another striking difference between correspondents in the two countries was the relative importance of "avoiding stories with unverified content." About 47% of the correspondents in Egypt said it was extremely important that the news media undertake this role compared to just 31% in Israel. (see Table 2).

TABLE 2
Western Correspondents' Newsmaking Roles in Egypt and Israel
(Means: 1=highest, 4=lowest; Percent saying "extremely important")

News Media Roles	Correspondents in Egypt			Correspondents in Israel		
	rank	mean	%	rank	mean	%
Get information to public quickly	2	1.5	54.1	3	1.5	55.3
Provide analysis of complex problems	1	1.5	63.5	1	1.4	70.2
Investigate government claims	3	1.7	50.0	2	1.5	59.6
Avoid stories with unverified content		1.9	47.2		2.1	31.5
Discuss national policy		2.0	30.1		1.8	40.2
Serve as adversary of government		2.3	26.8		2.1	31.5
Serve as adversary of business		2.4	25.4		2.2	23.6
Set the political agenda		3.1	2.7		3.1	5.4
Concentrate on widest audience		2.2	25.7		2.4	22.6
Provide entertainment		2.8	5.4		3.2	1.1
Develop intellectual/cultural interests		2.2	22.9		2.4	13.9
Influence public opinion		2.7	12.3		2.7	14.3
Let people express views		2.1	31.1		2.2	21.5

The Role of the Government Press Relations Directors. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the three top government press relations directors in Egypt and Israel: Moshe Fogel, the general director of the Israeli Government Press Office (GPO); Jenny Koren, the director of the Tel Aviv Branch of the Israeli GPO; and Nabil Osman, the head of the Egyptian State Information Service (SIS).

These interviews suggested that both the Egyptian and Israeli officials viewed themselves as conveyors of government information and mediators between the government and foreign news media. "The head of the GPO has a mandate to give interviews and to represent the government's position," said Fogel. "We act as the liaison between foreign correspondents and life at large in Egypt; my mandate is to facilitate, not to restrict. I am here to serve the correspondents if the need arrives," said Osman.

Despite the similarities in the way they viewed their roles, the Israeli and Egyptian officials differed in the way they carried them out. The Israeli government provides several spokespersons. "Every ministry in Israel has its own specialized spokesperson; however, the GPO is a representative of the government's points of view in general," said Koren. In contrast, the Egyptian government provides only one official spokesperson for the foreign news media. "I am the spokesman for Egypt *vis-a-vis* foreign correspondents. I speak on behalf of all the ministries. And if I don't have the information, I seek it from the concerned departments. I proposed several times that there should be a spokesman's office in some ministries, but up till now it has not been implemented," said Osman.

The Israeli government provides several public relations services to the foreign correspondents. According to Fogel, the GPO provides them with official announcements; organizes press conferences and news briefings twice or three times a week, and provides important information through the GPO's official Internet site, beepers, e-mail, and telemesser (audio messages heard over the phone).

The Egyptian government also provides public relations services to the correspondents." I am available to correspondents 24 hours a day. Whenever they wish, they can call me to decipher anything for them or to get information from other sources. If they want to do a field visit, initiate contact, or take photos in an area that requires permission, they come to me or they go to the Press Center," said Osman.

It was clear from the interviews that both governments try to provide public relations services to foreign correspondents. This is done in the context of the public relations asymmetric model, as those officials try to maintain an upper hand over the news media by giving accreditation to correspondents and requiring permissions for them to cover certain issues. The Israeli government provides far more services and more access to official information than does the Egyptian government. Moreover, unlike the Egyptian government, which provides only a single official spokesperson, the Israeli government provides a specialized spokesperson for every ministry. This allows for a more professional public relations apparatus and makes the correspondents' job easier by giving the feeling that all officials are accessible.

The Accessibility of Press Relations Apparatuses. A statement asking correspondents to rate the general accessibility levels of officials on a scale of one to seven, where one meant *very accessible* and seven meant *not at all accessible* measured the variable of interest. A t-test showed a significant difference between correspondents in the two countries (see Table 3).

TABLE 3
Western Correspondents' Perceptions of the Accessibility of Government Officials in Egypt and Israel (Range: 1=very accessible to 7=not at all accessible)

Country	Number	Mean	SD
Egypt	73	5.07	1.48
Israel	93	2.29	1.22

t-value= -12.92 df=138.26 $p<.0001$

To get a better understanding of this difference, the correspondents' interview responses were examined. An overwhelming majority of them agreed that Israeli government officials are easier to reach than are Egyptian officials.

An Associated Press correspondent in Tel Aviv said Israeli officials were very interested in expressing their views and availing themselves to the news media. They bombarded the correspondents with e-mail messages, phone calls, and press releases. "Israel is informal in that you can call an important official at home at 10 o'clock on a Friday night [Jewish Sabbath holiday] to inquire about anything. It is not a business-hours mentality in Israel. You can call officials anytime and anywhere, and they will be available. This is not the case even in the United States."

Another U.S. correspondent in Jerusalem said: "The Israeli government floods correspondents with information through beepers, e-mail messages, and phone calls.... It is lots of information, but only what they need to tell us, and they put their own 'spin' on it."

Jim Hollander, chief photographer for Reuters in Jerusalem, said the Israelis were very "savvy" about delivering their side of the story to the foreign news media. According to Hollander, "The Israeli officials are very literate and very professional in presenting their points of view and availing themselves to the media."

A prominent U.S. correspondent in Jerusalem said: "The Israelis are professional 'spinners' in that they are media conscious and media 'savvy' and they know how to get their views through."

In this same context, Nicolas Tatro, the bureau chief of Associated Press (AP) in Jerusalem, said: "Each Israeli government is different; they all flood us with information, but this current government has been more aggressive in presenting its points of view. It very much has an edge to it. The rhetorical factor is much higher than it has been since the early days of the Begin government."

Lyse Doucet, a Canadian reporter for BBC, said Israel has a very well-established public relations body that is unparalleled in the Middle East because the Israelis love to talk to the media and they are good at it. According to Doucet, Benjamin Netanyahu (the Israeli Prime Minister) was the "ultimate spin-doctor."

A German correspondent in Israel said: "BB [Benjamin Netanyahu] is the master of the sound bite, and he does it the American way. He believes that what is important is not what you say but the way you say it. He is regarded as a superficial politician who prefers style over substance."

Paul Holmes, Reuters bureau chief in Jerusalem, said the Israeli government was very active in setting the news agenda, and very professional in its public relations techniques. According to Holmes: "In other countries, one has to go and seek information or run after it, but here we get information on a more systematic and professional basis that reflects a more American approach to news."

An Australian correspondent in Jerusalem said: "While it is very easy to be critical of the Israeli government, their information channels are much better than other governments in the area. I have reported from many countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and in many ways, getting information here is much easier than most of the countries I have worked. However, making sense of this information is not easy. I do not think correspondents can, in any way, 'blame' Israel for the manipulation of data or material. It is the responsibility of correspondents to ensure they cross-check information with other sources."

The majority of foreign correspondents in Egypt said the Egyptian government was not always accessible and did not release sufficient information on the conflict. Claude Guibal, a Cairo-based French correspondent, said: "The Egyptian government gives us the minimum, and often no information. The Press Office of the Ministry of Information never calls me to say if there is going to be a press conference or a visit. I know of press conferences from my colleagues, not from the government officials."

Michel Rauch, a German correspondent in Cairo, said the Foreign Ministry was the only place to find accessible sources in the Egyptian government. "The strange thing is there may be bilateral talks going on in Cairo on the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the hot place to get faster access to reliable information about these talks is Jerusalem, or the sources closer to the Israeli side."

Cairo-based Associated Press chief correspondent Gerald La Belle said Arab governments, like all governments, wanted to get their point of view across. However, in most cases, they were not attuned to the needs of the news media. Thus Arab governments were willing to disseminate plenty of information about the conflict, but it was largely repetitive and often did not speak to the issue immediately at hand, said La Belle.

Alexander Buccianti, a Cairo-based correspondent for *Le Monde* (a French newspaper), said there was a general secrecy trend in the Egyptian government, and this trend was inherited from late Egyptian President Nasser's era. According to Buccianti, the general problem in Egypt was that only the "boss" can release the important information, and usually this "boss" was not accessible. "The PR machinery in Egypt is anti-productive, and it works against the policies of the government because of the inaccessibility of government sources," Buccianti said. The lack of government announcements on the Arab-Israeli conflict creates misunderstanding and contributes to the misconceptions that make the public encourage war against Israel, Buccianti said.

Similarly, AP's La Belle said Arab officials are often late in commenting on developments, and lower officials refuse to comment until ones higher up have indicated the political direction. Therefore, an Israeli comment or accusation often goes unanswered until the Arab answer is no longer news. When the comment finally does come, it is often in the form of an editorial in the state-run press or from an unidentified official, which does not carry the same weight as a government leader or official spokesman, said La Belle.

Patrick Angevin, a Cairo-based French correspondent, said: "The Egyptian government is totally inefficient in its dealings with the news media. In six years, I have not received one single press release." According to Angevin, speaking with foreign correspondents is regarded by officials in Egypt as something "dangerous."

Volkhard Windfur, the correspondent for Germany's *Der Spiegel* (a magazine) in Cairo and chairman of the Cairo Foreign Press Association, said the Israeli government was more successful in presenting its point of view to the foreign news media than the Arab governments because the Israelis have a better public relations apparatus. According to Windfur, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has spokespersons, but they were disorganized and inaccessible to the foreign press. "The Egyptian Foreign Minister attended a press conference organized by the FPA only once in five years. We are dismayed and astonished by that," said Windfur.

In her assessment of the accessibility of Egypt's public relations apparatus, Eileen Alt Powell, a correspondent for the Associated Press in Cairo, said: "Egypt has nothing like the public relations machinery that has been developed in Israel. There [in Israel], you are overwhelmed with interviews, facts, figures, and translations of pro-government editorials and the like. Here, translation services are weak. Government statistics are getting better, but they are still released with considerable delay. And sometimes briefings are done only for the Egyptian reporters assigned to a particular ministry. Other reporters, whether Western or local, are excluded."

The interviews supported the statistical test of the accessibility question—Israeli officials are accessible and quick to put their perspective forward, Egyptian officials are inaccessible and slow to respond to breaking news.

Discussion and Conclusions

Like the U.S. journalists in Weaver and Wilhoit's most recent study, the majority of Western correspondents in Egypt and Israel identified with three journalistic items: providing analysis of complex problems, investigating government claims, and getting information to the public quickly. However, results showed that analyzing complex problems was more important to Western correspondents than to American journalists. The role of professional journalists is to investigate and analyze current events regardless of where they are stationed. However, local reporters play roles other than newsgathering and investigation such as entertainment, setting the political agenda, or discussion of national policy. These items were not considered important roles by the foreign correspondents.

According to the majority of correspondents interviewed in this study, Israeli press relations directors are more accessible and more professional in releasing information about the Middle East conflict than their Egyptian counterparts. Correspondents' answers showed that the Israeli government applies the public relations asymmetric model in a more subtle and sophisticated way, using a Western style and manner that seems natural and spontaneous. In contrast, the Egyptian government is more blunt and less professional in applying the PR model. This is reflected in the unavailability of Egyptian officials to correspondents. Moreover, as the interviews with the senior press relations officials in Egypt and Israel showed, the Israeli government provides a professional spokesperson for every individual ministry; whereas the Egyptian government provides only one official spokesman for all the ministries. Israel is more likely to hold timely press conferences, issue fact-laden press releases and generally provide more useful information than Egypt.

Based on these findings and the two-way asymmetric model, one might assume that the correspondents in Israel would be less investigative and less suspicious of the Israeli government's announcements than their counterparts in Egypt. However, results showed that considerably more correspondents in Israel thought it was extremely important to investigate government claims than did their counterparts in Egypt. Despite their satisfaction with the amount of information released by Israeli officials and the overaccessibity of Israeli PR directors, correspondents in Israel maintain a heightened skepticism.

This is evident in comments made by Gisela Dachs, a Jerusalem-based bureau chief of *Die Zeit*, (a German newspaper) who said "journalists should not fall in the public relations trap set by the Israeli government." Similarly, Lisa Beyer, Jerusalem-based bureau chief of Time magazine, said: "The current government is very open, but it deliberately gives false information." Heinz-Rudolf Othmerding, bureau chief of the German News Agency (dpa) in Tel Aviv, said: "The Israeli officials are very professional in presenting the facts in a way that we swallow, and therefore, we have to carefully check what they tell us and compare it to what they said the day before."

In summary, the professionalism and sophistication of the Israeli public relations apparatus are not necessarily indications of its success in influencing the correspondents, who apparently do not buy into the Israeli public relations system completely. A public relations system as slick and as sophisticated as the one developed by the Israelis may actually have counter-productive results. Such a system can lead to more scrutiny, more fact-checking, and more critical attitudes on the correspondents' part. The fact that correspondents in Israel are being regularly "spoon-fed" with information by the Israeli officials makes them more suspicious of the completeness of the official information they obtain.

The newsmaking model is more comprehensive than the asymmetric model in its description of the relationship between the government and the news media. The newsmaking model addresses the government's role in disseminating information, and it also addresses the journalists' role in investigating the government's information. The public relations asymmetric model, however, deals only with the dissemination role of the government, and it neglects the journalists' investigative role, which, as this study showed, is highly valuable and important to the foreign correspondents.

Implications for Government-Press Relationship in the Context of the Middle East Conflict

One of the basic premises made earlier in the study is that decision-makers rely on the information made available to them by the news media to make political decisions in periods of conflict. Consequently, the decision-making process in Egypt and Israel is affected by the information exchanged between government and news media in both countries.

In a region such as the Middle East, there are lots of misconceptions among governments and a general lack of understanding that result in conflicts. Western correspondents have been accused, especially by the Arabs, of contributing to this misunderstanding by not being objective in their reporting, and by presenting half-truths about the conflict.

This study showed that the Arabs are at least partly responsible for misconceptions about themselves in the Western news media and for increasing the discrepancy between themselves and the Israelis, who are more accessible and open in dealing with the foreign news media.

The majority of correspondents interviewed in the Middle East said the Egyptian officials hurt the Egyptian cause by not holding press conferences or news briefings, by too infrequently distributing press releases, by failing to respond to requests for information and clarification, and by rarely returning Western correspondents' telephone calls. Israelis do all these things and more, and they get their position into the Western news media with clarity and considerable precision.

Although Egypt is not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it has an impact on the political matters in the region, and it plays a major role in the negotiation and mediation process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Therefore, the Egyptian officials should deal with Western correspondents not as opponents but as persons who will help project the Egyptian ideas and policies to the Israelis and to the rest of the world. This would be the first step toward clarifying the current misconceptions in the Middle East, and balancing the flow of information, which is dominated by the Israeli side.

The public relations asymmetric model is practiced in both Egypt and Israeli, but in two different styles. On the one hand, the Israeli government tries to manipulate the foreign news media by co-opting correspondents, by increasing officials' accessibility to correspondents, and by aggressively projecting the Israeli image abroad. On the other hand, the Egyptian government manipulates the foreign news media by withholding information at times and by denying access to official sources. Results of this study showed that the Western correspondents in the Middle East try to escape co-optation by Israeli officials and get access to the information denied to them by Egyptian officials.

Notes

[1] Correspondents in Israel were interviewed between September 21 and October 30. Correspondents in Egypt were interviewed between November 4 and December 30, 1998.

[2] Only foreign nationals on the Foreign Press Association lists were interviewed. Egyptian and Israeli nationals working for foreign agencies were excluded. Both governments require foreign journalists to register on these lists.

[3] Weaver and Wilhoit, like the Johnstone et al. study they replicated, used these code even though they are counterintuitive—one meaning more and four meaning less. We have continued this use for ease of comparison.

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A Talking Nation, Not a Talking Individual: A New Order in Tanzania?

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Abstract

Using a survey of 141 journalists, this study profiles the Tanzanian journalist in terms of demographic, workplace and attitudinal variables. The Tanzanian journalist's pursuit of his profession is deliberate and he subscribes to its lofty ideals. He rates accuracy, analysis, investigation, and such high, and places considerable importance on the public affairs role of journalism, more so than on the material benefits of the job. At the same time, the years of socialization under "ujamaa," the socialist policy of development which enrolled the press as partner, and the political policy of a one-party state have left their trace and are evident even in these more liberal times. These journalists believe in the role of the press in portraying the country, its leaders and its people positively and in using traditional media, ensuring rural coverage, and thinking of news as a social good. They rate press freedom as average and consider organization policy the most significant influence on their reporting. In general, they are satisfied with their jobs.

A Talking Nation, Not a Talking Individual:[1] A New Order in Tanzania?

Introduction

Background

Abandoning the authoritarian political systems and socialist economic policies they had adopted after their liberation in the 1960s from European colonial controls, some African countries began to experiment, in the 1990s, with democratic political systems and economic liberalization (Moma, 1995).[2] Whatever the reason for the change in the course of governance--end of the Cold war; demands by aid agencies, international financial institutions, and certain United Nations agencies; or Western alliances (Blake, 1997), this move from development to democratization imperatives[3] encompassed political pluralism, commitment to the protection of human rights, and economic liberalization (Blake, 1997) as well as more liberal communication policies. One of the principal objectives of this reform movement was freedom of the press. The emergence of new, democratically elected governments enabled media to evolve in ways not previously possible (Karikari 1993). This scenario has also played out in Tanzania.

Political, Economic and Press Brief of Tanzania

Tanzania is the generic name of the 1964 union of mainland Tanganyika and Zanzibar which is composed of the main island of Unguja and its sister island, Pemba, in the Indian Ocean. Before that, Zanzibar had received freedom in 1963, and Tanganyika in 1961 under the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)[4] led by Julius K. Nyerere who became Prime Minister of Tanganyika and, in 1962, Tanzania's first President.[5] Tanzania's July 1965 constitution provided for a one-party state.[6] Nyerere led his country on the socialist path to development making the press a partner in this effort. Politically, Tanzania avoided much of the tribalism that plagued other African countries and had reassuring political stability (Wallengren, 1997a and 1997b; "Time to Wake Up," 1998), but its experiment with socialism proved to be disastrous (Ransdell, 1995). The country, one of the poorest and most aid-dependent in all Africa, introduced economic austerity measures in the mid-1980s in response to IMF demands. The ruling party, CCM, further accelerated economic liberalization in the '90s. On July 1, 1992, Tanzania also launched a multiparty political system and announced elections for 1995. This political turnabout was marked by a structural change in the Tanzanian media, as "countries under pressure to liberalize their political systems…responded by liberalizing the media" also (Balikowa, 1995, p. 603). Today, Tanzania is functioning under this more liberal system.

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[1] Tegambwage. (1990). pp. 35-36.

[2] This move was accompanied by enthusiasm but also with some trepidation ("Time to Wake Up," 1998), and economic liberalization took priority over political reform (Ransdell, 1995).

[3] The word "democracy," Blake argues, is limiting because it refers only to multiparty general elections.

[4] TANU was created in 1954.

[5] Nyerere emerged as a statesman with acknowledged moral integrity and respected international standing (Lederbogen, 1992), stepping down in 1985.

[6] In Tanzania's history to date, TANU, later CCM, (formed in 1972 by merging TANU and the Afro-Shirazi party of Zanzibar) has always been the ruling party.

Within the context of political, economic, and press freedoms in Africa and Tanzania and based on empirical data, this paper provides a current profile of Tanzanian journalists in terms of demographic, workplace and attitudinal variables. It starts with a historical account of the political, economic, and press environment in Tanzania, situated within the African context, and then describes the current, more liberal environment. Next, it provides a history of the development of the press, radio and television. It concludes with a presentation of empirical findings from a 1999 survey of Tanzanian journalists and attempts to explain these findings within the historical context.

Press Policy in the Post-Independence Pre-Liberalization Period

Soon after independence, within the framework of non-democratic political systems, African media were enlisted to help with national unity and development. Broadcast media came under state control, and print was controlled by government control of newsprint supply and foreign currency, threat of nationalization, and sometimes even direct ownership by national political parties. African leaders emphasized "development communication, " i.e., use of mass and traditional media to publicize the benefits of development programs. In East Africa, "nation building" was considered crucial to the extent that every available resource including the press was required to mobilize for the goal.

In Tanzania, this policy was encoded in the *Arusha Declaration* of February 5, 1967 which spelled out the basis for moving towards socialism and self-reliance. In principle, it aimed at collective decision making, implementation, distribution and ownership of the country's wealth. Emphasizing the modernization of the rural sector, it directed that all major means of production would be publicly owned to promote the principle of ujamaa (Konde, 1984). Ujamaa, according to Nyerere, chief policy architect, captured the essence of African agrarian socialism. It was opposed to capitalism which seeks to build society on the basis of exploitation of one people by another, and to doctrinaire socialism's emphasis on class conflict. It translated into "familyhood," a system of villages organized by traditional African and socialist principles, and is the idea that society is an extension of the family.

The role of the press was more clearly articulated in Nyerere's message on the occasion of the nationalization of the *Standard* (Konde, 1984). The so-called independent press had not done much to mobilize Tanzanians to accept ujamaa;[7] its very existence after the Declaration was against the welfare of Tanzanians and in direct opposition to the ideals of the Declaration. The take-over would benefit peasants and workers and allay suspicions that this English-language newspaper served the interests of foreign owners. The *Standard* would now be free to debate any proposal put forward for the consideration of the people whether by government, by TANU, or by other bodies. It would be free to initiate discussions on any subject relevant to the development of a socialist and democratic society in Tanzania. It would be guided by the principle that free debate is an essential element of true socialism and would strive to encourage and maintain a high standard of socialist discussions. The press would be free to report, to comment on, and criticize any faults in society, without government restriction, but only when it reflected essential values of socialist democracy and respected decisions reached by the majority.

Collectivism is a central African thought, and according to Akhahenda (1983), African journalism from its inception has been used for collective goals, to not do so is a luxury Africa cannot afford. Indeed, the press in Tanzania is regarded as "part of the resources to be employed in the achievement of national goals defined by Tanzania's socialism" (Akhahenda, 1983, p. 93). This view seemed to be shared by African journalists. In one of the few studies done of African journalists, Roser and Brown (1986) found that opposition to censorship was not strong among newspaper editors in Africa, with almost two-thirds agreeing that governments should ensure that the media assist in national development. Also, black Africans showed more support for licensing of journalists than did South Africans.

Akhahenda (1983) argued that the imperative of national unity rather than individual liberty should be considered in any evaluation of the media in Africa. According to Konde (1984), Tanzania did allow freedom of press, the press was critical, and when it was subdued, it was for legitimate reasons.

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[7] Several African leaders, including Nyerere, were journalists who fought for freedom of the press under colonialism. From their use of journalism for obtaining national freedom, a collective goal, they went on to its use for national unity, another collective goal (Akhahenda, 1983).

According to Ochs (1986), no official censorship was sanctioned in the Tanzanian constitution or in other law, and none was practiced. Instead, advice as well as policy came down from party and government. Specifically, the Newspaper Ordinance (Amendment) of 1968 could be used to close down a newspaper if the President judged that such was in the public interest. Nonetheless, a certain amount of press criticism of government and individual actions was part of the Tanzanian press scene.[8]

Others differed in this evaluation believing that the national development role defined for the press had serious implications. In his 1990 book *Who Tells the Truth in Tanzania*, Tegambwage outlines the "impotence" of the press in the face of government silence, a silence which is, in a manner of speaking, a form of censorship (pp. ix, 15). With a government that did not talk or talked little (remained silent on many incidents, issues, etc.), the media could not get to the truth. Also, objectivity was sacrificed and many editors and journalists came across as government mouthpieces, playing a negligible role in molding public opinion on significant issues. The media were staffed by bureaucrats and red tape got in the way of information supply. Credibility of media became a cause for concern. Little journalistic training was available and present in the staffers (Ruijter, 1989). Even the use of the press for national development was poorly executed: *"In declared policies concerning mass communication, Tanzania [was] quite an advanced case—it [was] the implementation that [was] lacking"* (Kivikuru, 1989, p.118, italics in original). Additionally, in the politics of these pre-democratic societies, the press was often used as a tool in political infighting between different factions (Scannell, 1995). As a result, "Tanzania emerged as a nation, but without a press of its own" (Ng'wanakilala, 1981, p. 17).

Press Policy in the Liberal Period

Today, even though political partisanship may rule, changes are taking place in Africa in terms of constitutional guarantees for freedom of press, privatization, and democratic frameworks (Ogbondah, 1997). Still, in the case of Tanzania, some (Masha, 1997) argue that the controls of a one-party regime have stayed in place because multipartyism came to Tanzania only due to strong external forces that had to be accommodated. Laws restrictive of political and press freedoms still exist and their repeal is necessary to realize the new vision of a pluralistic society.[9] Maja-Pearce (1992) had earlier argued similarly; in a system where there is "dictatorship of the party as the sole repository of the moral values of the society," promises of freedom of the press are only promises. Whatever freedom there is exists only because the government is under pressure to play by the rules it subscribes to at least in theory.

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[8] In this respect, Ochs (1986) noted that "in Tanzania's case, legal restraints and government control are not as important impediments to the press as national poverty and the expense and general unavailability of newspapers" (p. 60).

[9] Tomaselli (1996) suggests that the new media are seriously challenging the controls. But there is no general agreement over the prospect of freedom of expression in Africa. For a detailed discussion on the future of free expression in Africa, see Skurnik (1986), pp. 147-154.

Despite fundamental political changes and subsequent changes in the media environment in Tanzania in recent years, the media still face several problems: not enough printing presses, government charges, and lack of skills to deal with the challenges posed by the fact that press freedoms are ahead of political freedoms (Onyango-Obbo 1996); a poor capital base ("World Press Freedom Review," 1994) – only 38 of about 100 new newspapers were alive by December 1997; "repressive laws and the intolerant attitude of the authorities to dissent—despite the fact that President Ben Mkapa himself is a former journalist" ("World Press Freedom Review," 1997, p. 94); and press harassment ("World Press Freedom Reviews," 1993, 1994).

A different point of view also prevails. Kasoma (1997) argues that the newly independent media in Africa are unprofessional in their conduct and are to blame for the restrictions that governments are imposing on them. Bourgault (1993) adopts a cultural analysis: in imposing western style press freedom in Africa, culture is not being taken into account. There was never and is not now a tradition of press freedom in Africa. Milton's *Aeropagitica* was written in the United States at the beginning of the commercial capitalist tradition. Africa is still in the agrarian feudalism stage. We are trying to graft the doctrine of press freedom, an ideological component of capitalism, onto an African cultural tradition when we attempt to establish modern mass media systems there. The aspects of African cultural tradition Bourgault focuses on are: 1) their discourse is mostly oral, empathetic, participatory, and aggregative, lacks the abstract, is combative in reporting on outgroups, and includes praise singing; 2) their cultural values include a group orientation and non-individuality; and 3) their concept of authority includes fear of Big Men. Blake (1997) has suggested that media policy formulations are somewhat difficult in the African context of respect for leaders. Praise singing, group orientation, non-individuality, and the concept of authority are other factors likely to have a similar effect not only on policy but also on practice.

Media History

Press

Anglophone Africa had a freer press in colonial times than Francophone Africa accelerating the coming of democracy to Nigeria, Zambia, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya (Kasoma, 1995). The history of the Tanzanian press begins with the early colonial period, when news sheets published by Christian missionaries were in circulation in Tanganyika as early as 1888. In the early 20th century, official government news sheets were also circulated, but these were mainly restricted to the European population. Independent newspapers like the *Tanganyika Standard*, which began in 1930, also catered almost exclusively to the settlers.

During the pre-independence period, the growth of the press in Tanganyika was severely hampered by a number of limiting factors: the small number of early European settlers, the low literacy of the African population, the absence of an urban African middle class, the scattered nature of the population and the late development of African nationalism (Mytton, 1968). According to Mytton, there was no indigenous African press and nothing in the vernacular languages till the early 1950s. Scotton (1978) disagrees and dates the origin of the indigenous press in Tanzania to 1937, when *Kwetu*, a weekly journal in English and Swahili, was launched by Erica Fiah in Dar es Salaam, and grew to be the voice of Tanganyika's African community. The *Kwetu* spawned other newspapers in different parts of Tanganyika, including multilingual papers like the *Tanganyika Opinion* (1939) and the *Tanganyika Herald* (1941), providing a forum for expressing African grievances and promoting the social, economic and political interests of native Africans.

There is little evidence to suggest that official attempts were made to censor the contents of these early indigenous newspapers though they were closely monitored by the government (Scotton, 1978). Vernacular papers sponsored by the government, which far outnumbered African-owned newspapers in the early years (Mytton, 1968), countered nationalist sentiments by espousing the idea that unless economic development took place, self-government would be impossible.

During the Second World War, the demand for news saw a large number of private and government-sponsored publications spring up. Many of the independent papers, including the *Kwetu*, died a natural death after the war due to sharp drops in circulation. The post World War II period marked the rise of African nationalism and a number of nationalist publications. TANU responded to a government ban on TANU-sponsored public meetings by circulating news sheets. The most important among these was the *Mwafrika*, whose circulation rose rapidly to over 20,000. This was the beginning of the African nationalist press, and other newspapers like the *Zuhra* and the widely circulated Catholic monthly *Kiongozi*, began to gradually support TANU's political role (Scotton, 1978).

The government response to this growing wave of nationalism was to exercise legal control by strengthening the Newspaper Registration Ordinance in 1952. The new law imposed stricter registration and bonding requirements, making it difficult for new independent publications to appear. Sedition laws were also applied to silence dissent. By the late 1950s, however, African newspapers were reaching into most areas of the mainland, and African rule in Tanganyika was more or less assured (Scotton, 1978).

In the 1960s, post-independence Tanzania had four daily newspapers (Mytton, 1968): the *Standard*, a conservative, English-language daily owned by Lonrho, a British multinational group, published by Habari Printers, *Ngurumo*— a Swahili daily, cheaper, cast in the tabloid mold (ceased circulation in the mid-1970s), *Uhuru*, the TANU-owned Swahili paper (seemed to have the best distribution in the country) started as a weekly, but became a daily in 1965, and the English language *Nationalist* founded by TANU in 1964. All these dailies were published in Dar es Salaam, then the capital of Tanzania. Their combined circulation was more than 50,000, their total readership was around 200,000.

In 1970, Nyerere nationalized the *Standard*. On April 26, 1972, the paper was merged with the *Nationalist* to form the *Daily News* (Ng'wanakilala, 1981). Ng'wanakilala considers this a defining moment in Tanzanian press history because "the political decision to phase out the foreign *Standard* marked the beginning of the 'Tanzanization' of the press in the country" (p. 20). The mid-1970s to the mid-1980s were represented by only two dailies: the government-owned *Daily News* and the party-owned *Uhuru*. The main weeklies included the *Sunday News* and *Mzalendo* (sister papers of the *Daily News* and *Uhuru*, respectively) and *Mfanyakazi*, published by the Workers Organization (JUWATA). In 1976, the government also launched the Tanzania News Agency (Shihata) to function as the main newsgathering agency, with a network of reporters spanning the entire country (Konde, 1984).

For the most part, the state-owned newspapers enjoyed a virtual monopoly until the mid-1980s. It was only after the 1985 resignation of Nyerere as President that the first private newspaper was started.[10] After a short-lived attempt by *Africa Baraza* in March 1987,[11] *Business Times* became the first privately-owned English weekly in 1988, followed soon by the bimonthly, *Family Mirror*. In February 1992, two more independent weekly newspapers began operating under the ownership of Media Holdings Ltd., the English-language *Express* and the Swahili-language *Mwananchi*.

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[10] Nyerere was succeeded by his Vice President from Zanzibar, Ali Hassan Mwinyi. This political change has been interpreted as a way of allowing a new government to move toward an IMF deal and away from "ujamaa." In 1986, Tanzania and the IMF reached a three-year agreement after a seven-year standoff between Nyerere and the lending institution over the IMF's austerity policies (Grosswiler, 1997).

[11] *Africa Baraza* contained a story criticizing corruption under Nyerere's presidency in its first issue. Within hours after it was printed, the first copies were seized by the police (Hachten, 1993).

The liberalized environment of the early 1990s led to the growth of a number of independent newspapers and magazines. Within a year of announcing a timetable for multi-party elections, 50 privately owned newspapers, magazines and periodicals mushroomed in a new spirit of pluralistic democracy. In the five years after the introduction of the multiparty system, Tanzania witnessed the advent of 100 registered newspapers ("World Press," 1997). In 1995, a significant event was the January 11 launch of a new, independent English-language daily newspaper, *The Guardian*. This brought to an end the 30-year monopoly of the state-owned *Daily News*. Puri (1995) described the date as "a historic [one] in the history of Tanzania's print media" (p. 41). Today, the growth of privately owned newspapers in Tanzania continues at a healthy pace.

Radio

Lederbogen (1992) notes that "radio is the only medium in Tanzania to which the term mass medium, can be applied" (p. 48). The development of radio in Tanzania was far more rapid than that of the press and listenership continues to grow very rapidly. Because of this wide listenership and a high level of illiteracy, radio was the major governmental instrument for nation-building, more effective than the press in realizing government policy (Lederbogen, 1992).Indeed Kivikuru (1989) found that the main interest among the rural population was in listening to the news.

Like other modern mass media in Africa, radio broadcasting in Tanzania is also a colonial legacy, tracing its beginnings to 1951. Trial broadcasts, with modest technical equipment, transmitted only to the Dar es Salaam area. At that time, the content was predominantly news about Europe and colonial government propaganda to acculturate Tanzanians into European civilization. In 1956, the broadcasting operation was constituted as a public corporation, Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation (TBC), modeled after the BBC, with nationwide reach. The experiment was so successful that there were about 72,000 receivers in use by 1960, with a listenership of 377,000 (Ng'wanakilala, 1981). However, expansion of radio into a mass medium did not begin until after independence in 1961.

As Tanzania adopted a one-party political system with independence, the country's new nationalist leadership began to make TBC and its operational philosophy compatible with its nascent sociopolitical ideology. In particular, the colonial administration's effective use of radio for propaganda led the Tanzanian government to utilize the medium for its development programs. TBC was placed under the control of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting in 1965, and named Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD). Since then, according to Lederbogen (1992), RTD has been an instrument of socialization and propaganda.[12]

Until the end of the 1980s, RTD had run three channels: the External Service, National Service, and Commercial Service. The External Service created in 1962 broadcast about 61 hours per week, mainly in English, and catered to the local foreign community. More recently, the External Service has programs dealing with Africa, good neighbourliness, support of African unity and publicity for Tanzania outside the country (Moshiro, 1990). The National Service, established in 1968, broadcast 18 hours daily in Kiswahili. It aired programs dealing with national independence, ujamaa building, boosting of productivity in agriculture and other industries, and the promotion of the national culture. The Commercial Service played a complementary function to the National Service, informing the people of various goods and services available in the country and educating them on how to consume and get the most out of them. It went even further, also educating industrialists on ways and means of realizing higher profits, and whetting the appetite of consumers (Moshiro, 1990). Apart from these, the School Service broadcasting for hours at a time on its own frequency (Amupala, 1989) supplemented the work of teachers in the formal education and socialization of the young (Moshiro, 1990).

A content analysis of six full days of programming in the 1980s at the National Service found that these programs mostly fell under the informative, innovative, and educational categories promoting the dominant development ideology of the society (Amupala, 1989). Also there was a strong emphasis on broadcasting only local and African music, reflecting a "partial anti-cultural imperialism policy" (p.112). With the advent of liberalization, the number of radio stations increased to 13 with most being private including a missionary radio station.

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[12] RTD was assigned the following tasks:

- To inform the people of what is happening in and outside the country, so that with an informed mind, Tanzanians can make rational decisions affecting their lives.
- To educate the people on effective ways of eradicating illiteracy, poverty, and disease.
- To safeguard the independence, peace, security, and unity of the nation.
- To mobilize and motivate the people in the implementation of the policy of Ujamaa and self-reliance.
- To participate in the liberation of Africa by supporting liberation movements and countering imperialist propaganda.
- To foster cooperation among African countries in the economic, social, and political fields with a view to bring about total African unity.
- To support the policies of good neighborliness, non-alignment, and all efforts geared at creating new world economic and information order in the interest of poor nations.
- To promote peace and justice in the world. (Lederbogen, 1992, p. 49)

Television

Television Zanzibar (TVZ), owned by the Zanzibar Island government, began broadcasting on the island of Zanzibar in 1971 as basically an educational medium. In 1973, Zanzibar inaugurated the first color television on the African continent (Konde, 1984). Until 1992, TVZ was the only television station in Tanzania. Mainland Tanzania did not have a TV station, a deliberate policy decision to prevent foreign cultural influence in the light of developmental goals (Ng'wanakilala, 1981). The extension of radio services into the rural areas, instead of launching television on the mainland, was considered more appropriate at this stage of development (Konde, 1984). With liberalization, three private television stations were built in 1992 and Multichoice, a South African-based pay satellite television, is now available to subscribers. On March 15, 2000 after three months of test transmission, Television Tanzania (TVT), the state-owned television station on the mainland, went on air (Mwaffisi, personal communication, April 14, 2000).

Purpose of the Study

Given the interesting juncture at which Tanzanian politics and press are and the little research attention the country has received, this paper provides a profile of the Tanzanian journalist in demographic, workplace, and attitudinal terms with the purpose of establishing benchmarks for future tracking. The attitudinal profile includes Tanzanian journalists' views about media functions, job related benefits, their jobs, the influences they experience in reporting, their job satisfaction, the freedom they have, and about whether government or private media are more credible, competent, and such. The paper has the additional goal of explaining the differences in these attitudinal variables by demographic and workplace variables such as gender, education, organization nature (private or government), and media type (print or broadcast).

Research Questions

1. What is the demographic and work profile of Tanzanian journalists?
2. What is the factor structure of a) media functions and b) job related benefits for Tanzanian journalists? That is, what are the major grouped functions and benefits Tanzanian journalists perceive? How do they rate these?
3. What are Tanzanian journalists' views in terms of their allegiance to their profession versus holding a job, in terms of the use of traditional media and rural coverage, and in terms of news as a social good?
4. How much do Tanzanian journalists consider personal values, organization, policy, and government position in their reporting?
5. How do Tanzanian journalists rate Tanzanian job satisfaction and their press freedoms?

6. Do responses for all these variables—from media functions and benefits to influencing factors and freedom ratings—differ by the nature of the organization respondents work for (private or government), by media type (print or broadcast), gender and education?
7. Do Tanzanian journalists ascribe certain media characteristics—credibility, competence, etc.—to private and other characteristics to government media? In what proportion?
8. Does Tanzanian journalists' ascription of these characteristics depend on the type of media (private or government) they work for?

Method

Using a questionnaire, the study conducted a cross-sectional survey of Tanzanian journalists, over a two-week period in Fall 1999.[13] The questionnaire was administered in English[14] to a convenience sample of 142 journalists[15] in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania's media center, major city and former capital,[16] and in Zanzibar. In Dar es Salaam, the researcher personally visited,[17] about three times on average, the media outlets these journalists worked for. Together the three visits included a meeting with the editor or delegate, an interview with the same person,[18] dropping questionnaires off for this person to distribute to the news staff,[19] and picking up completed questionnaires. The researcher did not visit the media in Zanzibar personally; instead a person assigned to assist her distributed and collected these questionnaires. The 142 journalists in the sample represent 16 media outlets (12 private and 4 government) covering almost all the major media in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar.

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[13] To conduct research in Tanzania, government permission is necessary. When permission is received, a Tanzanian is assigned to the researcher. The person assigned to this researcher was part of the media establishment, well known to most of the office holders and to many journalists, and of considerable assistance in working out the logistics of doing such research in Tanzania. This person was not always present with the researcher, particularly once the researcher knew the lay of the land and the people.

[14] The researcher had planned to translate the questionnaire into English but several African and Tanzanian contacts advised against it given the level of English language facility among journalists in Tanzania.

[15] It was difficult to ascertain the total number of journalists in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar for several reasons including the transient nature of some staff. (Kilimwiko & Mapunda,1998) provide these numbers but the author was often told by the Dar es Salaam media that these numbers had changed or were duplicative because the same staff worked for several papers within a media group. The author tried to get an estimate from each editor or delegate, but this proved to be quite difficult in most cases. A very rough calculation based on these estimates, when provided, and numbers from the above source places the total number of full-timers, part-timers, freelancers, production staff, etc., at 450 in the media outlets where the author collected data.

[16] The capital has been moved to Dodoma but the transition is not complete leaving Dar es Salaam still the center of much government activity.

[17] Because of its lack of a research tradition (most people are not used to completing questionnaires or participating in research), personal contact is extremely important in Tanzania. Telephone and mail contact does not result in a significant response rate. The personal contact reassured the staff that an independent researcher from the United States who had nothing to do with the Tanzanian government was conducting the research.

[18] This paper does not include qualitative data collected by the questionnaire from interviews and open-ended questions.

[19] This was the only way to access the news staff partly because of the bureaucracy and partly because this enabled distribution of the questionnaire to part-timers who were not always present when the researcher visited. Though not every member of each staff would receive a questionnaire, the researcher requested a wide distribution within each media outlet or group. Sometimes, the researcher, still on the premises conducting an interview, would witness the staff completing the questionnaires in their cubicles.

Private print media included The Guardian Limited, Business Times, Habari Corporation, Nation Media Group, Press Services Tanzania, *The Democrat*, *Majira*, *Uhuru* (official publication of CCM) and *Mfanyakazi* (a workers' newspaper). Private broadcast media included Dar es Salaam Television, Independent Television and Coastal Television Network. Government print media included Tanzania Standard Newspapers and *Nuru*, and government broadcast media included Radio Tanzania and Sauti Ya Tanzania Zanzibar (Voice of Tanzania Zanzibar). Several of the media groups had multiple newspapers, including tabloids, evening papers, and weeklies each with an editorial staff of less than five.

Questionnaire development went through several iterations based on the literature and in consultation with a few African contacts.[20] While based on the American journalist (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996) survey concept, this study was sensitive to the specific political and press dynamics in Tanzania. Instead of reproducing the American journalist survey, this study borrowed questions that were applicable (and to provide some comparability with the American study) (Weaver, 1998) and developed new questions.

The questionnaire began with measures of work background and details, and ended with measures of demographic information. The main body of the questionnaire measured several different variables. One set of scale items addressed the functions media perform which respondents rated on a five-point importance scale. Of the sixteen statements used in this measure, seven were developed by the researcher, six were borrowed (one modified) from Weaver and Wilhoit (1996), and two were borrowed (one modified) from Pauli (1999). Another set of items listed job related benefits to assess, again on a five-point scale, their relative importance. Of the twelve items, five were developed by the researcher, seven (three modified) were from Weaver and Wilhoit (1996).[21]

Yet another set of items with a five-point Likert scale measured how respondents viewed their journalistic jobs (two statements developed by the researcher), how important some typically African or Tanzanian aspects of journalism—use of traditional media (idea from Grosswiler, 1997) and coverage of rural news—were to the respondents (one statement each), and whether respondents viewed news as a social good (two statements, one of which was based on Grosswiler, 1997). Using a five-point scale, a fourth set of items, developed by the author, measured the extent to which respondents considered personal values (three statements), organization policy (two statements), and government position (one statement) in their reporting (i.e., in their topic selection, or in deciding what to emphasis or which angle to take).

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[20] Still some minor cultural biases did creep into the questionnaire, apparent during the data collection and input stage.

Four single questions assessed respondents' job satisfaction, rating of press freedom in Tanzania, rating of freedom to select stories, and rating of freedom to emphasize certain aspects of stories. The item rating press freedom was developed for this study and was the only scale that departed from five-points, instead using 10-points to capture variance. The other three items were original or modified Weaver and Wilhoit items. Finally, one set of 15 items presented characteristics of news media and asked respondents to assess whether the private or government media were more likely to have these characteristics. Most of these characteristics originated with the author, with two based on ideas from Grosswiler (1997). The questionnaire also included some open-ended questions.

Findings

Demographic and Work Background

Altogether, 142 questionnaires were completed; of these, three were incomplete and therefore discarded leaving 139 usable questionnaires.[22] Of the respondents, 97 were male (74%) and 35 female (26%) (Table 1). Respondents' age ranged from 23 to 60 years with most (74%) being less than 40 years old (mean age = 36). As many as 22 out of about 120 tribes were represented in the sample, providing a glimpse of the tribal diversity of Tanzania. However, quite a few respondents (n = 34; 32%) indicated no ethnic affiliation. Additionally, 8% considered themselves "Tanzanian" while 11% emphasized their African identity.[23] A large majority, 84% (n = 103), also indicated that they were not affiliated with any political party.[24] Of the respondents, 68% (n = 88) were Christian, 26% (n = 34) Muslim, 2% (n = 7) Moravian/Buddhist, and 3% (n = 4) said they had no religious affiliation.

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[21] Weaver and Wilhoit (1996) used 13 items to measure media functions and 9 to measure benefits.

[22] Numbers in the following description may not always add up to 139 because each variable had a different number of missing values.

[23] One of President Nyerere's greatest legacies is the abolition of tribalism in Tanzania. The question on tribal identification was a cultural mistake. Some respondents voiced displeasure at this question and repeatedly told the researcher that their affiliation is with their fellow Tanzanians not their tribe.

[24] This might have been a sensitive question in a country where multipartyism is new.

Nine percent had completed high school, about half (n = 65) had completed some college, and the remaining had completed college. Of the 52 respondents who had completed college, 23% held a bachelor's degree, 5% a master's degree, and 11% a vocational/technical qualification. While 57% (n = 66) of all those with a college education studied journalism, 4% (n = 4) studied radio-television, and 12% (n = 11) studied both.

Work experience in media varied widely, ranging from one to forty years, with a majority (n = 100; 72%) having worked for ten years or less in the profession (mean = 10 years). About 87% (n = 116) of the respondents worked full time while 13% (n = 18) worked part time. About 80% worked for private and 20% for government media, and 77% worked for print and 23% for broadcast media.

News reporting was the primary current work responsibility for 69% (n = 95). Other responsibilities included sub editing, feature editing, production and photography. About 7% (n = 9) held senior executive positions such as managing editor, deputy managing editor and executive editor. In their past jobs too, most (n = 78; 63%) listed reporting as their primary area of work with similar other titles (sub editing, feature editing, etc.) reported by the remaining respondents. Sixty percent (n = 84) received some training prior to entering the profession, with 33% of these being trained at domestic educational institutions.[25] More than 80% (n = 110) also received training while they were in their journalism jobs. Of these, some received training at domestic educational institutions (13%), others (17%) in-house or at other media organizations, and still others (50%) at various other locations in Tanzania and abroad. Mean income was 168,355 Tanzanian shillings (approximately US$ 212) per month. Less than 7% (n = 6) of respondents had a monthly income of more than 500,000 Tanzanian shillings (approximately US $630).

Media Functions

The scale items measuring functions were factor analyzed using principal components analysis with varimax rotation (Table 2). Four orthogonal factors with eigenvalues greater than one emerged, explaining 57% of the variance. If a variable loaded on more than one factor, it was grouped, in a majority of the cases, with the factor on which it had the highest loading.

The first factor was an African factor capturing the socialization of the press to cover domestic people, events, and issues positively. All but one item that loaded on this factor were specific to this survey; the exception was the Weaver and Wilhoit item—discuss national policy. One item—portray national leaders in a positive manner—loaded slightly higher on a different factor—Public—but had a significant loading on and greater conceptual fit within the African factor. Reliability (Cronbach's alpha) of the scale composed of the items that loaded on this factor increased from .73 to .76 with this inclusion. The second factor was Western and captured the more general or Western news values or functions—timeliness, investigation, analysis, etc. The scale had a reliability of .66. All the items loading on this factor were original or modified from Weaver and Wilhoit. The third factor was Public and focused on the public enlightenment function (from this factor the one cross-loaded item was moved to African; its reliability went from .67 to .65 with this removal). All statements loading on this factor were original to this study. The final factor was Entertainment with only one (original Weaver and Wilhoit) item loading on it.

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[25] For prior to and during the job training, some respondents did not limit their answers to workshops, etc., but included their educational training.

Did respondents differ on how highly they rated these factors depending on the nature of the organization (private or government) they worked for? There were no significant differences found for the African, Public and Entertainment factors. However, for the Western news function (F = 6.90; p. = .01), respondents from private media rated it higher in importance (1.47 on a five point scale where 1 equals more important) than respondents from government media (1.76). Still the overall means for both groups indicated that both placed a high importance on this function. A similar analysis by type of media worked for (print or broadcast), gender, and education (school or college) revealed no significant differences in the rating of these factors. Interestingly, respondents rated all functions above average in importance. Respondents' relative rating of these functions by overall mean was: Western 1.54; Entertainment 1.88; People 1.91 and African 2.28.

Job Related Benefits

The scale items measuring job related benefits were also factor analyzed using the same rules as for media function (Table 3). Three orthogonal factors with eigenvalues greater than one emerged, explaining 58% of the variance.

The first factor was Benefits from the job. Included in this factor was one item—job security—that belonged here conceptually but had a higher loading on another factor –Develop (reliability went down from .81 to .80 with this inclusion). The second factor was Public Affairs benefits related to being in a journalism career—chance to inform, expose corruption, meet important people, influence public affairs, etc. (reliability = .63). The final factor—Develop--had one item load on it with a very high loading; it was related to helping ordinary people. This was the factor from which the item job security was removed.

No differences were found by organization nature, type of media, gender and education in the importance ascribed to these factors. Again, all factors were rated above average in importance with relative ratings being: Develop 1.42; Public Affairs 1.56, and Benefit 1.78.

Job View

Respondents' did not subscribe to the view that their employment as a journalist "is only a job" (their mean score was 2 where a lower score indicates that their employment is **not** "only a job"). Respondents also sought a job in journalism because they believed that the media play an important role in people's lives (mean = 1.28). The combined mean for these job view statements was 1.66 indicating that the journalists were deliberate in picking their profession. Respondents did not differ in this view (as measured by individual as well as combined statements) by organization nature, media type, gender and education.

Traditional Media, Rural News, and News as Social Good

Respondents also believed that traditional media were important (mean = 1.95) and that news media should provide rural news along with urban news (1.17). And finally, the mean for "social good" (composite of two statements, one a direct question and the other asking whether news should adopt a bottom-up approach giving voice to the voiceless) was 1.6 indicating agreement with this view of news. Organization nature and media type did not make a difference in respondents' view of news as "social good" or in their views about media covering rural news. For use of traditional media, there was a difference by organization nature (F= 10.41; p. = .00) but not by media type, gender and education. Private media respondents (1.83) considered traditional media more important than did government media (2.43) but again both rated such media above average as they did rural coverage and news as social good.

Factors Influencing News Selection

Respondents rated organization policy as the highest influence on their reporting (mean=1.69), government position as second (2.26), and personal level influences third (3.1), the only departure from above average ratings.

For the personal and organization level influences, no differences were found by organization nature and media type. But differences for government level influence were found by organization nature (F =

13.69; p. = .00) with the government media rating it at 1.59 (more influence) and the private media rating it at 2.44, and by media type (F= 17.37; p. = .00) with the broadcast media rating it at 1.57 (more influence) and print at 2.47.

This set of variables—influencing factors —were the only ones for which differences by gender and education were found. Females rated the influence of government position (F = 8.63, p. = .00) as more important (1.79) than males (2.4). Journalists who had a college level education rated the organization level influences (F = 8.44; p. = .00) as more important (1.6) than journalists with only a school education (2.4).

Job Satisfaction and Freedom

Respondents were satisfied with their jobs (mean = 2.26). Respondents perceived they had considerable freedom to select and to emphasize certain aspects of stories (mean=2 for both). Respondents rated their press freedom 5.42 at almost dead center, on a 10-point scale. There were no differences by organization nature, gender and education for all four variables. By media type, the only difference was for freedom to emphasize aspects of stories (F= 5.61; p. = .02) with the print media indicating greater freedom (2) than the broadcast media (2.67).

Characteristics of Private and Government Media

As compared with governmental media, private media were considered more analytic (n = 87), greater vocal critics of government policy (n = 113) and supporters of political pluralism (n = 90), more balanced in political coverage (n = 88), and better reflecting views of the public (n = 92) (Table 4). Private media were also considered more likely to reflect views of the wealthy (n = 83), focus on sensational news (n = 99) and stir up ethnic, religious separatist conflict (n = 80). Government media, on the other hand were considered more likely to help unify the country (n = 83), contribute to the country's development (n = 62), and focus on cultural and intellectual issues (n = 64) (significant chi-square values for all above variables, p. <.5). No differences were found for the other characteristics.

For credibility, professional competence, accuracy, focus on cultural and intellectual issues, balanced political coverage, positive coverage in general, and reflecting views of common people more private media respondents said that the private media fulfilled these characteristics while more government media respondents attributed these characteristics to government media (significant chi-square values, p. < .05, for these variables) (Table 5).[26] The chi-square was significant for "analysis" too, but while more private media respondents felt the private media had this characteristic, an equal number of government media respondents said this was a characteristic of private and government media. For "contributing to country's development" too, the chi-square was significant, but most government media respondents (95%) believed that this was true of them, and 40% of private media respondents believed this was true of private media. This association did not exist for other characteristics--be a vocal critic of government, reflect views of wealthy, help unity country, support political pluralism, stir up ethnic conflict, and focus on sensational news.

Discussion

Tanzanian journalists were primarily male but had a considerable number of female colleagues. They were generally young to middle-aged, and largely Christian with several Muslim colleagues. Only a third (39.6%) of the respondents had completed college. Given that this figure includes journalists with diplomas, college education among journalists does not appear to be widespread. Those who did attend college, studied for the profession, i.e., journalism or radio-television. While college education was not widespread, training was. A majority of the respondents received training before entering the profession, some as part of their education and, a small percentage, through workshops. A small percent also pretrained abroad. This percent was larger for training received once they had joined journalism reflecting possibly the opportunities available through foreign non-governmental organizations interested in developing Tanzanian journalism. Most of the respondents received some type of training after they took up their journalistic jobs. Altogether, journalism education in Tanzania needs a strengthening of more degree programs. Journalism education (not always a degree program) is available in the Tanzania School of Journalism, St. Augustine University of Tanzania (formerly Nyegezi Social Training Center), Maarifa Media Trust (training wing of Habari Corporation), Makerere University, Kivukoni Academy of Social Sciences and Dar es Salaam School of Journalism, but the major university—University of Dar es Salaam—does not have a journalism program.

Possibly due to the tremendous increase Tanzania has seen in media outlets with the advance of political and press freedoms, most of the Tanzanian journalists had worked for less than ten years and a small percent worked only part-time. Salaries were low by U.S. standards but need to be assessed within the Tanzanian cost of living. Tanzanian journalists rating of press freedom in Tanzania was neither positive nor negative probably indicating the transitional status of the press or the "wait and see" attitude in this transitional period. The journalists, however, believed they had considerable freedom in selecting stories and aspects of stories to emphasize.[27] Given the lack of availability of past benchmarks, it is difficult to provide a comparison. Even more, it is difficult to assess how much of this rating is a function of the comparative past benchmarks in these journalists' minds. Tanzanian journalists expressed considerable satisfaction with their jobs.

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[26] This chi-square analysis was limited to "private" and "government" organization nature.

Of the four media functions factors, Tanzanian journalists rated the Western function of investigation and analysis as the most important and the African function of national development as the least important. Still they rated all functions above average. While Tanzanian journalists see their function as primarily being to provide accurate, timely, investigative news and analysis, they have been unable to shed the development imperative. This typically Third World or African, more so Tanzanian, function reflects the years of socialization under the national development imperative deriving from ujaama and the political reality of a former one-party state, under which community unity and positive portrayals were of primary importance. Tanzanian journalists' adherence to the ujaama view of journalism was also evident in the importance they ascribed to traditional media, rural journalism, and news as a social good.

Among the four benefits factors, Tanzanian journalists rated Develop and Public Affairs higher than Benefits providing yet another endorsement of the seriousness with which these journalists approach their profession. Further these journalists were in journalism because they wanted to be journalists; they did not look upon their jobs as mere jobs. That their pursuit of the journalism profession was deliberate was also clear from their selection of journalism as their area of study in college.

As has been found to be true of journalists in the United States (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), journalists in Tanzania too considered personal values of the least importance in their reporting. They considered organization policy most important, even more important than government position reflecting their new freedoms, but still indicated considerable freedom in selecting topics and deciding what to emphasize.

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[27] For all three freedom ratings, the longer the journalists had worked in the profession, the higher they rated their freedom (significan correlation values, p. <.05).

Responses sometimes varied depending on the ownership of the organization the journalists worked for. However, these were exceptions rather than the rule indicating the continued presence of a (ujamaa) socialization effect even among the respondents who work for the private media. In fact, one finding was quite surprising: private media considered the use of traditional media more important than did government media. The few exceptions to this consonance—for example, private media respondents subscribing to the Western news functions more and government media considering the government position in their reporting more—are not surprising. Interestingly, broadcast media also considered government position more important than did private media possibly reflecting the past tradition of monopolistic government control of broadcast media in many Third World countries and its continued indirect presence in this impactful medium. Reinforcing this argument of the continued effect of past socialization is the near absence of differences by gender and education in attitudinal responses. The blanketing strength of the socialization effect appears to override other possible sources of variation.

At the same time, the influence of the current owner is visible in some responses probably because the immediate effect of ownership and possible pride in one's workplace is difficult to override. Private media respondents believed they had the positive characteristics of credibility, professional competence, accuracy, balanced political coverage, positive coverage in general, reflection of interests of the common people, focus on cultural and intellectual issues, and contribution to the country's development, while the government media believed they had these characteristics. Somewhat similar results were found for analysis and contributing to country's development. At the same time, there was a certain honest recognition among these journalists of political and press realities. For example, for the more negative characteristics—focus on sensational news, stir up conflict, reflect views of wealthy—and for the somewhat more controversial characteristics in a new multiparty and free press state—support political pluralism and be a vocal critic of government—both agreed they were the private media's. For the development characteristic—help unify country—both agreed it was the government media's domain.

Conclusions

1. Journalism education needs strengthening in Tanzania to provide Tanzanian journalists with the training they need for the profession.

2. Tanzanian journalists have a commitment to their profession. They choose it deliberately and believe strongly in the primacy of the role they play in public affairs. Their job satisfaction is relatively high. This bodes extremely well for the future of journalism in Tanzania.

3. Tanzanian journalists have a strong desire to adopt the practices of western journalism, but this desire is tempered by a strong Tanzanian ethic of journalism deriving from the decades of socialization under press roles defined by ujaama and under societal traditions of praise singing, group orientation, concept of authority, and respect for elders and leaders. Periodic study is needed to track how this is resolved.

4. These journalists believe they have considerable freedom to choose topics to cover and angles to take, but at the same time they consider organization policy of greatest influence, more so than government position. And, they rate Tanzanian press freedom at midpoint. Further, in-depth study is necessary to explain the dynamics of reporting within the workplace in the current political and press atmosphere in Tanzania.

5. Very interestingly, there is consonance in the attitudes of Tanzanian journalists with demographic and workplace variables having scarcely any effect on these attitudes. The homogeneity of the answers is an important finding, and again might be the result of socialization under ujamaa and the newness of the liberal environment. It merits further research.

6. Similarly interesting is that Tanzanian journalists manifest the Lake Woebegone effect where all the variables are above average in importance or influence. This might be a function of their recent emergence from under political and press controls. It might also be due to the duality of their situation where both past tradition and present reality are together working their influence or where a perceived disconnect between what the government proclaims, i.e., the press is free, versus what is practice may be wielding influence through fear of reprisal or self-censorship.

Grosswiler (1997) identified four types of journalists in his study in Tanzania. These types represented a "third way," meaning that African journalists have a unique way of perceiving their roles: a mixture of socialism and some accommodation of western ideas of press freedom, but overall they still lean towards a collectivistic socialist model. Pauli (1999), in a study of Kenyan journalists, also found that communitarian roles were of considerable importance to these journalists. This study found similarly. Tanzanian journalists have, to some extent, kept their African concept of the press while simultaneously adopting the more western concept and even rating it as more important. Is this combination of tradition and the new a natural fusion of past socialization with new ideas, a stage in the path of change? Is it born out of necessity—a survival technique-- in this time of transitional uncertainty? Or is this the enduring character of journalism in Tanzania for time to come rooted in its cultural tradition? The coming decades will provide the answer as Tanzania moves from a talking individual to a talking nation.

Table 1
Distribution of Respondents by Demographic and Work Related Variables

	N	(%)	
Gender			
Female	35	(26.5)	
Male	97	(73.5)	
Religion			
Christian	88	(68.2)	
Muslim	34	(26.4)	
Moravian/Buddhist	7	(2.3)	
Education			
School	11	(8.6)	
College (including diplomas)	117	(91.4)	
Major in College			
Journalism	66	(56.9)	
Radio-TV	4	(3.4)	
Both	14	(12.1)	
Quantity Work			
Full-time	116	(86.6)	
Part-time	18	(13.4)	
Organization Nature			
Private	111	(79.9)	
Government	28	(20.1)	
Media Type			
Print	107	(77.0)	
Broadcast	32	(23.0)	
Received Pre-job Training in Journalism			
Yes	84	(60.4)	
No	55	(39.6)	
Received During-job Training in Journalism			
Yes	110	(80.3)	
No	19	(19.7)	
Mean Age (years)			36
Mean Years Worked in Journalism			10
Mean Monthly Income (Shillings)			168,355
Mean Monthly Income (Dollars)			212

Table 2
Factor Analysis of Journalistic Functions

	Mean	Factors				
		I	II	III	IV	h²
African	**2.28**					
Portray a positive image of the country	1.84	**.64828**				.46963
Promote the strength and unity of communities	1.56	**.74196**				.56314
Actively support government national development	2.05	**.62984**				.55812
Portray a positive image of the community	2.30	**.51020**				.42542
Discuss national policy while it is still being developed	1.99	**.43245**				.53028
Propagate government policy	2.91	**.58405**				.47796
Portray national leaders in a positive manner	3.24	**.49503**		.55155		.56054
Western	**1.54**					
Provide accurate information in a timely manner	1.12		**.47321**			.42543
Investigate claims and statements made by the government.	1.87		**.55483**			.57837
Provide analysis and interpretation of complex problems	1.53		**.71565**			.56051
Develop intellectual and cultural interests of the public	1.79		**.72859**			.61120
Give ordinary people a chance to express views on public affairs	1.40		**.63885**			.66738
Public	**1.91**					
Educate voters about how government operates	1.78			**.66827**		.61855
Objectively report on government national development programs	1.77			**.46339**		.49034
Inform voters about politicians' viewpoints	2.16			**.88988**		.80425
Entertainment	**1.88**					
Provide entertainment and relaxation	1.88				**.85318**	.73551
Percent of Variance		29.9	10.0	8.9	7.9	56.7
Percent of Covariance		52.7	17.6	15.7	13.9	

For the means, low score equals greater importance. Scale ranges from 1 to 5.

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Table 3
Factor Analysis of Job Related Benefits

	Mean	Factors			
		I	II	III	h^2
Benefit	**1.78**				
Pay	1.94	**.85337**			.73208
Chance to advance in the organization	1.87	**.76249**			.65443
Training opportunities	1.31	**.67208**			.53228
Fringe benefits	2.24	**.85298**			.73239
Job security	1.62	**.48642**		.61079	.63818
Public Affairs	**1.56**				
Chance to influence public affairs	1.45		**.45211**		.21234
Chance to expose corruption	1.35		**.68404**		.55024
Chance to meet important people	1.98		**.72282**		.62576
Autonomy	2.12		**.35130**		.23921
Chance to inform and educate the public	1.14		**.68613**		.51255
Chance to develop the country	1.43		**.57479**		.61893
Develop	**1.42**				
Chance to help ordinary people	1.42			**.91214**	.85652
Percent of Variance		31.8	16.6	9.2	57.5
Percent of Covariance		55.3	28.9	16	

For the means, low score equals greater importance. Scale ranges from 1 to 5.

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Table 4
Distribution of Respondents by Media Type and Media Characteristics

	Media Type							
	Private		Government		Both		Other	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Credibility	61	51	52	43	7	6	0	0
Professional Competence	52	41	65	52	9	7	0	0
Accuracy	52	45	56	48	8	7	0	0
Analysis	87	70	26	21	9	7	11	2
Vocal Critic of Government Policy	113	89	9	7	5	4	0	0
Support Political Pluralism	90	74	20	16	11	9	1	1
Provide Balanced Political Coverage	88	72	28	23	5	4	2	2
Provide Positive Coverage in General	60	51	50	42	6	5	2	2
Reflect Views of Common People	92	74	23	19	8	7	1	1
Reflect Views of Wealthy	83	70	25	21	9	8	9	2
Focus on Sensational News	99	83	15	13	5	4	0	0
Stir Ethnic Religious Separatist Conflict	80	76	15	14	5	5	5	5
Help Unify Country	26	21	83	66	16	13	1	1
Contribute to Country's Development	30	24	62	50	30	24	2	1
Focus on Cultural and Intellectual Issues	41	35	64	54	12	10	1	1

Table 5
Distribution of Respondents by Where Employed and Media to Which Characteristics were Ascribed

	Organization Nature (Where Employed)	
	Private (%)	Government (%)
Credibility*		
Private	63	14
Government	37	86
Professional Competence*		
Private	52	16
Government	48	84
Accuracy*		
Private	58	42
Government	9	91
Analysis*		
Private	84	50
Government	16	50
Vocal Critic of Government Policy		
Private	94	88
Government	6	12
Support Political Pluralism		
Private	84	71
Government	16	29
Provide Balanced Political Coverage*		
Private	88	20
Government	13	80
Provide Positive Coverage in General*		
Private	62	24
Government	38	76
Reflect Views of Common People*		
Private	89	41
Government	11	59
Reflect Views of Wealthy		
Private	79	68
Government	21	32
Focus on Sensational News		
Private	87	86
Government	13	14
Stir Ethnic Religious Separatist Conflict		
Private	86	77
Government	14	23
Help Unify Country		
Private	27	10
Government	73	91

Table 5 Continued
Distribution of Respondents by Where Employed and Media to Which Characteristics were Ascribed

	Organization Nature (Where Employed)	
	Private %	Government %
Contribute to Country's Development*		
Private	41	5
Government	59	95
Focus on Cultural and Intellectual Issues*		
Private	45	11
Government	55	90

*Significant chi-square values, $p < .05$.

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McQUAIL'S MEDIA PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND POST-COMMUNIST BROADCAST MEDIA:

A CASE STUDY OF BROADCASTING IN ESTONIA

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RUNNING HEAD: McQUAIL'S MEDIA PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

McQUAIL'S MEDIA PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND POST-COMMUNIST BROADCAST MEDIA: A CASE STUDY OF BROADCASTING IN ESTONIA

INTRODUCTION

The world in the late twentieth century experienced a third wave of democratization. Since the 1974 coup in Portugal, over forty countries experienced a transition from non-democratic to democratic political systems (Huntington, 1996, p 4). Most notable was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of communism in Eastern Europe. These post-Soviet societies found themselves in an awkward position caught between the old state-centered totalitarian system and democracy and its rules, between the old command economy and a competitive market economy.

Burdened with the baggage and relics of a state-managed political, economic, and social system, these societies followed a route to democracy influenced by both the legacy of their recent past and by their future goals (Frentzel-Zagorska, 1993, p 177). As these countries made this transformation, they democratized their institutions and liberalized their economies. Russell J. Dalton (1996) noted that "for the first time we are witnessing a transition from communism to democracy, and the nature and destination of this transition is unclear (p 1)."

The transformations in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Countries serve as a backdrop against the political fatigue suffered by the West and Central Europe, illuminating the challenges confronting democratization and communication. (Bruck, 1993). Further, these newly democratic countries provide an excellent opportunity to study the effects and outcome of radical political and economic changes in a mass media system. These post-communist countries faced many challenges as they politically and economically transforming their institutions and societies. As they struggled to reform both their political and economic systems, these countries endeavored to eliminate remnants of the Communist system and replaced them with the values and institutions of a democracy.

Traditional approaches to researching mass media systems involved theories considered highly ambiguous and philosophical. Comparative scholars used frameworks that merely examined the indigenous nature of the descriptive factors that influence the structure of a mass media system. Although these theories and approaches contributed to an understanding of state-media relationships, they were limited in that they over-generalize. The comparative frameworks tended to be heavy on description and light on assessment. Relatively new to mass media research is Denis McQuail's (1992) Media Performance Analysis which utilize an ideal set of democratic values, making it suitable for assessing the mass media systems of new democracies.

This study examined the broadcast system of one democratized post-communist country, Estonia. After gaining its independence in 1991, Estonia's existing state-run broadcasting structure was a relic inherited from the Soviet Union. Estonia was particularly aggressive as it democratized its political system and transformed its economy. This research focused on the restructuring of Estonia's broadcast system, at the end of the first 5 years of independence, 1996. During this period, Estonia saw the significant development of a private broadcast system to parallel its state owned and operated public system of radio and television stations. The political and economic changes that occurred in this post-communist country provided a rich environment for mass communication research in an emerging democracy. This environment highlighted issues concerning the mass media and democracy while providing an assessment of the progress and outcomes of the changes.

McQuail's (1992) Media Performance Analysis was used in this study to examine and assess Estonia's broadcast media system. This framework was used to appraise the new democracy's broadcast mass media system and the nature of the government-media relationship, and to highlight issues of democratic mass communication. This research examined the outcomes of the political and economic changes in Estonia's media system, a consolidated democracy, while exploring the utility of McQuail's (1992) framework for comparative and media system analysis.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Mass Media System Research

A country's mass media system mirrors the political, social, economic, and geographic conditions of that nation, revealing the character and nature of that society (Head, 1985). Research approaches in studying mass media systems include historical, descriptive, comparative, and critical perspectives. Much of the research on mass media systems normally incorporated two or more of these approaches. This study utilized historical and descriptive research approaches in examining the transformation of Estonia's broadcast system between 1991 - 1996.

Historical research of mass media systems examines the historical context or development of a particular mass media system. Studies include areas such as the development of a specific medium in a mass media system, the evolution of a particular mass media entity, and a review of a particular historical period for a mass media system. Examples include Smeyak's (1973) historical examination of the development of broadcasting in Guyana, Smith's (1974) history of British broadcasting, Ellis's (1979) study of the evolution of Canadian broadcasting, Brigg's (1985) study of the BBC's first fifty years, McDowell's (1992) examination of the history of the BBC broadcasting in Scotland, Cathcart's (1984) history of the BBC in Northern Ireland, and Criswell's (1997) recent study of British Broadcasting history. Historical examinations contribute to an understanding of the contextual issues surrounding the development of mass media systems.

Descriptive research contributes information on various factors and attributes of a mass media system. Many of these studies involve comparative research, comparing various mass media systems by a set of descriptive factors, and most include historical overviews of a mass media system's development. The research incorporating these approaches examines a number of mass media dimensions. Alan Wells (1996) sets forth five key factors upon which a media system can be examined and studied. He believes that an analysis of a media system should begin with the following questions: "How is the media controlled?, How is it financed?, What is its purpose?, Whom does it serve?, and How does it ascertain the effect it is having? (p 7)." Wells observes that control is a key factor in studying media systems. He cites A. Namurois' classification scheme composed of four types, state-operated, public corporation, public interest partnership, and private enterprise, as an adequate beginning to study control (p 5-6).

Some descriptive studies of mass media systems include Ploman's (1976) description of broadcasting in Sweden, Hallman's and Hindley's (1977) study of broadcasting in Canada, Sanders' (1978) research on broadcasting in Guyana, Fisher's (1978) study of broadcasting in Ireland, Noriega and Leach's (1979) examination of broadcasting in Mexico, and Chatterji's (1987) description of broadcasting in India. Early descriptive research was conducted in the 1970s on radio and television in Eastern Europe while these countries were still communist (Paulu, 1974). In addition, research was done incorporating both descriptive and historical approaches with Porter and Hasselbach's (1991) study of Germany's broadcast regulation. Recent descriptive research on African countries was conducted by Carver (1995) on Malawi and South Africa, by Lauriciano (1995) on Mozambique, by Lush (1995) on Namibia, and by Maja (1995) on Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The Four Theories

Theories concerning the media and its relationship to the state and society have existed for years as a means to describe and explain why a country had a particular type of mass media system. In the 1950's, a set of theories was developed concerning state-mass media relationships. Although limited, Siebert's, Peterson's, and Schramm's (1956) Four Theories of the Press have served as a reference point for most of the research literature on media systems in various countries.

The original Four Theories of the Press, developed by Siebert et al. in 1956, evolved out of the work of the Hutchins Commission.[1] These concepts described what the press should be and do. The Four Theories addressed some fundamental issues concerning the mass media including:

> Why is the press as it is? Why does it apparently serve different purposes and appear in widely different forms in different countries? Why for example, is the press of the Soviet Union so different from our own, and the press of Argentina so different from that of Great Britain (p 1)?

A basic reason for differences in mass media systems was that they reflected "the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates (p1)." The mass media illuminated the system of social control that influenced the relations of institutions and individuals.

The Four Theories - Authoritarian, Libertarian, Soviet-Communist, and Social Responsibility - provided a framework for how the press operated in a given society. Truth, in the authoritarian atmosphere of the Renaissance, was considered to be in the hands of a few wise people who could guide and direct others, not a product of the masses. Thus, the mass media functioned from the top down, providing a means to inform the masses of what the rulers wanted them to know and the policies they should support. Consequently, the media maintained the power of the ruler and the social order. For authoritarian systems, the press published on behalf of the ruling regime. The regime held the right to license the press, set policy and censor. (Siebert et al, 1956).

Libertarian theory developed out of ideas from the Enlightenment. These included "the growth of political democracy and religious freedom, the expansion of free trade and travel, [and] the acceptance of laissez-faire economics (Siebert et al, 1956, p 3)." People were considered rational beings, with the ability to distinguish truth from falsehood. Truth was no longer the property of power. It was now considered a natural and inalienable right for people to search for truth. In this realm the mass media were mechanisms that submitted arguments and information that people can used to judge their government and determine their own opinions on policy. A marketplace of ideas and information existed where the truth emerged from discussion and debate. Thus, the press must be independent and free from government influence and control.

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[1] The original theories were developed ten years after the first major study of the press and its role in society. It was the 1947 American Commission on Freedom of The Press, known as the Hutchins Commission, which first evaluated and established a set of standards for a socially responsible media. This commission was established to study criticisms that the media were one-sided and too powerful. Ironically, it was magazine tycoon Henry Luce who financed the studies. He was outraged by the findings of the commission. He and other media barons attacked the commission's report. They argued that freedom of the press was at stake when the government or anybody prescribed what the media should do. The Hutchins Commission's principles of social responsibility later influenced development of social theories of the media. See Commission on Freedom of the Press. *A Free and Responsible Press.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947. 2 volumes.

Soviet Communist theory evolved out of the authoritarian concept of the press. Unlike authoritarianism, the media were not private but state-owned entities. Under Soviet Communist theory, the media served as an instrument of the state for the purposes of propaganda and social control. While the libertarian media concept was based on the assumption that rational people could discern between truth and falsehood, the Soviets believed that their population needed careful guidance from its caretakers. Therefore, the Soviet system set up an extensive system to prohibit competing information. (Siebert *et al*, 1956).

The last theory, Social Responsibility, developed out of an uneasiness with the evolving growth in media companies and the concern that control of the press was being consolidated into a few powerful hands. The owners and managers of the mass media acted as gatekeepers deciding "which persons, which facts, which version of the facts, shall reach the public (Siebert, et al., 1956, p 5)." The U.S. Constitution embraced ideas of Libertarian theory by protecting the press from government control and censorship. However, the Hutchins Commission noted that protection from government was no longer a guarantee that someone with something to say would have an opportunity to say it. Due to the concentration of media ownership developing under the Libertarian concept, it was difficult to have a free market of ideas. Therefore, since the media occupied a position of power and monopoly in terms of providing information to the public, they had an obligation to be socially responsible.

There were criticisms of the Four Theories. These included observations that they really were just one theory, that the Four Theories were oversimplified, that the Four Theories ignored the private sector's concentration of power, and that the Four Theories neglected the potential weaknesses of the mass media's commercial realm (Guback & Nerone, 1995). Ognianova (1996) offered another criticism: that the Four Theories did not deal with media systems in transition.

Despite these criticisms, the Four Theories broke new ground by attempting to describe the relationship of mass media with the society within which it functioned. Since their inception, these theories have remained the basis for most discussion of the mass media's public role. Over the years, various scholars overcame the obviously sound criticisms by building and adding to the Four Theories. Raymond Williams (1967) brought in economics when he developed his own set of media typologies. He distinguished between four kinds of media systems: authoritarian, paternal, commercial, and democratic, providing a more realistic thinking about control and freedom.

Merrill and Lowenstein (1971) suggested that countries fall on a continuum between authoritarian-tending and libertarian-tending in their relations to the press. Later, Merrill and Lowenstein (1979) injected economic factors in theories concerning government-press relations. They suggested that press sponsorship be added which would differentiate levels of economic development and types of media ownership.

William Hachten (1981) proposed a replacement for the Four Theories that provided a more realistic picture of state relations to the press. He suggested five political concepts for state relations with the media: authoritarian, Communist, Western, revolutionary, and developmental. Robert Picard (1982/1983) offered a more distinct category within the Western model called the democratic socialist theory. McQuail (1983) contributed two variants to the Four Theories. They were development and democratic-participant.

Other researchers pursued alternative approaches to studying the media and their various political-societal relationships. In the last decade, McQuail (1992) offered a new framework for studying a country's media system and its various relationships. Media Performance Analysis established a framework of normative criteria to assess mass media's performance in the public interest.

He noted early criticisms that the Four Theories had little empirical use since they were broad and developed on outdated notions of the press. In addition, previous frameworks no longer fit with today's dynamic media environment. The enormous expansions of the media, democratization, and changing technologies created an environment for debate on the public role of the media.

Media Performance Analysis

McQuail's (1992) Media Performance Analysis was a framework of expectations for media performance. Its purpose was to serve as a guide for assessing media performance in serving the public interest. Media Performance Analysis was based on the assumption that the media's role was to serve the public interest, whether intentionally or by chance. The mass media were not considered to be like other businesses, they performed tasks important to society. Therefore, the mass media were held accountable for their performance. The media themselves that claimed to perform a public role, a role that was said to be in the public interest, often espoused this assumption. A definition of the public interest was that "something is in the public interest if it serves the ends of the whole society rather than those of some sectors of the society (p 65)."

What McQuail's (1992) Media Performance Analysis did was to establish a framework of normative criteria to assess mass media's performance in the public interest. He did this by drawing from the discourse found in law and regulation enactment, policy debates, commission reports and court cases of the last fifty years. From this, McQuail uncovered what he called the fundamental values of the public interest. These fundamental values provided the empirical foundation for inquiry into mass media performance (McQuail, 1992, p 30-32).

The principles proposed reflect core values of Western democratic society. The three basic principles that formed the framework for Media Performance Analysis were: freedom, equality, and order. These principles were the focus of expectations concerning mass media performance. While desirable, these principles often came into conflict with each other. Freedom could be inconsistent with the principles of order and equality, which could call for limits. This tension between principles was often found in policy debates and reflected the lack of consensus on their order of importance, or how they should be applied (McQuail, 1992).

The following describes these three basic principles and their elements in terms of media performance. As they are discussed, it is evident that they share elements and are interconnected. However, it is easier to understand Media Performance Analysis by separating and discussing the individual values, and then examining the interrelations.

The Freedom Principle

Freedom referred to the right to free expression and the free formulation of opinion. "It is a condition, rather than a criterion of performance, since freedom does not predict any specific outcome (McQuail, 1992, p 69)." It was based on two notions: (1) the right of humans to form and express personal beliefs and (2) the role of individuals as members of society. In society, people need access to information, to express opinions, to make judgments, and to participate in developing societal goals and the methods to achieve them. Freedom of expression was both an individual right and a social good (1992).

There were three elements of freedom: access, diversity, and independence. For the right of freedom of expression to exist, there had to be access to channels and the opportunity to receive diverse information. The degree of access an audience had to alternative channels of communication was a major element of freedom. The sender's access to their chosen audience was also important. Another element of freedom, diversity, permitted people to receive a variety of information and ideas upon which opinions and decisions could be made. Both access and diversity were dependent on the element of independence. Independence allowed the press to exercise its role as watchdog over government and business. Freedom permitted the media, through independence, to offend the powerful, to offer controversial views, and to deviate from the normal. The benefit of this element of freedom was a free media that was open to new ideas and accessible to different voices (McQuail, 1992).

The Equality Principle

Equality required that no special favor be given to those in power positions. Three elements of equality were access, diversity, and objectivity. Shared with freedom, access to the mass media was to be given on a fair and equal basis to everyone including opposition and deviant opinions. Diversity also was an element of equality and shared with freedom. It was important in that it supported the process of change in society. Equality in the mass media meant that diverse ideas that could lead to progressive changes have equal opportunities to be disseminated to society (McQuail, 1992).

The third element of equality was objectivity. It was a form of media practice and an attitude. Objectivity required that sources and objects of news receive equal and fair treatment. This element also was linked to freedom through the element of independence. Media independence was necessary to be able to be neutral and detached (McQuail, 1992).

The Order Principle

The normative principle of order referred to the cohesion and harmony of a social organization, involving the ability of communication to strengthen or weaken this cohesion. Those in power sometimes viewed the media as disruptive of the normal social order. Yet, the media was often viewed as indispensable in maintaining the social harmony of society. Another view of order was found at the individuals and sub-groups levels of society. Communication helped at these levels by focusing and maintaining identity and group cohesion. However, the mass media also can be "a source of disturbance or threat when it intrudes with alien values or as an instrument of constraint (McQuail, 1992, p 76-77)."

In terms of order, media assessment depended heavily on the choice of perspective. "The question of 'whose order?' had to be settled first (McQuail, 1992, p 75)." To simplify the concept of order and identify its various perspectives, McQuail distinguished between social and cultural domains. The social domain was composed of the elements of control and social cohesion. The social control perspective of media performance could be identified through the negative portrayals of conflict and disorder or through the positive support given to established authority and institutions (McQuail, 1992, p 78-79).

The element of social cohesion recognized that the

> mass media can help individuals to feel attached to the wider community and society and to share in its collective life, on the basis of sympathetic fellow-feeling, especially for others in difficulties of various kinds (McQuail, 1992, p 269).

This acknowledged that the mass media could function to help people and various groups in a society to connect and feel affiliated with each other. Social cohesion was dependent on access to mass media channels in order to enable individuals and groups to communicate, deliberate and connect.

The cultural domain of order was divided into elements of quality and identity or authenticity. Cultural quality usually was defined according to standards of high culture. Some categories of art, crafts, and customs of a nation were singled out for protection. Certain kinds of media content were believed to have broader implications for society. Thus, some countries required a minimum amount of educational programming. Other nations required programming that was domestically produced or in the native language. In this manner the media was seen to be protecting and maintaining cultural quality (McQuail, 1992, p 275-276).

The element of identity or authenticity referred to recognition and boundary markers. It was a matter of our culture versus others. The issue here was not the quality of culture, but whose culture the media was offering. McQuail observed that this element of cultural order represented the "value of having a consciousness of identity and belonging to a shared community of place (McQuail, 1992, p 291)."

Interrelation of Principles

The three principles of freedom, equality, and order have been described separately for purposes of identification. However, McQuail (1992) observed that they overlap and were interconnected. For example, the concepts of diversity and access were both found under the principles of freedom and equality. Free and equal access to channels of communication and diverse information demonstrated how these elements were interconnected. In addition, the concept of social cohesion was tied to both order and equality. The ability of the mass media to contribute to a cohesive society was dependent on equal access to channels and to diversity of information (McQuail, 1992).



Figure 1 **Framework of principles of media performance (McQuail, 1992, p 78).**

It must be noted that the principles of freedom, equality, and order could have inconsistencies, internally and between them. There also could be tension within equality as in absolute equality versus unequal but fair access. Each value was opened to interpretation. Thus, the framework offered for Media Performance Analysis "can never be used as a straight forward [sic] `reading' of the public interest from these values and their sub-concepts (McQuail, 1992, p78)." The assessment and interpretation was done on a case by case basis. Determination of the public interest performance could only be accomplished through argument and evidence from an established perspective. For example, conflict could occur between freedom and order in the area of liberty versus licensing. In this case, freedom of expression, which could be disruptive, confronted the need to establish order. Licensing would lead to social order but would impede freedom (McQuail, 1992).

McQuail's Media Performance Analysis was a relatively new normative theory. It offered a framework that could guide researchers in a very large area of study. The framework incorporated ideal democratic values, which most Western democracies strove to achieve, but failed to fulfill. Media Performance Analysis provided a map that investigators could follow regardless of the perspective or level of study. The framework offered researchers numerous concepts and perspectives of which to study and assess media performance through empirical analysis that could be understood by the lay person and used in policy debates (McQuail, 1992, p 15-16). It was appropriate to the extent it contributed to the discussion and debate of media policy. Its utility was found in its applicability to various levels from various perspectives.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the negation of communism in its satellite states led to major changes in the broadcasting systems of these countries. The abolition of authoritarian communication structures was one of the first conditions for democratization, with the ideal approach being the abolition of state monopolies and the deconcentration of power to create a pluralist communicative environment (Vreg, 1995). Democratization and economic restructuring occurred in many of these countries. With these changes, many of the barriers to democratizing mass communication vanished. The result was the establishment of a new media system for many of these nations.

Review of Literature on Post-Communist Mass Media Changes

Studies concerning the political and economic changes of mass media systems in post-communist Eastern Europe and the newly independent countries from the demise of the Soviet Union involved various aspects of the transition itself, and the role of the mass media in these transformations. The few studies done in the last decade included: snapshot reports of the mass media in transition, the lack of changes in some mass media systems, the aspects of changes occurring in the mass media systems, the barriers and limitations to changes in the mass media, the processes of change in a mass media system, the mass media's role in political development, the descriptions of mass media in post-Communist countries and the development of a transitional press concept to supplement the Four Theories.

Hester, Reybold, and Conger (1992) edited a series of articles that provided sketches of various media at the onset of democratization in 1991. A year later Hester and Reybold (1993) provided further snapshots of journalistic and mass media activities and the challenges in Eastern and Central Europe during democratization. In his examination of Belarussian mass media, Oleg Manaev (1993) noted that despite democratization there had been no change in the mass media's political and economic status. The mass media still remained dependent on government authorities based on the principle of social management. Changes in the mass media systems of post-Communist countries were examined in an analysis of East Germany's media system as unification and democratization occurred (Robinson , 1995). A study of Romania noted that improvements and dramatic increases in broadcast competition and freedom in that country were attributed to the "development of alternative networks, access to Western-style programming and production techniques, the rise of private, independent broadcasters, and the international exchange of broadcast content (Mollison, 1998, p 127)." Barriers and limitations to changes in mass media systems were observed in studies of the Ukraine, Hungary and Germany (Pryliuk, 1993). Observations concerning media and change in Hungary concluded that creating a democracy and its institutions was difficult when a people's history and socialization did not include the expectations and assumptions needed to accomplish it (Kováts & Whiting, 1995).

Peter Humphreys (1994) examined the development of German media policies since 1945. Part of this study included the imposition, upon unification, of West Germany's pluralistic media policies and system on East Germany. While studying the process of change in a mass media system, Kleinwaechter (1997) studied the transition of broadcasting in Eastern and Central Europe. The role of the mass media in political and economic development were examined in Romania and in a study of the comparison of Brazilian and Eastern European mass media (Gross, 1996). Gross (1993) also researched the role and effect of the mass media in forming public opinion in Romania, noting that the media's efforts produced mixed results.

Mass media's role in the process of democratic transition was compared in Brazil and Eastern Europe (Busato, 1993, Gross, 1996). Janice Overlock (1996) offered a descriptive overview of media developments in the newly independent post-Communist countries, providing a brief description of the number and programming of radio and television stations and the status of developing broadcast laws. John Downing (1996), using Poland, Hungary, and Russia as his focus, examined the multiple roles of the media in the political, economic, and cultural transitions taking place in these countries between 1990 - 1995. In studying the rapid changes occurring in Bulgaria's media structure, it was discovered that the prescriptive concepts of authoritarian, libertarian, Communist, social responsibility and democratic socialist coexist. Media developments in post-communist Bulgaria were examined leading to the development of a descriptive transitional press concept (Ognianova, 1996).

The transformations in Eastern Europe and in the newly independent post-Soviet nations furnished new opportunities to study the democratization of mass media systems (Bruck, 1993). They have had to redesign themselves politically and economically. As one of the new post-Soviet nations, Estonia's transformation was significantly different from that of the Eastern European nations, because its political and economic structures were highly integrated with the Soviet Union. Upon gaining its independence in 1991, Estonia embarked on an aggressive campaign of political and economic changes. One major focus of these changes concerned its broadcasting system.

Estonia

Estonia is situated on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea, bounded in the north by the Gulf of Finland. It shares borders in the east with Russia and in the south with Latvia. The northern most of the three Baltic Republics, Estonia is larger than Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, or Switzerland. The country covers 45,226 square kilometers with another 2,315 sq. km in dispute with Russia (Fjuk & Kaevats, 1994). By comparison, its is approximately the size of New Hampshire and Vermont combined (Cannon & Hough, 1995).

The Soviet Union occupied Estonia from June 1940 to August 1991, with brief German occupation during WWII. Before this, Estonia had experienced over 20 years of independence from Czarist Russia. Under Soviet occupation, the Soviet Union controlled Estonia's mass media system and served the purposes of the Communist Party. During this period, Estonian mass media operated under the Lenin doctrine that the media must serve as collective propagandist, collective agitator, and collective organizer (McNair, 1991).

In August 1991, upon gaining its independence from the Soviet Union, Estonia immediately began changing the political and economic system imposed upon them by the Soviets. Left with the remnants of a fifty-year communist political system and centrally planned economy, Estonia proceeded to restore its democracy with a new democratic constitution and institutions. The development of independent broadcast media began with protections provided for by the new constitution, ratified in June 1992, guaranteeing freedom of the speech and of the press. Section 45 secured the "right to freely circulate ideas, opinions, persuasions and other information by word, print, picture and other means.

In its early development, Estonia's broadcast system after independence faced a number of obstacles. It was an environment that challenged the development of a private broadcast system and the restructuring of the inherited state structure into a public broadcasting system. The political and economic changes occurring in post-communist countries such as Estonia offered researchers an opportunity to study the results of the transformation of these broadcast systems. When the lenses of Media Performance Analysis were focused on post-communist countries that have consolidated their democracies, its principles evoked inquiry as to the effects and extent that the changes have had on the broadcast media systems.

RESEARCH QUESTION

The mass media system of any given society is not isolated and detached. The task of evaluating a democracy can be accomplished by way of a singular mirror, its mass media system. Consequently, an examination of the mass media also illuminates the social and political system of any society. This unique prism reveals the democratic health and progress attained by a new democracy (Humphreys, 1994).

Due to space limitations, this paper will focus only on one Media Performance Analysis principle, independence. Thus, this paper covers the following research question:

- How independent were the broadcast media in Estonia, both public and private?

METHODOLOGY

This research employed a case study approach, which study the changes and development in Estonia's broadcast system. A case study approach was adopted since it focuses on understanding the dynamics existing within a single environment or setting (Arneson, 1993). Although the case study relied on the judgement of the researcher, it offered the advantage of triangulating sources of information, including personal interviews, newspaper reports, documents, and independent reports (Feagin et al, 1991). Estonia was chosen as a case study since it was recognized as the most advanced of the newly democratic states of the post-Soviet countries (Barnard, 1997).

The method used to study Estonia's broadcast system was historical. Startt and Sloan (1989) recognized that "one purpose of good history is to provide understanding of change (p 20)." Historical research furnished a "contextual foundation for identifying and understanding (Arneson, 1993, p 163)" issues and problems of the subject under study. Primary sources were used such as documents in conjunction with interviews to provide a historical view of the problem or experience of a situation. The major requirements for historical research were that evidence had come substantially from primary sources and that they had been checked for authenticity and credibility. Close examination and comparison of information gathered through primary sources contributed to establishing credibility and authenticity (Smith, 1981).

Purposeful sampling methods were used to select informants for in-depth interviews. For this study a snowball sampling method was used to recruit informants for interview. According to Babbie (1992), when a purposive sampling method was used, such as snowball, the researcher selected a sample of individuals that he "believe(s) will yield the most comprehensive understanding of [the] subject of study (p 292)." Some participants were interviewed for information they possessed, while others were interviewed for whom they knew. The latter respondents did not have information for study, but directed the researcher to someone who did. The researcher started the snowball by approaching individuals in Estonia's broadcast media. Then respective government ministries of culture and telecommunications were selected for interview for their knowledge of the development of

Estonia's broadcast system. Each informant was asked to suggest others to be interviewed. The Estonians interviewed for this research can be found in this paper's appendix.

Research concerning Estonia's broadcast media system necessarily included accounting for all groups and interests that sought to influence its development. This included the following actors: government officials, members of parliament, former and current public and private broadcast owners and operators, broadcast interest groups or associations, and other interested parties such as journalists and consultants. The nature of the issues raised by the research questions influenced the "range of actors, the extent, depth, and effectiveness of their involvement, and their various motivations and behavior (Humphreys, 1994, p 6-7)."

Estonia's new constitution, government laws, and private documents were studied and compared for information and their contribution to the development of this new democratic broadcast system. Information also was gathered from the Baltic English language newspaper, *The Baltic Independent*, now *The Baltic Times*, reviewing issues for the five year period under examination. Estonian language newspapers *Eesti Päevaleht* and *Postimees* were also studied for relevant articles with the help of an Estonian. In addition, information provided by *Baltic Media Facts* and reports by the European Community contributed to the findings found in this dissertation.

The researcher spent approximately five weeks in Estonia interviewing various respondents, including government officials, parliament members, public broadcasters, private broadcasters, and consultants. Interviews provided the opportunity to gain information from different actors concerning Estonia's broadcast system. For this study the researcher enlisted a native Estonian versed in both the subject and the English language to serve as an interpreter or to clarify the questions or answers.

Treatment of the Data

Qualitative methods generated a tremendous amount of data. The information provided depth and detail on the research topic through direct quotation and description of situations, events, and interactions. Identification and organization of relevant data often was difficult yet important for successful analysis. Interpretation followed as the researcher studied the data for ideas, causes, and relationships. Then the analysis concluded with the researcher establishing trust in the interpretations by reviewing the data for alternative explanations (Patton, 1987). Analysis of the data collected in Estonia was enhanced by the constant review that occurred during the comparing and contrasting of information. Often additional ideas and information emerged that enriched the findings.

RESULTS

Guided by McQuail's Media Performance Analysis framework, the researcher examined Estonia's broadcast system, utilizing ideal democratic values of freedom, equality, and order to assess its broadcast system. Although no Western democracy measures up to this ideal set of democratic values, all democracies strive to realize them. Specific to this paper was the element of independence.

How Independent Was the Broadcast Media in Estonia, Both Public and Private?

This question addressed an important element in McQuail's value of freedom, considered important in enabling a broadcast system to serve the public interest in a democratic society. An independent broadcast media provides people freedom to advocate and express their views and differing opinions, thereby participating in the governance of their society. This freedom also enables various members of society to compete for public office using the broadcast media to discuss and debate the issues in vying for the peoples' vote. Thus, an independent broadcast system is necessary as a democratic institution that serves the public interest. The independence of Estonia's broadcast system was examined by studying both its public and private broadcasting media.

Estonia's public broadcasting media evolved out of the Soviet Communist broadcast system inherited from the USSR. Since independence, Estonia's public broadcasting system worked to transform itself into a broadcast system that served the public interests rather than the state. Although the Estonian Constitution and the 1994 Broadcast Law provided for the right to free speech and freedom of the press, the public broadcasting system operated under some major handicaps that inhibited its abilities to be totally free from government interference: dependence on government operating subsidies, and government owned transmitters.

A number of interview respondents noted that direct government subsidization of public broadcasting was a major problem, despite the existence of a Broadcast Council. Laur (personal communication, November 1996) observed that the biggest problem was

> that public radio and TV are not in fact independent from the government and Parliament since their budget very heavily depends on . . . decisions from the government and the parliament . . . for example [if] public radio and TV are very critical towards the government [then] the government can actually not give them enough money . . . and of course the managers of these companies are interested in having a healthy budget.

She noted a recent example for the potential of government interference when Eesti Televisioon's news director made a comment about the predicted results of the elections. The government and political parties said that this was not appropriate for public television. They heavily criticized Eesti Televisioon's Managing Director Hagi Shein for these comments.

When asked about the independence of public broadcasting, Rummo (personal communication, December 1996) stated that "there have been attempts. . . Yes.. there have been such steps that can be interpreted as government interference." He acknowledged that mechanisms were needed to prevent the possibility of government interference. Veidemann (personal communication, December 1996) said that certainly the government tried. He saw cases where the government wanted to interfere and influence news and talk shows on public broadcast stations. Veidemann suggested that it was good that a Broadcast Council existed to serve as a layer between the government and public broadcasting, but he also cited direct subsidization of public broadcasting by The Riigikogu as a major concern. This practice exposed public radio and public television to potential interference from the government.

Managing Director of Eesti Televisioon, Hagi Shein (personal communication, December 1996), noted that public broadcasters "try to be independent but the politicians don't like it." In practice, public television was quite independent, but Shein also expressed concern about direct subsidies from the state. Direct subsidies potentially gave the state a lever of control, if they decided to use it. Herkki Haldre (personal communication, December 1996), Managing Director of Eesti Raadio during 1993 and 1994, said that he had personally experienced attempts at governmental interference. He noted that people in government had the "old telephone power (1996)." This meant he would get telephone calls from government officials, some of them his friends, who complained that as Managing Director of Eesti Raadio he was giving too many people from the opposition the opportunity to get "their word there (personal communication, December 1996)" on the public radio stations.

These government officials indicated that they did not like the opposition having so much broadcast time and that he should do something about it. These same 'old friends' had appointed him. Now they wanted him to keep public radio as a state control propaganda machine. Haldre (personal communication, December 1996) felt it was the same old game that Estonia had just freed itself from, part of the Soviet legacy. Words were exchanged and he resigned. At about this time the Broadcast Law was enacted. He noted that afterwards, with the coalition governments that followed, there were no more attempts at interference of which he knows. It had become too sensitive to try. But Haldre observed that public broadcasting was very careful; they were doing features and soft criticism, while private broadcasters were harder with on-air criticism. Estonian public broadcasting was careful and mildly criticized the government so as not to step on toes, because of their dependence every year on direct state subsidies (H. Haldre, personal communication, December 1996).

While direct subsidization by The Riigikogu was one major concern regarding independence from government interference, Estonian public broadcasting's rental of transmitters from state-owned Eesti Telekom was the other concern. Both public radio and public television rented transmitters from Eesti Telekom, making them vulnerable to indirect government interference.

According to Holmberg (personal communication, May 1998), compared to other countries with similar histories, Estonian public broadcasting was relatively free and democratic. However, while he had no documentation, he had it on good authority that there have been instances where the government leaned heavily on the public broadcasters, but to little effect. He noted in his conversations with public broadcasters that one cited example of the potential for government interference was the transmitters. His sources noted that the government could pressure them by increasing transmitter rental fees, but not their state subsidies. In that way, it would not appear that the government was interfering with public broadcasting.

Both direct subsidization and transmitter rental restricted Estonian public broadcasting's independence from government interference, restricting their freedom to criticize the government. A majority of Estonian public broadcasting station's revenues came from government subsidies, voted on and allocated annually by the Riigikogu. If The Riigikogu was displeased with public broadcasting's news coverage and criticism it could threaten or vote to cut these subsidies.

The other concern, transmitter rentals, also provided the government opportunities for interference. Again, if the government was unhappy with public broadcasting's news coverage or criticism, then transmitter rental fees could be increased without increasing subsidies, pressuring or punishing public broadcasting. Raising transmitter fees for public broadcasting would not be as overt as directly cutting subsidies, thus raising public suspicions, and could always be attributed to increasing costs. Private radio broadcasters, owning their transmitters systems were not particularly exposed to such government interference. The same was not true, however, of private television stations, which rented Eesti Telekom's transmitters, thereby exposing themselves to possible government interference. The lack of transmitter facilities, therefore, made the specter for government interference significant for public broadcasting and for private television broadcasting stations.

What made this significant was that the majority of listening and viewing audiences tuned to Estonian public radio and public television stations, which were exposed to government pressure and interference. The top 7 television shows in 1995 were on public television. In addition, Estonian public radio's four channels achieved a 63% weekly share of listenership compared to 27% for local radio (*Baltic Media Book*, 1996). While private broadcast stations were more critical of the government, the listening and viewing audiences overwhelmingly tuned to the public broadcasting stations.

Sinisalu (personal communication, November 1996) and Hunt (personal communication, December 1996) offered an important point in this discussion concerning independence. They felt that any real attempt by the government to censor or interfere with the broadcast media would have been met with public outrage and condemnation. Haldre (personal communication, December 1996) also noted that in recent years attempts to interfere with public broadcasting had "become a hot potato" for the government, suggesting that to do so would be foolish in light of the public's reaction.

When the independence of private broadcasting was explored, the prospect was more encouraging. Respondents noted that private broadcasters were free from government censorship and interference. Haldre (personal communication, December 1996) observed that private broadcasters were harsher in their criticism of the government than public broadcasters. Private broadcasters Lang (personal communication, November 1996), Loit (personal communication, November 1996), Jõesaar (personal communication, December 1996), and Taska (personal communication, December 1996) noted that they experienced no problems with government interference or censorship. Everyone was quick to point out that the criticism in the news and information programs of the private broadcasters offered evidence of the independence of these stations.

However, one caveat was the private television stations' rental of transmitters from state-owned Eesti Telekom. This exposed private television stations to the same potential problem of public broadcasters, possible governmental pressure and interference exerted through the transmission system rental fees. Private television stations already were paying rental fees that ranged from 40% to 50% of their monthly operating budgets, nearly ten times higher than what western broadcasters pay (I. Taska, personal communication, December 1996). The high fees inhibited the development and ability of private television stations to grow and offer competitive news and entertainment alternatives to the public television broadcast system. In addition, renting the transmission system from state-owned Eesti Telekom provided the government an indirect means to interfere with private television stations' operations and broadcasts.

Another issue concerning the independence of both public and private broadcasters in Estonia was their dependence on advertising revenues. Holmberg (personal communication, May 1996) noted that Estonia's market economy, still developing and growing, had limited available advertising revenue. Estonia's private broadcasting stations depended on advertising to finance their operations. In addition, public broadcasting also supplemented its budget with advertising revenue. As of 1996, advertising already made up almost 35% of Eesti Televisioon's budget (Eesti Televisioon on Glance, 1996) and almost 20% of Eesti Raadio's revenues (P. Sookruus, personal communication, December 1996).

What Holmberg (personal communication, May 1998) observed was the possibility that broadcasters were inhibited in the area of consumer journalism. Both public and private broadcasters would have hesitated to report and criticize businesses that advertise, especially since the advertising market was undeveloped and limited. Unfortunately, this inhibition occurred at a time when consumer journalism needed to be most aggressive in educating and cautioning the Estonian population about the negative aspects of a market economy and unscrupulous business practices. Although relatively independent, private and public broadcasters in Estonia nevertheless faced potential pressure from the business sector of their new market economy.

According to Holmberg (personal communication, May 1998), the overall evidence indicated that broadcasters in Estonia were relatively independent, especially when compared to other post-communist countries. While some respondents noted examples of government attempts to interfere with public broadcasters, they also observed that these were, for the most part, ignored and resisted. There were indications that public broadcasters knew where the line was in criticizing the government, as demonstrated when private broadcasters were harsher in their criticism.

Accordingly, the only problem with independence lay with the Riigikogu's direct subsidization of public broadcasting and the rental of transmission systems by both public and private broadcasters. Otherwise, Estonian broadcasters were independent. They have come a long way since Estonia gained its independence.

SUMMARY

The democratization of Estonia's broadcast system was evaluated from a Western democratic perspective, utilizing McQuail's (1992) Media Performance Analysis framework. This framework utilizes a set of ideal democratic values to examine a country's mass media system. These values represent the ideals sought in a democratic mass media system. Many democratic countries, including the United States, have not achieved these ideals, yet they are values that democratic nations or those that pursue democracy hope to or should eventually achieve.

One of the three elements of McQuail's (1992) Media Performance Analysis is independence. If independence of the broadcast media was assessed solely on performance, then Estonia's system could be considered free and independent. Sinisalu (personal communication, November 1996) and Hunt (personal communication, December 1996) opinioned that the Estonian public would not tolerate overt government meddling in the media. Haldre (personal communication, December 1996) felt that government control or interference in the broadcast media would be a hot potato. Further examination though, revealed a different assessment concerning the independence of Estonia's broadcast system.

This was reflected in the differences between the public and private broadcaster's coverage and criticism of the government. Public broadcaster's coverage of the government was considered softer than the private radio and television coverage. The obvious cause was the dependence of public broadcasting on annually appropriated direct government subsidies. In addition, public broadcasters also were dependent on the lease of government-owned transmission systems, exposing them to covert government interference through the manipulation of transmission fees.

This structural arrangement raised questions about the independence of Estonia's broadcast system. The Estonian government, despite oversight by the Broadcast Council, could directly influence public broadcasters by cutting their subsidies or by increasing transmission fees. Private broadcasters struggled to compete with a public broadcasting system that was dominant in both audience size and advertising revenues. However, public broadcasters and its supporters naively influenced the enactment of legislation that left public broadcasting vulnerable to government interference. This legislation created a broadcasting system that inhibited the development and growth of a private broadcasting sector, and made the dominant broadcasters, the public stations, vulnerable to government meddling.

The overall affect of political and democratic changes on Estonia's broadcast system was to create a public broadcasting system that dominated the private broadcast sector and inhibited its growth. It was a system where the public broadcasters, due to their dependence on government subsidies and the rental of government owned transmissions systems, were potentially exposed to direct or indirect government interference. This dependence caused concern since public broadcasting in Estonia dominated with large viewing and listening audiences. Thus, Estonian audiences depended on a public broadcasting system whose independence could be jeopardized by government interference.

Furthermore, the changes in Estonia's broadcast system also created a public broadcasting system that directly competed against private broadcasters for audiences and advertising dollars. This was detrimental to, and inhibited, the development of a pluralistic broadcast media system in Estonia.. The size of Estonia alone hindered the growth in the number of media outlets that could serve the various interests and groups. But the prospects for media pluralism would have been better served if Estonian public broadcasting was not financed by both direct government subsidies and advertising revenues.

At the time of independence, public broadcasting already had the advantages of established broadcast facilities and access to national audiences. Its established existence and competition for advertising and audiences impeded independent private broadcasting outlets from developing and establishing themselves in Estonia.. Therefore what occurred was the development of a broadcasting system that was dominated by public broadcasting which was open to government interference. With its current structure, it inhibited the growth of the independent voices of private broadcasters. It was a structure where public broadcasting benefited and enjoyed a competitive edge that included pre-established broadcast facilities, nationwide coverage, government subsidization, commercialization, and entertainment programming. Developing and growing an independent private broadcast system against this backdrop proved difficult and challenging.

During the interviews, respondents did not feel that government interference was currently a problem. Examples were cited where the government made some attempts to interfere during the first few years after independence. But in recent times censorship and interference was not a problem. However, respondents did express concern over the system of government financing of public broadcasting, noting its potential for government interference.

Thus, this structure with its domination by public broadcasting suggested that the democratic nature of Estonia's broadcast system was structurally uncertain when considering the potential for government interference and the resultant restraint on the development of broadcast media pluralism. Given the magnitude of the political and economic changes that Estonia implemented since independence, it has made phenomenal progress in democratizing its broadcast media. Like other democratic countries, Estonia now faces more challenging issues in further democratizing its broadcast media.

CONCLUSIONS

The synergy produced by combining an historical approach with McQuail's (1992) Media Performance Analysis framework enriches research into post-Communist media transformations.

The researcher's use of a historical approach and McQuail's (1992) Media Performance Analysis framework to study Estonia's broadcast media system enriched this study. Each approach on its own can contribute to understanding and explaining phenomena. Historical research provides context to a study, often highlighting issues and challenges concerning a phenomena or events. In the context of comparative broadcast media studies, historical analysis significantly contributes to understanding the factors that influenced the shape and nature of a country's broadcast system.

The historical approach illuminated the issues, motives, goals, and challenges in the political and economic changes of Estonia's broadcast system. It highlighted the limitations and problems confronting the Estonians in democratizing their broadcast media, while identifying those people who influenced its development. In this manner, the historical approach answered why the Estonian broadcast system was structured the way it was by the end of 1996.

While the historical approach showed why the broadcast system existed as it did in 1996, it offered no framework to assess the outcome of the broadcast system's changes. Some comparison was possible. However, the historical approach used by one comparative media researcher often may focus on a different aspect or period of a country's broadcast system, making comparisons between broadcast media systems difficult and challenging.

McQuail's (1992) Media Performance Analysis provides a framework permitting comparisons of different broadcast media systems. In addition, Media Performance Analysis provides the researcher a framework that guides the study. Media Performance Analysis also offers a benchmark for future assessments of the broadcast system, noting any changes or improvements in the system. It permits the researcher to assess and compare a country's broadcast media system at different periods in its history or development.

What this study demonstrated is how rich the results are from the synergies produced by using both the historical approach and the Media Performance Analysis framework. The historical approach provided the insight and explanation of why Estonia's broadcast system existed as it did in 1996. This, in turn, enhanced the finding's that resulted from using McQuail's Media Performance Analysis. The combination produced a more comprehensive understanding of the 1996 state of Estonia's broadcast system. It provided a greater grasp of both the path the changes took and why, thus explaining the consequences or results of the assessment made.

LIMITATIONS

The values incorporated in the Media Performance Analysis framework represent an ideal democratic mass media system. The broadcast systems of most democratic countries, including the United States, fail when examined through these values. Yet, they are values that reflect the nature of an ideal democratic broadcast system, one that democracies should desire. An aspect of utilizing Media Performance Analysis is the Western bias inherit in its use. The framework utilizes Western democratic values in examining a country's mass media system. However, if the country under study labels itself democratic or seeks to democratize its system then the use of Media Performance Analysis is appropriate.

The dissertation's time period limitations are reflected in the period examined for Estonia's broadcast system; the first five years after it gained its independence. It is an immense task to implement immediate political and economic changes in a post-Communist country. What took most Western countries a several hundred years to accomplish, post-Communist states are trying to implement on a crash basis. Five years could be considered too short a period in which to study the development and assess a broadcast media's public interest performance. However, at the speed that most post-Communist countries are pursuing these changes and redirection of their broadcast systems, further research is mandated to assess their progress and to highlight potential problems.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Research should be conducted on other post-Communist broadcast systems, using the same approaches, in order to compare and contrast changes, issues, and their transformations. Research on the other Baltic States, Latvia and Lithuania, especially would be relevant since these countries share the same fifty-year experience of Soviet occupation. It would help to contrast how each Baltic State approached the changes and redirection of their broadcast media and to compare their developments. Such research on the other Baltic countries could also serve to contrast each country's political and cultural differences, and what influences these have on the changes and redirection of their respective broadcast systems.

Finally, further examination and study is needed to explore further the utility of McQuail's (1992) Media Performance Analysis in comparative media research. Additional studies using this framework could serve to explore its utility and offer guides and insights into various methods of study. The newly democratized post-Communist countries offer a wonderful opportunity to build on this framework and to study the transformations that have occurred.

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APPENDIX

For this study the following people were interviewed:

Eelmaa, Epp. Operations Manager, Kanal Kaks (Channel 2 TV). Interviewed December 1996.

Hausmann, Ilona. Eesti Raadio, International Relations Department. Interviewed December 1996.

Haldre, Herkki. Advisor, Hanasbank. Radio consultant. Past Director of Eesti Raadio. Interviewed December 1996.

Holmberg, Simon. Deputy Director, Baltic Media Centre. Interviewed December 1996. Telephone interview May 1998.

Hunt, Margus. Marketing Director, Eesti Telekom (Estonian Telephone Company Limited). Interviewed November and December 1996.

Jõesaar, Andres. Vice-President, TV3. Interviewed December 1996.

Kokkota, Evelin. Information Assistant, United States Information Service, American Embassy, Tallinn, Estonia. Interviewed November 1996.

Laanejare, Nele. Chief Editor at new television station TV1. Interviewed November 1996.

Lään, Vello. Director, Raadio Tartu. Past Director of Estonian State Radio. Telephone Interview. May 1998.

Lang, Rein. President and General Manager, AS Trio Ltd. Raadio Kuku. Interviewed November 1996.

Laur, Marju. Vice Head Department of Post and Telecommunications, Ministry of Transport and Communications. Past Deputy Ministry of Culture. Interviewed November and December 1996.

Laurinstin, Marju.. Professor, Tartu University. Interviewed December 1996.

Loit, Urmas. Managing Director, Eesti Ringhaalingute Liit (Association of Estonian Broadcasters). Interviewed November 1996.

Middleton, Victoria. Public Affairs Officer, United States Information Service, American Embassy, Tallinn, Estonia. Interviewed November 1996.

Palts, Tõnis. CEO and Chairman, AS Levicom. Interviewed December 1996.

Rebané, Raul. Deputy Director General, Editor-in-Chief, Eesti Televisioon. Interviewed December 1996.

Ricci, Raymond. Director, Love Raadio. Interviewed November and December 1996.

Rummo, Paul-Eerik. Member of Parliament. Chair Broadcast Council. Past Minister of Culture. Interviewed December 1996.

Shein, Hagi. Director General, Eesti Televisioon. Interviewed November and December 1996.

Sinisalu, Hando. General Manager, *Eesti Päevaleht*. Radio consultant. Interviewed November and December 1996.

Sookruus, Peeter. Director General, Eesti Raadio. Interviewed December 1996.

Tammerk, Tarmu. Editor-at-Large, *The Baltic Times*, (formerly *The Baltic Independent*). Managing Director, Eesti Ajalehtede Liit (Estonian Newspaper Association). Interviewed December 1996.

Taska, Ilmar. Chairman, Kanal Kaks (Channel 2 TV). Interviewed December 1996.

Veidemann, Rein. Advisor for Literature and Media. Past Member of Parliament. Past Chair of Broadcast Council. Interviewed December 1996.

Veskimägi, Margo. Member of Council, EMOR, Baltic Media Facts. Interviewed November 1996.

Sovereignty, Alliance and Press-Government Relationship:

A Comparative Analysis of Japanese and U.S. Coverage of Okinawa

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Sovereignty, Alliance and Press-Government Relationship:

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On September 24, 1997, the United States and Japan announced a set of new defense cooperation guidelines that would take the military relationship between the two countries well into the next century. This security alliance originated from a 1951 U.S.-Japan peace treaty designed to deter the advance of communism in Asia Since then, in spite of several conflicts, particularly the crisis surrounding the revision of the security treaty in 1960, both nations have maintained a stable strategic alliance and enjoyed mutual benefits in pursuit of their own national interests during the Cold War period and beyond. Under the U.S. military protection, Japan sustained rapid economic growth without spending a large proportion of its budget on the national defense. The United States was able to use the military bases on Okinawa free of the restrictions imposed on American bases in mainland Japan (Clapp, 1975, p. 8). In the U.S.-Japan security alliance, Washington often took the lead and Tokyo simply followed suit.

The pattern of U.S.-Japan relations becomes more complex, however, when national sovereignty is involved. The issue was especially volatile and sensitive in the late 1960s and early 1970s when, amid growing public hostility in Japan, the United States and Japan were heavily engaged in diplomatic negotiations to return U.S. controlled islands to full Japanese sovereignty. The long process ended as one of the most successful diplomatic settlements the two countries have ever achieved in the post-war era (Destler, 1976). Not only did the United States and Japan resolve the territorial sovereignty with mutual compromises, they also established a new security alliance that bolstered Japanese commitment to the U.S. strategic design in Asia. Notwithstanding the governmental efforts, little is known in the literature about the position and participation of American and Japanese news media throughout this trying period in the history of the two countries. To fill in the gap, the purpose of this paper is to determine, within a comparative framework, the form and content of news coverage of the Okinawa reversion issue.

The Okinawa reversion issue was one of the most important and controversial diplomatic problems in the post-war U.S.-Japan relations because of the 1951 security arrangement. Under the treaty, Japan retained "residual" territorial sovereignty while the United States virtually took total command of Okinawa. As such, Japan expected the United States to "eventually" return the islands to its control (Watanabe, 1970, p. 17). Nevertheless, Okinawa's status remained uncertain for more than 20 years. In the early 1960, turmoil broke out in Japan when the revision of the security treaty took place. Massive oppositions demanded its abolition, arguing that it would merely make Japan a forefront for American military bases and infringe on Japan's peace constitution (Otake, 1990). The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) forced the passage of the new security treaty and triggered fierce public protests, resulting in the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan and Prime Minister Kishi's resignation.

The LDP and Japanese political elites took the struggle of 1960 very seriously and the U.S. government also became sensitive to this anti-military reaction in Japan (Destler, 1976). In the meantime, little serious discussion of the Okinawa status transpired between the U.S. and Japanese governments until 1965 because of the islands' strategic importance in the Vietnam War. The U.S. Defense Department insisted on maintaining the administrative control over Okinawa and adamantly refused to consider, or even discuss, the issue of reversion (Purves, 1998). In the face of growing reversion and anti-military domestic movements in the late 1960s, however, the Japanese government gradually took the initiative to negotiate with the U.S. government about the reversion. To avoid public protests against the renewal of U.S.-Japan security treaty scheduled in 1970, as was the case ten years ago, both countries were anxious to settle the Okinawa issue before the due time.

In 1965, Japan and the United States held talks over the Okinawa reversion issue. Two years later, both countries agreed that Okinawa would be returned to Japan, but the communiqué did not specify when and how. In the 1969 communiqué, the United States and Japan indicated that Okinawa would be returned to full Japanese control in 1972, with most American bases left intact and placed under the U.S.-Japan security treaty. The issue of nuclear weapons on the islands was vaguely addressed. The United States claimed that nuclear weapons would be removed by the time of reversion while Japan emphasized that a "nuclear-free, mainland-level reversion" was achieved. In fact, the two sides also made a secret agreement over the possible redeployment of nuclear weapons in an emergency (Gabe, 1998).

The final agreement eliminated long-term U.S. financial aid to Okinawa and brought the United States substantial amounts of financial compensation from Japan for the perceived loss of U.S. properties on Okinawa after reversion. More importantly, the two countries successfully developed a new security alliance that promised more Japanese cooperation in U.S. military engagement policies in East Asia. As Sarentakes (1994) described, "Japan regained its lost territory, while the United States maintained an alliance critical to an international system that made it the predominate power in the Pacific. The return of these islands brought continuity through change" (p. 35). From the Okinawans' point of view, however, this agreement was a great disappointment. As a local newspaper's headline in the reversion day edition put it, "Continuing Bases, Continuing Suffering" (*The Ryukyu Shimpo*, May 15, 1972, p. 1).

The local newspaper's response to the Okinawa reversion issue epitomized the sentiment and involvement of Japanese news media during the most contentious and explosive period of Japan-U.S. relations. Although the U.S. and Japanese governments shared security interests in Okinawa, public reactions toward the reversion contrasted sharply between the two countries. More than half of the survey respondents in the United States opposed returning Okinawa to the

Japanese control (Binnendijk, 1973) while nine out of 10 Japanese favored the reversion (*Seron Chosa Nenkan*, 1970, #183). Caught in between the state interests of alliance and the public voice of emotions were the news media of the two countries. Although media systems in the United States and Japan are similar in their journalistic spirit and practices, there are significant differences in the press-government relationships between the two nations (Budner & Krauss, 1995). It is theoretically important to examine what that relationship might be and how it might affect coverage of the Okinawa reversion issues in the United States and Japan.

The News and Press-Government Relationship

The general theoretical approach in this study is based on two major factors that have been found in the literature to influence the news content: ideological structure in society and press-government relationship. Studies of media content have long argued that mass media content is socially created and influences from outside the media organization, such as governmental manipulation and the predominant ideology of society, have substantial and pervasive impacts on the form and content of news (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). In this view, the news is often shaped by a variety of extra-media factors that determine what will be gathered and how it will be treated. The news, therefore, represents a form of ideology as a function of active production of meanings in systematic and regular ways in society (Gitlin, 1980; Hall, 1982). Empirical studies have provided evidence to support such observation (e.g., Akhavan-Majid, Ramaprasad & Boyster, 1997; Gans, 1979; Hallin, 1987).

Another line of research is more specific, focusing on the press-government relationship in the process of newsgathering and reporting. Previous studies have shown that the practices of mass media tend to reinforce the legitimacy and status of the authority (Bennett, 1990; Hallin; 1987; Herman, 1993). In international affairs, the news media are generally found to follow the government's point of view and adopt a pro-government stance (Bennett, 1996; Chang, 1993; Entman & Page, 1994; Gans, 1979; Lee & Yang 1995). This is what Gans called "ethnocentrism," a mentality that values one's own nation above all others. One of the contributing factors is a heavy reliance on government officials as news sources (Hallin, Manoff, & Weddle, 1993; Sigal, 1973), which leads to more authoritative framing of the story. If the news media depend mostly on the policy makers for news, it is inevitable that their news and views become more inclined to support the government and its decisions (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). Bennett's (1990, p. 106) indexing hypothesis is relevant here.

The indexing hypothesis suggests that the press tends "to 'index' the range of viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debates about a given topic" (Bennett, 1990, p. 106). In other words, when there is active dissent in the process of political communication, the press reflects the strength of debates and "other" voices that may emerge, including critical information and challenges to the status quo. When there is little or no dissent, the news includes few competing voices, thus concentrating on the dominant views. The media's tendency to present powerful official perspective in the news therefore is predicated on the level of consensus among the elites themselves.

The level of consensus is part of the domains in which the news media may find themselves and practice their trade. Hallin (1986) divided journalistic practices into three different modes: spheres of consensus, legitimate controversy, and deviance. In the sphere of consensus, journalists are prone to advocate the values and views recognized by the main political actors in the process of decision making. In the sphere of legitimate controversy, journalists are likely to capture the diversity of debates among various actors in an objective and balanced manner because of the presence of viable alternatives and strong opposing positions. In the sphere of deviance, journalists abandon neutrality by excluding those who violate or challenge the political consensus as "unworthy of being heard" (p.117). Whatever the sphere of journalistic practices, one thing is certain: Journalists are socialized to "follow the trail of power" in their daily routines in newsgathering (Bennett, 1996). In the case of Okinawa reversion, most of the significant agreements were made by a limited number of high-ranking officials between the United States and Japan. Political structure in the two countries poses different constraints on the way American and Japanese news media reported on the issue.

Political Structure and News Media in Japan and the United States

As noted earlier, journalistic principles in the U.S. and Japanese media follow the same libertarian model despite idiosyncratic social heritage and traditional norms. While there has been criticism over their performance, the watchdog role of news media in the United States is well received and documented in the literature. A similar view can also be found in Japanese mass communication research. Previous studies have demonstrated that news media in Japan play multiple and conflicting roles in their relationships with political actors (Farley, 1996; Feldman, 1993; Groth, 1996; Lee, 1985; Pharr, 1996; Tsujimura, 1994; Ward, 1978). An extensive survey by Kobashima and Broadbent (1986) shows that the mass media in Japan have a substantial power over society and politics on the one hand and contribute considerably to greater political pluralism by opening news gates to the general public on the other hand (see, also, Cooper-Chen, 1997).

The Japanese news media, however, seldom challenge the fundamental official position or undermine the government's authority (e.g., Krauss, 1996; Pharr, 1996). For example, it was found that even if the Japanese news media held a critical stance toward the policy-making processes or individual policy makers involved, they rarely questioned the larger political and economic framework within which an elite political party keeps its dominant power (Lee, 1985). Thus, if opposition movements appear to threaten existing political or economic order, the news media would dispute the legitimacy of protests and try to maintain a moderate or stable climate in society. Several factors help foster such unwillingness on the part of Japanese news media.

The most prominent factor that allows the Japanese government to sway the news media is the well-established system of press clubs, the so-called "kisha kurabu." About four hundred press clubs are attached to political, social and economic institutions at all levels in Japan, ranging from central government ministries and agencies to political parties and private organizations (Lee, 1985). Not surprisingly, the press clubs of the government executive branch are among the largest in Japan. Significant changes of official policies are often announced or disseminated through the press clubs organized by member-reporters from major newspapers, news agencies, and broadcasting companies. To gather news from important organizations without going through the press clubs in Japan is difficult and sometimes virtually impossible (Wolferen, 1989). Weekly and news magazine reporters, freelance writers, industry newspapers, and foreign correspondents are excluded from full membership, with limited access to press conferences (Oiwa, 1991). Responding to growing demands for access, some press clubs have recently allowed foreign journalists to attend their press conferences, but exclusion persists.

Under the press club system, Japanese journalists collect, share, and concentrate on information from the government sources regularly and effectively without worrying about missing significant stories. As such, when opinions or interpretations of fact are conveyed by the news media, they essentially represent the viewpoints of the government (Krauss, 1996). The press club arrangement in Japan gives the government a tremendous power to control the news content and flow by regulating the dissemination of information. As Kim (1981, p. 93) put it, "so long as the club system is intimately related to government agencies, susceptibility to government manipulation is present. What is more, the club system predisposes the reporters to view and assess matters from the perspective of the agency to which they are assigned." This media attachment to political elites in Japan is likely to cause uncritical coverage of government policies. For one thing, Japanese reporters are reluctant to write news stories that may be embarrassing to their sources. One of the consequences of the press club system in Japan is that the news turns out to be incredible uniform.

Although not exactly similar to the Japanese press clubs, American news-gathering is also organized through routine channels—the newsbeat system. The major beats such the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon have obvious bureaucratic and economic advantages for any media organization in terms of assignments of reporters, coverage of a wide area of territory and production of a steady, predictable supply of stories that would allow the newsroom to fill the daily news hole in a cost-effective way (Bennett, 1994; Cook, 1994; Sigal, 1973). A significant difference between the U.S. and Japanese systems is that American reporters are expected and encouraged to collect information from wide-ranging sources to balance a story, while their Japanese counterparts are most likely to seek information or responses from the assigned institutions, thus totally depending on their routine channels (Budner & Krauss, 1995; Farley, 1996) or preventing them from investigative scrutiny of political leaders and their activities on a day-by-day basis (Lee, 1985).

Historically, Okinawa received occasional treatment in the U.S. media, mostly about military activities or personnel matters, or alleged Communist influence on the islanders, while the Japanese papers seldom covered the general condition of the residents (Watanabe, 1970). It was not until 1955 did the Japanese news media begin to pay prominent attention to these islands (Arasaki, 1969). Initiated by American missionaries in 1955, a special series in the *Asahi Shimbun* devoted considerable space to a document that criticized the U.S. military administration on Okinawa, charging unfair land procurement programs, wage discrimination against Okinawan laborers and other civil rights violations (Hosaka, 1995). This report evoked a wide response in

Japan, and to a lesser extent, in the United States. Since then, the Japanese press had treated the Okinawa issue somewhat vigorously, with a steady increase of first-hand reports by news correspondents stationed on the island. Still the U.S. press remained relatively indifferent.

It was in the late 1960s when the United States and Japan began their slow move toward reversion that the volume of news coverage, both American and Japanese, reached its peak. Among the few scholarly studies on the Okinawa reversion issue, there seems to be a consensus about how American and Japanese news media covered the issue. The American press rarely reported on this topic until the very last stages of the bilateral agreements (Binnendijk, 1973; Clapp, 1975), while the Japanese press played a significant role in mobilizing public sentiment toward the reversion (Destler, 1976; Hosaka, 1995). From a comparative point of view, however, not much is systematically documented about how and why the news media in the United States and Japan reported the Okinawa reversion issue the way they did.

Based on the above conceptualization and discussions of related findings, this study seeks to test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The Japanese press tends to present the issue of Okinawa reversion and anti-military sentiment more frequently than the American counterpart.

Hypothesis 2: Both the Japanese press and American press tend to present more views of their own governmental executive branch than by any other sources in their coverage of the Okinawa reversion issue.

Hypothesis 3: The press in Japan and the United States tends to follow its own government's policy line, focusing on the maintenance of a solid U.S.-Japan relationship in the report of the Okinawa reversion issue.

Specifically, the three hypotheses were tested using the *New York Times* in the United States and the *Asahi Shimbun* in Japan as samples of news media in both countries. Because of the two papers' national and international status, they provided a stronger test of the perspectives discussed earlier.

Method

In this study, the *New York Times* and the *Asahi Shimbun* were selected for content analysis. They are considered to be the leading, prestigious news organizations in each country and to have liberal editorial policies that are more likely to cover the diverse stories and views in society and around the world (Merrill & Fisher, 1980). Prestigious newspapers are frequently read by the elites, have significant influence on the public and the leadership in the country (Pool, 1970), and serve as agenda-setters for other media to follow (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991).

From 1969 to 1972, four periods during the Japan-U.S. negotiations over the Okinawa reversion issue were chosen: the Sato-Nixon summit in November 1969, the Reversion Treaty signed in June 1971, the Reversion Treaty approved by the legislatures of the United States and Japan in November 1971, and the Reversion in May 1972. These episodes were all diplomatically significant and received serious coverage in the *New York Times* and the *Asahi Shimbun*. More significantly, there were mass protests, demonstrations, and petitions by political activists, labor unions, citizen groups in Okinawa and Japan throughout each of the four periods. All news stories and editorials regarding the Okinawa reversion issues that appeared in the two newspapers one month before and after the four major events were studied. This yielded 54 news stories and 8 editorials from the *Times* and 413 stories and 27 editorials from the *Asahi*.

The unit of coding was the paragraph because of its greater sensitivity to the elements involved in the content analysis. Eight categories of topics were compiled, based on previous scholarly works on the reversion issue, particularly from *Okinawa fukki no kiroku* [Record of the Okinawa reversion] (1972). These topics were diplomacy, domestic politics, military and defense, sovereignty, reversions policy, Okinawan sentiment, public response and movement, and others. Other variables included in the coding were news sources and editorial themes toward the U.S. and Japanese government policies over the Okinawa reversion issue.

Three coders who were fluent in both Japanese and English languages coded a random sample of news stories and editorials from the two newspapers. Using the Holsti's formula (1969), the intercoder reliability for the variables among the three coders were: major topic, .88; news source, .89; and editorial theme, .86. For the complete set of variables, the average intercoder reliability was .93.

Results

During the study period, the *Asahi* had far more extensive coverage (about 1.7 stories per day) than the *New York Times* (about 0.2 story per day) of the Okinawa reversion issues in both news stories and editorials. Each news story in the *Times* was usually longer than that in the *Asahi*. The news in the *Asahi* averaged 6.5 paragraphs per story, while that in the *Times* averaged 9.7 paragraphs. The *Asahi* had more front-page (44.0%) stories on the issue than the *Times* (22.9%). It is evident that the Japanese newspaper devoted much more attention to the issue and displayed it more prominently than the American newspaper.

Hypothesis 1 suggests that the Japanese press would present the issue of Okinawa reversion and anti-military sentiment more frequently than the American counterpart. As shown in the analysis of main topics between the two newspapers in Table 1, there were significant differences between the *Asahi Shimbun* and the *New York Times*. The reports covering Okinawa sentiments occupied 22.1 percent of the *Asahi*'s news coverage, compared with 8.3 percent in the *Times'*. This finding supports the first hypothesis. Coverage of Okinawa sentiments was also more salient in the *Asahi* than in the *Times*. The proportion of news coverage of Okinawa on the front pages was 11.7 percent in the *Asahi*, but only 1.9 percent in the *Times*, lending further support to the first hypothesis.

Overall, "domestic politics" (27.0%) was the most frequent topic in the *Asahi*, while it was "military and defense" (34.6%) in the *Times*. The other significant difference between the two newspapers lies in the subcategory of "domestic politics." The *Asahi* gave only 2.7 percent of news coverage to U.S. domestic politics whereas the *Times* devoted as much as 11.7 percent to Japanese domestic politics. Further, the administrative right over Okinawa and its legitimacy were mentioned in the *Times* (4.6%) more frequently than in the *Asahi* (1.0%).

Hypothesis 2 postulates that the press in the United States and Japan tends to present more views of their own governmental executive branch than any other sources in their coverage of the Okinawa reversion issue. As reported in Table 2, while there were significant differences between the distribution of news sources in the two newspapers, the data support the second hypothesis. Both the *Asahi* (32.7%) and the *Times* (44.1%) reported the views more frequently from their own executive branch than from any other sources. An interesting contrast between the two newspapers is that the *Asahi* devoted a small proportion of stories to the U.S. governmental executive branch (6.1%), but the *Times* spent a considerable amount of space covering the views from the Japanese governmental executive branch (31.1%).

The legislature from each side apparently played a different role in the process. Although the *Times* reported U.S. Congressional voices meagerly (3%), the *Asahi* reported the Japanese Diet significantly (22.6%). The *Asahi*'s concerns over Okinawan sentiments could also be seen in its more frequent use of local sources (27.3%) than the *Times* (8.1%). Apparently, the *Asahi* was more open to Okinawan officials and public than the *Times*. A closer look at the treatment of news sources in the *Asahi*, however, reveals that alternative voices in Japan were portrayed less prominently in the news. The front pages of the *Asahi* were dominated by voices of the Japanese executive branch (45.8%), followed by the opposition parties (18.2%) and Okinawan officials (14.2%). This suggests that the *Asahi* turns its eyes to the alternative voices to some extent, but the focused attention and priority always lie in more authoritative sources, that is, the government's executive branch.

Hypothesis 3 proposed that the press in Japan and the United States tends to follow its own government's policy line, focusing on the maintenance of a solid U.S.-Japan relationship in the report of the Okinawa reversion issue. This hypothesis was tested using editorials from the *Asahi Shimbun* and the *New York Times*. As shown in Table 3, the editorials were found to be different between the two newspapers. The *Times* indeed followed U.S. government's policy line, emphasizing a solid partnership with Japan (42.9%), but the *Asahi* was more concerned with how Japan's military and defense postures were influenced by U.S. military forces on Okinawa (35.1%) and the governments' responsibility for handling the reversion issues (35.1%). Hence, this hypothesis was partially supported in the analysis of the *Times*, but not in the *Asahi*. The *Times'* relatively higher proportion of other themes came mainly from statements either praising U.S.-Japan agreements as sensible compromises or discouraging senators to link the Okinawa reversion with economic disputes with Japan. As a whole, the *Times* was strongly supportive of U.S. government's reversion policy, while the *Asahi* was strongly critical of Japanese government's reversion policies and decision-making behaviors (Table not reported).

Conclusion and Discussion

During the study period from 1969 to 1972, on the issue of Okinawa reversion, this comparative analysis found that the *New York Times* and the *Asahi Shimbun* both paid more attention to its own government's decision-making activities (diplomacy and domestic politics) and issues of military and defense than other topics. Unlike the *Times*, the *Asahi* also carried relatively more stories concerning Okinawan local residents' sentiments toward the reversion. The *Asahi*'s extensive coverage of these issues indicates how much more concerned the leading

Japanese newspaper was with the Okinawa reversion as a long-term pending problem than its American counterpart.

For the *Asahi*, the Okinawa reversion issue was not only a matter of national security, but also a problem to be resolved for national unity. To be sure, the Japanese government felt more or less obliged to release Okinawa from under foreign military control. The social context influenced by the dominant ideology toward the territorial issue would certainly lead to more attention to Okinawan sentiments in the *Asahi*'s stories. In the case of the *Times*, Okinawa was nothing but a geopolitical issue involving a remote territory that the U.S. military had governed on the other side of the Pacific, with little social or cultural proximity to the locals there. This larger context seems to be linked with the *Times'* indifference to and occasional misunderstandings of Okinawan sentiments.

During the study period, officials of the executive branch in the United States and Japan were always the top news sources for both the *Times* and the *Asahi*, respectively. They appeared to be dominant not only in quantity, but also in quality, attracting a high visibility and front-page treatment in the two countries. This finding clearly demonstrates a close press-government relationship in news reporting of foreign policy affairs in the United States and Japan. The *Times'* dependency on the U.S. government for news about the reversion was far greater than the *Asahi's* reliance on the Japanese government, however. This can largely be attributed to the nature of the Okinawa reversion issue. Throughout the whole process of decision-making in Washington, the main circle generally centered around high-ranking officials led by the State Department. Such observation is further confirmed by the pattern of *Times'* news source.

For the most part, the American paper turned to the Japanese government executive branch for news quite often. In the negotiating process of the Okinawa reversion, in order to obtain greater concession from the Japanese government, the U.S. government avoided any specific comments on its final decision. As for the Japanese government, it was also very secretive about the actual content or deal of negotiations with the United States at that time, unwilling to give clear explanations to the public. Nevertheless, the active campaigns and major initiatives from the Japanese side produced more opportunities for American journalists to seek policy decisions or information from outside the immediate governmental circles. They simply followed the trail of power. If the routine contacts of government officials are not available, reporters turn their eyes, not to Okinawans or opposition parties, but to other types of authorities like foreign governments, in this case, the Japanese government executive branch.

In Japan, the Okinawa reversion became an explosive issue due to its strategically important status as a forefront of U.S. military bases. Leftists and peace activists such as opposition parties, labor unions, and individual Okinawans were strongly opposed to the military-oriented reversion formula and staged many massive demonstrations. This social phenomenon indicates that far more critical actors were available for the *Asahi*. Routine channels connected to those actors helped the paper gain access to those critical voices. As discussed earlier, press clubs in Japan are located in almost all governmental departments and opposition parties. Furthermore, the *Asahi* had regular correspondents assigned in Okinawa. When more critical sources were available, particularly from opposition parties, the political discourse became dynamic. The more intense official conflicts and domestic debate became, the more likely the *Asahi* was to index the competing views and to turn its eyes to alternative sources, as suggested by Bennett (1990). In this sense, the *Asahi* contributed to greater political pluralism in the reversion debates in Japan, as asserted by Kobashima and Broadbent (1986).

The comparative evidence shows that in the process of Okinawa reversion, the *Times* was less diversified in its coverage than the *Asahi*. With regard to the editorials, the American newspaper followed closely the dominant U.S. governmental discourse and held almost identical position regarding the reversion issue. In the case of editorials in the *Asahi*, the focus was placed more on either military problems or the Japanese government responsibility from a consistent critical stance. Most negative views were directed at the government responsibility or lack of leadership, not at military and defense policy itself. Apparently, the disparity of social and cultural proximity to Okinawa between the United States and Japan seems to have produced differences in news coverage of Okinawan sentiments by the two papers.

This finding is somewhat different from that of the recent study by Budner and Krauss (1995). In their comparison between the news media in Japan and the United States, they found that the Japanese press tended to be pro-Japan or side with Japan's position while the American press did not show such a tendency toward the United States or its government. A plausible explanation for the discrepancy can be found in the nature of issues under study. The security alliance that underscored the Okinawa reversion issue has been maintained without major crisis under U.S. leadership, while the economic disputes Budner and Krauss examined have emerged frequently as a battle between the United States and Japan, as Japan has gained greater economic power during the past few decades.

Over the past years, U.S.-Japan economic problems tend to be discussed with both sides on the same level of power, as Japan has grown strongly enough to compete with the United States. In the process of economic disputes, not only the Japanese business and government but also other members of society, including the news media, have to some degree to give credit to Japan's own position and interests. The balance of power in the security relations between the two countries, however, has always favored the U.S. status quo or leadership over Japan's. Moreover, Japan's position under the U.S. military umbrella seems to be weak to receive vigorous support from the press.

In other words, it is reasonable to believe that the Japanese press would not explicitly fall in line with the official policy as long as Tokyo keeps a deferential position to Washington. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that in U.S.-Japan relations, the more economic conflicts and disagreements between the two countries, the less likely the Japanese press is to criticize the government's position in an outspoken manner because Japan's interests may be at stake when the two countries are considered equal partners. As for the strategic alliance between the United States and Japan, the more obedient position the Japanese government takes, the more the news media are prone to attack the government because Japan might have a lot to lose in a submissive status in the bilateral power equation.

Nonetheless, the close relationship between the press and the powers that be in Japan is observable in the interplay between the *Asahi* and the Japanese government. As the government dropped the Okinawa issue, including the thorny question of U.S. military bases, after 1972, the *Asahi* also stopped covering the issue, even though the Japanese government has not kept its promise to reduce the number of U.S. military bases. So long as the Japanese government is active on the issue, the *Asahi* keeps its eyes on it. When the government leaves the issue aside, so does the paper. Evidently, governmental discourse and the news are intrinsically connected in Japan. It is an epitome of how policy agenda may shape the news agenda in the realm of foreign affairs and international relations. Future research should shed greater light in this area if more news media are included and the time span extended back to 1965, when the United States and Japan started their slow action toward the Okinawa reversion.

Table 1: Comparison of Main Topics Between the New York Times and the Asahi Shimbun*

Main Topics	New York Times	Asahi Shimbun
Military/Defense	34.6%	25.8%
Domestic Politics	22.1	27.0
U.S.	10.4	2.7
Japan	11.7	24.3
Diplomacy/U.S.-Japan Relations	14.8	9.6
Reversion Policy: Others	10.1	4.8
Okinawan Sentiments	8.3	22.1
Public Response/Movement (Japan)	5.5	9.8
Sovereignty	4.6	1.0
N =	434	2,539

Chi-square = 199.06, d.f. = 7, $p < .05$.

* Entries are number of paragraph. The category of "Others" was excluded. The percentage total does not add up to 100 due to rounding error.

Table 2: Comparison of News Sources Between the New York Times and the Asahi Shimbun*

News Sources	New York Times	Asahi Shimbun
US Government Executive	44.1%	6.1%
Japanese Government Executive	31.1	32.7
US Public	9.3	.5
Okinawan Official	5.6	16.9
Japanese Diet	3.7	22.6
US Congress	3.1	1.4
Okinawan Public	2.5	10.4
Japanese Public	.6	9.5
N=	161	1,285

Chi-square = 339.9. d.f. = 7, p. < .005

* Entries are numbers of paragraphs. Unidentified sources and others were excluded. The percentage total does not add up to 100 due to rounding error.

Table 3: Comparison of Themes Between the New York Times and the Asahi Shimbun*

Editorial Themes	New York Times	Asahi Shimbun
Partnership (U.S.-Japan Relations)	42.9%	1.1%
Military Problems	23.8	35.1
Reaching Accords	14.3	4.7
Economic Resonance	11.9	.7
Duty, Accountability, and Leadership	4.8	35.1
Struggle & Confidence Crisis of Okinawans	2.4	23.2
N =	42	276

Chi-square = 142.526, d.f. = 5, $p < .05$.

* Entries are numbers of paragraph. The category of "Others" was excluded. The percentage total does not add up to 100 due to rounding error.

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Government, Press and Advertising Revenue:
Impact of the 27 October, 1987 Suspension of *The Star*'s License to Publish on *The Star* and the Competing *New Straits Times*

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Abstract

This study seeks to understand the relationship among an authoritarian government, the newspapers and the advertisers. It content analyzed the advertising that appeared in two Malaysian leading English Newspapers, *The Star* and the *New Straits Times*, before and after *The Star* was temporarily suspended by the government on 27 October, 1987. The results found that the Malaysian government's suspension of *The Star*'s publishing license decreased the newspaper revenue and increased those of its main competitor, the *New Straits Times*, following *The Star*'s return to publication.

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Introduction

In the pre-dawn hours of 27 October 1987, under the Internal Security Act (ISA), Malaysia police arrested 63[1] people from different walks of life within the first 48 hours. By the time the crackdown ended on 14 November 1987, which was called “Operation Lalang,” 106 people were arrested (the number later rose to 119).[2] In addition, on October 28, the government shut down 3 newspapers –*The Star* (English), *Sin Chew Jit Poh* (Chinese) and *Watan* (Malay) – “for carrying reports considered ‘prejudicial to national security and public order.’”[3] In March 1988, five months after Operation Lalang, new publishing permits were re-issued to the three news organizations. However, the media environment had changed considerably. Tunku Abdul Rahman, former Prime Minister of Malaysia and a columnist for *The Star*, at the time said that because of restrictions on publishing, "readers will not get the message from me in my column as frankly as I would have liked."[4] In fact, his column ceased to appear when *The Star* later re-opened.

While some of the changes that occurred in Malaysia’s media environment at the time could be easily detected or experienced by the media practitioners, other possible changes, such as other institutions’ responses to the shutdown of the news organization, have not been carefully investigated. This study, a content analysis of the advertisements that appeared in *The Star*—the only English newspaper that was suspended in this event—before and after “Operation Lalang,” examined if there was a change of sponsorship due to the shutdown. Studying the advertisements appearing before and after a political intervention such as this provided an opportunity to better understand the impact that political influences have upon advertisers and news organizations, especially in developing nations where such practices are not uncommon.

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[1] “Mahathir Cracks down: 63 held” *The New Straits Times* 29 Oct. 1987: 1.

[2] Harold Crouch, *Government and Society in Malaysia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1996), 109.

[3] “3 Papers ordered to stop publishing,” *The New Straits Times* 29 Oct. 1987: 1.

[4] "Banned English paper reopens in Malaysia," *New York Time* 27 Mar. 1988: 8.

This study content analyzed advertisements that appeared in *The Star* before and after the period when its publishing license was suspended and advertisements in its chief competitor—the *New Straits Times*—during the same period, to understand advertiser response to such political intervention. As advertisers generally do not seek to involve themselves in political controversy or wish to be perceived as going against the authority, the researcher anticipated a significant difference in advertisements before and after *The Star* suspension's period.

Background of the Suspension

According to Elliott,[5] in the early 1980s, Malaysia had only four English-language newspapers. They were the *New Straits Times*, *The Star*, the *Malay Mail*, and the *National Echo*. The *New Straits Times* was the oldest and most famous newspaper at the time. Started in 1845 as a business and shipping intelligence paper, the organization had managed to establish itself as the number one English newspaper (with a circulation of 199,000 in 1986[6]) in the country. United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the main partner of the coalition government, at the time owned 80 percent of the parent company of the paper: New Straits Time Group. Compared to the *New Straits Times*, *The Star* is a relatively young newspaper. Started in 1971, *The Star* managed to increase its circulation from 10,000 to 63,000 within the first year and has become increasingly

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[5] Elliott Parker, "Malaysia," in *World Press Encyclopedia*, ed. Kurian George (New York: Facts on File, 1982), 615-617.

[6] This statistic is cited from *Editor & Publisher International Yearbook 1986*, Section IV, 613.

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influential. In 1986, its circulation reached 130,000[7] and had become the second largest English newspaper in Malaysia. *The Star* at the time was 75 percent owned by the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), the second major partner in the Malaysian coalition government. The *New Straits Times* and *The Star*'s affiliation with UNMO and MCA played an important role in *The Star*'s suspension in October 1987. In early October 1987, both newspapers had reported stories on the Malaysian Chinese political parties[8] and communities protesting the Minister of Education's decision that sent 66 non-Chinese educated teachers[9] to various independent Chinese schools as administers. MCA leadership at the time, although part of the coalition government, was in favor of the protesters' position and urged Malay Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who was also a political leader of UNMO, to withdrew his decision. This act, however, prompted UNMO grassroots organizations to organize a rally of 15,000 people to protest against MCA and to urge the UNMO leadership to expel MCA members from the cabinet. As a result of these interactions, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who was also the Minister of Home Affairs and Chairman of UNMO, administered Operation Lalang which led to suspension of *The Star*'s publishing license.

Literature Reviews

The related studies for this research are divided into four parts. The first part seeks to place the relation between the Malaysian government and press industry in the context of communication theory. The second part focus on studies that deal with the relation between press and advertising industry. The third part looks at the interaction between Malaysian government and its advertising industry. The final section situated this project in the context of relationship among government, press, and advertiser.

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[7] Ibid.

[8] Including MCA and other Chinese opposition political parties.

[9] The then Minister of Education Anwar Ibrahim argued that although these teachers were not proficient in Mandarin they were nevertheless Chinese.

Press and Government Licensing

To understand the relationship between the Malaysian government and the mass media, one must begin by looking at the history of this multiracial society. Because the Malaysian population is comprised of mainly three ethnic groups—Malay (51%), Chinese (37%) and Indian (12%)[10]—the tensions among these communities, in particular between the Chinese and Malay, have been high since its independence in August 31, 1957. On 13 May 1969, due to the outcome of a national general election, a communal riot eventually erupted, which left two hundred dead. As the media were not decisively used during the crisis and "in the absence of credible and complete accounts of events, wild rumors circulated, greatly worsening the situation," hence "corrective measures were imposed."[11]

Under the Printing Presses Act of 1948[12] and subsequent amendments in 1971 and 1974, every newspaper publisher is required to obtain:

> (a) A license to use a printing press; and (b) a permit authorizing the printing and publication of a newspaper. Both documents have to be renewed annually. (Zainur Sulaiman & Nawiyah Che'Lah, 1996)

In addition, the act gives the Minister of Home Affairs the power to suspend or revoke a publisher's license and the minister's decision has been made immune to judicial review.[13] This means of control has in general created a chilling effect on Malaysian journalists. Chee Khoon Tan, a Malaysian veteran politician, has pointed out that, as a result of the Printing Presses Act, the "Malaysian editors have been conditioned to 'behave' by the Press Laws, particularly by the annual press license."[14] In the case of *The Star*'s 1987 suspension, Aziz Addruse Raja observed that after *The Star* was re-issued the publishing license, the newspaper "ceased its previous independence and forthrightness, in reporting local events and news. Looked at objectively, it [*The Star*] has not much choice. Once its application for the reinstatement of its license was approved, it was no longer in a position to continue to maintain its independent stance; it could no longer afford to antagonize the licensing authority. The indirect economic sanction, as it were, has had its desired effect."[15] Both Tan and Raja's observations of the Malaysian scenario seem illustrative of Fred S. Siebert's authoritarian theory of the press which argues that under an authoritarian state, the authority controls the mass media through government patents, guides, licensing and sometimes censorship. He also points out that for the mass media of such system, its chief purpose is to "support and advance the policies of the government in power; and to service the state" and not to reflect opposition within the society. It is important to noted that for the 1987 event, one of the official reasons provided by the government for suspending *The Star*'s publishing license was because it had supposedly incited racial tension between the Malay and Chinese communities.[16] In order to prevent the 13 May 1969 communal riot from happening again, the government claimed that it had to exercise it authority.

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[10] Elliott Parker, "Malaysia," in *World Press Encyclopedia*, ed. Kurian George (New York: Facts on File, 1982), 613.
[11] Drew O. McDaniel, *Broadcasting in the Malay World.* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1994), 84.
[12] This law was originally implemented by the Colonial British Administration to assure media control in order to battle the Malayan Communist Party.

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[13] Zainur Sulaiman and Nawiyah Che'Lab, "Media Monitors in Malaysia." In *Media Monitors in Asia*. ed. Asian Media Information and Communication Center (Singapore: AMIC, 1996), 41.

[14] Chee Khoon Tan, "Without Fear or Favor." *The Star*, 16 January 1985.

[15] Aziz Addruse Raja, "The Erosion of Press Freedom." In *Mediawatch: The Use and Abuse of the Malaysian Press*, ed. Kia Soong Kua (Kuala Lumpur: The Resource & Research Centre, Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, 1990. Iowa State University Press, 1996), 25-26.

[16] In an interview with *Asiaweek* (11/20/87) which titled "'Let's Talk,' Say Mahathir," the Prime Minister of Malaysia gave the reasons for suspending *The Star*'s publishing license as follow: "In the meantime, you

Press and Advertiser Muscle

The competition between the two leading Malaysian newspapers, the *New Straits Times* and *The Star*, has been keen since the 1980s. The *New Straits Times* and *The Star* are targeting the same readers. According to Hashim Adnan, the readerships of both the *New Straits Times* and *The Star* is predominantly urban-skewed (*NST*: 80%, *Star*: 86%), with similar age groups.[17] As both newspapers are situated in Kuala Lumpur and aiming at a similar readership, it is inevitable that they also compete for the same advertising revenues.

The important of advertising revenue for newspapers has been researched by many communication scholars. In studying the history of advertising, Joseph Turow pointed out that since the turn of the century, as financing the cost of production for newspapers has shifted from readership to advertising, advertising revenue "became the monetary lifeblood of the journalistic enterprise."[18] As advertisers play an increasingly important role in contemporary news media organizations, their influence on the press has also increased. In her 1992 survey on advertising and editorial decisions about real estate news, Wendy S. Williams reported that real estate editors at some of the United

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have the newspapers, particularly *The Star* (now banned), which wanted to be different from the *New Straits Times* in order to capture more readers. They began to pick on racial issues, trying to (put) what they term the 'Malay government" in a bad light. For some people, the important thing is how to break Malay support for the government. They do two things: one is to play up Chinese sentiments, the other is not to mention the Malays but the government, that it is corrupt, it is incompetent, It is (pushing) policies that are no good. When *The Star* does that you find that increasing numbers of people read *The Star*. The *NST* then felt threatened so it went along the same way, as did the vernacular papers."

[17] The *NST*'s readership: 47% between the age of 15 and 29, 53% above 30. *The Star*'s readership: 48% between the age of 15 and 29, 52% above 30.(Adnan Hashim, *Advertising in Malaysia* [Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1994], 64).

[18] Joseph Turow, *Media Systems in Society: Understanding Industries, Strategies, and*

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States' largest newspapers claimed "little aggressive, serious reporting appears in their section because of fears about offending powerful advertisers." [19] As a result controversial stories dealing with land or housing run in other sections of the paper, which are not associated with real estate, far from the ads that sell houses and mortgages. While some advertisers use their dollars to influence media content in favor of their product, other advertisers use their muscle to influence political positions taken by media. Lappalainen found that the political leanings of a newspaper has either a positive or negative influence on the interaction between an advertising company and the news organization. In his survey of sixteen of the largest advertising companies in Sweden, he found "only one of these said that the political tendency of the paper never influenced the decisions of where to place the advertising."[20]

Advertising Industry and Regulation

In examining the social and legal constraints on advertising as well as its impact on the growth of the advertising industry in Malaysia, Frith argued that "the government, instead of banning advertisements outright, allowed advertisers freedom to advertise so long as they conform to government rules."[21] She pointed out that while the Ministry of Information is the main government agency that monitors and controls advertising in Malaysia, advertisements that promote certain categories of products need additional approval. These government agencies involved in the process are the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Trade and Industry's Consumer Affairs Division.

Power. (New York & London: Longman, 1992), 59.

[19] Wendy S. Williams, "For Sale! Real Estate Advertising & Editorial Decisions about Real Estate News." *Newspaper Research Journal* 13, (Winter/Spring 1992): 160.

[20] Tomas Lappalainen, "Cultural Functionalism: the Function of the Press in Economic Power Relations." *European Journal of Communication* 3 (1988): 392.

The multiracial nature of the Malaysian society also plays an important role in the nation's advertising industry. In studying advertising in Malaysia, Teck pointed out that two issues are particularly important to the government regulation of the advertising industry. First is the Western influence on Malaysian advertising and second is the "sensitivities of diverse ethnic groups" in Malaysian society.[22] Neither Frith nor Teck explicitly touch on the interaction among the Malaysian government, advertisers and mass media, but their work indicates that a close relationship exists between the advertiser and the government. Because advertisers are aware of the regulation and principles underlying them, which can be interpreted by the authorities in various ways, their tendency to associate themselves with a media that have offended that authority is minimized. As a result, advertising revenue becomes another tool that assists government in keeping the news media in line.

Government, Press, and Advertiser

Research focusing on the influences that government has on advertisers is not prevalent in mass media studies. One of the few exceptions is Pama A. Mitchell. In studying the broadcasting and advertising trade press coverage of blacklisting from 1950 to 1956, Mitchell found that most of these organizations "fell in line with the prevailing hysteria." His findings indicate that advertisers in general are unwilling to risk associating their products with people or organizations that might provoke the authority.[23]

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[21] Katherine Toland Frith, "The Social and Legal Constraints on Advertising in Malaysia." *Media Asia* 14 no. 2 (1987): 100.

[22] Ngu Hua Teck, "Advertising in Asia: Communication, Culture and Consumption," in *Malaysia: Advertising in a Multiracial Society*. ed. by Katherine Frith Toland (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1996), 251.

[23] Mitchell, Pama A. "The Response of the Broadcasting and Advertising Trade Press to Television Blacklisting Practices, 1950-1956," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, 10-13 August 1989, 22, EDRS, ED 311487, microfiche.

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Other than Mitchell, such scholars as Shoemaker, Reese and McQuail have also theorized a relationship among the press, government, and advertiser.

In *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*, Shoemaker and Reese presented a comprehensive model indicating the hierarchical relationship among different levels of players. At the extramedia level, two important players are the government and advertisers. They point out while the former influences the media through laws, regulations, licenses, and taxes, the latter shows their strength by using their financial muscle.[24] McQuail also points out four types of social forces that could pressure a media organization: (1) Social and political pressure which include legal/political control and other social institutions, (2) Economic pressures such as competitors, news/information agencies, advertisers, owners and union, (3) Events plus constant information and culture supply, and (4) Distribution channels, audience interest/demand.[25] While Shoemaker and Reese, as well as McQuail, have presented theories that explain the relationship among the press, government and advertiser, not many communication researches have used empirical data to inform us of these interactions. It is the purpose of this study to provide such information.

Research Questions

The main purpose of this study is to understand the impact that a government has on advertisers when it temporarily withdraws a major newspaper organization's publishing license. Would such action deter advertisers from placing advertisements in this particular newspaper after its license is reissued? The suspension of *The Star* from

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[24] Pamela J. Shoemaker and D. Reese Stephen, *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman publisher USA, 1996), 194-209.

[25] Denis McQuail, *Mass communication theory: An introduction*, 3rd ed. (CA: Sage, 1997), 190-192.

October 1987 to March 1988 provides the researcher an opportunity to study the response of the advertisers under an extreme scenario. Would the suspension of a newspaper license prompt the advertisers to channel the advertisements to the newspaper's major competitor? Also, after the license is reissued to the banned newspaper, would the number of advertisements remain the same for its major competitor? The following are the research questions that this study sought to answer:

RQ1: How did the advertisers respond to *The Star* before and after its suspension period?

RQ2: Did *The Star*'s main competitor, the *New Straits Times*, gain from the suspension?

RQ3: What are the indictors that best inform the impact of a publishing license suspension on advertising revenue?

Methodology

Two major Malaysian English newspapers, *The Star* and *The New Straits Times*, were content analyzed to understand the impact that the suspension of the newspaper license has on advertising. *The Star* was selected in order to see if there was a difference in its number of advertisements before and after the suspension period. As for *The New Straits Times*, it was selected because it has always been the major competitor of *The Star*. By content analyzing and comparing the advertisements that appeared in these two newspaper before and after the period of license suspension, it provide an additional dimension for understanding the impact of the suspension.

The unit of analysis is the entire copy of the newspaper. Base on Riffe, Lacy and Fico's method[26] for daily newspaper sampling, 25 copies of the two newspapers (10 from

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[26] Lacy Riffe, and Fico, *Analyzing Media Message: Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research*. Mahwah, (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998), 97.

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The Star and 15 from the *New Straits Times*) were randomly selected. Five copies of each newspaper were selected from 28 September to 27 October, 1987—the month before *The Star*'s suspension and five copies of each paper were selected from 28 March to April 27, 1988— the month *The Star*'s license was reissued. In addition, 5 copies of *The New Straits Times* were selected during *The Star*'s suspension period—from 28 October, 1987 to 27 March, 1988.

For each copy of the newspaper, the number of newspaper pages, the number of Run of Press (ROP) advertising pages, the number of classified advertising pages, total ROP advertising space and the type of advertising (electronic appliances, real estate and so forth) was coded. The coding sheet was modified from Yun-Ju Lay's and John Schweitzer's research on the advertising content before and after the lifting of martial law in Taiwan in 1988.[27]

Three graduate students from a major mid-western university participated for the test of inter-coder reliability and established, on the basis of percentage of agreement, that intercoder reliability ranged from a low of 74% for the sub-category Recreation Related Services & Products to a high of 100% for number of newspaper pages. Overall intercoder reliability for this study was 91%.[28]

Results

The data of this content analysis showed that the publishing license suspension did had an impact on *The Star* as well as the *New Straits Times*' advertising space. Table

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[27] Yun-Ju Lay, and John C. Schweitzer. "Advertising in Taiwan newspapers since the lifting of the bans," *Journalism Quarterly* 67, no. 1 (1990): 201-206.

[28] Guido H Stempel III, "Content Analysis" and Statistical Designs for Content Analysis," in *Research Methods in Mass Communication*. 2nd ed. ed Guido H. Stempel III and Bruce H. Westley (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1989).

1 compares the advertising that appeared in *The Star* and the *New Straits Times* before and after the suspension period. Table 2 looks at the *New Straits Times*' advertising before, during and after *The Star*'s suspension. Table 3 would looks specifically at ten types of advertising by space to see if the suspension has an impact on certain types of services or products' advertisement.

Table 1:
Number of Total Pages, ROP Advertising pages, Classified Pages and
Total Advertising Space between *The Star* and the *New Straits Times*
before and after the Suspension of *The Star*'s Publishing License, 27 October, 1987

Category	Before (28 Sept. to 27 Oct. 87)		After (28 Mar. to 27 Apr. 88)	
	Star (N=5)	NST (N=5)	*Star* (N=5)	NST (N=5)
Number of Total pages for the newspaper ①	*320*	164	*284*	208
Number of Run of Press Advertising Page②	*245.5*❶	116	*158*❶	155
Number of Classified Advertising Page	*31.5*	20	*26*	29.5
Total Advertising Space③ **(Measured in page)**	*106.46*❷	38.19	*69.44*❷	61.46

① $X^2 = 6.93$ Df=1 $P \leq 0.01$
② $X^2 = 20.36$ Df=1 $P \leq 0.001$
③ $X^2 = 11.69$ DF=1 $P \leq 0.001$
❶ $X^2 = 18.97$ df=1 $P \leq 0.001$
❷ $X^2 = 7.97$ df=1 $P \leq 0.01$

RQ1: Advertisers response to *The Star* before and after its suspension period.

Using the chi-square goodness-of-fit test to observe *The Star* before and after its suspension, two out of four categories—number of Run of Press (ROP) advertising pages and total advertising space—in Table 1 indicate significant difference. Number of ROP advertising pages for *The Star* dropped 35.6% from 245.5 to 158 pages ($X^2 = 18.97$, df=1, $P \leq 0.001$). Total advertising space also dropped 34.8% from 106.46 to 69.44 pages ($X^2 =$

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7.97, df=1, $P \leq 0.01$). The similar percentage of decrease between these two categories—ROP advertising pages 35.6% and total advertising space 34.8%—indicates that the drop of ROP advertising pages was closely related to the drop of total advertising space which is the actual space purchased by the advertisers. Two other categories—number of total pages and number of classified advertising pages—also dropped 11.25% and 17.5% respectively after the suspension period. Comparing the percentage drop between number of total pages (11.25%) and ROP advertising pages (35.6%), indicated that while *The Star*'s advertising revenue had dropped after the suspension period, its production cost did not decline accordingly. One possible explanation for such outcome is that by trying to maintain a similar number of total pages before and after its suspension, *The Star* sought to present itself to the readers and advertisers that it was a substantial publication unaffected by the suspension. In so doing, it might regain the confidence of the advertisers, so they would return to sponsoring the newspaper.

RQ2: The interaction between *The Star* and the *New Straits Times*

The chi-square contingency test was also used to see if there was a significant association between the percentage decrease of advertising for *The Star* and the percentage increase of advertising for the *New Straits Times* before and after the suspension. The data in three of four categories—number of total pages, number of ROP advertising pages and total advertising space—indicated that the *New Straits Times* gained from *The Star*'s suspension in terms of advertising revenue. While *The Star*'s number of total pages dropped 11.25%, the *New Straits Times* increased its pages from 164 to 208 pages: an increase of 26.8% ($X^2 = 6.93$, df=1, $P \leq 0.01$). For the number of

ROP advertising pages, a similar increase was also found. The *New Straits Times* increased from 116 pages to 155 pages: an increase of 33.6% ($X^2 = 20.36$, df=1, $P \leq 0.001$). The most striking increase, however, was the total advertising space category. The *New Straits Times* increased from 38.19 pages to 61.46: an increase of 60.9% ($X^2 = 11.69$, df=1, $P \leq 0.001$). Comparing the percentage of increase for the number of total pages (26.8%) and total advertising space (60.9%), indicates that the increase of the *New Straits Times*' number of pages enabled it to accommodate more advertisements. As a result, while the advertising revenue for the *New Straits Times* increased more than 60% due to *The Star*'s suspension, its production cost increased only slightly more than 25%. The classified advertising page for the *New Straits Times* also increased 47.5% from 20 to 29.5 pages, however, the chi-square values for this finding did not reach statistical significance.

To better understand the benefit that the *New Straits Times* gained from *The Star*'s absence, five copies of the *New Straits Times* from the suspension period were also content analyzed. Using the chi-square goodness-of-fit test to observe the *New Straits Times* before, during and after *The Star*'s suspension, three out of four categories—number of total pages, number of Run of Press (ROP) advertising pages and total advertising space—demonstrated significant difference (see Table 2). The number of total pages for the *New Straits Times* before the suspension period was 164 pages, this number climbed to 222 pages—an increase of 35.4%—during *The Star*'s suspension. After March 28, as *The Star* returned to publish, the number dropped slightly to 208 pages. Compared to before the suspension period, however, the *New Straits Times* increased in size by 26.8% ($X^2 = 9.25$, df=2, $P \leq 0.01$). A similar trend was observed in

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the number of ROP advertising pages category. The ROP advertising pages for the *New Straits Times* fluctuated from 116, to 166, to 155 pages ($X^2 = 9.53$, df=2, $P \le 0.01$) before, during and after the suspension period. For the before and during suspension periods, the *New Straits Times* had a 43.1% increase in its ROP advertising pages. Although it suffered when *The Star* returned and dropped slightly, comparing the before and after the suspension period, it is fair to state that the *New Straits Times'* ROP advertising pages still gained 33.6% after *The Star*'s suspension.

Table 2:
Number of Total Pages, ROP Advertising Pages, Classified pages and Total Advertising Space in the *New Straits Times* before, during and after the Suspension of *The Star*'s Publishing License, 27 October, 1987

Category	Before (28 Sept. to 27 Oct. 87) (N=5)	During (28 Oct. 87 to 27 Mar. 88) (N=5)	After (28 Mar. to 27Apr. 88) (N=5)
Number of Total pages for the newspaper①	164	222	208
Number of Run of Press Advertising Page②	116	166	155
Number of Classified Advertising Page	20	36	29.5
Total Advertising Space ③ **(Measure in page)**	38.19	71.20	61.46

① $X^2 = 9.25$ Df=2 $0.01 \le P$
② $X^2 = 9.53$ Df=2 $0.01 \le P$
③ $X^2 = 10.10$ Df=2 $0.01 \le P$

The most interesting data in Table 2, however, is the total advertising space for the *New Straits Times*, before, during and after the suspension period. The total advertising space increased 86.4% from 38.19 to 71.20 pages while *The Star* was suspended, then dropped to 61.46 pages ($X^2 = 10.10$, df=2, $P \le 0.01$) after *The Star*'s publishing license was reissued. However, comparing the *New Straits Times*' total advertising space before and after the suspension, we found that the newspaper gained 60.9% in advertising space.

As for the *New Straits Time*'s number of classified advertising pages, the data showed that it fluctuated from 20, 36 to 29.5 pages before, during and after the suspension period, however, this did not achieve statistical significance.

Other than the main four categories, this study also looked at types of advertisement by space before, during and after the suspension period. Table 3 showed that the trend for this category was not as unidirectional as for the previous categories. While *The Star*'s advertising space for different types of advertisement in general did drop, there were sub-categories such as Real Estate advertising (from 2.82 to 5.45 pages) and Other advertising (from 1.63 to 2.15 pages) that increased. On the other hand, while the *New Straits Times*' advertising space increased in most of the sub-categories, Financial, Banking and Insurance Advertising (from 5.07 to 3.49 pages) as well as Recreation Related advertising (from 4.74 to 3.85 pages) declined. *The Star*'s Household and Personal needs related Services and Product advertising declined 50.6% from 32.18 to 15.89 pages ($X^2 = 5.52$, df=1, $P \leq 0.02$). Differences in the sub-category of Electronic Appliances and Services advertising for both newspapers also reached statistical significance. While *The Star*'s Electronic Appliances and Services advertising declined 67.9% from 15.87 to 5.10 pages from before to after the suspension period ($X^2 = 8.87$, df=1, $P \leq 0.01$), the same category for the *New Straits Times* increased 116% from 10.22 to 22.13 pages from the before to during the suspension period ($X^2 = 9.96$, df=1, $P \leq 0.01$).

Table 3:
Types of Advertisement by Space appearing in *The Star* and the *New Straits Times* before, during and after the Suspension of *The Star*'s Publishing License, 27 October, 1987

Type of Advertisement by Space	Before (28 Sept. to 27 Oct. 87)		During (28 Oct. 87 to 27Mar. 88)		After (28 Mar. to 27 Apr. 88)	
	Star (N=5)	NST (N=5)	*Star*	NST (N=5)	*Star* (N=5)	NST (N=5)
Ads for Self Improvement and Health	*18.50*	6.51	--	10.79	*18.23*	12.53
Car and Automotive Items	*4.65*	1.17	--	6.09	2.76	2.00
Congratulate and Achievement Ads	*6.79*	0.64	--	3.51	*4.45*	5.36
Household and Personal needs related Services and Product Ads	*32.18* ❶	5.01	--	8.28	*15.89* ❶	6.64
Electronic Appliances and Services Ads	*15.87* ❷	10.22 ❸	--	22.13 ❸	*5.10* ❷	12.89
Financial, Banking and Insurance Ads	*7.80*	5.07	--	5.54	*5.11*	3.49
Real Estate Ads	*2.82*	0.66	--	2.15	*5.45*	2.63
Recreation Related Ads	*11.30*	4.74	--	6.37	*7.73*	3.85
Tobacco, Beer and Wine Ads	*4.92*	3.04	--	4.83	*2.57*	8.57
Other Ads	*1.63*	1.13	--	1.51	*2.15*	3.50

❶ Household and Personal needs related Services and Product Ads	$X^2 = 5.52$	Df=1	$P \leq 0.02$
❷ Electronic Appliances and Services Ads	$X^2 = 8.87$	Df=1	$P \leq 0.01$
❸ Electronic Appliances and Services Ads	$X^2 = 9.96$	Df=1	$P \leq 0.01$

RQ3: The indictors that best inform

This study showed that the indictors that best explain of the impact of a publishing license suspension on advertising revenue lost are the number of ROP advertising pages and total advertising space. The latter apparently is more accurate than the former, for it reflects the newspaper space that the advertisers have actually purchased. However, as the measuring of advertising space could be time consuming, number of ROP advertising pages become the next best indictor that reflect the financial situation of a newspaper after its suspension. The total number of newspaper pages apparently could be deceiving under this particular scenario. A publisher might be willing to endure the cost of production in maintaining number of newspaper pages at a level similar to the number published before suspension to create the impression that it has retained its professional stature and readership as well as its advertising revenue. The last two categories, number of classified advertising pages and types of advertising by space appearing in the newspaper, also proved to be less as useful. Part of the reason for this might be because the results for these categories are relatively small numbers compared to those for the other categories making it more difficult to achieve statistical significance.

Conclusion

On 1 March, 2000, the Malaysian only major opposition newspaper —Harakah— was again facing the threat of having its publishing license suspended. According to its managing director, the organization could lose 100,000 ringgit (US $26,315) in revenue for its next issue if the government has not renewed its license in time.[29] Siebert, Peterson and Schramm first published their authoritarian theory of the press in 1956, but it apparently continues to be a useful theory in understanding the news media relationships with their governments in many parts of the world. The authority to issue or suspend a newspaper's publishing license gives a government the power not only to regulate the news media but also to inform the advertisers regarding the "right" media to choose for promoting their products or services.

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[29] "Mahathir's deputy told how to avoid 'Habibie syndrome," Agence France Presse 1 Mar. 2000.

This study showed that through the temporary suspension of *The Star*'s publishing, the Malaysian government successfully undermined the news organization's advertising revenue. However, after the end of the suspension period, *The Star* managed to survive the initial loss of advertising revenue and continued to be the second largest English newspaper in Malaysia until 1996, when it finally topped the *New Straits Times* and became the English newspaper with the highest circulation in the nation. Such an outcome could prompt two possible future studies. First, is to study the process by which *The Star* reinstated its advertising revenues. How long it took *The Star* to regain the number of ROP advertising pages and the advertising space that it maintained before the suspension would be an appropriate research question for such a study. Second is to study the content of *The Star*, in particular the editorial page, through time, to see if the newspaper has shifted its editorial position following the suspension.

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The Post-Cold War Bulgarian Media: Free and Independent at Last?

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Abstract

The Post-Cold War Bulgarian Media: Free and Independent at Last?

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Immediately following the Cold War's collapse, many Bulgarian journalists suddenly declared the Bulgarian mass media "free." Ten years later, they now argue that the Bulgarian media are far from achieving an independent, democratic status. This study describes changes in the Bulgarian mass media during the Cold War's final years through the post-Cold War era to answer the following question: How close are the Bulgarian media to establishing themselves as a free, independent Fourth Estate?

The Post-Cold War Bulgarian Media: Free and Independent at Last?

Ten years ago, immediately following the Cold War's collapse, many Bulgarian journalists and citizens alike suddenly declared the Bulgarian mass media "free" (Ognianova, 1997; Keller, 1995). Ten years later, they now argue that even though the post-Cold War Bulgarian media have experienced tremendous growth and have made substantial freedom of speech advances, the media are far from establishing themselves as an independent, democratic media system (The Sofia Echo, 1997a,b). Bulgarian journalists argue that although they are freer to express themselves during the post-Cold War era than during the Cold War, freedom of expression continues to be seriously threatened by restrictive government policies and practices and severe economic constraints (Ognianova, 1997; Keller, 1995; Druker, 1995a,b; Bakardjieva, 1995).

As the Bulgarian media and government struggle to shed their communist trappings in order to build a more democratic society, the Bulgarian public seems to have lost faith in both institutions (The Sofia Echo, 1997b). Most Bulgarians are currently fighting a losing battle to improve a dismal standard of living brought about by many factors, including an unstable government, a deteriorating economy, and rapidly increasing inflation, food prices, unemployment, crime and corruption (Human Rights Report, 1999; Freedom House, 1998, 1999a,b; Ognianova, 1997). Many Bulgarians have acknowledged their poverty and have stressed their strong desire to escape it in a variety of public opinion polls. In one such poll, 99.6% of Bulgarians surveyed said their savings are used for buying food; 72% agreed with the statement that "money is the most important thing in life," while in earlier such polls most Bulgarians rated "the family" as their top priority; and 32% said that they would emigrate immediately if given the opportunity (Georgiev, 1997, p.1).

While many Bulgarians blame the government for their compromised standard of living and low morale, they blame the media for failing to shed enough light on issues that could significantly improve their lives (Ognianova, 1997). Many Bulgarians view journalists as "irresponsible" individuals who publish "rumors and unverified facts" in order to promote their publishers' political and economic agendas (Druker, 1995b, p. 34).

Ironically, many Bulgarian journalists agree with such criticisms. These journalists admit that they often practice yellow journalism and report news in a biased fashion in order to promote their publishers' political objectives and to help sell their publications in an increasingly cut-throat media market (Keller, 1995). Such journalists say that although they despise their own behavior, they must often report in this manner to keep their jobs (Catto, 1997). However, they also claim that their unprofessional behavior should not be mistaken for disinterest in improving Bulgarian lives. On the contrary, they say they are constantly struggling to become more professional, to gain the public's respect and to help improve Bulgarian lives (Ognianova, 1997; Bakardjieva, 1995). As one Bulgarian journalist explains: Although many journalists, individuals pressured by their publishers and editors into a working environment akin to "prostitution," are "not very professional," they feel a strong "responsibility to the people" (Catto, 1997, p. 42). Bulgarian journalist Nevenuh Gryovoh supports this view, adding: "Today, journalists in Bulgaria are like wild animals -- like vultures who eat dead animals. We live in filth and dirt, but continue to see the possibility for good." (Keller, 1995, p.1).

The Bulgarian media can not truly serve their public until they report the news in an unbiased, independent fashion (Druker, 1995a,b). As media scholars, professionals and entrepreneurs continue struggling to determine how to best establish a professional, democratic Bulgarian media, a clear understanding of the contemporary Bulgarian media is essential. Since today's Bulgarian media are largely defined by their attempts to break away from communist constraints and to survive severe political and economic pressures in order to practice free speech and to serve their public, this study will describe changes in the Bulgarian mass media during the Cold War's final years through the post-Cold War era in an attempt to answer the following inquiry: How close are the Bulgarian news media to establishing themselves as a free, independent Fourth Estate?

The Cold War's Collapse: Political Upheaval Lays the Groundwork for a Freer Media

On November 10, 1989, the day after the Berlin Wall officially crumbled, Bulgarian communist dictator Todor Zhivkov was overthrown by his own party and was later replaced by reform-minded communist leader Petar Mladenov. The following year, a rapid succession of key political reforms took place: In January, the "newly reformed" Communist Party relinquished its monopoly power and allowed a multiparty political system to take root; in April, the Communist Party further distanced itself from its repressive past by officially changing its name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP); and in June Bulgaria experienced its first free multiparty election in 44 years (The World Book Encyclopedia, 1998). While the BSP won most seats in Bulgaria's new legislative body, the Grand National Assembly, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), a political party that emerged from a loose coalition of

15 anti-Communist groups and came in second in legislative seat wins, became the BSP's most powerful opponent. In July, Mladenov resigned from office following heated debate over whether he had used military tanks the previous year to silence anti-government demonstrations; and in August, the Grand National Assembly elected UDF leader Zhelyu Zhelev president, Bulgaria's first non-Communist head of state since 1944 (Freedom House, 1998).

As political pluralization ushered in media pluralization, Bulgarian journalists' dreams of true post-totalitarian independence switched into high gear (Ognianova, 1997). In March of 1990, two months after the BSP-led parliament made independent political parties legal, parliament passed a Bill on Parties agreement that allowed all individuals and political organizations to issue their own newspapers, magazines or journals and ordered the state to supply paper for such publications at subsidized prices (Bakardjieva, 1995). In addition, in 1991 the state monopoly over broadcasting was dissolved, and in 1992 an Interim Committee for Radio Frequencies and TV Channels was given the power to register private channels (Ognianova, 1997).

The Bulgarian Media: Free at Last?

Many Bulgarian journalists argue that the Communist Party's loosening grip over the Bulgarian government and society had an immediate impact on the media (Ognianova, 1997). The news media not only ceased playing the role of Communist Party mouthpiece and shaping stories to fit Marxist-Leninist doctrine, they began criticizing the Communist Party's shortcomings and covering stories according to news value standards (Catto, 1997). After the Cold War's collapse, Bulgarians began calling freedom of speech the country's most important post-communist achievement (*Pogled*, 1993). Bulgarian journalists reveled in their new sense of freedom and liberation. As one Bulgarian journalist stated: "The Berlin Wall in the mass media has been destroyed" (Ognianova, 1997, p. 19).

Economic and Political Roadblocks

However, just when publishers and broadcasters faced their much anticipated first real opportunity to establish independent media, harsh economic and political realities created enormous obstacles to not only freedom of speech, but survival itself (Horvat, 1992). The road from a state-planned to a free-market economy was especially bumpy. To survive, publishers were forced to overcome government control over the cost and availability of newsprint, printing services and distribution. Since they were dependent on the state's supplies and its good will to meet their circulation and subscription needs, publishers were once again forced to censor negative government coverage to remain economically viable (Ognianova, 1997).

In April of 1991 the government stopped controlling the allocation and price of newsprint. Although the government continued to control printing and distribution services, many publishers viewed their new right to obtain unlimited newsprint as an opportunity for free speech. However, harsh market conditions quickly took over and true editorial independence was forced to once again take a back seat to economic survival (Engelbrekt, 1992). Within days, newsprint prices increased between 300 to 1,000 percent (Wilson, 1991). As a result, newspapers immediately raised their cover prices (Engelbrekt, 1992). Since increased cover prices often led to decreased sales, many newspapers were forced to dramatically decrease their size, circulation and frequency. A government imposed value-added tax of 18% further threatened publications' survival. While many publications immediately faced bankruptcy, others were sustained via especially creative financing, flexibility and cunning. As Ognianova (1997) explains:

> Anything that could sell … newspaper[s] was tried: from front-page imitations of British tabloids to bingo and lottery games to free classified ads or free city transit tickets with a purchase. Journalists were encouraged to sell advertising for a commission; editors-in-chief used their personal contacts with state companies and new private businesses to solicit advertising (p. 15).

Although advertising helped Bulgaria's largest circulation newspapers grow stronger, it offered little relief to smaller publications, who had difficulty convincing often conservative small-business entrepreneurs with limited resources that advertising actually works (Ognianova, 1997). After all, the concept of advertising is relatively new to Bulgarian businessmen and media consumers. While many entrepreneurs still demand proof that advertising can significantly improve their profits, many Bulgarian consumers, used to massive shortages, continue to believe that quality goods and services need no advertising: only faulty goods or services need advertising as a crutch (Dulin, 1995).

Post-Cold War broadcasters also faced an intense daily struggle for economic livelihood (Sarakinov, 1994). The more private radio and TV channels emerged, the more these channels, along with the state-owned Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) and Bulgarian National Television (BNT), were forced to intensify their efforts to capture "the same audience and the same, still scarce advertising resources" (Ognianova, 1997, p. 14). Since BNR and BNT both received limited state operating funds and were the only broadcast entities allowed to broadcast on a national level, they maintained a clear competitive advantage over their private counterparts. However, both state and private broadcasters depended mostly on money-raising schemes, advertisers and sponsors for survival (Johnson, 1995).

Although state broadcasters were more likely to gain advertising clients and sponsors due to their national reach, private broadcasters were sometimes savvy enough to capture enough of the national market to remain viable. However, private broadcasters, particularly those based outside of the capital, had an especially difficult time securing advertising and sponsorship revenue (Ognianova, 1997). Such broadcasters were forced to predominantly rely on small, often unstable businesses for their ad and sponsorship funds. Since small-town businesses tended to be more interested in exporting their goods than in selling them at home and often either did not believe advertisements or sponsorships were worth the investment or did not have the funds necessary to buy air time, their payments to private broadcasters were severely limited (Ognianova, 1997). Accordingly, many private broadcasters quickly disappeared from the media landscape, and those remaining claimed they were coerced into catering to their clients' political agendas in order to keep their stations afloat (Human Rights Report, 1999). As a result, independent views were often sidestepped for survival's sake.

While Bulgarian journalists insist that they have not given up their struggle to establish an independent, professional media, they admit they are still struggling to determine how to ward off economic and political coercion in order to practice free speech (Druker, 1995a,b). Analysis of Bulgarian newspaper and broadcast media transitions from the Cold War through post-Cold War years will help determine how close today's journalists are to accomplishing their free-speech objectives.

Newspapers

Bulgaria's major newspapers, all of them privately owned by individuals, groups, political parties or a combination of the above, include the following (along with their circulations): *Noshten Trud* (Night Labor, 332,000); *24 Chasa* (24 Hours, 330,000); *Trud* (Labor, 200,000); the BSP's *Duma* (Word, 130,000), ***Standart News Daily*** (Standard, 110,000); *Narodno Delo* (People's Cause, 56,000); *Zemya* (Earth, 53,000); the UDF's *Demokratsiya* (Democracy, 45,000); and *Kapital*[1] (Capital, 27,000-30,000) (The Europa World Year Book, 1999; Freedom House, 1999c).

A small number of Bulgarian newspapers serve Bulgaria's largest minority groups, Turks and Roma (Gypsies). Weekly newspaper *Prava i Svobodi* (Rights and Freedoms) serves Bulgaria's Turks, 9% of the Bulgaria's 8.5 million population (some 760,000 citizens) (The Europa World Year Book, 1999; Human Rights Report, 1999; Engelbrekt, 1992). *Prava i Svobodi*, published in both Turkish and Bulgarian, is produced by Bulgaria's third largest political party, the Turkish-driven Movement for Rights and Freedoms. *Guven/Doverie*, a weekly newspaper focused on the lifestyles of ethnic Turks, is also published in Turkish and Bulgarian. And the weekly *Tsiganite* (Gypsies), published in both Bulgarian and Romani, serves the Romani population (about 338,000 citizens).

The Changing Newspaper Landscape

The Bulgarian government's break from its totalitarian past and acceptance of privately owned newspapers has set the stage for the contemporary Bulgarian newspaper market. From 1988, about one year before the Berlin Wall and Cold War collapsed, to 1995, some six years after the Cold War's demise,[2] the number of Bulgarian newspapers nearly tripled from 381 to 1,058 (Table 1). Although newly created newspapers continue to appear on news stands every day, many disappear within a month due to an extremely competitive media market.

While the number of Bulgarian newspapers has substantially increased since the Cold War's collapse, the number of newspaper copies has dramatically decreased. From 1988 to 1995 the number of newspaper copies plummeted from 880 to 505 million (Table 1). This substantial drop in post-Cold War newspaper copies is no doubt largely due to the severe economic and political publishing roadblocks previously discussed. *(Table 1 about here.)*

In addition, from the Cold War to post-Cold War years the frequency of Bulgarian newspaper publications has remained relatively consistent. For example, from 1988 to 1995 about 5% of newspapers were dailies, about 23% were published 1 to 3 times a week and about 71% were published less frequently. Also, regional newspapers have remained most prevalent, followed, respectively, by national and local papers. However, as time passes the percentage of national and local newspapers has substantially increased, while the percentage of regional papers has substantially decreased. For example, from 1988 to 1995 national newspapers increased from 17.3% to 34.5% and local newspapers increased from 1.3% to 10.4%, while regional newspapers decreased from 81.4% to 55.1% (Table 2). *(Table 2 about here.)*

While the post-Cold War proportional increase in national newspapers seems to illustrate an increasing desire among Bulgarians to keep abreast of national issues, the proportional increase in local newspapers appears to be related to new opportunities for Bulgarian citizens to have their voices heard and to participate in local decision-making. Since post-Cold War national and local newspapers tend to be most prevalent, it is not surprising that regional papers' presence has decreased due, in part, to mounting competition from their national and local counterparts.

Also after the Cold War's collapse, the number of newspapers focusing on different types of content has tended to dramatically increase. For example, from 1988 to 1995 the number of medicine/hygiene newspapers increased from 2 to 18, sports newspapers increased from 4 to 286, and political/economic newspapers increased from 1 to 141. Only one type of newspaper appeared to fall prey to the post-Cold War era: company bulletins. From 1988 to 1995 company bulletins, often similar to in-house newsletters, decreased in number from 119 to 9 (Table 3). *(Table 3 about here.)*

This increased emphasis on newspapers focused on different types of content reflects Bulgaria's transition from a communist regime to a society based on free market principles. Post-Cold War independent publishers have focused on creating newspapers most likely to turn a profit: newspapers catering to readers' individual needs and desires. For example, during the post-Cold War era non-communist explanations of the unfolding political/economic environment have been in high demand, along with news considered especially important for one's health and a variety of entertainment news, such as sports, for emotional escapism during hard times (Deltcheva, 1996).

Newspaper Reporting Bulgarian-Style

During the Cold War, journalists were required to write stories promoting communist principles, goals and ideals. Whether covering topics such as Communist Party events, local community issues or artistic performances, journalists were required to shape their stories according to current Communist Party guidelines. Journalists who wavered from government stipulations were often re-assigned or fired. As a result, mainstream coverage tended to be highly ideological, predictable and filled with communist cliches and terminology. Cold War newspaper coverage also tended to sidestep taboo topics, including pornography and life after death (Kaplan, 1999).

During the post-Cold War years, newspaper coverage has been greatly influenced by severe economic competition and hardships, resulting in an increased urgency to cater to readers' most sensationalist needs. Accordingly, post-Cold War Bulgarian newspaper reporting is diverse, often mixes fact with fiction and is over reliant on cheap, young journalists. In addition, a German company's near monopoly ownership of Bulgarian newspapers, the Bulgarian government's stifling of free press activities, punitive libel laws and anonymous acts of violence have tended to reign in journalists' free speech attempts, often resulting in passive coverage.

Post-Cold War newspapers not only tend to ignore communist practices and ideology, they offer their readers everything from lively written news, sports and entertainment stories to enthusiastic coverage of formerly banned topics, such as pornography, erotica, magic, astrology, extraterrestrials and spirituality. They also often blur the line between news and entertainment coverage: Newspapers have become stock full of "rumors presented as news, shocking headlines unsupported by stories' content, crude language, graphic pictures, and uncritical citing of sources" (Ognianova, 1997, p. 29). For example, Bulgarian newspapers regularly carry "true" stories about formerly taboo topics, such as the supposed truth behind dissident writer Georgi Markov's alleged Bulgarian umbrella murder in London, headlines such as "Rats Attack Varna" and "6 Boiled in Thermoelectric Power Station," and full frontal nude photographs of women, often posing with large hunting knives (Deltcheva, 1996; *24 Chasa*, 1994a,b; *Noshten Trud*, 1997a,b).

Post-Cold War "any means necessary" approaches to marketing, such as mixing news with hearsay and rumors and hiring inexpensive, inexperienced journalists, have kept many newspapers in the black, but at a serious cost: credibility. A popular hearsay approach to news coverage, often illustrated by the use of a conditional verb form that means "I did not see, but it has been said ...," is found in 80% of major Bulgarian newspapers' front-page stories (Scott, 1993, p. 10). Also, young reporters, who tend to lack crucial life experience and journalistic training, often unknowingly blur the truth. As a result, readers are left alienated and uninformed. Many newspaper consumers respond to what they view as a general void in credible news coverage via triangulation, reading several newspapers side-by-side and comparing "facts" in an attempt to reconstruct reality (Kaplan, 1999).

Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (*WAZ*), one of Germany's top three publishing groups, owns two of Bulgaria's most popular newspapers, *24 Chasa* and *Trud*. As a result, *WAZ* controls between 80-90% of Bulgaria's total national newspaper circulation (Freedom House, 1999c; Human Rights Report, 1999). *WAZ* threatens independent Bulgarian newspaper coverage by not only causing Bulgarian newspaper competitors severe economic strain and forcing many of them out of business, but by controlling the content of Bulgaria's most read newspapers.

WAZ has continuously slashed its papers' prices, which drives down rival Bulgarian newspaper sales and, accordingly, forces Bulgarian publishers to lay off journalists, reduce print-runs and, often, to declare bankruptcy (Human Rights Report, 1999). As *WAZ*'s grasp on the Bulgarian newspaper market continues to tighten, the Bulgarian market place of ideas and independent Bulgarian voices appear to be shrinking as news coverage becomes more Westernized and homogeneous (Ognianova, 1997). Although the *Bulgarska Telegrafna Agentsia* (Bulgarian Telegraph Agency) covers both domestic and international news for Bulgarian newspapers, an increase in German ownership of Bulgarian newspapers has lead to heavy reliance on Western news services and sources. Thus, Bulgarians are increasingly learning about the world, and their own affairs, through foreign eyes.

Post-Cold War newspaper coverage critical of topics such as the government, crime and corruption is often self-censored due to a variety of government, economic, legal and anonymous threats. For example, government officials often silence negative coverage by "threatening bureaucratic sanctions against businesses that advertise with offending publications" (Freedom House, 1999c, p.12). In addition, libel's chilling effect is especially strong in Bulgaria, where libel, punishable under a criminal code, can lead to harsh prison sentences and heavy fines. Journalists claim that prosecutors, under the guise of "libel investigations," harass investigative journalists uncovering uncomfortable truths. Also, anonymous violent attacks against journalists and newspaper office bombings are instigated by assailants in attempts to frighten journalists into dropping investigations. In 1998 alone, 11 such attacks occurred (Human Rights Report, 1999).

Broadcast Media

Bulgarians, who find the post-Cold War print media exceedingly expensive, have begun relying heavily on the broadcast media for information. A recent poll of Sofia and Plovdiv residents found that 74% of city residents received most of their news from state television and 10% from state radio (Ognianova, 1997). In Bulgaria, major radio and television channels are still primarily state owned and operated. Parliament's majority ruling party, currently the UDF, presides over Bulgaria's two main broadcast entities, Bulgarian National Radio and Bulgarian National Television.

Radio

State-owned BNR operates Bulgaria's two national radio channels, *Horizont* and *Christo Botev* (The Europa World Year Book, 1999). It also operates local and regional programs in several Bulgarian cities and Foreign Service broadcasts in a variety of languages, including Bulgarian, Turkish, Greek, Serbo-Croat, French, Italian, German, English, Portuguese, Spanish and Albanian.

In 1992, the Bulgarian government finally allowed individuals and groups to establish private local radio stations (Deltcheva, 1996). In 1993, Sofia University introduced *Radio Alma Mater*, a cable radio service with about 100,000 listeners that broadcasts cultural and scientific programs. Also in 1993, the independent *Darik Radio* was established, which has become best known for its January of 1997 coverage of police vs. anti-government demonstrator clashes.

Although private citizens are not allowed to establish national radio channels, more than 30 private local and regional radio stations operate in Bulgaria (Human Rights Report, 1999). At first, many entertainment-oriented private stations borrowed heavily from U.S. radio formats: They produced mostly English-language popular music and call-in game show programming. But in recent years broadcasters have responded to their audiences' growing displeasure with the anglicization of their air ways by introducing more "Bulgarian elements" to their programming (Deltcheva, 1996, p. 309).

The Changing Radio Landscape

In post-Cold War Bulgaria, the establishment of private radio has helped drive the amount of overall radio programming and programming for Bulgarian audiences to an all-time high. From 1988 to 1995 annual radio programming hours increased more than five times, from 46,810 to 284,627, and radio programming produced for Bulgarian audiences increased from 65.7% to 93.8%. Although the amount of radio programming designed for foreign audiences remained relatively constant during this time frame, the great increase in radio broadcasting for Bulgarian citizens resulted in proportionally far fewer foreign broadcasting hours: in 1988, 34.3% of radio programming hours focused on foreign audiences compared to a mere

6.2% by 1995 (Table 4). *(Table 4 about here.)*

Media experts have attributed the substantial post-Cold War growth in Bulgarian radio broadcasts to increased Bulgarian interests in local community affairs and the substantial decrease in foreign broadcasting hours to the media's abandonment of its Cold War mandate to spread communist propaganda abroad (The Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1997).

Both Cold War and post-Cold War radio have focused on entertainment and news programming. However, while news, educational and cultural radio programming have decreased from Cold War to post-Cold War years, entertainment, advertising and miscellaneous ("other") types of programming have increased over time. For example, from 1988 to 1995 news programming dropped from 40.7% to 29.4%, educational from 2.2% to 1.1%, and cultural from 5.7% to 2.9%; while entertainment programming increased from 48.1% to 52.1%, advertising programming from 2.5% to 4.6%, and miscellaneous programming from 1% to 9.6% (Table 5). *(Table 5 about here.)*

Radio's post-Cold War increase in entertainment and in a greater variety of programming, along with its subsequent decrease in news programming, can be attributed to Bulgarians' tendency to use radio more often than other media to temporarily forget their woes (Deltcheva, 1996).

Radio Reporting

During the Cold War, Bulgaria's Communist Party and Committee for Radio and Television stifled Bulgarian journalists' independent coverage by closely monitoring them and punishing them for views in conflict with the Communist Party's. Both radio and TV were pressured to follow a strict "program scheme" in which "permissible topics" and types of content were clearly spelled out, along with taboos (Deltcheva, 1996, p. 308). When radio anchors ignored party guidelines, the government often punished them by temporarily pulling them off the air, re-assigning them, or, under extreme conditions, firing them. Since such punishments often created martyrs and led to huge increases in listeners and attention to undesirable issues, the government limited its sanctions in order to avoid greater damage (Deltcheva, 1996).

During the post-Cold War era, many journalists argue that the government continues to fight independent reporting by heavy handedly overseeing Bulgaria's broadcast media and punishing broadcasters for critical coverage, saving the weakest available channels for private Bulgarian broadcasters and holding private broadcasters licenses in limbo (Bakardjieva, 1995; Human Rights Report, 1999; Freedom House, 1998; The Sofia Echo, 1997b).

According to the 1990 *Temporary Statute of National Radio and Television*, the parliamentary majority, although not allowed to directly alter news content, is still permitted to "monitor the performance of these media and to initiate personal and organizational changes in their management" (Bakardjieva, 1995, p. 7). As a result, many reporters say they continue to be temporarily removed from the air, re-assigned or fired for stories critical of parliament's ruling party (Bakardjieva, 1995; (Human Rights Report, 1999). For example, in March of 1998 government officials took BNR journalist Diana Yakulova off the air for a month for allegedly using "anonymous information" to criticize Bulgaria's Minister of the

Interior (Human Rights Report, 1999, p. 7).

In addition, soon after the Cold War's collapse the Bulgarian government kept strong channels for state-owned broadcasting and allowed foreign broadcasters, such as the VOA and *Deutsche Welle*, to snatch up most of the remaining strong ones. As a result, Bulgarian private entrepreneurs were only offered a limited number of remaining channels with weak frequencies, making it difficult for them to compete with state-owned radio (Bakardjieva, 1995; Human Rights Report, 1999).

Although most private radio stations originated with operating licenses, these licenses have since expired. Even though the government has temporarily allowed private operators to broadcast illegally, a pending new media law has made it impossible for private operators to renew their licenses. The government's inability and/or unwillingness to once again legalize journalists' right to broadcast has placed their independence, and very existence, at risk (Human Rights Report, 1999).

Television

State-owned BNT operates two national TV channels, *Channel 1* and *Efir 2*. While *Channel 1* is known for its entertainment programming, such as Western movies and lavish variety shows, *Efir 2* is known for its documentaries and arts programming (The Europa World Year Book, 1999).

In the 1980s, Bulgaria's two national channels co-existed with a Russian channel, *Ostankino*, which was received via satellite. The extremely popular *Ostankino*, with its *perestroika*-driven open talk shows and satire, left Bulgarian audiences craving *glasnost*. In 1987, non-profit, educational French TV 5 was launched in Sofia and other major Bulgarian cities (Deltcheva, 1996).

Bulgaria's television structure did not substantially change until 1994. In July of that year, Bulgaria's first private TV station, *Nova Televiziya*, began operating and broadcasting news and entertainment programming. In addition, in 1994 CNN-International began broadcasting in Sofia and Plovdiv, and MTV began broadcasting in Varna.

Also during the mid-1990s, U.S. shows exploded onto Bulgarian TV screens, especially soap operas, such as *Guiding Light* and *The Bold and The Beautiful*, and sitcoms, such as *Alf* and *Cheers*. And Bulgarian versions of popular American game shows, such as the Bulgarian *Nevada*, a cross between *The Price is Right* and *Wheel of Fortune*, gained widespread audiences (Deltcheva, 1996). More recently, Bulgarian-produced entertainment programming is gaining popularity (Kaplan, 1999).

Although the government has promised to privatize one of its two national channels and to occasionally broadcast in Turkish, neither commitment has been met. The few existing local and regional private TV networks experience difficulty competing with their national counterparts for ad revenue and sponsorships (Human Rights Report, 1999).

The Changing TV Landscape

The expanding post-Cold War Bulgarian TV arena substantially increased the overall amount of TV programming. For example, from 1988 to 1995 total annual TV programming increased from 5,918 to 32,884 hours. In addition, while Cold War Bulgarian TV programming was about twice as likely to be produced in Bulgaria than in a foreign country, post-Cold War TV programming is about twice as likely to be produced abroad than domestically. For example, in 1988 Bulgarian programming was 54.4% Bulgarian-produced vs. 25.5% foreign-produced, while in 1995 Bulgarian programming was 57.5% foreign-produced vs. 34.5% Bulgarian-produced (Table 6). *(Table 6 about here.)*

The fact that Bulgarian TV emphasized Bulgarian-produced programming during the Cold War and foreign-produced programming during the post-Cold War era is not surprising. After the Cold War's collapse, formerly taboo, newly available and inexpensive yet technically advanced Western programming has been especially attractive to Bulgarian programmers and audiences (Kaplan, 1999).

During both the Cold War and post-Cold War years the most popular type of TV programming has been entertainment programming, including soap operas, sitcoms and movies. While entertainment programming in both eras has amounted to about one-half of all Bulgarian TV programming, the remaining roughly one-half of programming during both periods has been divided among the following: news, youth, cultural, educational, advertising, religious and miscellaneous ("other") (Table 7). However, from the Cold War through post-Cold War years entertainment, advertising and religious programming have tended to increase, while several types of programming, including youth and educational, have tended to decrease. For example, from 1988 to 1995 entertainment programming increased from 45.9% to 63.8%, advertising programming from .6% to 4.1 % and religious programming from zero to .2%; while youth programming decreased from 14.3% to 4.4%

and educational programming decreased from 4.1% to 1.2% (Table 7). *(Table 7 about here.)*

Post-Cold War TV programming trends reflect Bulgaria's transition from a centralized to a more open free market economy. As TV broadcasters experience increased *glasnost* and economic competition, increased entertainment, advertising and religious programming are no surprise. Nor is it surprising that in a supply and demand post-Cold War world, youth and educational programming, like their Western counterparts, are struggling to remain economically viable (Kaplan, 1999).

TV Reporting

Although no formal restrictions on TV content exist, the Bulgarian government threatens independent TV programming by exercising an "unduly large influence" over Bulgaria's broadcast media (Human Rights Report, 1999, p. 6). Government critics argue that the parliament's majority party, which predominantly controls BNT, consistently threatens reporters' programming and livelihood. For example, in February of 1998 when the extremely popular satirical TV program *Hushove* (Outcasts) did not adhere to government warnings to limit government criticism, critics claim the UDF used its influence over BNT's management to cancel this show. And, one month later, the government appeared to push BNT's decision to dismiss journalist Svetoslava Tadarakova for "statements in the media [which] ruin the good reputation of Bulgarian National Television" (Human Rights Report, 1999, p. 7).

Government critics also argue that ruling party government officials threaten TV's freedom of speech by convincing advertisers to pull their support from TV programmers broadcasting anti-government sentiments, and by only allowing minimal air time for oppositional party and/or minority views (Human Rights Report, 1999).

Although a "new" electronic media law limiting government management of radio and TV broadcasting passed on July 18, 1996, it remains influx due to a barrage of politically motivated parliamentary revisions (Krause, 1996). Until this law or a similar version of it is enacted, Bulgaria's ruling party will continue to oversee Bulgaria's broadcast media (Human Rights Report, 1999).

The Post-Cold War Bulgarian Media: Free and/or Independent?

Perhaps an anonymous Freedom House source best described the post-Cold War Bulgarian media when he called them "free, but not independent" (Freedom House, 1999c, p. 12). The Freedom House (1999b) appears to support this finding, with the following clarification: The Bulgarian media are only "partially free" (p.6).[3] Even though Bulgaria's new constitution claims that the post-Cold War media are entirely free, official and unofficial government interference in most levels of media management and operation, combined with severe economic, political and legal obstacles, have seriously stifled free speech. Post-Cold War Bulgarian journalists have at times achieved significant free speech successes. For example, *Kapital* has made remarkable strides covering government corruption and the Russian-speaking mafia, and *Darik Radio* has broken new ground by broadcasting, live from parliament, clashes between police and anti-government demonstrators. But isolated free speech achievements alone do not define an independent media system. The Berlin Wall in the mass media may have very well been destroyed.

However, whether truly independent Bulgarian media will succeed in rising from the rubble remains to be seen.

Notes

1. According to media critics, *Kapital* is the most objective, independent-minded Bulgarian newspaper. It is not only the intelligentsia's newspaper of choice, it has made some strides toward fighting Bulgaria's insidious crime and corruption (See Freedom House, 1999c).

2. Scholars do not agree on when the Cold War officially ended. However, most seem to argue it either ended with the Berlin Wall's collapse (November 9, 1989) or the fall of the Soviet Union (December 8, 1991) and/or Gorbachev's resignation (December 25, 1991) (See Goodman, R. (1999). Prestige Press Coverage of U.S.-China Policy During the Cold War's Collapse and Post-Cold War Years: Did a Deteriorating Cold War Paradigm Set the Stage for More Independent Press Coverage. *Gazette*, 61(5):392-93.

3. Freedom House is a non-partisan organization that promotes human rights and freedom worldwide. One of its major activities is an annual worldwide press freedom survey. Each country's survey is concluded with a free-speech designation based on a three-point scale: "free," "partially free" or "not free."

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Table 1
Bulgarian Newspapers (1985-1995) – Titles vs. Copies

Years	*New Titles*	*Published Titles*	*Copies (in millions)*	*Copies (per person)*
1985	17	394	1100	122.8
1986	9	395	1154	128.8
1987	4	386	995	110.9
1988	16	381	880	97.9
1989	25	301	895	99.6
1990	242	540	1099	122.2
1991	344	727	520	57.9
1992	444	917	616	72.1
1993	322	928	654	77.2
1994	434	1,059	611	72.4
1995	399	1,058	505	60.1

Source: *Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria* (Sofia: National Statistical Institute, 1997): 172.

Table 2
Bulgarian Newspapers (1985 — 1995) – Frequency vs. Type

	Frequency (%)				***Type(%)***		
Years	*Dailies*	*1-3 times a week*	*Less than 1 time a week*		*Central*	*Regional*	*Local*
1985	4.3	24.4	71.3	!	15.5	80.5	4.1
1986	4.3	24.6	71.1	!	15.4	81.3	3.3
1987	4.4	25.1	70.5	!	16.3	82.4	1.3
1988	5.2	25.2	69.6	!	17.3	81.4	1.3
1989	5.6	64.5	29.9	!	17.6	77.1	5.3
1990	4.4	48.1	47.4	!	21.8	77.1	7.0
1991	4.3	27.1	68.6	!	38.5	54.6	6.9
1992	5.0	36.1	58.9	!	43.7	50.4	5.9
1993	5.8	34.7	59.5	!	40.6	51.8	7.5
1994	6.4	29.6	63.9	!	35.7	55.7	8.6
1995	5.5	22.4	72.1	!	34.5	55.1	10.4

Source: *Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria* (Sofia: National Statistical Institute, 1997): 173.

Table 3
Bulgarian Newspapers (1985-1995) – Content

	1985	*1986*	*1987*	*1988*	*1989*	*1990*	*1991*	*1992*	*1993*	*1994*	*1995*
Politics/Economy	1	1	1	1	1	16	88	96	81	85	141
Sociology	0	2	0	1	1	0	1	35	41	23	9
Religion	1	1	1	1	1	2	9	20	15	18	20
Education/Training	2	6	2	3	5	1	14	25	32	31	53
Medicine/Hygiene	2	3	2	2	1	4	5	15	16	26	–18
Agriculture	2	2	2	2	1	3	7	16	12	7	12
Sports	4	4	4	4	5	10	14	46	29	64	286
Literature	2	3	2	3	2	6	14	14	9	6	11
Youth	8	8	8	8	8	13	25	39	32	21	21
Humor	1	1	1	1	2	8	16	26	21	22	14
Informational	48	48	49	29	29	85	60	0	1	44	21
Lifestyles	133	147	147	175	172	245	305	337	408	523	228
College Education	18	13	14	11	12	21	11	15	17	23	34
Company Bulletins	151	130	131	119	44	93	71	36	26	13	9
Other	21	26	22	21	17	33	87	197	188	153	181
Total	394	395	386	381	301	540	727	917	928	1059	1058

Source: *Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria* (Sofia: National Statistical Institute, 1997): 174.

Table 4
Bulgarian Radio (1985 — 1995)–Programming Hours

Year	*Radios per 1,000 people*	*For Bulgarian Audiences* *Hours*	*%*	*For Foreign Audiences* *Hours*	*%*	*Total Hours*
1985	225	29,105	65.7	15,179	34.3	44,284
1986	223	29,544	65.2	15,799	34.8	45,343
1987	221	29,679	64.8	16,131	35.2	45,810
1988	219	30,751	65.7	16,059	34.3	46,810
1989	216	32,052	66.1	16,466	33.9	48,498
1990	212	31,847	65.4	16,871	34.6	48,718
1991	207	32,172	67.1	15,774	32.9	47,946
1992	208	36,126	68.4	16,707	31.6	52,833
1993	198	143,002	88.7	18,276	11.3	161,278
1994	186	218,966	92.2	18,517	7.8	237,483
1995	172	267,098	93.8	17,529	6.2	284,627

Source: *Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria* (Sofia: National Statistical Institute, 1997): 178.

Table 5
Bulgarian Radio (1985-1995)– Content (%)

Year	*News*	*Educational*	*Cultural*	*Religious*	*Advertising*	*Entertainment*	*Other*
1985	42.0	2.8	4.9	0	2.3	46.7	1.3
1986	42.6	2.9	4.8	0	2.3	46.2	1.2
1987	42.1	2.3	5.5	0	2.3	46.9	1.0
1988	40.7	2.2	5.7	0	2.5	48.1	1.0
1989	53.9	2.1	4.8	0	1.9	36.3	1.0
1990	49.6	2.9	4.7	0	1.8	34.6	6.3
1991	50.8	2.6	7.5	0	2.2	33.9	3.0
1992	46.3	3.4	7.4	0.1	2.4	36.7	3.8
1993	33.4	2.0	3.7	0.3	4.3	51.1	5.2
1994	30.5	1.2	3.9	0.2	5.3	50.6	8.3
1995	29.4	1.1	2.9	0.3	4.6	52.1	9.6

Source: *Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria* (Sofia: National Statistical Institute, 1997): 179.

Table 6
Bulgarian TV (1985 — 1995) – Programming Hours

Year	*TV sets per 1,000 people*	*Bulgarian Produced*		*Foreign Produced*		*Repeat*		*Total Hours*
		hours	*%*	*hours*	*%*	*hours*	*%*	
1985	190	2,673	58.8	1,026	22.6	846	18.6	4,545
1986	189	3,116	57.9	1,246	23.1	1,021	19.0	5,383
1987	189	3,258	58.6	1,245	22.4	1,052	19.0	5,555
1988	187	3,220	54.4	1,508	25.5	1,192	20.1	5,918
1989	185	3,601	56.2	1,544	24.1	1,267	19.8	6,412
1990	182	3,356	53.7	2,010	32.2	882	14.1	6,248
1991	177	3,537	59.0	1,785	29.8	676	11.2	5,998
1992	182	3,743	54.0	2,360	34.0	830	12.0	6,933
1993	176	3,203	49.2	2,715	41.7	588	9.1	6,506
1994	176	3,902	54.4	2,618	36.5	658	9.1	7,178
1995	176	11,361	34.5	18,903	57.5	2,620	8.0	32,884

Source: *Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria* (Sofia: National Statistical Institute, 1997): 180.

Table 7
Bulgarian TV (1985—1995) – Content (%)

Year	*News*	*Educational*	*Cultural*	*Religion*	*Advertising*	*Entertainment*	*Youth*	*Other*
1985	20.1	5.5	2.2	0	1.0	51.9	11.5	7.8
1986	35.2	4.4	2.2	0	1.0	39.3	14.0	3.8
1987	18.9	5.9	3.0	0	0.5	45.9	14.7	11.1
1988	14.8	4.1	5.0	0	0.6	45.9	14.3	15.4
1989	15.6	4.4	3.6	0	0.5	43.4	12.3	20.2
1990	22.3	3.4	1.9	0	0.3	45.8	10.6	15.6
1991	23.7	3.3	2.3	0	0.7	40.8	10.2	19.0
1992	25.5	4.6	3.3	0.3	1.1	42.8	10.1	12.3
1993	28.5	1.3	1.7	0.3	2.2	46.9	9.9	9.3
1994	16.3	1.2	3.5	0.4	2.2	48.2	11.2	16.9
1995	13.2	1.2	3.9	0.2	4.1	63.8	4.4	9.3

Source: *Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria* (Sofia: National Statistical Institute, 1997):181.

Korean Environmental Journalists:
How They Perceived A New Journalistic Role

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Abstract

This study examined how Korean environmental journalists conceptually perceived a new journalistic role that they played in covering environmental campaigns launched by the news media since 1992 in South Korea. Despite being inadvertently put in situation to receive an unprecedented role of encouraging civic participation in environmental preservation, Korean environmental journalists showed considerable sophistication of understanding their social role. Factor analysis found that Korean environmental journalists clearly differentiated the three roles, "Role of Covering Specific Environmental Issues," "Role of Generating Broad Social Impact," and "Fundamental Journalistic Role," and understood them very quickly.

Introduction

It was not until the early 1990s that the term environment became widely used in South Korea (Koo, 1998). That term had rarely been a part of public discourse until big environmental accidents occurred, and were covered by the news media. Koreans had been more concerned with economic development than environmental preservation.

That atmosphere has changed dramatically since 1992 when the news media in South Korea (hereafter Korea) began to launch environmental campaigns. Stories were written about garbage, river pollution, car emission pollution, endangered species and so on. According to Oh (1994), the environmental campaign coverage had several characteristics. First, the news media in Korea began to regularly cover a variety of environmental issues that had not been covered before. Second, they changed the angle of news articles to emphasize citizens' efforts to preserve the environment. They also reported information about how to enhance the environment by introducing foreign concepts such as recycling and car pool. Finally, the news media urged citizens to act by holding national events at which citizens removed waste and cleaned the riversides.

Specifically, Korean environmental journalists began investigating river pollution with civic groups (Lee, 1995), distributed books guiding waste reduction in daily life (Han, 1992), and even encouraged citizens to measure the degree of river pollution for themselves (Han, 1994b; Park, 1994). Such new reporting practices emerged during these campaigns, and were only seen in environmental journalism in Korea (Oh, 1994).

The campaign coverage shows that the Korean news media made a series of efforts to improve the environment by approaching, motivating and mobilizing their audience and citizens. In doing so, environmental journalists themselves appear to have changed, too, sometimes relinquishing their traditional journalistic roles.

The news media-led environmental campaign was indeed an experiment in Korean journalism history like the public journalism project in the United States. However, environmental campaigns did not seem to spring from serious speculation among journalists about either the responsibility of the press in society or citizen isolation from public decision-making process, as was the case in public journalism projects (e. g., Charity, 1995).

Arguably, Korean environmental journalists confronted a sudden unexpected situation while covering the campaigns. They faced a professional challenge to play an unprecedented new role as co-workers with their audience, contrasted to their traditional role as detached observers. In addition, the role change was fast enough to confuse journalists and might have caused a serious controversy among themselves on their journalistic role in Korean society. In fact, they did not seem ready to play such a new role, given the condition that Korean journalists receive reeducation once in 16 years on the average and only 14% of them majored in journalism or mass communication (The Korean Journalist, 1999).

Therefore, this study tries to explore how comfortable Korean environmental journalists were with their role changing during a complex and challenging task such as an environmental campaign, and to what degree they were able to conceptually differentiate and understand the new role which they had begun to play. This study also attempts to examine whether Korean environmental journalists perceive the new role in a different way in accordance with their demographic difference. For this study, the authors employed a survey of 139 Korean environmental journalists and conducted factor analysis.

After review of Korean environmental campaigns and discussions about the "new" journalistic role, the authors will reaffirm research questions of this study and set four hypotheses.

Literature Review

The News Media-led Environmental Campaigns in Korea

Lee (1994) divides the evolution of Korean environmental journalism into three time stages. First, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Korean media only superficially covered pollution issues because they were too restricted by leaders in power. Obsessed with its policy of putting first priority on economic development, the Korean government used a heavy hand to prevent the media from tackling environmental issues (Koo, 1998).

In the 1980s when the cost of unchecked economic growth became obvious, Koreans began to think about the environment seriously. The Korean government set up the Agency of Environment in 1980. Several pollution-related diseases were detected near industrial complexes. Small environmental groups formed to spotlight the diseases and their activities provided the news media with newsworthy information (Lee, 1994).

In the mid-1980s, the press extensively covered five big anti-pollution campaigns held by environmental groups and citizens. The campaigns focused on either compensation for the disease damage or opposition to new locations of health threatening industries (Jeong, 1996). In 1990, the Agency of Environment was upgraded and renamed Office of Environment. A year later, however, Korea suffered its most serious pollution accident. Phenol discharged by an electronics factory polluted the Naktonggang River that provides 10 million residents with drinking water. Nine national newspapers gave unprecedented coverage of the event, running 496 stories during the first week after the accident (Yoo, 1991). However, the press in this period still focused on exposing pollution issues anecdotally, rather than in a systematic and in-depth manner (Lee, 1994).

Many authors agree that more sophisticated environmental journalism in Korea began in 1992 with the news media-led environmental campaigns (Jeong, 1996; Koo, 1998; Lee, 1994). Since then, each of the ten national newspapers has launched environmental campaigns more than once with different agendas (Ryu, 1996). Most newspapers published one or two pages of an "environmental section" every week (Lee, 1996). In 1991, environment-related articles of newspapers numbered in 1,110, but numbers have rapidly increased, 3,066 in 1992, 4,699 in 1993, 6,250 in 1994, 7,773 in 1995, and 7,623 in 1996 (Chang, 1997). The Office of Environment was upgraded again in 1994, now called the Ministry of Environment. Environmental groups working at the national level emerged and came to be considered as essential news sources (Ryu, 1996).

The following section will briefly review the campaign coverage of the "big four" Korean national newspapers: *Chosun Ilbo*, *Dong-A Ilbo*, *Joongang Ilbo* and *Hankook Ilbo*.

Example 1: *Chosun Ilbo*

On June 19, 1992, *Chosun Ilbo* ran a front-page story, headlined "Don't Waste Wastes," which declared "The degree of pollution caused by trash is so great, we won't have a homeland to give our offspring…We will continue to report waste pollution until the annual amount of waste discharge has decreased" (Cho, 1992a). *Chosun Ilbo* welcomed citizen participants to work toward that goal. As the paper printed photos of newspaper trash, cigarette butts, empty cans and a filthy river, readers' responses exploded. Citizen participatory groups numbered in 2,400 in the first three months and reached 3,600 in a year (Kim, 1993). All the groups' names were published at the paper.

For example, *Chosun Ilbo* distributed 11 million recycled paper bags for separation of "yesterday's newspapers" from other garbage (Cho, 1992b). *Chosun Ilbo* published two booklets, "Let's Learn about Trash," and "Trash Should Not Be Discarded," about garbage pollution and methods for recycling (Han, 1992). About 49,700 copies of these books were freely distributed by *Chosun Ilbo* to 18,514 schools (Seol, 1992).

Inspired by successful citizen mobilization, *Chosun Ilbo* held its first nation-wide garbage-cleaning event, called "Clean Up Korea." For three days in September 1992, nine million people from families, churches, schools, industries, military corps, governments, and even foreigners living in Korea participated in this campaign. *Chosun Ilbo* distributed a guidebook, "What Should Be Cleaned and How?" and prominently covered citizen efforts on 16 pages during those three days.

In addition, in early 1993, *Chosun Ilbo* began to investigate air pollution caused by car emissions and consequently launched its second campaign, "Let's Ride a Bicycle." Running 70 stories in serial form for three months, *Chosun Ilbo* encouraged citizens to believe that they could switch to biking by profiling many citizens who already were using bicycles for regular transportation (Oh, 1994). Also introduced were foreign concepts like the French use of compact cars and the Japanese use of a car pool system.

Right after the coverage, the government decided to establish a special committee for bicycle road construction (Bae, 1993).

Chosun Ilbo's campaign reached its climax during its "Save Our Streams (SOS)" campaign. Upon launching the campaign in July 1994, *Chosun Ilbo* said, "The SOS campaign is a movement for seeking solutions," and "Citizens must be watchmen if 102 major streams are to be reclaimed from pollution" (Han, 1994a).

In this campaign, *Chosun Ilbo* equipped citizens to scientifically monitor river pollution. First, *Chosun Ilbo* made and freely distributed a brochure, "Methods for Measuring River Quality," providing step-by-step instructions on how to measure river quality by using aquatic insects living in the river (Han, 1994b). Second, the paper also freely provided 50 local citizen groups with portable water quality measurement equipment to monitor main streams (Park, 1994). Third, the paper made and distributed a guidebook, "Mapping River Pollution," describing methods for investigating sources of river pollution (Seol, 1994). The paper covered numerous stories with other angles, such as getting kids to measure river quality using aquatic insects and getting housewives to investigate chicken farms and hog yards. Thirty-four river pollution maps made by students and citizen groups were published at the paper.

Example 2: *Dong-A Ilbo*

Dong-A Ilbo began extensive coverage of environmental issues on January 12, 1994. Under the title "The Naktonggang River-- All 1,750 Miles Are Moaning," *Dong-A Ilbo* published six big stories investigating the polluted river with the help of citizen groups (Lee, 1995). It also ran three stories about the condition of tap water in foreign countries such as Japan and Germany. *Dong-A Ilbo* launched an environmental campaign called, "Green Scouts," on July 5, 1994, with the help of the Association for Environmental Movement, a major environmental group. The number of citizen participants in that campaign reached about four million by 1995 (Lee, 1995).

From July to October 1994, *Dong-A Ilbo* published 26 stories in serial form, which dealt with river and coastal sea pollution caused by industrial complexes and food waste. In particular, the paper explained to readers the actual cost of wasting food, using disposable products, and car emissions pollution. The paper also sponsored dozens of workshops on environmental education for schoolteachers.

In 1995, *Dong-A Ilbo* launched a new campaign called "Let's Find All The Deserted Well Holes." At that time, tens of thousands of well holes had been deserted and caused filthy storm water to contaminate ground water. Even the Korean government did not know the actual number of deserted well holes in the nation. The paper published stories of ground water pollution and urged readers to report the locations of well holes. *Dong-A Ilbo* ran stories of regional maps of deserted well holes that citizens had found.

Example 3: *Joongang Ilbo*

Joongang Ilbo focused on endangered native species. In February 1996, *Joongang Ilbo* launched the "Mascot Species" campaign. It suggested that every school and industry should pick and try to save one native flora or fauna (Kim, 1996). The paper published dozens of stories of species that had disappeared or become endangered in Korea. It also reported on activities, regulations and working solutions that other countries had tried to protect endangered species. *Joongang Ilbo* developed a Web site and distributed information and photographs about endangered species (Kang, 1996).

After the campaign, not only nine local government branches changed their existing mascot species from foreign to native species, but also people in 17 cities organized clubs dedicated to protecting native endangered species such as owls, raccoons, white herons and mallard ducks.

Example 4: *Hankook Ilbo*

Hankook Ilbo emphasized the importance of the ecosystem in its campaign, "Let's Proceed toward An Era of Green Life," launched in December 1994. At first, *Hankook Ilbo* limited itself to publishing stories of damaged forests, later however, it tried to involve people directly with nature by holding dozens of events such as bird watching and wild animal feedings.

Like *Joongang Ilbo*, *Hankook Ilbo* developed a Web site, called "Information Network on the Environment and Pollution." This site contains 29 departments, such as air quality, water quality, forestry, soil and foreign information (Jeong, 1995). In 1997, *Hankook Ilbo* published the CD-ROM, "Let's Go To The Forests," which described ecological characteristics of wildlife and the harmful results of deforestation. About 9,500 copies of the CD-ROM were freely distributed to schools (Jeong, 1997).

Discussion about the campaign coverage

The news media-led environmental campaigns show how Korean journalists have changed their journalistic role in drastic ways. They began to approach citizens, work with them, and lead them to act rather than remained as detached observers.

The campaigns produced results. A year after the initial campaign, the annual amount of national garbage decreased for the first time (The Environmental White Paper, 1994). A special law introducing bicycle road construction was passed with the help of the campaigns (The Environmental White Paper, 1998).

However, severe criticism had arisen, too. Some reporters blamed the press for taking advantage of the popularity of the campaigns to increase readership (Hwangbo, 1994). Environmentalists asserted that the press has long been negligent of its original role as monitors of the government and industry (Oh, 1994).

Regardless of whether the environmental campaign coverage is similar to either crusade journalism or advocacy journalism or public journalism, it is obvious that Korean environmental journalists played a markedly different role than before. The role that they played partly overlaps what many authors assert that journalists should play for a sound democracy. The following section deals with such assertions.

A New Journalistic Role and Public Engagement

Discussions about the so-called new journalistic role seem based on familiar complaints: The press provides empty messages; it is too sensational today; it is manipulated by special interests and biased; it entertains instead of informs; as a result, people are disgusted with what the news media cover and how they do it.

Focused on a growing sense of alienation from the political system, Schudson (1995) points out detached journalism and a heavy reliance on official sources as dominant biases in American journalism. Both are important in this study in that they are suspected as the very causes of a great divide between the news media and the public. Schudson says that today's journalism do not provide enough information for citizens to take action such as actually going to the polls. Relying on official sources, the press have gravitated toward the elite interests and converged with those powerful few, and lost viable connections to their readers (Greider, 1992). Similarly, Carey (1987) notes that citizens are immobilized and demobilized and merely ratifies the judgment of experts because of today's journalism full of fact without regard to promoting understanding.

There seems agreement that the press should change its mandate to narrow the distance between the press and the public. In a plea for more positive journalism, Schudson (1995) says that the public should be "informed citizens" who have not only information but also points of view and preferences with which to make sense of an issue. Anderson et al. (1996) define newspapers as the commons that can provide a forum for citizens to discuss community content, quite apart from function as an information conduit. Furthermore, the press is asked to accept its own responsibility to democracy by throwing out some inherited rules for producing news (Greider, 1992) and by taking a new ethic of listening to the community (Lambeth, 1992).

The public is also asked to change, too. Dykers (1995) says, "Citizens who do not join in a robust public conversation, who watch rather than participate, are handicapped citizens who have lost important opportunities to educate themselves" (p. 16). Calhoun (1992) argues that a public sphere adequate to a democratic polity depends on both quality of discourse and quantity of participation. In addition, Allen (as cited in Lee, 1998) insists that the news media focus on finding creative ways to activate citizens, and that citizens play the role of active participants rather than as advisors.

However, what is the process through which citizens come to effectively participate in community issues? What should citizens and the news media do? And what are the impediments to civic participation?

By using the idea of "banding together," Mathews (1994) explains the process of civic participation practically. He says that banding together needs three elements: the public's affirmative willingness to act, public choice or community empowerment to make decisions about how to act, and the public's action. His model additionally needs two principle activities: (1) people must name and frame community issues in their own terms and (2) people must make choices together.

This model, however, is likely to encounter three obstacles in reality. According to Mathews (1994), the first obstacle is the idea that there is a public and the public must act. He says that those who think they are the public are neither politicians nor journalists, but are usually the established civic leaders. The second obstacle is people's tendency to see representative government as a given proposition, despite certain things citizens must do for government officials to be able to fulfill their responsibilities. The third obstacle is the tendency among those in authority to interpret public action as reaching and persuading citizens to do something. The problem is when persuaded, citizens become more passive than active, feel less responsibility, and come to be less willing to make sacrifices.

Yankelovich (1991) also provides a practical method for citizen participation in resolving social issues. His cure is to improve the quality of public opinion and redress the power imbalance between citizens and experts. Contrary to "mass opinion," his "public judgment" is "the state of highly developed public opinion that exists once people have engaged an issue, considered it from all sides, understood the choices it leads to, and accepted the full consequences of the choices they make" (p. 6). He describes three stages of public judgment with transition obstacles between stage 1 and 2.

The first stage "consciousness-raising" is where citizens recognize the existence and meaning of an issue. Consciousness is more than mere awareness; it demands people take an issue seriously and feel something must be done about it. In the media, this is called agenda setting and Yankelovich says the news media do too well in this stage.

There are several obstacles to the second stage "working through," according to Yankelovich (1991). These obstacles include people being given insufficient or inadequate choices and alternatives, or not grasping the consequences of the various choices. For example, if the media set a faulty agenda by underestimating or exaggerating the importance of an issue, the public will be misinformed, misled and, finally, cannot effectively participate in the policy-making process. The expert-public gap is another obstacle. If experts think one way and the public thinks another, the results will be a stalemate, divisiveness, polarization and mistrust. Thus, to claim a "consciousness-raising" achievement, it must be determined whether the media offered credible solutions and used plain language, and if the media agenda reflected the reality of an issue.

Despite being well informed, people are still likely to be ambivalent and lack a sense of urgency to solidify an opinion, make a choice and act. In the second stage "working through," Yankelovich (1991) says that individuals must confront the need for change in a largely internal process. He also notes that people should be provided with opportunities to express their various opinions. He speaks of the third stage, "resolution," as the successful end of "working through." This is not just an intellectual coming-to-terms, but it is an emotional and moral one: actually making a responsible choice.

Surprisingly, Yankelovich's "public judgment" is similar to Mathews' "banding together" theory in that both argue that people can have a viable public opinion only if they feel responsible for choices they take. Yet, there is a difference. Mathews considers media performance as a given condition, so he stresses the public's positive ability. On the other hand, Yankelovich pays less attention to the public's spontaneity because he assumes and focuses on the information provider. Although Yankelovich does not specifically mention who should help the public to establish "public judgment," many authors accept that the news media play that key role in the Yankelovich plan (Bare, 1995; Charity, 1995; Lambeth, 1998b; Lee, 1998; Merritt, 1998; Rosen & Merritt, 1994).

Yankelovich's "public judgment" has been called the most relevant theoretical underpinning of public journalism (Lambeth, 1996). Charity (1995) says that Yankelovich's idea "provides a powerful example of how insights into the way people make decisions can be turned into concrete newsroom goals for making those decisions easier" (p. 4). Even critics of public journalism agree that public journalism asks journalists to reassess their role by helping citizens to engage in social issues (Gade et al., 1997; Lee, 1998).

Defining public journalism. Lambeth (1998a) notes two journalistic roles: (1) to examine alternative ways to frame stories on important community issues, and (2) to take the initiative to report on the issues in a way that advances public knowledge of possible solutions and the values served by alternative action. Lambeth (1992) differentiates public journalism from the social responsibility theory of the press by emphasizing the media's role of stimulating and nurturing civic participation in public decision making.

In light of these elements of public journalism, public journalists obviously differ from traditional journalists. Rosen (1994) says that there would be no need for journalism without an engaged citizenry. Merritt (1996) argues that the press's attempt to strengthen civic participation is a departure from traditional journalistic detachment. Rosen (1996) distinguishes public journalism from traditional journalism, saying, "The times demand something additional: *Journalists should try to strengthen the political community's capacity to recognize itself, converse well, and make choices*" [Italics in the original] (p. 23). Lambeth and Craig (1995) put the role of public journalist on a continuum from low to high civic involvement. Low-level involvement stresses journalists' systematic listening to citizens about community problems. High-level involvement refers to the media as a participant, with citizens and leaders, in an attempt to solve community problems.

Charity (1995) almost perfectly squares Yankelovich's theoretical ideas with the practical process of public journalism in terms of the journalist's role. Charity says that, in Yankelovich's "consciousness-raising" stage, newspapers gather and filter information on a wide variety of issues, and then insist on their importance. He says that journalists could reduce the chances that people will give up on the issues emphasized by the media by helping the public to set an agenda. Charity's view on the expert-public gap is that if people cannot make sense of expert opinion, they will not take part in public policy. He contends the media can narrow a knowledge gap by promoting two-way communication between experts and people.

In Yankelovich's "working through" stage, Charity (1995) says that public journalism emphasizes the news media's function of underlining core values and spelling out the costs and consequences of each choice. Charity believes that the news media should help the public to first discuss the pros and cons of each choice in a systematic way. He explains Yankelovich's third stage "resolution" in a more practical way, saying, "The public's choice may be achievable through the actions of foundations, schools, businesses, families, churches, voluntary associations, and individual citizens themselves. Journalists should invent ways to make this kind of action easier too" (p. 8).

As mentioned above, the new journalistic role is considerably different from that of traditional journalists and its essential elements suggested in the literature can be summarized as follows:

Table 1
Elements for Civic Participation and the New Journalistic Role

Systematic process for civic participation	The new journalistic role
• Effective agenda setting • Avoid exaggeration of the situation • Using plain language • Provide possible alternatives or solutions • Explanation about pros and cons of choices • Provision of various voices involved in issues • Explanation about background of issues • Emphasis on conciliatory language • Provide opportunities for civic participation	• Reform existing job routines • Focus on responsibility rather than freedom of the press • Involved journalists • Problem solver rather than objective observer • Belief in citizens' intelligence and willingness to engage in democracy • Belief that social problems can be resolved

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Literature shows that the role Korean environmental journalists played in covering environmental campaigns involved most elements illustrated in Table 1. The most surprising fact here is that they did play the new role in the absence of education and enough time for deliberation about such a role. Then, the next question would be "Did they really understand the role that they played?" In other words, "Did they conceptually differentiate a variety of roles that they played, despite being put in an unprecedented situation?" The aim of this study is to find an answer.

Also interesting is to explore whether Korean environmental journalists perceive the new role differently in accordance with their demographic differences. A 1999 national survey of 703 Korean journalists indicates that there was no difference among groups based on journalists' age, years of employment, rank and kind of beat in perceiving the importance of their roles such as neutral reporting, telling the truth, and balanced reporting of controversial issues (The Korean Journalist, 1999). All the groups except a group based on rank also showed no difference in perceiving the importance of reflecting readers' interests. An another survey of 161 Korean journalists found that there was no difference among groups based on years of employment and media type in perceiving their roles of providing useful information, surveillance and criticism (Kim, 1997). This literature strongly supports the possible similarity between Korean journalists regardless of their demographic difference. Thus, the following four hypotheses were set:

> H1: There is no significant difference among Korean environmental journalists based on years of employment as journalists in perceiving whether comfortable or uncomfortable with their role in covering environmental campaigns.
>
> H2: There is no significant difference among Korean environmental journalists based on years of employment as environmental journalists in perceiving whether comfortable or uncomfortable with their role in covering environmental campaigns.
>
> H3: There is no significant difference among Korean environmental journalists based on their rank in perceiving whether comfortable or uncomfortable with their role in covering environmental campaigns.
>
> H4: There is no significant difference among Korean environmental journalists based on media type in perceiving whether comfortable or uncomfortable with their role in covering environmental campaigns.

Methodology

The authors surveyed 181 journalists all who had worked as correspondents at the Korean Ministry of Environment between 1992 and 1998. The subjects' names were gathered from the Correspondent's Profile documented by the Official Communication Department in the Ministry. The years 1992 and 1998 were chosen because the initial campaign began in 1992 and several news media are still doing similar campaigns.

Personal interviews were made in May 1999 and a survey was also conducted twice in June 1999, from which were collected 139 responses, 78% of the population. The questionnaire was comprised of 22 statements that respondents rated on the five-point Likert scale according to the degree of agreement.

This study employed factor analysis to sort out the perceived role of Korean environmental journalists and then t-test and analysis of variance (ANOVA) based on factor scores were conducted to examine hypotheses.

Findings

Characteristics of Korean environmental journalists

The survey collected answers of 139 Korean environmental journalists from 24 Korean national news media outlets, including 15 newspapers, three television stations, three radio stations, one wire service, and two cable news television stations.

Most respondents were male, 128 were male and only 11 were female. Respondents were mainly in a youthful middle-age group of 31-40 years (60.5%). The age groups and frequencies were: 21-30 years, 13; 31-40 years, 84; 41-50 years, 40; 51-60 years, 2. Respondents were well educated. All but one respondent had attended college and received degrees, and 35 of them received master's degrees.

College degrees, however, were mainly in the arts and humanities rather than sciences. Twenty-seven percent of respondents majored in language literature and the next highest major was journalism (17%). Only 12% of respondents majored in sciences and two of them were in environmental science. The degrees and frequencies were: language literature, 37; journalism, 23; business or economics, 17; sociology, 14; sciences, 12; politics, 11; law, philosophy, 6 each; history, public administration, 5 each; animal husbandry, physical education, 1 each. Korean environmental journalists had only a few opportunities of learning their environmental specialty. Only 30 respondents (21.6%) had attended an education program about the environment or science inside or outside the office after they began to work as reporters.

Respondents reported an average of 1.95 years of environmental reporting. Significantly, 49% of respondents spent less than a year on environmental reporting. Eighty-six percent of respondents worked as environmental journalists for three years or less, and only 5% of respondents worked as environmental journalists for five to seven years. This is less surprising when considering that Korean news media rarely allow reporters to be in charge of a single beat for long. These findings show that Korean environmental journalists may not have enough time to establish a specialty in this area.

However, the journalistic background of respondents went considerably beyond this. They were experienced reporters before coming to the environmental beat, spending an average of six years on other assignment reporting.

Factor analysis

To examine how comfortable Korean environmental journalists were with their role changes in covering environmental campaigns, factor analysis was conducted with 22 statements. Before factor analysis, however, the data set was screened first to check whether it was factorable through Kaiser's measure of sampling adequacy and Barlett's Test of Sphericity. A general criterion of Kaiser's measure of sampling adequacy is values greater than .60 and that of Barlett's Test of Sphericity is values less than .05 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). The data set for this study produced .636 of Kaiser's measure of sampling adequacy and .0004 of Barlett's Test of Sphericity. The data set was good for factor analysis.

The exploratory factor analysis yielded seven factors with eigenvalues above 1, accounting for 58.12% of variance. However, four of them were considered minor factors and eliminated since only one statement loaded on each factor with loadings greater than .40. The remaining three factors accounted for 34.81% of variance. Upon Varimax rotation, a most common method of rotation, the three factors were clearly differentiated. Table 2 shows the loadings of all 22 statements on the three common factors.

Twelve of the 22 statements had clearly high loadings on one of the three factors. In general, only items with loadings of .32 and above are interpreted (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996) and loadings in excess of .55 are considered "good" for interpretation and .45 "fair" (Comrey & Lee, 1992). The authors considered .50 or above as significant loadings and retained them for subsequent hypothesis testing.

Factor 1 had loadings greater than .50 of five statements and numbers of loadings are in boldface type in Table 1. Two of the five statements involved journalists' perceptions about specific content of the campaign coverage, such as reportage of "practical methods for reducing river pollution" and "the amount of lost resources." Also included in this factor were three statements describing perceived results of the campaign coverage in a very specific way, such as citizens' "reporting who pollutes," "buying 'green products'" and "participating in cleaning up riversides." Therefore, Factor 1 was labeled "Role of covering specific environmental issues."

Table 2
Factor Loadings of Perceived Role of Korean Environmental Journalists

Statements	Mean*	Factor 1	2	3
1. Influenced by the campaign coverage, citizens began to take a decisive step of reporting who pollutes.	3.40	**.71**	-.002	.06
2. The press reported practical methods for reducing river pollution in the coverage of the campaigns.	3.40	**.65**	.17	.05
3. The campaign coverage encouraged readers to have a pro-active environmental lifestyle such as buying "green products."	3.60	**.63**	-.05	-.03
4. The press helped citizens to participate in cleaning riversides and mountains by holding clean-up events.	3.45	**.60**	.09	.05
5. The press reported about the amount of lost resources and its price tag when people do not reduce food waste.	3.93	**.54**	.14	-.003
6. Environmental campaigns encouraged people interested in demonstrations against dam and road construction plans that may destroy natural habitats.	2.82	.48	-.02	-.10
7. Journalists present public life as a vital activity in which citizens can be engaged rather than as a depressing spectacle.	3.57	-.37	.21	.28
8. The press is not likely to rely on "worst-case" scenarios when covering environmental issues.	1.94	-.21	**-.65**	.007
9. Environmental campaigns made the public aware of what environmental issues the Korean society faces.	4.20	.18	**.57**	-.09
10. The news media are too powerful to pretend they have nothing to do with social well-being.	4.19	.08	**.57**	.19
11. Through environmental campaigns, people felt something should be done to resolve environmental problems.	4.00	.24	**.50**	-.29
12. I do not think that our job is to tell the truth, no matter who gets hurt.	2.00	.21	-.48	-.33

* 1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree

Table 2 (Continued)
Factor Loadings of Perceived Role of Korean Environmental Journalists

			Factor	
Statements	Mean*	1	2	3
13. The news media have presented most readers and viewers' views and interests well.	3.00	.33	-.47	.29
14. Promoting events to encourage citizen involvement in civic affairs is the job of the news media.	3.14	-.01	-.33	.26
15. A journalist's central mission is to report information necessary for daily life rather than to reveal social problems.	2.94	.25	-.29	.20
16. It is the news media's role to bring people together to help solve society's problems.	4.01	-.27	.14	**.53**
17. A journalist should realize that he or she is a citizen first and a journalist second.	3.81	-.17	.05	**.51**
18. Democracy requires shared information and the news media should function as a means to discuss it.	4.37	.18	.38	**.50**
19. Strong competition among the news media improves their performance in covering environmental issues.	3.07	.25	-.14	.41
20. I disagree that we probably know more about what is good for citizens and the society than the people themselves.	2.56	-.40	-.04	-.42
21. Freedom of the press is a conditional freedom that should be evaluated by media performance.	3.66	.07	-.06	.40
22. I do not think that the press should just provide factual information and let the public decide where the truth is.	3.24	.02	.02	-.20

* 1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree

All four statements loading on Factor 2 pertained to issues broader than those of Factor 1. Two of them involved journalists' perceptions about their role of consciousness-raising in environmental campaigns, such as readers' "awareness of what environmental issues Korean society faces" and their feeling of urgency that "something should be done to resolve environmental problems." The other two statements were also related to broad social impact of the news media. Statement number 8 reflected the possible exaggeration of media coverage of environmental issues and statement number 10 mirrored the overall influence of the news media in Korean society. Hence, this factor was labeled "Role of generating broad social impact."

Factor 3 had high loadings from three statements describing issues more theoretical and philosophical than those of both Factor 1 and Factor 2. Statement number 16 asked about journalists' perceptions of their role to encourage people to engage in resolving social problems and statement number 18 was related to the news media's function as public forum. Statement number 17 involved journalists' basic attitude toward their job. Therefore, Factor 3 was labeled "Fundamental journalistic role."

In short, factor analysis sorted out three major roles that Korean environmental journalists think that they played in covering environmental campaigns. These findings imply that Korean environmental journalists understood those three different roles conceptually and differentiated them clearly.

It should be noticed in Table 2 that 17 out of 22 statements received mean scores greater than 3, that is, "Neutral." In particular, statements of number 9, 10, 11, 16 and 18 received mean scores of 4, that is "Agree," or above. About 90% of Korean environmental journalists agreed that "the news media are too powerful to pretend they have nothing to do with social well-being" and 85% of them agreed that "it is the news media's role to bring people together to help solve society's problems." In addition, the percentage of those who agreed that "a journalist should realize that he or she is a citizen first and a journalist second" reached 73%. These results indicate that Korean environmental journalists think that they raised public consciousness by setting campaign agendas effectively and did accept nurturing civic participation as one of their roles.

Subsequent analyses were conducted only with the three major factors and 12 statements having high loadings on one of those three. By using the standardized scores of each respondent's raw scores on 12 statements and factor coefficient matrix, the authors produced each respondent's factor scores on each of three factors. These factor scores were used as dependent variable in hypothesis testing.

Hypothesis Testing

As mentioned earlier, four hypotheses were set to examine whether Korean environmental journalists have different perceptions of their role in covering environmental campaigns in accordance with their demographic difference.

H1 was supported: There was no significant difference among groups of Korean environmental journalists based on years of employment as journalists in perceiving whether comfortable or uncomfortable with the role that they played in covering environmental campaigns (see Table 3 in Appendix). Four groups of respondents and the sample size of each group were: "Working period as journalist in less than 5 years," 20; "5 to 10 years," 45; "10 to 15 years," 49; "15 to 20 years," 25. These four groups did not show any difference in perceiving their "Role of covering specific environmental issues (Factor 1)," "Role of generating broad social impact (Factor 2)" and "Fundamental journalistic role (Factor 3)."

H2 was also supported: There was no significant difference among groups of Korean environmental journalists based on years of employment as environmental journalist in perceiving whether comfortable or uncomfortable with the role that they played in covering environmental campaigns (see Table 4 in Appendix). Three groups of respondents and the sample size of each group were: "Working period as environmental journalists in less than 1 year," 68; "1 to 2 years," 41; "more than 2 years," 30. These three groups did not show any difference in perceiving journalistic roles represented by the three factors.

H3 predicted that there would be no significant difference among groups of Korean environmental journalists based on media type in perceiving whether comfortable or uncomfortable with the role that they played in covering environmental campaigns. This hypothesis was partly rejected. Respondents were divided into two groups, "Newspaper Journalists" and "Broadcast Journalists" working for television stations, radio stations, and cable news television stations. Sample sizes of these groups were 87 and 45, respectively.

"Newspaper Journalists" and "Broadcast Journalists" showed no difference in perceiving Factor 2 and Factor 3. However, they perceived Factor 1 differently (t-value = 2.384, $p < .05$, 130 d.f., see Table 5 in Appendix). The mean factor score of Factor 1 for "Newspaper Journalists" was .089 and that of "Broadcast Journalists" was -.189. Therefore, it was concluded that newspaper journalists tended to more clearly perceive the "Role of covering specific environmental issues" than broadcast journalists.

Finally, H4 was supported: There was no significant difference among groups of Korean environmental journalists based on rank in perceiving whether comfortable or uncomfortable with the role that they played in covering environmental campaigns (see Table 6 in Appendix). Respondents were divided into two groups, "Reporter" and

"Higher than reporter," and their sample sizes were 89 and 50, respectively. The two groups did not show any difference in perceiving Factor 1, 2 and 3.

In short, subsequent t-test and analysis of variance found that H1, H2 and H4 were supported and H3 was partly rejected. As a whole, these results were consistent with the literature.

Discussion

This study aimed at exploring how comfortable Korean environmental journalists were with changes of their role in covering environmental campaigns and to what degree they were able to differentiate and understand the changed role that they had to play.

Factor analysis found three conceptual roles crystallized by Korean environmental journalists: "Role of covering specific environmental issues," "Role of generating broad social impact," and "Fundamental journalistic role." This finding is very impressive, given the condition that Korean environmental journalists lack journalism education and have rarely been exposed to new journalism practices. Despite being inadvertently put in situation to receive an unprecedented role, they showed considerable sophistication of understanding their social role. They were not only able to differentiate the challenging role conceptually but also understand it clearly and quickly.

It should be noted that the three conceptualized roles are hierarchical. Korean environmental journalists did not just play a role of covering specific environmental issues. Their perceived role broadened into the role of raising environmental consciousness among the Korean public. Moreover, they already identified a more philosophical and thus controversial journalistic role of encouraging civic participation.

As mentioned in the Findings section, Korean environmental journalists by and large agreed with the new role which may induce social changes, such as encouraging civic participation and providing a public forum. Their perception of the journalistic role in society is indeed very similar to that of public journalists. This finding is very interesting when being juxtaposed with probable reactions of American journalists about such a role. Some critics accuse public journalists of their role in public life by "confusing news pages with editorial pages, serving up involvement and attachment instead of disengagement and detachment" (Buckner & Gartner, 1998, p. 229). A 1992 national survey in the United States, though not recent, also shows a very similar reaction like those critics. Only 6.2% of 1,156 American journalists considered the role of "Populist Mobilizer" very important, while much higher percentage of them considered other roles very important: "Imperative" role, 62.9%; the role of "Disseminator," 51.1%; the role of "Adversarial," 17.6% (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996).

Regarding the hypotheses set in this study, there was almost no difference among Korean environmental journalists based on their demographic characteristics in perceiving the new role that they played in covering environmental campaigns. This finding was consistent with the literature.

Results of research questions and hypotheses imply that Korean environmental journalists are open-minded to the new journalistic role. And such a new journalistic role, as Gade et. al (1997) argue, is closer to journalists' responsibility to society rather than freedom of the press. Then, the next questions for future study would be: "Why could Korean environmental journalists be comfortable with the new journalistic role?" and "What reservations do they have in accepting and performing new journalism practices?"

One clue for answering these questions was already found. According to a 1995 survey, 67% of 1,024 Korean journalists considered "responsibility of the press" more important, while 33% of them chose "freedom of the press" (The Journalist's Responsibility and Ethics, 1995). Arguably, the latent disposition of Korean journalists toward journalistic responsibility to society has not been studied enough. In this context, it would be valuable for future study to examine the possibility of introducing the notion of public journalism, its theoretical background, detailed process and practical methods to Korean journalists.

It must be noted that the factor structure obtained in this study is a result of exploratory analysis done in a very narrow setting: Korean environmental journalists were asked about their role in covering environmental campaigns. Thus, it is not possible to generalize the factor structure. However, the basic idea of sorting out the conceptualized journalistic role can be applied to other cases in which journalists play a very different role from their traditional one. One case would be so-called "development journalism" which has been conducted in Southeast Asian countries (e. g., Shafer, 1998).

Appendix

Table 3
F-Test of Three Factors Based on Working Period as Journalists

Factor	Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Between Groups	1.304	3	.435	1.068	.365
	Within Groups	54.948	135	.407		
	Total	56.252	138			
2	Between Groups	1.472	3	.491	1.110	.347
	Within Groups	59.645	135	.442		
	Total	61.117	138			
3	Between Groups	.334	3	.111	.418	.741
	Within Groups	36.033	135	.267		
	Total	36.367	138			

Table 4
F-Test of Three Factors Based on Working Period as Environmental Journalists

Factor	Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Between Groups	2.177	2	1.809	2.738	.068
	Within Groups	54.075	136	.398		
	Total	56.252	138			
2	Between Groups	2.558	2	1.279	2.970	.055
	Within Groups	58.559	136	.431		
	Total	61.117	138			
3	Between Groups	.052	2	.026	.098	.907
	Within Groups	36.315	136	.267		
	Total	36.367	138			

Table 5
T-Test of Three Factors Based on Media Type

Factor	t	df	Sig.	Mean Difference
1	2.384	130	.019*	.278
2	.806	130	.422	.100
3	-.418	130	.676	-.040

* $p < .05$; Mean factor score of "Newspaper Journalists" was .089 and that of "Broadcast Journalists" was -.189.

Table 6
T-Test of Three Factors Based on Rank

Factor	t	df	Sig.	Mean Difference
1	-1.254	137	.212	-.1412
2	-1.553	137	.123	-.1818
3	-.417	137	.677	-.037

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Manufacturing Consent of 'Crisis': A Content Analysis of the *New York Times*' Reporting on the Issue of North Korean Nuclear Weapon

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Introduction

The U.S.'s military actions against foreign countries seem to become more open and more frequent. During the 1990s, the United States launched in public several military attacks against foreign countries, especially Third World countries, such as Iraq, Bosnia, and Sudan. Then, did the majority of U.S. citizens really want or agree to such frequent military actions of their own country?

Wars are waged today by governments, and, in democratic societies, governments must win public support from their own citizens before they can fight and win a war against the enemy. In other words, to win a war today, government must win the minds of its public, especially in a pre-war period. Therefore, the effective use of words and media today, in times of crisis, is just as important as the effective use of bullets and bombs (Hiebert, 1993). Communication technology has been developed to the extent that it can change the nature and outcome of crises. In other words, the media are able, at least partly, to frame political and international conflicts. While the public, in most cases, can not directly observe crises, news media supported by satellite technology are able to cover and assess events as they break anywhere in the world. Media presentations may be especially forceful in shaping perceptions of the conflicting protagonists, their options, the events, and the outcomes (Gantz, 1993). Under such conditions, the media's influence and impact is likely to be large. Here, the important thing is that mass media are not neutral players, especially in international politics, but have their own agenda, as critical media scholars such as Herman & Chomsky (1988) and Bennett (1994) have argued.

In 1994, the United States and North Korea had a serious conflict around the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons, although the conflict did not eventually become a military war. U.S. news media continued to cover this issue as a serious international problem, and even reported, in June, an impending war on the Korean Peninsula by presenting various expected war scenarios. At that time, many people around me in the U.S. talked about the situation on the Korean Peninsula as if North Korea would invade South Korea sooner or later or sometimes as if North Korea had already invaded South Korea. And many Koreans living in the U.S. (including me) were so worried about their families and friends in South Korea that they called to Korea almost every day to check their safety. During the June 1994, it was very difficult to make telephone connections between the U.S. and South Korea because of the increase in usage. However, what was ironic is that most people in South Korea (including my family) seemed not to take the possibility of a war in Korea seriously, at least not as much as people in the U.S did. How can we explain this irony?

The primary concern of this study was on the relationship between mass media and 'crisis' or on the role of mass media in (constructing) a 'crisis' period. With this purpose, this study examined the reporting position of U.S. mainstream media[1] in treating international conflicts between the U.S. and other countries. Then, this research analyzed the reporting position of the *New York Times* on the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons in 1994.

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[1] Kellner (1993) refers to "mainstream media" as "corporate media" because they are owned by big corporations such as GE, ABC/Capital Communication, and CBS/Tisch Financial Group and express the corporate point of view. According to Kellner, corporate media are the three major television networks, national news magazines such as *Time* and *Newsweek*, and national newspapers such as *New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal*. This study follows the Kellner's definition of "U.S. mainstream media"

Conceptualization

Many theoretical and empirical news studies have been conducted either from the U.S. traditional viewpoint[2] or from the critical viewpoint[3]. Although there is disagreement over the larger interests which the news media may serve, the researchers generally agree that there is a certain distance between events or reality and news, or the existence of selectivity in news reporting (Jacobson and Fang, 1993). However, the news researches have focused on domestic reporting and relatively neglected to examine foreign reporting. One significant exception is the work of Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, who examined the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and U.S. media's foreign news coverage (Herman, 1982; Herman and Chomsky, 1988).

Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that U.S. foreign policy is designed primarily to promote the country's economic interests. In pursuing these interests, the U.S. government often intervenes in the political processes of other countries, particularly Third World countries, and supports some governments that brutally repress their own populations. From the viewpoint of Herman and Chomsky, U.S. new media practice selectivity in a manner convenient for U.S. foreign policy. For example, U.S. news media consistently portray people abused in enemy states as "worthy victims", whereas they depict people treated with equal or greater severity in friendly countries as "unworthy victims". U.S. new media also subsequently report the violation in enemy countries but rarely do so in friendly countries. In short, for Herman and Chomski, U.S. mainstream media as propaganda instruments for the U.S. government play a role in reproducing global economic structure.

It was the Persian Gulf Crisis that made media scholars notice and research the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and foreign coverage by the mainstream U.S. media. Many studies on the U.S. media's coverage during Gulf crisis[4] generally agree that, in the crisis period, mainstream U.S. media became very cooperative to government, and then played a crucial role in constructing and deepening the crisis and in developing the crisis into a military war. For example, Ella Shohat (1994) says,

> From the very inception of the Gulf Crisis, the dominant U.S. media failed to fulfill the role of independent journalism. Instead it acted as public relations for the State Department, assimilating the language, terminology, and the assumptions of the administration, thereby undermining any critical perspective upon the conduct of the war (p. 147).

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[2] For example, Blizzard (1969), Cohen & Young (1981), Gieber (1956), Hackett (1984), Rivers (1970), Sinder (1957) and White (1956).

[3] For example, Curran (1979), Gans (1979), Golding & Elliot (1979), Murdock (1982), Parenti (1986), Glasgow Media Group (1980), Tunstall (1971), and Tuchman (1978).

[4] These studies are collected in several books such as Bennett & Paletz (1994), Greenberg & Gantz (1993), Jeffords & Rabinovitz (1994), Kellner (1992), LaMay, FitzSimon & Sahadi (1991), McCain & Shyles (1994), Mowlana, Gerbner & Schiller (1992), and Smith (1992).

Patrick O'Heffernan (1993) states that U.S. news organizations played the role of quasi-diplomats regardless of "balance" and "objectivity" during the Gulf crisis (and other crises), and took a position of pro-war and pro-America. For him, crisis coverage of U.S. news organizations often strayed into jingoism, with generous and unquestioning coverage of U.S. military operations and policy. O'Heffernan argues that in some way, if the crisis had not occurred, media would have had to invent it.

Douglas Kellner (1993) also estimates that mainstream U.S. media served as a mouthpiece and amplifier for U.S. foreign policy during the crisis in the Gulf, and that the range of policy discussion in the mainstream media during the pre-war crisis was woefully restricted. He says that Gulf War was a disaster that could have been avoided, but the mass media's uncritical coverage of the Bush Administration and Pentagon policy made war practically inevitable and certainly helped promote the eventual military attempt at solving the crisis. Kellner (1992) argues that, although there was opposition policies of the Bush administration, this opposition was marginalized in the mainstream media and ultimately silenced[5].

As one of the crucial reasons that the coverage of the mainstream U.S. media tends to be pro-U.S. government and pro-war in the pre-war period, the researchers notice the media's dependence on official government sources. Kellner (1995) points out,

> Mainstream media favor official government sources for their stories, especially in times of crisis. The press and broadcast media journalists regularly get their news and information from official sources and thus attempt to maintain good personal relations with their sources. If reporters turn on their sources, or are too critical of official polices, they disrupt their connections and lose important conduits of information. Thus, they tend to be conduits for U.S. government policies and actions, though there are significant exceptions (p. 205).

Timothy Cook (1994) also states that the existence of regular newsbeats such as the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon encourages the over-representation of administration views. For him, the beat system probably reinforces the procedural element in the coverage, since reporters share a career interest with sources on the beat in making sure the process includes an influential role for the institution covered.

On the other hand, Entman and Page (1994) recognize that the mainstream U.S. media's dependence on official sources is based on their commercial nature.

> The media tend to rely on heavily on official sources and tend to report them favorably because of the ease of regular access to officials, the dependable supply of news the officials provide, the need to cultivate such sources over time, and the usefulness of citing legitimate, authoritative sources, all of which serve important commercial needs to these for profit businesses (p. 96)

In the similar context, O'Heffernan (1993) also understand the interdependence between media and government, especially in a crisis period.

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[5] See Entman & Page (1994), Kaid at al (1993), and Kellner (1992, 1993) for the empirical data, and see Hackett (1993) for antiwar movements and mainstream and grassroots media's coverage of them during the Gulf War.

> Television news and government need and exploit one another. Government manipulates television news to set political agendas, influence public opinion, and communicate with other governments. Television news takes advantage of government to get low-cost information and access to news makers and news events. Moreover, behind the scenes, the television industry wants government to free it from regulation while protecting it from competition. Television's audience- the nation's polity- is also enmeshed in this relationship, receiving a glut of information and emotion, but a dearth of perspective and understanding (p. 28).

Some scholars focus more on the commercial logic on which mainstream U. S. media are based as a direct reason that they tend to take a pro-war position. Raboy and Dagenais (1992) state that, in a certain sense, the media thrive on 'crisis' and are threatened by 'normalcy' so that the media tend to seek out crisis where it does not exist. For them, the media will tend to pay even more attention to a fabricated crisis than to one that can stake a material claim to reality. Kellner (1995) more directly points out the relationship between U.S. mainstream media's pro-war position and their logic of pursuing profit.

> Although the mainstream media served as propaganda conduits for the U.S. government and military, in my interpretation, the media are not propaganda instruments *per se* for the state as some argue (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Chomsky 1989). Rather, one should see the major commercial network primarily as a money machine seeking ratings and profits. If the war is popular, then in pursuit of ratings the network will provide a positive picture of the war, eliminating discordant voices, as happened in the Persian Gulf War (pp. 212-213).

On the other hand, as the one of the important reasons for the mainstream media's support for the military solution, Kellner (1992) demonstrates the military-industry-media complex, the striking interlocking connection among military, media and other industries.

> General Electric (GE), which owns NBC, derived $9 billion of its $54.5 billion in revenues from military contracts in 1987 (while NBC only provided $3.4 billion in revenue)… In other words, when correspondents and paid consultants on NBC television praised the performance of U.S. weapons, they were extolling equipment made by GE, the corporation that pays these salaries… Many GE board members sit on the boards of other corporate media like the *Washington Post* and are connected with U.S. government agencies and oil corporations as well. ABC's board of directories is involved with oil companies and the defense industries, and CBS also has connections with big oil and the defense industries… Hence there were strong corporate forces connected to the "Big Three" TV networks which would benefit from a war in the Middle East. Consequently, when the networks were boosting military technology, a military solution to the crisis, and U.S. intervention to promote corporate interests, they were acting in the interests of the corporate elite who controlled the networks (pp. 59-60).

It is the demonization of Saddam Hussein and Iraq that the researchers recognize as the primary way that U.S. mainstream media framed their coverage of the Gulf crisis in ways that supported Bush administration policies and that thus helped mobilize support for the Gulf War. Mainstream U.S. media quickly made Hussein the villain in the pre-war period. The media constantly juxtaposed Hussein with Hiltler, Musoline and Stalin, and described him as "a beast", "a monster", "barbarous", "an evil dreamer of death", "a bloodthirsty megalomaniac" and so forth. U.S. mainstream media endlessly repeated stories of Hussein's brutality and made countless reports on Iraqi chemical weapons, its potential nuclear capacity, and its ability to mobilize terrorist attacks on U.S. and its allies (see Dorman & Livingston, 1994; Shohat, 1994; Kellner, 1992, 1993, 1995; Manheim, 1994; Hallin & Gitlin1994). Although the Iraqi people were themselves victims of Saddam Hussein and his regime, the media images of the evil Hussein reduced the Iraqis to an evil essence embodied in the Iraqi leader (Kellner, 1992).

The researchers argues that the effect of the demonization of Hussein and Iraqis was to promote a climate in which the necessity to take decisive military action was privileged. Hussein was constructed as an absolute villain, as a demon who is so threatening and violent that he had to be destroyed and eradicated. The extremely negative framing of Hussein and the Iraqis ruled out the possibility of negotiation and a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Kellner (1992) argues that the U.S. is perpetually in search of enemies and constructs enemies with propaganda campaigns that paint some leaders, or countries, as absolute villains, while painting other leaders, who may be just as bad, or worse as "allies".

Design and Methods

Based on above researchers' arguments, this study drew three major characteristics of the mainstream U.S. media's coverage of the conflicts between the U.S. and other countries, especially in a pre-war period: pro-war position, dependence on official U.S. government sources, and demonization of enemy countries and their leaders. This study regarded the year 1994 , especially June, when the issue of North Korean nuclear weapon was keenly debated in the U.S., primarily led by mainstream U.S. media, as a prewar period against North Korea. Three hypotheses, then, were constructed:

H1: News reports of mainstream U.S. media related to the issue of North Korean nuclear weapon will include more anti-negotiation-oriented content than pro-negotiation-oriented content.

H2: News reports of mainstream U.S. media related to the issue of North Korean nuclear weapon will depend more on official U.S. government sources than on any other source.

H3: News reports of mainstream U.S. media related to the issue of North Korean nuclear weapon will negatively describe Kim Il Sung (the leader of North Korea in the 1994 year) and North Korea.

In order to examine these hypotheses, this study conducted content analysis of the *New York Times*. As one of the major mainstream media, the *New York Times* is a top U.S. paper in foreign reporting, a widely acknowledged agenda setter for other news organization and newspapers (Jacobson & Fang, 1993). From the *New York Times*, all stories covering the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons during June of 1994 were selected for coding. The time period chosen for analysis was based on the reason that the arguments on the issue were the most vigorous and serious during that period. The *New York Times Index* shows that there were 50 reports about the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons in June, 35 % of the total 142 reports for the 1994 year. In other words, the *New York Times* ran 1.67 reports a day during June of 1994.

Sampling was accomplished using a key word search (North Korea and nuclear weapon and date = June 1994) of the *New York Times* file in Mead Data Central's NEXIS database service (NEXIS, database online). This sampling process was chosen not only because it was convenient for obtaining news reports but also because it gathered more comprehensively relevant stories (57 reports) than the *New York Times Index* did (50 reports).

For the first hypothesis, this study chose a paragraph as a coding unit. A word or a sentence as a unit seems to be too short to include a certain position and requires too much effort from the researcher. A whole report as a coding unit was excluded because a report usually(at least superficially) includes or presents various positions on a certain issue. Three categories were set: "anti-negotiation-oriented", "pro-negotiation-oriented" and "neutral". The paragraphs were considered "anti-negotiation-oriented" if they implicated or presented negative connotations on the negotiated or diplomatic solution for the problem of North Korean nuclear weapon. This category consisted of 15 sub-categories (see <Table II>). A paragraph was classified as "pro-negotiation-oriented" if it appeared to explore or support negotiated or diplomatic solution. This category had 12 sub-categories (<see Table III>). A "neutral" paragraph was any objective description about a mere fact or any paragraph that had dual content or the content which could not be classified as either "pro-negotiation-oriented" or "anti-negotiation-oriented".

To study the second hypothesis, all sources cited in the reports were assorted into 11 categories (see <Table IV>). For the last hypothesis, this study coded all words (adverb, adjective, noun) describing Kim Il Sung into three categories; "positive", "negative", and "neutral". Words were considered "positive" if they praised or supported Kim Il Sung. A word was classified as "negative" if it appeared to criticize or convey negative connotations about Kim Il Sung. A "neutral" word was any objective one which could not be classified as either positive or negative (see <Table VIII>). For examining the media image of North Korea, this study used two categories: "positive portrayal of North Korea", a sub-category of "pro-negotiation-oriented" and "negative portrayal of North Korea", a sub-category of "anti-negotiation-oriented" (see <Table IX>).

Results

<Table I> presents the positions of report contents. Coded paragraphs totaled 747. Among them, 421 paragraphs (56.4%) were categorized into "anti-negotiation-oriented", 214 (28.7%) into "pro-negotiation-oriented", and 112 (15%) into "neutral".

<Table I: Position of Report Content>

	Anti-negotiation-oriented	Pro-negotiation-oriented	Neutral
Frequency	421	214	112
%	56.4	28.7	15.0

<Table II> presents 15 sub-categories of "anti-negotiation-oriented". The sub-categories can be abstracted into three themes: 1) North Korea's negative image or bellicose tendency such as "North Korea's dual tactics in the process of negotiation," "negative portrayal of North Korea," "North Korea's threat to launch a war," "possibility or result of North Korea's owning or using nuclear weapons," and "North Korea's arms development, experiment, or export"; 2) inefficiency or impossibility of negotiation or diplomatic solution such as "criticizing the Clinton administration's compromising position," "criticizing Carter's visit to North Korea," "deepening confrontation," "complexity of the problem and difficulty of solution," "uselessness or negative result of high-level talks with North Korea," and "North Korea's non-compromising action"; 3) punishments against North Korea such as "imposing or strengthening sanction against North Korea," and "necessity of military actions of U.S. or South Korea against North Korea."

<Table II: Sub-category of Anti-negotiation-oriented>

Sub-category	Frequency	%
Imposing or strengthening sanction against North Korea	79	18.8
North Korea's dual tactics in the process of negotiation	48	11.4
North Korea's threat to launch a war	41	9.7
Negative portrayal of North Korea	41	9.7
Possibility or results of North Korea's owning or using nuclear weapon	41	9.7
Necessity of military action of U.S. or South Korea	36	8.5
Criticizing the Clinton administration's compromising position	25	5.9
Complexity of the problem and difficulty of the solution	24	5.7
Deepening confrontation with North Korea	22	5.2
North Korea's non-compromising action	16	3.8
North Korea's arms development, experiment, or export	14	3.3
Conflict of Carter and the Clinton administration about Carter's role	14	3.3
Possibility of resuming North Korea's nuclear weapons program	9	2.1
Criticizing Carter's visit to North Korea	8	1.9
Uselessness or negative result of high-level talks with North Korea	3	0.7

<Table III> shows the sub-categories of "pro-negotiation-oriented". They mainly covered: 1) effort and possibility of solution by compromise such as "U.S. effort for negotiated solution," "North Korea's compromising attitude," "high level talks between U.S. and North Korea," "two Koreas' summit meeting," "positive evaluation about Carter's visit to North Korea," and "exploring various ways to solve"; 2) skeptical viewpoints on repressive ways to solve the problem such as "uselessness or negative result of sanctions", "suspending sanctions against North Korea," and "uselessness or negative result of military action of U.S."; 3) necessity of rethinking on attitude on North

Korea such as "necessity of a correct understanding on North Korea," and "positive portrayal of North Korea."

<Table III: Sub-category of Pro-negotiation-oriented>

Sub-category	Frequency	%
U.S.' effort for negotiated solution	35	16.4
Uselessness or negative result of sanction	31	14.5
North Korea's compromising attitude	28	13.1
Necessity of correct understanding on North Korea	24	11.2
High level talks between U.S. and North Korea	23	10.7
Two Koreas' summit meeting	19	8.9
Suspending sanction against North Korea	14	6.5
Positive evaluation about Carter's visit to North Korea	12	5.6
Exploring various ways to solve	9	4.2
Positive portrayal about North Korea	9	4.2
Uselessness or negative result of military action of U.S.	6	2.8
Nuclear crisis over	4	1.9

In sum, the *New York Times* tended to circulate anti-negotiation-oriented (or pro-war) position rather than pro-negotiation-oriented position. It tended to privilege repressive actions through economic sanction or military action rather than negotiated or diplomatic solution.

<Table IV: Source of Report>

Source Title	Anti-negotiation	Pro-negotiation	Total	%
U.S. government	78	71	149	40.3
U.S. politician	19	21	41	11.1
U.S. public organization (expert)	16	0	16	4.3
International organization	11	9	21	5.7
South Korean Government	18	31	49	13.2
South Korean news organization	5	0	5	1.4
Public in South Korea	0	8	8	2.2
North Korean government	14	12	26	7.0
North Korean news organization	2	2	4	1.1
General North Korean in Japan	0	9	9	2.4
Other countries' governments	10	42	52	14.1
Total	173	197	370	

<Table IV> suggests that the reports depend primarily on government sources (74.6%). U.S. government sources in particular account for 40.3% of total sources. U.S. sources, South Korean sources, North Korean sources, other countries' sources account for 55.7 %, 16.8 %, 10.5 %, and 14.1%, respectively. The U.S. government, U.S. politicians, the North Korean government, North Korean news organizations, and international organizations were cited almost equally for both positions, "anti-negotiation-oriented" and "pro-negotiation-oriented". U.S. public organizations and South Korean news organizations represented more anti-negotiation-oriented positions than pro-negotiation-oriented positions. The South Korean government, the public in South Korea, North Koreans in Japan, and other countries' governments were cited for more pro-negotiation-oriented positions than anti-negotiation-oriented positions.

Two things must be considered cautiously in interpreting the relationships between sources and their positions. The first is the characteristics of some categories. As showed in <Table V>, U.S. sources did not show a significant difference in terms of frequency between pro-negotiation-oriented position and anti-negotiation-oriented position.

<Table V: Source and Position of Report Content>

	Anti-negotiation	Pro-negotiation
U.S.	113	93
Other	60	104

However, without U.S. government sources, whereas the sources for pro-negotiation-oriented position are very limited, only Carter and a democrat, the sources for anti-negotiation-oriented position are various, a few of republicans and various public organizations (including conservative experts and officials in Bush administration)[6]. This might create an environment in which the anti-negotiation-oriented position was more widely supported in the U.S.. Related to this environment, citing other countries' sources more for the pro-negotiation-oriented position than for the anti-negotiation-oriented position might make other countries look anti-U.S. or pro-North Korea, and then make effects to justify the anti-negotiation-oriented position within the U.S..[7]

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[6] Kellner (1992) also presents the mainstream media's reluctance to seek and use various sources for pro-negotiation oriented positions during the Gulf Crisis.

Not only was the large antiwar movement ignored, but "[n]one of the foreign policy experts associated with the peace movement-such as Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, or the scholars of the Institute for Policy Studies-appeared on any nightly news Program" (FAIR 1991, press release) Instead media "experts" came from conservative think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, with the centrist Brookings Institute providing "the left boundary of debate." (1992, p. 79-80).

[7] Kellner also finds a similar phenomena and effect during the Gulf crisis.

The second thing that we should notice in interpreting the relationships between sources and their positions seems to be more crucial to understand the reporting position of the *New York Times*. <Table VI> shows that, whereas most of the paragraphs categorized into "pro-negotiation-oriented" were source-cited (92.1 %), the paragraphs categorized into "anti-negotiation-oriented" included more non-source-cited paragraphs (58.9 %) than source-cited ones (41.1 %).

<Table VI: Source and Non-source, and Position of Report Content>

	Anti-negotiation	Pro-negotiation
Source-cited	173	197
Non-source-cited	248	17

When we consider that non-source-cited reports reflect writers' or the newspaper's position more directly than source-cited reports do, this result more obviously indicates that the *New York Times* tended to circulate anti-negotiation-oriented position over the issue of North Korean nuclear weapon.

<Table VII> presents what words were used to described Kim Il Sung in the reports. Negative words (70.8%) overwhelmingly outnumbered positive(16.3%) or neutral ones(12.3%).

<Table VII: Description of Kim Il Sung in Report>

Category	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Frequency	62	6	11
%	70.8	12.3	16.9

The only critical voices allowed on television specifically concerning the deployment were Arabs in the U.S., Egypt, Jordan, and other countries where television networks stationed crews-and their criticisms were sometimes framed, or perceived, as "anti-American" hostility rather than rational arguments (1992, p.77).

A few images of antiwar demonstrators in the U.S. that appeared during the crisis in the Gulf often juxtaposed anti-American Arab demonstrations... Such a juxtaposition coded antiwar demonstrators as Arabs, as irrational opponents of U.S. Policies (1995, p. 209).

As <Table VIII> shows, Kim Il Sung was compared with Hussein, Hitler, and Stalin, and was primarily described as a bellicose, irrational but very skillful dictator who executed absolute power over North Korea for a long time. The positive words for Kim Il Sung were found only in the statements of Carter and a Korean professor.

<Table VIII: Description of Kim Il Sung>

Category	Word
Negative	82-year-old (4), "Great leader" (4), skillfully (4), dictator (3), Hussein (3), dangerous (3), authoritarian (3), autocratic (2), reclusive (2), paranoid, terrorist, manipulator, Hitler, Stalin, world's longest-surviving ruler, world's longest-serving leader, world's most unpredictable, disastrous, crazed, furiously, xenophobic, liar, criminal, marshal, firm control, self-sufficient, family dictatorship, cheat
Positive	vigorous (2), intelligent (2), honest, peaceful, surprisingly well informed, alert, active, not monolithic, not irrational
Neutral	North Korean leader (5), North Korean president (3)

<Table IX> shows that negative portrayals of North Korea (82%) appeared significantly more than positive one (18%) in reports. The negative portrayals of North Korea were mainly about absolute one-person dictatorship system, idolization of Kim Il Sung, dual policy, an ambition to communize South Korea, desperate economic situation and abuse of human rights. North Korea was described as very warlike and dangerous to other nations. Since the reports regarded North Korea as completely controlled by Kim Il Sung, the reports tended to treat the two as one phenomena.[8] Then, the image of North Korea was necessarily associated with the negative image of Kim Il Sung.

<Table IX: Portrayal of North Korea>

Category	Negative	Positive
Frequency	41	9
%	82	18

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[8] Kellner (1992, p. 64) also points out that during the Gulf crisis and war the dominant mode of reference was to "Saddam Hussein," who was presented as the sole agent of all Iraqi actions, and thus Iraqi was collapsed into Saddam.

Conclusions

This study attempted to examine the reporting position of mainstream U.S. media in pre-war crisis period. For this purpose, this research, with three hypotheses, conducted content analysis of the *New York Times'* reports on the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons in June of 1994. There was support for the hypothesis that news reports of U.S. mainstream media will include more anti-negotiation-oriented content than pro-negotiation-oriented content. The former accounted for 56.4 % of total reports and the latter 28.7 %. The *New York Times* tended to circulate negative images of North Korea, to emphasize the inefficiency or impossibility of negotiation or diplomatic solutions, and to encourage economic and military punishment against North Korea. The *New York Times* was relatively reluctant to acknowledge and examine the possibility of negotiation and diplomatic solutions.

The hypothesis that news reports of mainstream U.S. media will depend more on official U.S. government sources than on any other source was also supported. The U.S. government was the most important source in reporting (40.3 %). However, the result did not support the assumption of this hypothesis that the news content cited from U.S. government sources would be uniformly anti-negotiation-oriented. Rather, the content was almost equal, in terms of amount, in supporting the anti-negotiation-oriented and the pro-negotiation-oriented positions. Related with this hypothesis, an interesting finding is that, whereas 92.1 % of pro-negotiation-oriented content was reported with the news sources, only 41.1 % of anti-negotiation-oriented content was reported with the news source. In other words, more anti-negotiation-oriented content (58.9 %) was reported without any source. This findings more obviously indicates the *New York Times'* anti-negotiated-oriented (pro-war) position. It can be said, in one sense, that the *New York Times* took a more anti-negotiated-oriented (pro-war) position than the Clinton administration did over the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons.

The result also supported the hypothesis that news reports of mainstream U.S. media will negatively describe Kim Il Sung and North Korea. Among coded words describing Kim Il Sung, negative terms constituted 70.8 % of the total, and positive and neutral ones constituted 16.9% and 12.3% respectively. The *New York Times* often juxtaposed Kim Il Sung with Hussein (sometimes with Hitler and Stalin), and primarily described him as irrational, warlike, tricky, and very dangerous to the world's peace. Among the content portraying the characteristics of North Korea, negative terms amounted to 82 % of the total, and positive terms amounted to 18%. The *New York Times* tended to treat North Korea as a group owned by a powerful dictator who used his people for his political ambition rather than as a nation that had a different political system from the U.S.'. North Korea was described primarily as very dangerous to other nations.

In sum, the results of this study provided some indication that, during North Korean nuclear weapons crisis in 1994, the mainstream U.S. media tended to demonize Kim Il Sung and North Korea, to rule out the possibility of a negotiated or diplomatic solution to the crisis and to promote a climate in which the necessity to take decisive military action was privileged.

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